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ABSTRACT
This thesis was conceived in response to the recent 
controversy in Hartmann scholarship concerning the existence 
of a psychological progression in Hartmann's characters. 
Whilst the majority of scholars argue that a progression 
does exist in these works, three scholars in particular, 
Rudolf VoB, Hubertus Fischer, and otfrid Ehrismann, claim 
that Hartmann remains unconcerned with the inner world of 
his characters. Instead, they suggest that he depicts 
perfect protagonists who are affected by a visitation of 
objective sin (VoB), or who react primarily to the demands 
of secular honour (Fischer) or courtliness (Ehrismann). The 
present study attempts to re-examine the issue of ethical 
progression in Hartmann's three earliest narratives. This is 
achieved principally by considering the ability of the 
characters to perceive and to make ethical judgements on the 
basis of their mental deliberations. This evidence is 
considered in the light of the objections of the scholars 
mentioned above. In particular, their work has reminded 
scholarship that Hartmann's narratives cannot be interpreted 
in terms of modern individual morality. Similarly, their 
arguments lead one to surmise that an ethical dimension in 
these works would be likely to reflect Hartmann's status as 
a clerically-educated secular poet and the concerns of his 
secular audience, rather than specific theological 
developments relating to self-awareness. A moral dimension 
in these works would therefore be likely to be informed by 
lay ethical notions and a general awareness of theological 
concepts concerning perceptiveness, such as would be 
broadcast through the penitential system. The present study 
attempts therefore to set the evidence pertaining to 
perceptiveness and ethical behaviour in Hartmann's works 
within the context of the lay morality shared by this poet 
and his audience-
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INTRODUCTION
The name Hartmann von Aue is counted amongst the four 
literary giants of the High Middle Ages in Germany. 
Alongside Wolfram von Eschenbach, Gottfried von StraBburg, 
and Walther von der Vogelweide, Hartmann was active as a 
poet during the final twenty years of the twelfth and the 
first decade of the thirteenth century, an age of rapid 
political change in the German empire, and of continued 
progress in the far-reaching theological, social, and 
cultural developments which had been taking place during the 
previous century and a half in western Europe, This age of 
renaissance and expansion found reflection in the literary 
world in terms of the creation of new genres and in the 
complexity of composition and content of works designed for 
noble audiences. The four poets named above were at the 
forefront of these developments.
The accomplishment of his works has attracted the close 
attention of literary scholars to Hartmann for the past 
hundred and fifty years. The resulting abundance of 
criticism suggests that every last detail of his output has 
been perused. Nevertheless, the sophistication of the works 
and the difficulty of interpretation caused by the centuries 
dividing Hartmann's age and this, has prevented a 'grand 
theory' from being established which might unlock Hartmann's 
texts completely. Furthermore, recent controversy in 
particular has resulted in the undermining of the relative 
stability of post-war Hartmann scholarship, and in the call 
for a reconsideration of the most basic tenets underlying 
Hartmann's works. The present study is conceived as a 
response to this challenge.
The recent controversy itself is focused on the question of 
psychological depth in Hartmann's characters. Prior to the 
appearance of the work of Rudolf VoB, Hubertus Fischer, and 
Otfrid Ehrismann in the 1980s, which initiated this debate.
Hartmann scholarship since the end of the 19 20s had 
generally accepted Gustav Ehrismann's claim that Hartmann's 
protagonists undergo a psychological, ethical progression 
from egoism to altruism throughout the course of the 
narratives.1 Such an interpretation assumes the existence 
of an inner life in the characters which allows them to 
experience moral failure and subsequent improvement. 
Furthermore, these scholars (e.g. Peter Wapnewski, Bernard 
Willson, Walter Ohly, David Duckworth) have tended to link 
this subjective dimension in Hartmann's work to the 
theological teaching of his day. VoB, Fischer, and otfrid 
Ehrismann have challenged these claims by arguing that there 
is an absence of ethical failure and psychological 
progression in Hartmann's protagonists, an absence which 
they take to indicate the author's portrayal, not of a 
morality informed by specific theological notions, but one 
based on more objective principles which have been drawn 
from various sources of influence. Thus, VoB claims, for 
example, that Hartmann's works reflect the objective sinful 
state of humankind, and that the protagonists' failings are 
therefore morally inculpable. In contrast, Fischer and 
otfrid Ehrismann perceive a framework in these narratives 
based exclusively on the ethic of secular honour and of 
courtliness respectively. Although the protagonists violate 
these codes, this is not perceived by these scholars as an 
ethical failing, but rather as evidence of objective 
miscalculation. In their various ways, therefore, these 
three scholars have sought to look beyond the consensus in 
scholarship by challenging the assumption that Hartmann 
portrays a psychological progression and moral improvement 
in his narratives which is informed by theological 
principles and which would demand an inner awareness of the 
self in his protagonists.
In response to this controversy, the present study intends 
to readdress the question of whether Hartmann's protagonists 
reveal evidence of an inner life, and whether this
11
psychological depth is used to portray a form of ethical 
progression. In addition, however, a broader assessment of 
the range of influences which might underlie any such 
subjective dimension will be undertaken in the light of the 
justifiable challenge of these three scholars. Their work 
has particularly drawn attention to the fact that Hartmann, 
as an educated ministerial, was in a position to be aware of 
theological developments, but nevertheless also inhabited 
the secular world of the court and the military aristocracy. 
He was not, therefore, a specialist theologian, nor was he 
composing for a specifically clerical audience. Conseq­
uently, one might speculate that his own and his audience's 
awareness of subjective, ethical notions would have been 
informed by general trends which had arisen from both the 
secular and theological traditions and had combined to 
create a form of secular morality which was relevant to this 
stratum of society. With regard to theological tradition, 
therefore, there is a case to be made for considering in 
particular the broader issues relating to the inner life 
which affected all Christians, such as the penitential 
system, rather than the specific influence of any one master 
or theory on Hartmann himself. Similarly, the contribution 
of social and cultural developments to the creation of a 
secular moral code and a more general awareness of the inner 
life and individuality must be evaluated.
This study will therefore seek to examine the evidence of 
psychological depth in the main protagonists and additional 
characters inhabiting Hartmann's works which can be 
considered a prerequisite of ethical progression. This will 
be achieved by focusing specifically on the ability of these 
characters to perceive and to be self-aware. In addition, 
this evidence will be placed in the broad context of secular 
and general clerical influences which might have informed 
such a portrayal of the inner life in these works of 
literature. Perception is defined in this study as the 
characters' ability to reflect and reason for themselves,
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and to demonstrate, by means of this cognitive process, 
their awareness of the various facets of their identities, 
whether as Christians, knights, lords, or spouses, which 
they have a secular moral duty to fulfil. Therefore, any 
occurrences of basic thought processes in the characters and 
the manner in which they are portrayed will be taken into 
consideration. Similarly, the content of any thought 
processes will be investigated in order to determine in 
particular how and whether Hartmann's characters are able to 
analyse their situations and relationships or be aware of 
their own behaviour. By comparing the results of these 
findings, it should be possible to establish whether the 
main protagonists in particular reveal any progress in their 
ability to be aware of their surroundings and duties in this 
way. Intertextual comparisons will also be undertaken in 
order to highlight any similarities or differences of 
emphasis or portrayal in the inner lives of the characters 
within the various genres which Hartmann employed.
The initial chapter of this present study will constitute a 
detailed investigation of the work of Rudolf VoB, Hubertus 
Fischer, and Otfrid Ehrismann, which has so profoundly 
challenged Hartmann scholarship. In addition, the work of 
two scholars who acknowledge a subjective dimension to 
Hartmann's narratives will be considered as representatives 
of a contrasting interpretation. However, this chapter is 
not intended to represent an exhaustive survey of recent 
scholarship, but rather to reveal certain significant 
contributions to the issue which have been made over the 
last fifteen years. It is against this general scholarly 
background that the present study can subsequently be 
measured.
A general survey of the contemporary historical background 
to Hartmann's works will be undertaken in the second 
chapter. Here, the various ethical traditions, classical, 
clerical, and secular, will be explored which may have
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informed a portrayal of the inner life in Hartmann's 
protagonists. In addition, the cultural and social 
conditions of Hartmann's age will be considered in order to 
establish their contribution to the issue of inner awareness 
at this time.
The final three chapters of this study will be devoted in 
turn to each of Hartmann's three earliest works, Die Klage, 
Erec, and Gregorius. These detailed textual analyses are 
intended to demonstrate the extent and nature of Hartmann's 
interest in a subjective dimension. However, such attention 
to detail prohibits the inclusion of Hartmann's later 
narratives in a study of this scale. Nevertheless, Iwein in 
particular receives considerable attention within the scope 
of the first chapter, and Hartmann's lyric poems are 
considered as part of the chapter concerning Die Klage. A 
restriction of focus to the earliest narratives can, in any 
case, be justified in various ways. Firstly, it allows 
greater attention to be paid to Die Klage, a work which has 
been accorded relatively minor importance in Hartmann 
scholarship. Consequently, it will be possible to establish 
whether Hartmann's concern with subjective elements is 
present at the beginning of his surviving output and how 
this concern developed throughout his later works. 
Furthermore, Hartmann's initial works represent examples of 
the full range of narrative genres employed by this author, 
namely the disputation, the Arthurian romance, and the 
religious narrative. Such a restriction of focus therefore 
still permits a broad analysis of Hartmann's use of genre. 
Finally, these three narratives also form a coherent group 
in terms of certain shared concerns, for example the issue 
of youthfulness, which set them apart from Hartmann's later 
works.
CHAPTER ONE 
An Appraisal of Recent Scholarship Concerning the Ethical 
Dimension of Hartmann’s Works
Rudolf Vofi. Die Artusepik Hartmanns von Aue. Untersuchungen zum Wirklichkeits- 
begriffund zurAsthetik eines literarischen Genres im Kraftefeld von soziokulturellen 
Normen und christlicher Anthropologie
VoB initially insists that his approach will be of a broad 
nature. He puts the case in his introduction that it is 
possible to interpret the issue of guilt in Hartmann's 
Arthurian romances in the same terms as his religious works 
by claiming that Hartmann has applied aspects of Augustine's 
teaching to all of his narratives to investigate secular as 
well as religious issues (Artusepik, pp. If.). The 
complexity caused by such a combination of theological and 
secular concerns in the works is, according to VoB, as yet 
unappreciated by Hartmann scholarship. On closer inspection, 
however, the broad approach to the complexity which VoB 
advocates is in fact revealed to be based on a narrow focus 
owing to his disregard of certain textual elements.
VoB's main bone of contention with other scholars is that 
they are preoccupied with the existence of an ethical 
dimension and a psychological development in works of 
courtly literature (Artusepik, p. 84).  ^ A development, by 
definition, requires evidence of an ethical lack or failure 
on the hero's part. VoB denies the existence of such a lack 
in Hartmann's protagonists, although he does not completely 
reject all evidence of an ethical dimension in these works. 
He maintains, however, that to recognize an ethical 
progression in a perfect hero is to cast doubt on the 
integrity of the work, and therefore takes issue with the 
general tendency in scholarship to equate Hartmann's works
with Christian concepts of morality to the exclusion of all 
else:
Nun ist allerdings nicht zu leugnen, daB sich ethische Terminologie in Hartmanns Werk reich dokumentieren und sogar mit ûber dessen sozialen Rahmen hinaus gültigen Tugendwerten in Beziehung bringen laBt. Aber damit ist noch keineswegs die vielfach als selbstverstandlich vorausgesetzte Meinung gedeckt, daB sich die ethische Konzeption der Artusepen nahtlos in das Kategoriensystem der stoisch-christlichen Ethik füge und deshalb auch von dorther erschlossen werden kônne. (Artusepik, p. 49)
In VoB's opinion, the ethical dimension which Hartmann is 
portraying does not correspond exactly to Christian morality 
as his works also represent the lay ethics and interests of 
the military aristocracy. This complexity has resulted in a 
confusion which VoB seeks to clarify by proposing that 
Hartmann's Arthurian romances are works in which the social 
ethic is overlaid by the Christian ethic. In other words, 
these works follow a moral code which parallels Christian 
anthropological morality, but remain fundamentally secular; 
the salvation the main protagonists are seeking therefore, 
is perfection in this world, rather than entry into the 
next.
VoB proposes Gregorius as his main point of comparison with 
Hartmann's Arthurian romances. It is in this work that VoB 
observes the Christian moral code which he argues Hartmann 
uses as the model for his secular works. In consequence, VoB 
maintains that the main protagonists in all these works are 
depicted as initially perfect, but are thereafter afflicted 
by an objective visitation of sin and forced to strive to 
regain their status of perfection. There is no suggestion 
that the main protagonists succumb to failure as a result of 
a moral or psychological fault within themselves. In 
contrast to other scholars, VoB contends that objective sin 
was a prevalent theological concept in Hartmann's day in
view of the influence of the later teachings of Augustine 
(Artusepik, pp. 74-80). Throughout his life, Augustine 
wrestled with the relationship of guilt to free will and 
original sin. VoB traces the various developments undergone 
by Augustinian thought and underlines the main points of his 
later theories. According to Augustine, humankind was 
burdened with an inheritance of sin as the result of the 
Fall of Man. Thus, each human being is born with an inherent 
culpability for a sin which is not caused by a subjective 
failure, but rather exists on an objective or metaphysical 
plane. This sinful inheritance is manifested in a 
fundamental weakness in the will which causes it to respond 
to the forces of evil.
Although he concedes that steps were taken in the twelfth 
century toward acknowledging a subjective failure as the 
basis of sin, most notably by Abelard, VoB argues that the 
main body of theological opinion at this time regarded sin 
as objective and as linked with the inheritance of all 
humankind since the Fall. This opinion is specifically 
reflected in Gregorius (Artusepik, pp. 80-3). Thus, 
according to VoB, even though Gregorius' guilt lies outside 
his own personal responsibility, he is forced to acknowledge 
it as his inheritance from original sin (Artusepik, pp. 
81f.). He proceeds to do penance as a means of confirming 
this acknowledgment and his experiences serve to represent 
Augustine's teaching on the frailty of the human condition 
and the transitory nature of this world. In this way, an 
ethically perfect individual is compromised by his guilty 
inheritance. Once he has acknowledged his objective guilt, 
he eventually regains and surpasses his former position. The 
required reaction to objective sin is therefore to strive 
through its onslaught in order to attain an ideal.
VoB's consideration of Christian anthropology with regard to 
Hartmann's narratives is useful in broad terms. However, his 
investigation of late Augustinian thought concerning
original sin does not take into account the manner in which 
these concepts were interpreted by twelfth-century 
theologians. Emphasis was given, particularly by masters 
such as Abelard and Hugh of St Victor, to the personal 
responsibility of each Christian to acknowledge his or her
inherited guilt from the Fall. The failure to accept this
responsibility, however, was regarded as culpable 
negligence, in other words, a subjective failing, such as 
VoB rejects in his interpretation.=
In order to illustrate his view, VoB engages in a detailed 
examination of the text of Gregorius, and identifies various 
occurrences of objective sin. Gregorius' father, for 
instance, is affected by a mixture of love, youth, beauty, 
and the power of the Devil (Gr 303ff., 323ff., 332ff.)
(Artusepik, pp. 61f.). All of these forces lead him to 
commit a crime for which he cannot be considered 
responsible, as if he were the passive victim of these 
influences. The same notion is also evident in the second 
incest, in which Gregorius' mother appears to be affected by 
the forces of love, the Devil, and misfortune (Gr 2488ff., |I2559ff., 2667). Likewise, Gregorius' own initial reaction to 1
the discovery of his sin is to consider himself a victim of i
God's decision to guide him to his mother's land (Gr 2614- {
18). VoB concludes that;
nach solcher durchgangig transsubjektiven Motiv­ation der Geschehensablâufe kann kein Zweifel bestehen, daB das Thema der Schuld nicht auf moralischer oder psychologischer, sondern auf metaphysischer Ebene gestellt ist. (Artusepik, p.73)
He strengthens his argument further by asserting that no 
evidence exists in the work to suggest a psychological 
defect in the main protagonist, a claim which he maintains 
by demonstrating how Gregorius is continually referred to as 
perfect, even from birth:
Den âuBeren Vorzügen, die schon den Neugeborenen (674, 679ff,, 686, 708, 1033f.), spater denHeranwachsenden (1238) und dann den Ritter (1877ff., 2117ff.; vgl. 2906ff.) auszeichnen,entspricht die intellectuelle und ethische Vollkommenheit. (Artusepik, pp. 63f.)
In addition, VoB argues that Gregorius commits no crime by 
leaving the monastery (Artusepik, p. 68), and considers his 
daily reading of the tablet to constitute sufficient penance 
(Artusepik, p. 63). VoB maintains that Gregorius 
demonstrates no moral lack or loss of control on these 
occasions. This is verified by the abbot's reaction to 
Gregorius' desire to leave the monastery, which contains no 
suggestion that he believes Gregorius to be committing a 
sin. Indeed, he even offers marriage as an alternative to 
Gregorius' desire for knighthood. Moreover, Gregorius' later 
reference to his own 'tumpheit' (Gr 1484-6) is seen by VoB 
as carrying little weight when compared with the 
overwhelming number of positive references to him in the 
narrative (Artusepik, p. 66). The contradiction which these 
opposing statements would otherwise create is too great to 
be credible in VoB's eyes. Instead, he argues that these 
self-criticisms typify the reaction of an heir to original 
sin towards his inheritance (Artusepik, p. 67),
VoB proceeds to draw a parallel between his interpretation 
of Gregorius and Hartmann's Arthurian romances, describing 
the latter as similarly reflecting the dictates of medieval 
theology regarding sin (Artusepik, pp. 83-90). As a result, 
the two main protagonists are represented as morally perfect 
from the start in order to highlight their later subjection 
to a sin for which they are not personally responsible. The 
main protagonists subsequently reveal the influences of 
their sinful inheritance, but prove their worth in the 
manner in which they take responsibility for their inherent 
culpability. Erec and Iwein, like Gregorius, are therefore 
guilty of a metaphysical sin, rather than an ethical 
failing. Within the parallel structure of these secular
works, sin is correspondingly depicted as an objective 
social disaster. In addition, VoB claims that the Christian 
concepts of penance, regret, and mercy likewise find 
reflection within this secular structure:
Der Artusroman reproduziert demnach, obwohl er sich nicht primar von christlichen Inhalten gepragt zeigt, die Struktur des christlichen Schuldbegriffs und der damit zusammenhângenden Phanomene Reue, BuBe, Vergebung (Gnade) und lâBt so mit bemerkenswerter Souverânitât im Frei- heitsraum des asthetischen Mediums die feudal- hdfische Sphare auf dem epochalen christlichen Fundament aufruhen, ohne ihre nicht durchweg mit christlichen Wertsetzungen zur Deckung zu bringenden normativen Eigenintentionen zu verflüchtigen. {Artusepik, p. 88).
On the basis of this claim, VoB contends that the 
protagonists strive for secular salvation in terms of fame, 
noble standing, and knightly success. They are likewise 
subjected in secular terms to the weakness caused by their 
human inheritance and the forces of objective sin, which act 
as a reminder that the path to achieving a social ideal is 
as fraught with unseen difficulties as attaining a place in 
Heaven. VoB thus interprets the Arthurian romances as works 
of social idealism, displaying the transitory nature of a 
life which is constantly at the mercy of objective forces, 
but also describing the means to withstand the inevitability 
of failure and reach the heights of social fame. i
IThe crux of VoB's approach lies in his interpretation of the j
initial adventures of the two main protagonists before they I
succumb to failure, and the nature of that failure itself, |
VoB therefore asserts that Erec and Iwein, like Gregorius, I
are portrayed as morally perfect from the outset, Erec, |
despite his youthfulness, proves in the initial episode that I
he is full of ideal potential (Artusepik, pp. 5ff.). His ;
success at Tulmein and the wedding tournament is i
confirmation of his status as a young and perfect knight. :
Erec is likewise described as an established member of i
Arthur's court (Er 2f., ISlOff., The lack of
evidence denoting a psychological failing leads VoB to 
conclude that the initial episode is:
eine Jugendgeschichte, die eigentlich gar keine ist, weil sie nicht den ProzeB einer inneren Veranderung aufzeigt, sondern den Protagonisten ausschlieBlich in seiner idealgemâBen Zielphase vorführt, (Artusepik, p. 18)
VoB's definition of Hartmann's emphasis on Erec's youth, 
however, is too narrow in its scope. Erec's youthfulness may 
indeed emphasize his extraordinary precociousness and early 
success, but may likewise suggest a period of incomplete 
learning and growing, which VoB ostensibly rejects.*
VoB likewise interprets this initial episode in accordance 
with the medieval concept of the individual. Erec is thus 
portrayed as an individual knight whose existence is 
fundamentally bound up with his society. Thus, the insult 
inflicted on him by Maliclisier is a slight on courtly 
society which Erec must avenge. VoB recognizes Erec only as 
a catalyst for the recovery of his society's honour from 
this slight. He considers Erec to respond entirely 
objectively to his situation, down to desiring Enite's hand 
merely in reaction to his objective need for a beautiful |
companion when confronting Iders. VoB surmises that j
Hartmann's narratives cannot be interpreted in terms of a I
modern definition of individual alienation in society as |
critics such as Kohler have maintained (Artusepik, pp. 7f.). 1
VoB's interpretation is justified. Nevertheless, to refuse |
subsequently to acknowledge an additional ethical dimension i
to the whole of the narrative on the basis of this 
definition, as VoB does, suggests that he is unduly 1
simplifying a more complex issue.
VoB supports his conclusions by emphasizing the narrator's i
references to the main protagonist. Their constantly
positive nature in this initial encounter is presented as 
further evidence of Erec's perfection (Artusepik, pp. 13f.). 
VoB's interpretation does not therefore allow for the 
possibility of irony or double-meaning behind the narrator's 
praise. Only by taking the narrator at his word is VoB able 
to draw such conclusions.
In VoB's opinion, therefore, Erec does not display any signs 
of an ethical lack or immaturity in this initial episode 
and, by extension, the rest of the narrative. Moreover, in 
keeping with the notion that the narrative reflects the 
tenets of a Christian anthropology, which the lack of a 
subjective failing confirms, VoB concludes that Erec's 
failure at Karnant must be the result of objective 
causality.
Similar conclusions are drawn in VoB's interpretation of 
Iwein. The main protagonist is likewise considered to be 
perfect from the outset, and to reveal no indication that 
his future failure may be subjectively motivated. VoB also 
considers Kalogrenant to be blameless in his behaviour. This 
he justifies by Arthur's and Iwein's decisions to repeat 
Kalogrenant's adventure themselves (Artusepik, p. 27). VoB 
makes no mention of a shallow appraisal of knighthood in 
Kalogrenant's explanation to the wild Herdsman nor of any 
indication of subjective failure in Kalogrenant's statement 
of regret (Iw 635) (Artusepik, p. 26). According to VoB, 
Iwein's vengeance is exonerated by the narrator (Iw 945ff.), 
as is his pursuit of Askalon, which is described in an 
ethically neutral fashion as occurring 'âne zuht' and is 
therefore to be understood as an objective necessity of 
Iwein's circumstances (Artusepik, pp. 29-33), Furthermore, 
VoB claims that Iwein's marriage is the consequence of his 
objective superiority to Askalon and the similarly objective 
forces of love (Iw 2054ff.) (Artusepik, p. 41). Finally, his 
meeting with Lunete, the very person who would be disposed 
to save him, is seen by VoB as proof that Iwein's rescue was
8
virtually preordained in view of his moral perfection (Iw 
1298ff.) (Artusepik, p. 34).
The initial episodes of Hartmann's Arthurian romances are 
thus interpreted by VoB as being focused on an objective 
transcendental plane, and this conclusion is subsequently 
extended to the remainder of the narratives. There is no 
room in his approach for evidence of such subjective issues 
as impetuosity or immaturity which are also implied in these 
initial episodes, but which emerge as aspects of consequence 
only in the course of the main protagonists' ensuing periods 
of failure. VoB considers these periods to be caused by the 
inability of the main protagonists to balance love and 
social obligations as a result of the influence of the 
forces of love and adventure (Artusepik, pp. 56ff.). 
According to VoB, Iwein in particular is portrayed as 
morally perfect throughout this onslaught. His initially 
genuine intentions to respect the deadline are proof of 
this, as is his realization that he has broken his promise 
before Lunete makes her accusation, which is similarly 
devoid of any reference to a personal failing. VoB declares 
that Iwein's moral integrity is thereby proven. However, 
these aspects could likewise be understood as indications of 
Iwein's future recovery from a lapse induced by a moral 
failure. From VoB's point of view, however, Iwein has merely 
encountered a period in which objective forces have caused 
him to lose his status temporarily. Likewise, Erec 
experiences a period of failure, but VoB again stresses that 
no causal subjective fault is evident. Both protagonists 
should therefore be considered, according to VoB, to be 
quote sundære in the same respect as Gregorius, afflicted by 
external forces owing to their human inheritance, and 
encountering disaster through no fault of their own.
Erec is subsequently portrayed by VoB as following a path of 
adventure along which he continually encounters objective 
forces. The basic motivation of his reactions to these
forces is similarly objective. He helps Cadoc and the widows 
at Brandigan, for example, because they are of noble status 
and their suffering offends Erec's noble sensibility 
(Artusepik, pp. 107-9). Any note of altruism on Erec's part 
is therefore considered by VoB to exist only within these 
exclusive parameters. Thus, Erec does not seek expressly to 
help others in order to rectify an earlier moral failure. He 
encounters these situations merely as a consequence of 
following the path of adventure to re-establish his own 
honour, and reacts to them purely in terms of their merit in 
helping him achieve this aim.
Erec's progress towards such achievement is highlighted by 
his opponents, who are similarly affected by the objective 
forces of love. Neither Gaioain, Oringles nor Mabonagrin are 
portrayed as inherently evil, but, like Erec in the verligen 
episode, they are unable to defend themselves against the 
demands of love. Erec's victory over them thus serves to 
accentuate his superiority in taking responsibility for his 
inherent weakness.
In VoB's final reference to Erec, he observes that 
indications of progression regarding the main protagonist 
are apparent throughout the narrative, but only on a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative scale (Artusepik, pp. 
112-4). In this way, the two horses Enite receives are 
distinct in the sense that the second is described in 
greater detail. However, both are referred to as the most 
desirable (Er 1423ff., 7279ff.). Lengthier descriptions,
therefore, are no indication of an ethical progression on 
the part of the protagonists. This is also the case with the 
difference in the size of Erec's receptions at Karnant. VoB 
distinguishes between the informality of the first and the 
formality of the second owing to Erec's elevation in status. 
There is no suggestion that he has progressed in any ethical 
sense, however. In addition, VoB argues that the very 
timescale of the narrative prohibits an ethical development
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because Erec's whole course of adventures after the verligen 
takes only one week. In VoB's opinion, this is insufficient 
time for such a profound change to have occurred (Artusepik, 
pp. 161-5). It is doubtful, however, whether it is 
justifiable to draw such conclusions by comparing two sets 
of possibilities from within and without the realm of 
fiction.
VoB's consideration of Iwein after the missing of the 
deadline embraces the same approach. He observes that, even 
in the midst of Iwein's madness, there are still references 
to his former perfection (Iw 3231ff.), and by recovering his 
wits and dressing as a knight, Iwein is declared by VoB to 
have returned instantly to his former perfect state. VoB 
therefore claims that, as with Erec, there are no 
indications of an identity crisis or an ethical failing 
(Artusepik, pp. 125f.). VoB considers this to be apparent in 
the adventure at Narison, in which Iwein displays the 
gratitude and willingness to help which were absent in his 
earlier treatment of Laudine and Lunete with regard to the 
deadline. This does not indicate, in VoB's opinion, that 
Iwein has improved in any moral sense from his previous 
failure, but rather that this earlier incident was merely a 
temporary aberration caused by the external effects of 
misfortune. At Narison, Iwein proves that this temporary 
problem has now been rectified (Artusepik, p. 127). He 
subsequently embarks upon a path of adventure on which he 
encounters objective forces which serve to prove his 
inherent worthiness, rather than constituting ascending 
levels of ethical progression.
VoB's emphasis on external factors is exemplified by Iwein's 
encounter with Lunete on the eve of her execution 
(Artusepik, pp. 128-30). On this occasion, VoB recognizes 
that both protagonists partly blame themselves for their 
behaviour (Iw 3966ff., 3999f., 4006ff., 4216ff., 4250ff.), 
as well as the objective effects of misfortune (Iw 3960ff.,
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4031, 4067f., 4201). It appears as if a balance is created 
here between objective causes and subjective responsibility. 
However, Vol5 interprets Lunete's self-accusation as being 
due to her dismay at her impetuosity. Moreover, he claims 
that this fault is easily counterbalanced by her noble 
intentions in persuading her mistress to remarry. Any 
ethical aspects in her inner appraisal are thus rendered 
insignificant. Similarly, Vo6 interprets Iwein's self­
accusation as reflecting the male lover of the courtly love 
tradition who identifies his unworthiness as the cause of 
his failure, and yet also acknowledges his mistreatment by 
Fortune. Vofî therefore holds that this avowed unworthiness 
does not imply an ethical failing. However, VoB, in 
maintaining his objective interpretation, disregards the 
fact that Iwein's willingness to help Lunete constitutes a 
distinct change from his initial selfish reaction to her 
distress (Iw 4030f.). Only after hearing her story does he 
agree to repay her earlier kindness. During this episode, 
Iwein appears to take significant steps from a state of 
self-absorption to a stage where he can recognize and pity 
the misfortunes of others. This is an issue which VoB 
neglects to raise. In a similar instance, VoB stresses 
Lunete's continued support for Iwein, but fails to consider 
the disparaging remarks and accusations which she directs at 
him later in the conversation (Iw 4184f., 4199f.), despite 
also describing Iwein as blameless (Iw 4067). There are 
grounds, therefore, for acknowledging a more complex state 
of affairs involving subjective issues in this narrative 
than VoB is willing to recognize.
VoB's emphasis on external factors is further evident in the 
Harpin adventure in which Harpin, an objective source of 
misfortune in himself, provides Iwein with a dilemma 
regarding his second deadline. This dilemma encompasses two 
levels comprising Iwein's concern for his social reputation 
and his desire to prove his loyalty to Lunete. VoB rejects 
the interpretation that the repetition of the deadline is an
12
indication of ethical progress in Iwein by which he 
demonstrates a newly-evident altruism and awareness of 
responsibility. Instead, VoB considers the second deadline 
a distant objective consequence of the first, and therefore 
unsuitable as a comparison in light of the differing 
circumstances (Artusepik, p. 132).
VoB's reading of the text likewise leads him to interpret 
the kidnapping episode and the inheritance struggle between 
the two sisters as examples of the ability of objective 
forces to complicate the achievement of a social ideal. VoB 
focuses on Arthur's dilemma over Meljaganz' request which is 
caused by his concern to defend his image of ideal 
magnanimity. Similarly, Gawein's support for the older 
sister's dubious cause is the result of ideal expectations 
of knightly assistance (Artusepikf p. 141). Although these 
two episodes may appear to raise doubts about the pursuit of 
the ideal when it results in such adverse consequences, as 
VoB himself acknowledges, he nevertheless considers these 
isolated incidents to lose significance when compared with 
the wealth of positive examples of courtly idealism in the 
narrative. Despite conceding that these episodes suggest the 
existence of elements of discord within courtly society, VoB 
does not entertain the possibility that Hartmann is raising 
ethical questions regarding the restrictive nature of the 
courtly ideal. These questions are exemplified by Gawein's 
failure to recognize the evil intentions of the older 
sister, and the consequences of Arthur's impossible position 
created by the clash between his pursuit of ideal generosity 
and an extreme demand. One may even surmise that Hartmann is 
highlighting the constraints of ideal courtly behaviour 
which restrict the ability to recognize or respond to such 
vital ethical considerations. Whatever the case, VoB is 
unwilling to expand his theory to accommodate these levels 
of interpretation.
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A significant tendency of VoB's approach is to disregard the 
change in circumstances and status experienced by Hartmann's 
main protagonists and their reactions to that change, such 
as are evident in the depiction of their inner thoughts. VoB 
fails to consider the protagonists' monologues which depict 
such awareness in the three texts he considers. It is upon 
these monologues and other aspects relating to the thoughts 
and motivations of the protagonists that the present study 
intends to focus in detail. VoB prefers to rely on the 
guidance of the narrator, which at times may provide a more 
ambiguous insight into events than the characters' own 
thoughts and words. The continued references to the 
worthiness of the main protagonists, which VoB regards as 
firm evidence of the absence of an ethical deficiency, may 
be interpreted as indications that their mistakes are only 
temporary, but do not exclude the possibility that they are 
nevertheless moral failings.
VoB's failure to compare Hartmann's narratives with their 
sources likewise enables him to draw such conclusions. 
Hartmann's additions to his sources reveal a tendency to 
incorporate new ethical dimensions into the issues 
portrayed. For example, in Hartmann's hands the mistakes of 
Erec and Iwein evolve from being problems of a love 
relationship to being problems of general attitude which 
undermine the status of the main protagonists.
The present study does not seek to attest that the ethical 
dimension excludes all others, an approach which VoB has 
condemned other scholars for adopting. On the contrary, 
there are aspects of social reality visible in these works, 
particularly with regard to knightly honour. However, in 
reaction to VoB's approach, it can be claimed that 
Hartmann's works are indeed imbued with a subjective 
dimension. VoB may be commended for highlighting the dangers 
of an excessive concentration on ethical evidence, but his 
own approach is guilty of similar limitations by ignoring
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these aspects. In addition, Christoph Cormeau observes a 
further tendency in VoB's work:
Die Arbeit unterschatzt die narrative Dynamik der Zentralfiguren und die Erkenntnisse der Erzahl- forschung.®
Likewise, Silvia Ranawake criticizes VoB's superficial 
approach:
Eine derartig vereinfachende Sicht kann Hartmanns Werk, seiner Komplexitat und seinen Spannungen, die auch seine literarische Qualitât ausmachen, nicht gerecht werden,®
VoB's point of departure is therefore too restricted. His 
disregard of subjective aspects causes him to propound 
objective sin as the basic dynamic of Hartmann's works. By 
considering only the works of Augustine and not the broader 
range of twelfth-century theological works which Augustine 
inspired, VoB is rejecting the appreciation of such 
subjective issues as insight and motivation in Hartmann's 
day which find reflection in his Arthurian romances with 
regard to secular moral issues, and in Gregorius with regard 
to acknowledging the sinful inheritance of humankind. The 
dimension of subjective culpability within these parameters 
cannot therefore be ignored in a balanced appraisal of 
Hartmann's art.
Hubertus Fischer. Ehre, Hof und Abenteuer in Hartmanns ‘Iwein \  Vorarbeiten zu 
einer historischen Poetik des hôfischen Epos
Hubertus Fischer shares VoB's rejection of the majority 
tendency amongst scholars to acknowledge the existence of a 
psychological progression in Hartmann's works. Like VoB, he 
advocates that the protagonists' adventures are of an 
objective nature, and gives no support to the argument that
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the protagonists precipitate a subjective failure which 
demands restitution. Despite the broad similarities between 
their conclusions, the approaches of VoB and Fischer are 
nevertheless based on differing theories. Whereas VoB 
contends that Hartmann's Arthurian romances represent a 
social ideal modelled on a Christian anthropological 
structure, Fischer repudiates all theological influence in 
these works. Instead, Fischer declares Iwein to be a 
portrayal and exploration of contemporary secular issues 
relating to the concept of knightly honour which would have 
been clearly identifiable and relevant to an audience drawn 
from the military aristocracy, but which have been 
overlooked or misinterpreted by modern scholars owing to 
their bourgeois moralistic mindset.
Fischer bases his rejection of theological aspects on the 
evidence of certain didactic works including the 
Policraticus of John of Salisbury and the writings of Peter 
of Blois (Ehre, Hof, pp. 14-18). John of Salisbury regarded 
the pastimes of the military aristocracy, including 
listening to courtly romances, as excessive preoccupation 
with secular issues. Fischer contends that this was a 
widespread opinion amongst twelfth-century theologians. Even 
such positive elements in the romances as the portrayal of 
compassion or forgiveness were considered to be harmful, 
secular digressions from true Christian virtues.^ This 
conclusion leads Fischer to reject the works of those 
scholars intent on recognizing a theological dimension in 
Hartmann's works:
Wir meinen jene Versuche, der Artusepik einen religiosen Hintersinn zu entlocken und aus ihr mit Hilfe der christlichen Moraltheologie 'exempla' gottgefalligen Tuns zu machen. Zumal die christlichen Gebote der 'caritas' und 'miseri- cordia' hat man ja immer wieder in diesen Werken verwirklicht sehen wollen. Sieht man die Sache aber nâher an, dann fallen diese idealen Konstruktionen rasch in sich zusammen. (Ehre, Hof, p. 17)
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Thus, Fischer claims that the didactic concerns of the 
courtly romances are distinct from Christian morality, and 
proceeds to illustrate this claim initially in his 
assessment of Kalogrenant's behaviour. Fischer considers 
Kalogrenant's curiositas to be an essential knightly quality 
in the eyes of the military aristocracy. From a theological 
viewpoint, however, as scholars such as H.B. Willson have 
maintained, this inclination to pursue adventure was 
regarded as the gateway to sin through its association with 
the temptation inherent in original sin (Ehre, Hof, pp. 
19f.). Fischer, however, argues that the curiosity 
experienced by Kalogrenant constitutes the very essence of 
a knight's active existence. This argument is also supported 
by the fact that the adventure at the spring takes place in 
the real world, despite parallels with Eden. According to 
Fischer, this indicates that the knights' aims in this work 
are secular and constitute the 'Selbstbestatigung und 
SelbstgenuB des Ritters in seinem gegenwartigen Tun' (Ehre, 
Hof, p. 26). As such, these aims violate theological 
teaching on curiositas and place this work outside the 
concerns of clerical morality.
Fischer interprets the overtly secular interests portrayed 
in Iwein as the result of a developing social consciousness 
amongst the military aristocracy at this time, which 
incorporated an insight into their relationship with their 
natural environment, and which caused their 'religiose 
Selbstentfremdung' {Ehre, Hof, p. 26). This emancipation 
likewise involved the pursuit of pleasure in listening to 
romances, which was condemned by theologians (Ehre, Hof, p. 
28). Thus, the social consciousness of the military 
aristocracy, their desire for entertainment, their secular 
ethical principles, and their awareness of their 
relationship with the natural world are all considered by 
Fischer to be reflected in the secular bias of Hartmann's 
Arthurian romances.
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Fischer's interpretation of the reaction of theologians to 
works of courtly literature should be placed in a broader 
perspective, however. Fischer is partly justified in drawing 
attention to the objections of a few theologians to the 
pursuit of self-glorification in these works, which echo 
their objections to the violence of the tournament. However, 
it is harder to justify Fischer's claim that the majority of 
theologians protested in this way and that this consequently 
implies a complete lack of theological influence in this 
genre. The objections of a small number of masters to the 
pleasure principle and to the discussion of virtues in 
courtly literature do not necessarily indicate that these 
works were not influenced by Christian morality to any 
degree. Although justified therefore in condemning the heavy 
emphasis on this dimension to the detriment of the secular 
aspects discussed, Fischer nevertheless goes directly to the 
other extreme of rejecting out of hand any connection 
between secular ethics and contemporary theological thought.
In addition to this repudiation of theological influences, 
Fischer accuses the many critics who have identified a 
psychological progression in the main protagonists of 
Hartmann's works of having succumbed to the bourgeois 
morality inherent in nineteenth and twentieth-century 
literature (Ehre, Hof, pp. 37ff.). Many scholars, and 
Fischer accuses Peter Wapnewski in particular, have thus 
applied modern ethics to twelfth-century literary 
protagonists. The inconsistencies produced by this approach 
are demonstrated by Fischer in the case of Iwein's killing 
of Askalon. Fischer believes that the military aristocracy 
would have considered such an action completely justifiable 
because Iwein was avenging the dishonouring of a relative. 
This is supported by historians of the age, such as Karl 
Bosl (Fhre, Hof, p. 10, note 5). Iwein's actions are thus 
bound by the secular dictates of honour. As such, they may 
appear immoral to the modern reader, sensitized to bourgeois 
notions of morality, but they are completely acceptable
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within the feuding mentality of the twelfth-century military 
aristocracy.
Fischer's alternative reading is further demonstrated in his 
interpretation of Kalogrenant's description of aventiure (Iw 
528ff.). He maintains that Kalogrenant's words are to be 
understood literally, and perceives nothing superficial or 
morally inferior in Kalogrenant's comprehension of this 
issue (Fhre, Hof, pp. 20-2). Kalogrenant is only aware of 
'das reine Abenteuer der Selbsterfahrung' (Ehre^ Hof, p. 
176), which is an acceptable attitude in terms of the 
secular honour ethic. Fischer's interpretation prevents him 
from considering Kalogrenant's words in terms of a broader 
lay morality, however, although there is evidence that the 
narrative incorporates this wider perspective. Such an 
approach would conclude that Kalogrenant's appreciation of 
knighthood, which only includes physical prowess and 
personal glory, is essentially shallow, and that Hartmann is 
therefore presenting the concept of the honour ethic for 
discussion in broader terms.
Fischer's criticism of moral interpretations of Hartmann's 
narratives is focused primarily on Wapnewski's argument that 
the protagonists are individuals whose morality depends on 
the consciousness of their actions and the difference 
between right and wrong (Ehre, Hof, pp. 37ff.). In contrast, 
Fischer has markedly different notions regarding knightly 
individuality in the twelfth century as mirrored in 
chivalric romances. His theory draws heavily on Hegel's 
interpretation of individuality in feudal society in the 
first volume of Asthetik, On this basis, far from 
considering the morality of their actions, Fischer contends 
that knights in Hartmann's Arthurian romances are only 
concerned with the degree to which an action will increase 
their honourable standing. This is not as egotistical as it 
may appear to the modern reader, however, because the honour 
of an individual in the feudal era was entirely bound up
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with the honour of his whole society, no distinction being 
made between the two. An individual's honour was not 
therefore held to be in conflict with the general interests 
of society. Consequently, the feudal individual did not 
suppress any natural inclinations. To act on instinct was 
encouraged because, unlike in bourgeois society, following 
impetuous, individual decisions was not considered to be 
acting in conflict with society's interests, but rather the 
contrary:
denn das feudale Individuum hat seine gesell- schaftlichen Beziehungen noch nicht in der Weise aus sich herausgesetzt und entwickelt, daB sie ihm als verselbstandigte Macht gegenübertreten kônnten, die ihm das abstrakt Allgemeine des Willens als fasten, unverrückbaren Gegensatz zu seinem besonderen Willen in sein BewuBtsein brâchten. (Ehre, Hof, p. 41)
The feudal individual had no conception therefore of 
existing as a separate being from society. In consequence, 
this mentality would be represented in courtly literature by 
a protagonist striving for honour in the interests of both 
himself and his society. Thus, he would display such virtues 
as compassion only as his pursuit of honour dictated. As 
Fischer says:
der Held des hôfischen Epos bleibt immer bei sich 
selbst in seinem Tun, besiegt nicht seinen besonderen Willen und seine Leidenschaften, seine Triebe, seine edlen Gefühle und Neigungen, sondern setzt sich mit ihnen als diese unmittelbare Individualitat gewaltsam durch. Wenn er dabei schon allgemeinere Verhàltnisse trâgt, wie etwa solche der 'helfe', des 'dienstes', der 'triuwe'Oder der 'erbermde', dann tut er auch dies stets unter Wahrung seiner individuellen Selbstan- digkeit, sieht darauf, ob es ihm gemaB sei, so zu handeln, und entschlieBt sich nach seiner 'Willkür' zur Tat, nicht aber indem er 'zu dieser Pflicht der Pflicht und ihrer Erfüllung wegen sich' entschlieBt. {Ehre, Hof, p. 41)
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No thought is therefore spared for altruistic consid­
erations. Instead, everything is subordinate to the knight's 
pursuit of individual honour of which the honour of society 
is an extension.
Fischer illustrates this claim by discussing the approach of 
scholars such as Gunther Schweikle who apply moral 
principles to the initial episode of Jweln.® Iwein's 
behaviour at the spring appears egotistical and impetuous in 
these terms. Schweikle asserts that Iwein subsequently 
evolves into a compassionate and selfless being, who, by 
means of inner reflection, has realized and rejected his own 
selfishness. In Fischer's opinion, however, the processing 
of the hero's inner thoughts, for example on Iwein's 
awakening after his madness, merely signifies the necessary 
self-preoccupation of the individual knight which is 
instrumental in bringing honour to his society, rather than 
a developing altruism which would be anathema to him (Ehre, 
Hof, pp. 107f.).
In Fischer's opinion, therefore, Iwein's inner thought 
processes and impulsive actions do not constitute evidence 
of a conflict between his individual interests and those of 
society. Such bourgeois moral considerations would be the 
death of the active knightly pursuit of honour and 
adventure. As Fischer says;
die gewôhnliche Moral ... ware fur ihn ein todliches Gift, denn in der Pflichtenethik erstirbt jedes selbstandige Handeln. (Ehre, Hof, p. 57)
Indessen fragt es sich, was aus dem Ritter wohl geworden wâre, wenn er tatsachlich seinen 'Aggres- sionstrieb' eingedâmmt ... hâtte; vielleicht ein nützliches Mitglied der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, ganz sicher aber nicht dieser ruhmbedeckte Held der Tafelrunde. (Ehre, Hof, p. 59)
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Iwein's inner deliberations, however, are intended, not so 
much to prevent him from acting on his knightly impulses as 
Fischer accuses other scholars of claiming, but rather to 
weigh his actions first in terms of his social obligations. 
The knightly pursuit of honour is to be encouraged, but must 
be channelled appropriately. As such, the individual knight 
remains indistinct from his society, but is nevertheless 
required to be aware of his social responsibilities. This is 
particularly the case with regard to Iwein, owing to the 
radical expansion of his social obligations which his 
marriage to Laudine precipitates. Fischer is certainly 
justified in accentuating the idealization of honour as part 
of the secular reality which forms the background to this 
work. However, Fischer's association of subjectivity with 
bourgeois morality blinds him to the broader discussion of 
honour in terms of lay ethical issues which is particularly 
evident in the portrayal of inner awareness in Hartmann's 
work.
A major point of similarity between the approaches of VoB 
and Fischer is their reliance on the initial episodes of 
Hartmann's works to provide a blueprint for interpreting the 
whole narrative. Fischer contends that, far from revealing 
Iwein's lack of moral integrity, the adventure at the spring 
can be justified in terms of the honour ethic of the lay 
aristocracy. Iwein and Kalogrenant display an admirable 
desire to seek glory, and Iwein has a legitimate duty to 
avenge his kinsman's dishonour as a result of Askalon's 
condescension (Ehre, Hof, pp. 33-6). Furthermore, Iwein has 
reason to fear the contempt of Keii. These justifications 
therefore exonerate Iwein's actions in striking Askalon from 
behind. Fischer rejects Wapnewski's interpretation that the 
narrator's 'âne zuht' comment implies moral inadequacy, 
claiming instead that, without proof of victory, Iwein may 
have been subjected to disbelief and scorn (Ehre, Hof, pp. 
29-31). Honour necessarily demands the acclaim of others, 
and this is the focus of Iwein's thoughts on seeing Askalon
22
escape and when he believes Lunete intends to help him flee 
before he has gained proof of his victory (Iw I766ff.) 
(Ehre, Hof, pp. 46f.). According to Fischer, who follows the 
example of Hegel in this respect, these thoughts are an 
expression of Iwein's personal autonomy. Fischer refers to 
the connection between thought processes and honour as the 
'in sich reflektierte Selbstandigkeit' of a knight (Ehre, 
Hof, p. 32). Thus, Iwein's thoughts indicate how his whole 
knightly identity is bound up with the attainment of honour. 
Once Iwein is stripped of his honour by Lunete's accusation, 
he loses his identity in his madness. Fischer subsequently 
asserts that Iwein's thoughts and behaviour after his 
madness are guided by the single aim of regaining that same 
honour-based identity.
The initial adventure at the spring thus provides Fischer 
with abundant and justifiable evidence to support his 
arguments. Great emphasis is laid in this episode on the 
issues of honour, vengeance, and the pursuit of adventure. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the issues 
depicted are more complex than Fischer's interpretation 
implies. Hartmann is describing an episode which involves 
acceptable behavioural patterns in terms of the honour ethic 
of the military aristocracy, but also appears to be 
attempting to provoke a wider debate concerning the pursuit 
of those honourable goals within a broader framework of 
secular morality. Iwein enters that framework on marrying 
Laudine and extending his obligations from the pursuit of 
personal honour to the far more onerous tasks of lordship. 
He is required to complement this broadening of obligations 
with an increase in awareness. In this sense, Iwein's 
failure to meet the deadline is indeed evidence of an 
ethical failing. Such a reading is supported by events after 
Iwein's madness, particularly his series of monologues, 
rather than by the opening episode of the work. However, 
Fischer, like VoB, only draws conclusions from the initial 
episode and applies them wholesale to the rest of the
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narrative. By embracing a more holistic approach and 
considering the relationship between events occurring before 
and after Iwein's madness, both critics may have found their 
evidence still significant, but far more difficult to 
sustain as a key to unlocking Hartmann's work completely.
Fischer likewise concludes that Iwein's only crime is to 
miss the deadline. As evidence, he cites the fact that 
Askalon's death is never referred to as mort (Ehre, Hof, p. 
47), Iwein's failure to keep his promise, however,
contravenes a central tenet of feudal society. The 
unacceptable consequences of his laxity are to leave his 
land and wife unprotected for longer than agreed. The
difficulty in attaining a balance between lordship and
knighthood was a significant problem for the military 
aristocracy of this period. Fischer cites numerous sources 
as evidence, including the works of Andreas Capellanus, John 
of Salisbury, Konrad von Megenberg, and Reinmar von Zweter, 
Alan of Lille's Summa de arte praedicatoria, and Der
Winsbecke. All refer, as does Gawein in his advice to Iwein, 
which corresponds closely to the Epistola Bernard! de cura 
rei familiar is, to the imperative need to balance these dual 
roles (Ehre, Hof, pp. 78-91). A knight was required to 
maintain physical fitness and attend tournaments in order to 
prove and advance his reputation, but was also expected to 
nurture the material seat of his wealth. Fischer's plethora 
of references indicates that this problem indeed received 
wide discussion in the late twelfth century, and that 
Hartmann himself was duly contributing to this discussion in 
Iwein. However, Fischer's interpretation of the problem of 
combining lordship with knighthood is based on purely 
objective criteria. He claims that Iwein's failure is not 
caused by a moral failing as he merely sustains a loss of 
honour for breaking his promise, and must simply regain that 
degree of renown.
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The predisposition to reject evidence of a subjective 
dimension in this work leads Fischer, like VoB, to deduce 
that events in the romances are governed by objective 
forces, and are not generated by any subjective fault in the 
hero (Ehre, Hof, pp. 60f., and often). Consequently, Fischer 
concludes that Iwein's return to the tournament circuit and 
his subsequent missing of the deadline would have been 
interpreted by a contemporary audience as subjectively 
innocent actions despite the disastrous objective 
consequences. This is due to the fact that Iwein merely 
agrees to Gawein's proposed course of action. Gawein must 
therefore accept the greater share of responsibility. In 
addition, Fischer proposes that Iwein subsequently forgets 
his duties as a result of the workings of fate. In either 
case, Iwein is free of subjective blame.
The missing of a deadline and breaking of a promise are 
indeed serious breaches of knightly conduct. However, the 
narrative also emphasizes that these breaches result from 
Iwein's lack of consideration for the extended obligations 
he acquired on marrying Laudine. Iwein's subsequent 
adventures therefore serve not only to help him regain his 
knightly honour, as Fischer suggests, but also to develop in 
himself the awareness to prevent a repetition of his 
failure. This progression can be traced by comparing Iwein's 
initial monologue after his madness with his later 
monologues.
Nonetheless, Fischer disregards such ethical issues, and 
maintains that Iwein's madness, which was precipitated by 
the realization of his failure, has no bearing on his basic 
perfect state. Fischer supports his argument by highlighting 
the narrator's positive references. Thus, in contrast to 
other scholars, Fischer argues that Iwein remains true to 
himself despite temporarily losing his honour and his 
identity as a consequence of this mistake:
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wie faisch ein solches Verfahren ist, zeigt sich auch daran, daB der treubrüchige Iwein trotz des Verrats die Identitât seines vorbildhaften Seins bewahrt. Denn seiner 'inneren Natur' nach ist er sich unverbrüchlich treu; er besitzt noch in seinem tiefsten Fall 'sin groziu triuwe/sines stæten muotes' (Vs. 3210f.). Es geht eben überhaupt nicht um ein inneres Werden des Subjekts, eine Charakterentwicklung des Helden, wie standig gegen die Aussagen des Werks behauptet wird. (Ehre, Hof, p. 70)
In addition, in his account of Iwein's awakening, Fischer 
underlines the fact that Iwein's first thoughts are for his 
loss of honour and identity. Fischer concludes from this 
that honour is Iwein's first priority, and as such has 
precedence over any ethical considerations (Ehre, Hof, pp. 
104f.). However, one may argue that, as in the case of 
Kalogrenant's definition of adventure, Iwein's initial 
concerns serve to focus attention on the broader components 
which constitute honour, namely active knighthood employed 
in a responsible manner and with ample regard for additional 
obligations. The subsequent emphasis on such components 
becomes apparent in a comparison between this initial 
monologue and Iwein's later monologue at the spring.* In 
this way, Iwein's concept of honour undergoes a progression 
from the pursuit of individual glory, which he demonstrated 
before his marriage, to a broader comprehension of the issue 
which corresponds to his change in circumstances.
Fischer's conclusions are fuelled by his investigation into 
the manner in which feudal society, unlike bourgeois or 
classical Roman society, was not ruled by an ideology which 
constrained the individual. Rather, as Marx stated, the 
aristocratic individual was governed by the principle of his 
own independence and the opinion of others. In such a 
society, honour was considered the ideal expression of the 
principle of knightly independence;
Denn da das adlige Individuum für sich selbstandig ist und auf sich beruhen will, ohne einer von ihm
26
unafohângigen sachlichen Beschrânkung schon unterworfen zu sein, und es in einer bestimmten Situation wiederum nur auf andere selbstandige Individuen trifft, stellt es vor sich und den anderen diese Selbstandigkeit ideell in der Ehre vor und will dann so genommen und behandelt werden, daB niemand 'iiti an sin ère' sprechen darf (Vs. 112, Vs. 167f., Vs. 1071). (Ehre, Hof, p. 143)
Each individual knight pursued honour, and was rewarded by 
recognition. The demands of honour and the fear of shame 
were often the cause of impetuous thoughts or violent 
actions {Ehre, Hof, p. 144). However, honour was considered 
to be a valid excuse for this disruption. Fischer points to 
the evidence of Hobbes who, even as an opponent of 
absolutism, understood why dangerous actions were still 
willingly undertaken in his day in the quest for honour, and 
were regarded as honourable whatever the outcome {Ehre, Hof, 
pp. 145f.). Honour often had little in common with being 
sensible, and thus Fischer concludes that violence in the 
cause of renown did not constitute a moral issue for the 
military aristocracy:
Wenn nun der entschiedene Verfechter des Absolutismus und geschworene Feind feudaler Ehrgesetze immerhin noch so viel Verstandnis für die Unvernunft der Ehre aufbringt, daB er sie als angemessenen Ausdruck einer naturwüchsigen Gesellschaft begreift, um wieviel weniger Veranlassung haben wir dann, dem Dichter des Hochfeudalismus mit unseren vernünftigen und moralischen Ansichten ins Wort zu fallen1 {Ehre, 
Hof, p. 145)
Thus, Iwein and Kalogrenant's actions at the spring, 
although they involve violence, are not indications of a 
moral failing. Fischer likewise concludes from his study of 
honour amongst the military aristocracy (which he bases on 
the work of Hegel) that to accept a dubious cause, as does 
Gawein in the inheritance struggle, or to grant an 
inappropriate request, as does Arthur to Meljaganz, is 
nevertheless to act honourably, or is acceptable as a way of
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preserving one's honour. These examples portray how honour 
must be accorded prevalence at all costs, thereby making 
slaves of all individual knights;
Die Ehre erweist sich so als eine selbstandige Macht gegenüber den Individuen, die sie auch das Verwerflichste geschehen zu lassen zwingt. (Ehre,
Hof, p. 141)
Recklessness, violence, and dubious decisions were thus 
accepted as the consequences of this all-pervading force.
It is the strength of this force which leads Fischer to 
adopt a non-ethical interpretation of Iwein to which even 
the characters' apparently ethical reflections are subject. 
They do not search their consciences to ascertain the 
morality of their actions. Instead, their thoughts relate to 
the attainment of renown. The hero's reflections on aiding 
other characters could, if considered in moral terms, be 
interpreted as indications of compassion or pity. However, 
according to Fischer, they reveal that the hero remains in 
pursuit of his goal of honour. In his opinion, any evidence 
of ethical considerations is merely a chance offshoot of the 
protagonist's single goal:
Im ganzen dominierte der Ehrbegriff uber all seinem Tun, so daB nicht 'dienest', 'reht', 'helfe', und 'erbermde' an sich den Ausschlag gaben, sondern erst ihre Beziehung auf die 'in sich reflektierte Selbstandigkeit' des Helden. Selbst dort, wo die Nâhe zum Religios-Ethischen besonders groB war, blieb immer noch erkennbar, daB sich das 'ethische Substrat' der 'âventiure' zuletzt doch dem Selbstzweck des Helden unterordnete; seinem Glück und seinem Ansehen. 
(Ehre, Hof, p. 155)
The chance expression of pity in the narrative has no 
ethical significance, therefore. Instead, it is simply a by­
product of the hero's search for honour, or else is inspired 
by the influence of courtliness. References to Iwein's
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courtliness, and to the uncourtliness of other characters, 
constitute further clear signals for Fischer that the issue 
at stake in Iwein is not of an ethical nature (Ehre, Hof, 
pp. 156-8). The guidelines of courtliness were developed, in 
Fischer's opinion, by clerics in France to create stability 
in an age of anarchy (Ehre, Hof, p. 156). As such, they 
particularly emphasize the attainment of closer social 
relationships, and, as a result, such apparently ethical 
actions as defending the weak are revealed to be the chance 
consequences of the main pursuit of courtly individuals, 
that of increasing the power base of the military 
aristocracy. Iwein's decisions are therefore ruled by the 
few basic tenets of this courtly mentality which was focused 
on power and stability. He does not need to assess his 
situation in terms beyond this sphere, which constitutes the 
core of noble power. Fischer's definition of courtliness as 
an attempt to introduce stability and encourage the 
activities of the military aristocracy is justified. 
However, as with his definition of honour, the manner in 
which that stability is obtained and utilized in terms of 
secular moral obligations is not considered. Courtliness as 
a process for promoting a lay moral code for the military 
aristocracy is overlooked, leaving Fischer to propound a 
definition which, despite its justifications, does not fully 
embrace the complexity inherent in Hartmann's narratives.
This is likewise the case with regard to Fischer's 
discussion of virtue in the courtly romances. The historical 
background of twelfth-century society provides Fischer with 
evidence that virtue was associated with physical power;
In einer solchen Epoche, die den Anfangen der sich neu ausbildenden Formen von Staatlichkeit auf der Grundlage der Territorien voraufgeht, mochte dann auch die Bedeutung von 'Tugend' identisch sein mit der willkürlichen, rohen Gewalttatigkeit selbst.(Ehre, Hof, p. 175) I
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On this basis, Fischer identifies virtue in the courtly 
romances as denoting the physical prowess to which the term 
tugent originally referred. According to Fischer, this 
concept of virtue, namely prowess, is in itself an ethically 
neutral force which can be used for good or evil. The knight 
and his enemies therefore utilize the same physical means to 
achieve different ends:
Der unaufgeloste und unauflosbare Widerspruch ist dieser: Das Gute, das der tugendhafte Ritter voll- bringt, hat nur durch seine individuelle Tat Wirk- lichkeit. Insofern existiert es auch nur in dem Gewaltvermogen des Einzelnen, in seiner Fâhigkeit, vollendet zu kampfen, in seiner Kraft, das im Gegner ebenso nur als Fahigkeit und Kraft vorhandene Schlechte zu bezwingen. 1st die Tugend nun zwar nicht im BewuBtsein des Helden, aber in ihrer Realitât immer nur diese ritterliche Tüchtigkeit selbst, dann heiBt das, daB sie auch zu ihrem Gegenteil werden kann. Als die personals Gewalt der Individualitat, wodurch das Gute erst in Existenz tritt, ist diese Tugend eine gegenüber 'Gut' und 'Schlecht' indifférente Potenz. (Ehre,
Hof, p. 170)
Thus, the knight's defence of his independent lifestyle is 
by definition a promotion of virtue. Furthermore, Fischer 
contends that virtuous intentions are meaningless unless 
coupled with action, which may well be violent. This 
constitutes the paradox of the knightly lifestyle. It is 
vital that a knight remains active and independent so that 
he may achieve good by violent means (Ehre, Hof, p. 175). 
Fischer's accentuation of the need for action can again be 
justified, but reveals certain limitations. In this 
assessment, Fischer gives no credence to the role of an 
ethically-inspired conscience used in combination with 
physical actions, a role which is portrayed in Iwein's inner 
considerations prior to taking action, and which constitutes 
significant evidence that Hartmann's concerns lie in the lay 
moral sphere, rather than within the bounds of the honour 
ethic.
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Fischer's interpretation that secular honour is the 
underlying issue in this narrative is subsequently applied 
to Iwein's adventures following his madness. According to 
Fischer, all of these episodes are pervaded by the notion 
that honour is synonymous with identity and consciousness. 
For example, Iwein almost faints on his second arrival at 
the spring. As Fischer states;
hat der Ritter vor allem in der Ehre das nachste affirmative BewuBtsein seiner selbst, dann muB ihm die Erkenntnis, daB er bar jeder Ehre ist, auch das BewuBtsein wieder infirmieren. (Ehre, Hof, p.107)
Iwein's subsequent attempt at suicide denotes his revenge on 
the body which led him astray. Once Iwein's honour has 
withstood the ultimate test, however, in his combat against 
Gawein, he is able to reveal his identity (Ehre, Hof, pp. 
133-9). Up until this point, Iwein disguises himself with a 
pseudonym, not as an indication of evolving altruism, but 
rather of diminished honour. (Ehre, Hof, p. 119).
By excluding ethical motivation, Iwein's willingness to aid 
others is attributed by Fischer solely to his concern for 
honour. By practising knighthood in this way, Iwein 
reconfirms his capabilities as an active knight, as is 
apparent in the episode with the Lady of Narison (Ehre, Hof, 
pp. 105f.), or else takes responsibility for the objective 
consequences for his earlier actions, as in his defence of 
Lunete (Ehre, Hof, pp. 110-2). In Fischer's opinion, Iwein 
is not ruled by compassion or an awareness of subjective 
guilt for Lunete's predicament. Instead, he is simply 
refusing to delegate responsibility for the unintentional 
consequences of his actions. Fischer comments that this 
acceptance of objective guilt by the heroic individual is 
likewise evident in other works of this genre:
Weder wuBte Parzival, wessen er sich schuldig machen würde, als er die sogenannte Mitleidsfrage
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unterlieB, noch lag es in dem Vorsatz Erecs, sich zu 'verligen', oder Iweins, einen Eidbruch zu begehen, doch werden alle schuldig. Und Iwein miBt sich ausdrücklich den ohne Schuld des Willens zustande gekommenen 'verrât' also nur seine Schuld zu, die auch allein auf ihn zurückfâllt. (Ehre,
Hof, p. 110)
It can be claimed, however, that each of these main 
protagonists fails as a result of an inadequate awareness of 
their obligations. Nevertheless, Fischer rejects what he 
terms the bourgeois concept of subjectivity in his 
consideration of Iwein's guilt, and gives no credence to the 
evidence that this issue was similarly of great import in 
terms of secular morality in Hartmann's age.
Fischer considers Iwein to have regained his honourable 
status before he reaches Pesme Aventure. This episode 
therefore stands apart in the sense that Iwein acts 
independently against external forces, rather than seeking 
to rebuild his shattered reputation by aiding those who have 
a claim on his assistance (Ehre, Hof, pp. 125-32). He is not 
pursuing honour in this case because the actions of his 
antagonists negate any advantage to be gained in defeating 
them. Instead, this is a separate episode in an epic 
structure which portrays the end of Iwein's journey to 
regain his honour. He has demonstrated his readiness to re­
enter his own society.
The fact that compassion does not motivate Iwein's actions 
is further proven, according to both Fischer and VoB, by the 
noble status of the recipients of Iwein's help. This is the 
case with Gawein's sister's family, whose identity he 
establishes before offering his aid (Ehre, Hof, pp. 112-4), 
with his agreement to help the count's younger daughter 
(Ehre, Hof, pp. 123f.), and even with the Pesme Avanture 
episode in which Iwein's concern for the captive maidens is 
based on their noble birth, rather than their suffering 
(Ehre, Hof, pp. 126f.). Similarly, Iwein agrees to fight
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Harpin because he has acted dishonourably, and has caused 
pain to noble people. The high social status of the
recipients of Iwein's aid is a prerequisite for his
accumulation of honour, even though from a modern ethical
point of view, his motivation in imposing such conditions 
appears decidedly dubious. On this issue, Fischer makes a 
particularly valid point which serves to recentre the 
tendency in Hartmann scholarship to accord only the 
Christian notion of altruism to Iwein. The restricted nature 
of Iwein's aid supports the interpretation that Hartmann is 
concerned with portraying the secular morality of the
military aristocracy, such a socially-exclusive moral code 
does not incorporate a level of compassion which is 
unrestricted by status and class. However, for Fischer to 
draw the conclusion that such an accentuation of social 
status excludes any other ethical dimension is again to 
demonstrate only a limited perspective.
Fischer's major piece of evidence in highlighting Iwein's 
singular concern for his reputation lies in the episode in 
which he is bound by two deadlines. On realizing his 
predicament, his initial thoughts centre on the possibility 
that he will be considered cowardly for not defending 
Lunete, rather than on the danger to Lunete herself (Iw 
4830-4) (Ehre, Hof, p. 115). He is therefore reacting in an 
apparently egoistical fashion, but one which is acceptable 
in the eyes of the military aristocracy. Iwein's predicament 
therefore lies in the inability to see a clear way to both 
preserving his honour and helping those relying on him. 
Fischer identifies this incident as a prime opportunity for 
Hartmann to have emphasized a moral dilemma. By not doing 
so, Hartmann, in Fischer's opinion, must be disregarding 
moral issues (Ehre, Hof, p. 117). As further confirmation of 
the objective nature of this incident, Iwein is released 
from his dilemma by the workings of fate when Harpin appears 
at the last possible moment. Fischer, however, overlooks the 
fact that the equal demands placed on Iwein here do indeed
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constitute a moral dilemma. His claim that Hartmann does not 
introduce an ethical aspect to Iwein's predicament does not 
take into account Iwein's stated desire to act justly in 
overcoming this crisis by aiding those relying on him as 
well as by proving himself (Iw 4892, 4898).^°
It is also apparent that Fischer disregards textual evidence 
in this way on other occasions in order to arrive at his 
anti-moralistic interpretation. The two episodes which 
provide this evidence in particular abundance are Iwein's 
encounter with the lion and the dragon, and his initial 
reaction to Lunete on his return to the spring. It is indeed 
stated, as Fischer maintains, that Iwein decides to help the 
noble beast (Iw 3848f.). However, Fischer does not consider 
the reasoning behind Iwein's decision. It is stated that 
Iwein in fact undergoes agonies of indecision over whom he 
should help:
hern îwein tete der zwxvel wêwederm er helfen solde,und bedâhte sich daz er woldehelfen dem edelen tiere. (Iw 3846-9)
This is the result of the fact that the precise intentions 
of both parties are unclear (Iw 3850-60). It cannot be 
denied that Fischer is justified in demonstrating Iwein's 
concern with nobility in this incident, but he extracts this 
point from a context which reveals Hartmann's concern with 
broader lay moral issues. Fischer consequently misinterprets 
this fundamental passage in the text. Furthermore, he 
brusquely rejects the opinion of Hansjürgen Linke that the 
struggle between the lion and the dragon symbolizes the 
ethical struggle within the main protagonist, and that this 
episode constitutes the moment at which Iwein's concerns 
turn from egoism to altruism. Fischer observes no 
indication from the narrator that this episode has symbolic 
depth, and concludes that:
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das eifrige Bemühen, im Lowenabenteuer den Durchbruch des moralischen Charakters zu zeigen, führt zu dem denkwürdigen Ergebnis, daB Hartmann entweder unfahig gewesen sein muB, zu sagen, was er eigentlich meinte, oder ein sehr raffinierter Autor, der den Sinn seiner Rede so kunstvoll zu verschlüsseln wuBte, daB er sich nur dem gewiegtesten Kenner erschlieBen konnte. (Ehre, 
Hof, p. 64)
Fischer appears to have overlooked the significance of 
Iwein's reflection and vacillation at this juncture, Linke, 
however, recognizes this significance and is thus not 
discouraged by the lack of narrator's comment. The evolution 
in Iwein's perception to a greater awareness of the 
motivations of others, which has been caused by his missing 
of the deadline, needs no further clarification if one is 
prepared to recognize the significance of his thoughts. 
Hartmann is indeed a sophisticated author, but his meaning 
is not veiled in such complex terms as to render it almost 
invisible, as Fischer suggests. Instead, Hartmann uses 
various methods to reveal the meaning behind his narratives 
as will be examined later.
The second episode in which the limitations of Fischer's 
interpretation are demonstrated is Iwein's encounter with 
Lunete at the spring. After hearing Lunete's cry, Iwein 
responds to her lament by claiming that he himself has a 
greater right to feel sorrowful (Iw 4028-31). Iwein's 
subsequent discovery of her identity and his involvement in 
her predicament, however, provoke a thoughtfulness which 
allows him to experience compassion for her, as well as to 
increase his honour and repay his debt to her, as Fischer 
has stated. Iwein's initial seIf-préoccupâtion therefore 
highlights his transformation in this episode. In addition, 
this passage offers a further piece of evidence which 
Fischer ignores. Iwein states that he will defend Lunete as 
repayment for helping him to his position of lord:
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'Ez ist reht daz ich iu loneder êrbæren kronedie ich von iuwern schulden truoc.ich hete êren genuoc:waz half mich daz ich golt vant?ez ist eht vil unbewantzuo dem tôren des goldes vunt:er wirfet ez doch hin zestunt.swie ich zuo mir selben habe getân,ir suit iedoch gewis hân,ichn lâze iuch niht under wegen.wan do ich tôt wære gelegen,do hulfet ir mir von sorgen:also tuon ich iu morgen.' (Iw 4247-60)
Iwein therefore makes a valid insight into the nature of 
honour here. He recognizes his failure to cherish it and to 
appreciate the part others played in its acquisition. 
Elements relating to Iwein's increasing awareness and 
appreciation of honour may be traced throughout the text. 
Fischer's observations are valid in as much as honour is 
vital to the hero. However, the definition of honour in 
terms of knighthood and lordship is at issue in this work. 
The pursuit of honour does not serve Iwein well after his 
marriage because he fails to appreciate it within a broader 
context than the individual quest for glory. Only through 
the course of his adventures does he relearn the meaning of 
honour, as is apparent in his monologues. According to 
Fischer, however, Iwein simply returns to his earlier 
honourable status after re-establishing himself in his 
adventures. By acknowledging subjective issues, however, it 
is possible to trace Iwein's progress from an appreciation 
of honour with regard to action and renown, to an 
appreciation of how that prowess must be used to fulfil his 
new obligations and for the good of all noble people.
QtMd Efarismann. *Hofisches Leben und Individualitat - Hartmanns Erec'
The repudiation of the existence of psychological 
progression in Hartmann's work by VoB and Fischer is
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supported by Otfrid Ehrismann in his consideration of Erec. 
Ehrismann presents a different angle of interpretation, 
however, by maintaining that Hartmann's main protagonists in 
Erec are essentially de-individualized, exemplary 
representations of courtly culture, and that the text 
consequently should not be considered in subjective terms. 
Instead, he claims that 'es ist die Logik des courtoisen 
Erzahlens, in die der Interpret schlüpfen mu&, nicht die der 
Seele' ('Hofisches Leben', p. 114).
According to Ehrismann, Erec and Enite, as the ideal courtly 
couple, are required to undertake a journey owing to their 
pursuit of individual desires at the expense of the well­
being of their society. By means of this journey, they must 
demonstrate a superior approach to courtly life, namely one 
in which the desires of the individual are not accorded 
uppermost importance. It is therefore a journey towards 
reintegration into courtly society which does not entail a 
psychological progression towards greater self-knowledge:
DaB der Held am Ende und im Rückblick ein einmaliger Typ ist Oder zu sein scheint, verdankt er seiner Geschichte und gerade nicht seinem Werden, bei dem er nicht zu sich selbst, sondern zum Hof gekommen ist. ('Hôfisches Leben', p. 121)
In the light of this emphasis on courtly life, individ­
ualistic actions, such as those demonstrated by Erec and 
Enite after their wedding, are condemned as socially 
detrimental. As Ehrismann states:
die Darstellung mittelalterlicher Heldenwege dient der Zurücknahme von (als kollektiv bedrohlich empfundener) Individualitat. ('Hôfisches Leben', p. 102)
Like VoB and Fischer, Ehrismann bases his interpretation on 
the distinction between the modern and medieval concepts of 
individuality, claiming that the modern notion of the unique
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individual alienated from society is inapplicable to 
Hartmann's work. In quoting Horst Wenzel, he states that;
das einheitsstiftende Prinzip des dargestellten Lebens ist noch nicht die kausalpsychologisch rekonstruierte Entwicklung eines Ich in Auseinandersetzung mit der Welt, sondern die Demonstration personaler Identitat als Nachvollzug und Einlosung von überindividuellen, dem Einzelnen auBerlich (von Gott) vorgegebener [sic] Lebens- muster.
Despite this valid distinction, however, Ehrismann proceeds 
to reject the possibility that Hartmann is demonstrating how 
individual actions, primed by an awareness of obligations, 
are an essential element in the functioning of feudal 
society, and also underlie contemporary religious practice, 
A comparison between this literature and theological 
concepts concerning self-awareness is not appropriate in 
Ehrismann's opinion. Indeed, he claims that Hartmann, by 
presenting a work in which courtly issues are portrayed as 
superior to psychological progression, has specifically 
chosen not to reflect contemporary theological thought 
regarding individuality;
Er desavouiert durch die hofische Aktion das Hineinhorchen des Menschen in sich selbst, zu dem er, denken wir an die augustinischen cotifessiones Oder die zeitgenossische Mystik, die wie er eine 'Vernichtung' des Ich betreibt, durchaus fahig ware. Es sieht in der Tat so aus, als ob er kônnte, aber nicht wollte. ('Hôfisches Leben', p.120)
Furthermore, Ehrismann contends that any comparison of 
Hartmann's works with theological concepts is futile owing 
to the fact that individuality in literature is an aspect of 
genre and therefore distinct from religious doctrine;
Die salvatorische Klausel des Literarhistorikers gegen die Realitët bedeutet weiterhin, die Dichtung nicht unbesehen in Anlehnung an zeitgenossische theologische Konzepte zu
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interpretieren bzw. der Dichtung die Realisierungsabsicht dieser Konzepte zu unterstellen. ('Hôfisches Leben', p. 102)
Ehrismann's approach, like that of VoB and Fischer, is based 
upon a detailed consideration of events before the verligen 
episode. Conclusions drawn from these events are thereafter 
applied to the remainder of the narrative. In his analysis 
of the initial episode of Erec, Ehrismann argues that 
Hartmann is concerned with representing aspects of courtly 
culture and moral issues over and above his source- In this 
sense, he greatly expands the description of the wedding and 
preparations for the tournament, and employs imagery from 
the courtly love tradition ('Hôfisches Leben', pp. 109-13). 
These additions to the source do not comprise elements 
relating to individuality. Instead, Ehrismann maintains that 
they are partly the result of a desire to present unfamiliar 
concepts of courtliness to the German audience, as Huby has 
suggested, but are also caused by Hartmann's conscious 
toning down of aspects concerning individuality in his 
source ('Hôfisches Leben', pp. 117f.). Ehrismann concludes 
from this initial episode therefore that Hartmann is 
portraying courtly issues as superior to individual actions.
These conclusions are subsequently applied to the remainder 
of the narrative. However, Ehrismann's preoccupation with 
Hartmann's descriptions of courtly life and morality leads 
him, like VoB and Fischer, to disregard Erec's inner 
monologues and other signs of psychological awareness both 
before and after the verligen- These monologues reveal a 
significantly different approach to Hartmann's source, and 
suggest that, far from trying to reject individual actions 
as detrimental to society, Hartmann was concerned with 
portraying the essential nature of appropriate individual 
awareness and behaviour for the good and basic functioning 
of aristocratic society. By focusing exclusively on the 
episode prior to the verligen, Ehrismann presumes that 
Hartmann's greater emphasis on courtly behaviour over and
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above any psychological depth in his characters, represents 
his whole approach. In fact, by taking the entire narrative 
into account, and particularly the depth of inner awareness 
of the main protagonists directly after the verligen, it is 
possible to detect a contrast by which post-verligen 
psychological depth in the protagonists may be measured. Too 
much emphasis on pre-verligen events deprives Ehrismann of 
the opportunity of making such a contrast. Ehrismann's 
disregard of this evidence of psychological depth leads him 
to claim instead that Erec and Enite fail to reach clear 
decisions or display clear motives in the course of their 
adventures ('Hôfisches Leben', pp. 106f.). Any evidence of 
psychological awareness in the narrative is fragmentary and, 
according to Ehrismann, cannot even be proven to be 
intentional on the author's part ('Hôfisches Leben', p. 102, 
pp. 115-18). In Ehrismann's estimation, it occupies a 
position of secondary importance to courtliness.
Courtly behaviour is indeed central to Hartmann's work. 
However, this is not due to the restrictions of the 
Arthurian romance tradition, as Ehrismann suggests 
('Hôfisches Leben', pp. 121f.), or to Hartmann's lack of 
originality in his adaptation ('Hôfisches Leben', p. 99). 
Neither is it the case that Hartmann's representation of the 
ideal courtly couple involves a rejection of socially- 
damaging individual concerns. Rather, Hartmann's narrative 
provides a framework for a discussion of the relationship 
between the courtly individual and his society, one based on 
duty and courtly morality to which the key is self- 
awareness. The ideal courtly couple must possess this key in 
order to balance their obligations to God, to one another, 
and to their society.
A Comparison of VoB. Fischer, and Ehrismaim
In denying the existence of an ethical dimension to 
Hartmann's works, these three scholars share certain
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similarities in their otherwise distinct approaches. Of 
essential significance is their contention that the initial 
episodes of the narratives act as blueprints which may be 
applied to the whole text as a guide to interpretation. 
However, a more holistic approach, incorporating at least 
the circumstances and immediate aftermath of the periods of 
failure encountered by the main protagonists, reveals an 
exclusive concentration on the initial episodes to be 
ultimately restrictive. Events directly following these 
failures reveal an emphasis on the inner awareness of the 
protagonists. The remainder of the narratives depicts 
similar evidence of the author's preoccupation with this 
aspect within the protagonists' considerations of their 
options, responsibilities, and previous actions. The initial 
episodes therefore lay the foundations for these 
psychological aspects to be revealed in the wake of the 
protagonists' failures. This is not to claim that in these 
initial episodes the protagonists are overtly inferior in 
any ethical sense. Nonetheless, they have yet to undergo a 
fundamentally important change in circumstances which will 
make extensive demands on their powers of self-awareness. 
Furthermore, there are covert indications of progress to be 
made or issues to be discussed, as revealed in the
references to Erec's youthfulness and the definition of 
adventure in Iwein. Such covertness, coupled with Hartmann's 
tendency to allow his protagonists to represent his approach 
in their monologues, rather than his narrator, stresses that 
these works function as vehicles for the discussion of the 
lay moral concerns of the military aristocracy.
Such an interest in the protagonists' self-awareness also 
places Hartmann's works within the framework of the
exploration of the subjective nature of sin by twelfth- 
century masters. Nevertheless, the focus of these works is 
not entirely religious. It is on this point that these three 
scholars make their most valuable contribution to
scholarship. The depiction of individual morality in these
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works cannot be defined entirely by twelfth-century 
theological or by modern ethical standards. The basis of 
Hartmann's approach is much broader than this. As such, the 
concern of the protagonists for their honour cannot be 
dismissed as unethical, nor can the individual knight be 
considered alienated from his society. Within the context of 
a secular aristocratic morality, however, a knight must 
attempt to balance a variety of roles and obligations to his 
status, his society, and his God. The means to achieve this 
balance and to fulfil all these roles, however, is through 
self-awareness.
In order to balance the approach of this present study, it 
is also necessary to address the work of recent scholars who 
acknowledge the existence of an ethical progression in 
Hartmann's works. The work of Rüdiger Schnell will be 
closely considered as an example of a similar but more 
specific approach than the present study. In addition to 
Schnell's evidence of the influence of twelfth-century 
developments concerning the subjective nature of sin on 
Hartmann's works, one further study, by Susan Clark, which 
traces the subjective dimension in a close, text-based 
appraisal of Hartmann's narratives, will be briefly 
considered.
Susan Clark. Hartmann von Aue: Landscapes o f Mind
The title of Clark's work immediately reveals the focus of 
her interpretation, namely that Hartmann was seeking to 
examine the manner in which his characters' minds work. As 
she states in her introduction;
Hartmann takes as his abiding and overriding concern the workings of the mind - and by mind shall be understood cerebral functions as well as the emotive and perceptual functions tied to mind - and translates mind into terms individual to each of his poems. Hartmann, more so than
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Gottfried or Wolfram, is occupied constantly with how characters think, how their minds and therefore their lives change, and how what they think they know is continually called into question. (Landscapes, pp. 3f.)
Subsequently, Clark maintains that this authorial interest 
in perception has a co-ordinating function in the narrative 
as Hartmann's 'fascination with the mind ... forms the glue 
that binds his longer poems together' (Landscapes, p. 3).
By recognizing the existence and significance of thought 
processes in Hartmann's works in this way, Clark is applying 
a distinctly different approach to the objective stances of 
VoB, Fischer, and Ehrismann. This is not only the case in 
her insistence on the importance of a psychological 
dimension in the narratives, but also in her consideration 
of the works outwith their historical context:
I will spend little time on sources that may have contributed to Hartmann's understanding of mind, since they are poorly established and our knowledge about them is speculative. To focus on them detracts from the focus on Hartmann's own parameters of mind as well as those faculties he sees as related to mind. My intent is to suggest readings that are true to the individual poems as well as to the coherent concern of the body of Hartmann's work. (Landscapes, p. 6)
The speculation which concerns Clark relates to Hartmann's 
biographical details and his knowledge of early scholastic 
psychology. Clark thus elects to avoid the approach of 
critics who claim that Hartmann was influenced by specific 
theological sources. With regard to these approaches, Clark 
argues that;
while we must consider how a "medieval" frame of mind received medieval texts, I feel that many critics who speak with certainty about what that frame of mind was are merely consciously or subconsciously echoing the constant medieval reliance on auctoritas» Often a modern reader's
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response to the text is overwhelmed by references to the Patrologia latina or Augustine or Bernard of Clairvaux and standard reference works. I find delight in these sources, but a middle ground approach seems better, not only because we cannot say with certainty what those "mislichen buochen"... were upon which Hartmann based his works or who wrote them, but also because my approach to Hartmann does not demand the "antecedent model" favored by many medievalists today. (Landscapes, p. 6)
Clark's reluctance to associate Hartmann with any particular 
source of influence in the light of such unreliable evidence 
is partially justified. However, whilst evidence pertaining 
to specific influences on Hartmann can indeed only be 
speculative, Clark's choice of a 'middle way' does not take 
account of an alternative option, namely that of placing 
Hartmann's works against a general historical background. 
Such a context can be created by considering how the 
concerns of specific early scholastic theologians regarding 
self-awareness filtered down by means of sermons, 
confessional guides, and the penitential system, to achieve 
a widespread influence on the lives of ordinary Christians. 
Similarly, there is general evidence to suggest that 
economic and social factors contributed from the late 
eleventh century in western Europe to the creation of a 
broad awareness of individual choice and obligations which 
demanded the guidance of self-knowledge. Such general 
concerns provide a more justifiable context for informing 
Hartmann's interest in the mind and presumably the awareness 
of such concerns in his audience. Thus, even though Clark's 
approach allows her to achieve detailed insight into 
Hartmann's works, her disregard of their historical context 
is not entirely justified by her argument. As a result, her 
subsequent conclusions occasionally lack the guidance which 
a historical context would provide.
In spite of its restrictions, Clark's text-based approach 
nevertheless allows her to reveal detailed evidence of
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thought processes in Hartmann's works. In particular, she 
considers interior monologues and speech, losses of 
consciousness, and descriptions of a character's knowledge 
and ignorance (Landscapes, p. 4) . In addition, she takes 
into account references to actual thought processes, or 
'mind terms', for example words denoting the mental activity 
of thinking, imagining, knowing, and evaluating (Landscapes, 
p. 5). These terms are subsequently analyzed with regard to 
frequency and position in the text to highlight areas of 
high or low incidence of thought processes. Clark proceeds 
to compare the interior mental state of the protagonists 
with their changing exterior surroundings, and in addition 
extends her investigation to include Hartmann's thematic 
narrative technique. This she interprets as challenging the 
audience to respond to the text by employing the same mental 
processing that the protagonists themselves demonstrate 
(Landscapes, pp. 4f,). In this way, the reader is asked to 
reflect constantly on the narrative by being alert to 
similarities and contrasts in the plot structure.
Clark's text-based approach, despite its lack of context, is 
nevertheless particularly welcome for revealing the 
progression of Hartmann's interest in perception throughout 
his output, À brief account of Clark's interpretation of 
Hartmann's narratives will be sufficient to demonstrate the 
advantages of her detailed investigation, and the 
disadvantages of its isolation from its historical 
background.
According to Clark, Die Klage constitutes a direct portrayal 
of a person in conflict, in which the two protagonists, the 
heart and body, represent the forces of reason and of 
capriciousness within that person. Their debate serves to 
illustrate the need for co-operation between these forces in 
order for the decision-making process to work and for 
justifiable action to be achieved. As Clark states:
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[Die Elage] sets out an anatomy of the functions of a mind as the seat of both reason and emotion, and as an entity capable of reflection, imagination, and problem-solving. (Landscapes, p. 44)
The body, representing the force of physical desire and 
irrationality, is eventually forced to acknowledge the 
heart's superior judgement as the power of reason. In 
addition, the body learns to appreciate the need for these 
two disparate forces to establish a state of harmony in 
order that a love relationship may be successfully pursued. 
Furthermore, it is by these same means that God's favour is 
likewise to be gained. Clark therefore defines this work as 
Hartmann's initial investigation of the inner conflict
between desire and perception which emerges in the 
protagonists of his later narratives. However, her valid 
conclusions are not complemented by the setting of the role 
of rationality and its relationship with desire in this work 
into the context of classical philosophy. Neither does Clark 
consider the twelfth-century theological debate concerning 
free will and the roles of action and thought in the
achievement of virtue and remission of sin which was 
influenced by this tradition. In light of the fact that this 
debate affected penitential practice in Hartmann's age, it 
can reasonably be claimed that it also found resonance in 
this narrative and amongst Hartmann's audience.
Clark links Die Klage closely with Erec by discerning a 
repetition of the heart/body rift in the conflict within 
Erec and Enite's marriage. Both partnerships suffer from a 
lack of communication, and both the body and Erec, 
representing the force of irrationality, are required to 
accept the guidance of reason in the guise of Enite and the 
heart. Clark's scrutiny of terms referring to mental 
processing and her consideration of monologues serve to
elucidate Erec's journey from perceptive knight to
imperceptive husband and lord, and finally to a life of
46
altruism and considerate knightly activity. In a reflection 
of the initially dysfunctional relationship between the 
heart and body, Erec and Enite represent the forces of 
imperception and perception in the wake of the verligen 
episode. Thus, in Clark's estimation, Enite inherits Erec's 
earlier perceptive qualities, whilst Erec retreats into a 
state of blank imperception (Landscapes, pp. 60f.). This 
transformation is most apparent in Enite's capacity to 
speak, whilst Erec, in a demonstration of his non­
reflection, is silent, and attempts to impose a similar 
silence on his wife. Clark concludes that Enite's speech 
represents moderate and discerning action which is guided by 
the perception she demonstrates in her inner monologues. 
This perceptive judgement is particularly visible in her 
repeated justifications to her husband of her disobedience. 
In contrast, Erec's disorientation is revealed in his unfair 
treatment of his wife. Erec subsequently undergoes a gradual 
recovery of his perceptive qualities, however, until he 
finally reveals his renewed ability to judge situations in 
the Cadoc episode by asking questions and acting promptly on 
his conclusions (Landscapes, pp. 75f.). His achievements are 
finally confirmed in his thoughtful and careful actions in 
the Joie de la curt episode in which he overcomes his former 
anti-social self in the figure of Mabonagrin (Landscapes, 
pp. 85f.).
Clark's emphasis on aspects in the text which highlight the 
perception of the main protagonists, for example, speech, 
monologues, and the contrasting perceptive qualities of 
opponents, is thoroughly demonstrated with reference to 
Erec. Nevertheless, certain details in her conclusions must 
be called into question, for example, her claim that Enite 
only pretends to believe that Erec is asleep on making her 
complaint at Karnant (Landscapes, p. 61), or else her 
argument that Enite's lament in the forest demonstrates a 
loss of perception to rival Erec's earlier failure 
(Landscapes, pp. 77f.). These are points which will be
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discussed in Chapter 3 of the present study. Such aspects 
mar Clark's broader, justifiable conclusions relating to the 
depiction of perception in this work.
In the case of Iwein, Clark likewise traces a progression in 
the main protagonist from his egoism in impetuously killing 
Askalon to the altruism he acquires by learning to think and 
judge before he acts. She concludes that Iwein's attitude 
before his failure is the result of a lack of perceptive 
control. This failing is initially manifested in 
Kalogrenant's rendition of his own adventure, which Clark 
interprets as a conscious attempt on Kalogrenant's part to 
warn his fellow knights of the dangers of impetuosity 
(Landscapes, pp. 171f.), and in the figure of the Wild 
Herdsman whom Clark contrasts, as a figure controlling 
disparate forces, with Iwein's own lack of control 
(Landscapes, p. 173). A similar impetuosity underlies the 
union between Iwein and Laudine which is based solely on 
desire (Landscapes, p. 184). Iwein's wish to pursue his 
knightly activities constitutes a continuation of this lack 
of control, and his year on the tournament circuit reveals 
no evidence of his awareness of his other obligations. Only 
once he has regained his senses after his madness does he 
gradually exhibit in the progression of his monologues the 
acquisition of the capacity to guide his actions by his 
thoughts and so engage in knightly pursuits for the sake of 
others (Landscapes, pp. 188f.). The co-ordination and 
harmony of thought and action is thus presented by Clark as 
the key objective for the heroes of Hartmann's Arthurian 
romances.
Clark's focus on perception in Hartmann's narratives 
continues in her analysis of Gregorius. However, her 
conclusions from the narratives previously discussed, in 
terms of the need for perception to be combined with action, 
are no longer apparent here, despite their relevance. Clark 
interprets Gregorius as a work revealing the difficulties
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inherent in handing down knowledge of the experience of sin 
through the generations (Landscapes, pp. 94f.). Thus, 
Gregorius inherits incomplete information regarding his 
origins from the tablet, and this lack of information 
directly causes his own sin in the second incest. However, 
through the actual experience of sin, Gregorius ultimately 
achieves true wisdom. Clark concludes that without this 
experience, humankind, as represented by Gregorius, only has 
access to imperfect knowledge and a flawed capacity to 
reason, rather than to true wisdom (Landscapes, pp. 94f., p. 
104, p. 118).
The concept of incomplete knowledge is not only apparent in 
the message on the tablet, but also in the theme of 
concealing knowledge throughout the narrative, for example, 
the hiding of Gregorius with foster parents, and of the 
tablet by the abbot and Gregorius himself. Likewise, Clark 
argues that Hartmann employs irony and concealment 
strategies in his narrative techniques to recreate the 
deficiency in his protagonist's knowledge amongst his 
audience. Clark furthermore emphasizes the use of terms 
relating to sight in the maid, who acts as a figure of 
perception in this work, and whose inquisitiveness contrasts 
with the partial knowledge and imperception of Gregorius and 
his mother.
Clark's demonstration of imperception in the characters is 
again thorough and partially justified, but nevertheless 
suffers from a serious flaw. She bases her assumption that 
the characters' knowledge of the nature of sin is incomplete 
on the tablet's limited information. Gregorius does indeed 
initially find himself in a state of ignorance, but it can 
be argued that his tablet nevertheless provides him with 
sufficient knowledge about his inheritance to permit him a 
full insight into his sinful state. In this sense, 
therefore, his self-knowledge is already complete after he 
reads the tablet at the monastery. Gregorius' later readings
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of the tablet after his marriage, which Clark accepts as 
demonstrating sufficient penance (Landscapes, p. 106), 
therefore reinforce the fact that he has access to the 
essential details of his sinful inheritance, but that he 
subsequently fails to acknowledge this information fully by 
continuing his search for his parents. The ignorance of the 
characters does not therefore symbolize the problem of 
handing down knowledge, and the manner in which that 
incomplete knowledge leads to sin, as Clark maintains. 
Rather, it represents the inherited sinfulness of humankind 
as a result of original sin which has to be overcome by 
active recognition and acceptance. This is indicated in 
twelfth-century teaching regarding the consequences of the 
Fall. Although Gregorius is initially ignorant of his 
inheritance, therefore, his tablet provides him with all the 
necessary information. However, it is information which he 
does not fully accept, and his inaction regarding his vow to 
find his parents leads him ultimately into a state of 
personal sin. It is therefore not the case that Gregorius 
has to experience sin as a result of his flawed perception 
in order to gain wisdom, but rather that he has to accept 
his knowledge of his inheritance in a meaningful and active 
m a n n e r . I n  fact, Clark's conclusions from her assessment 
of Hartmann's Arthurian romances are highly relevant to 
Gregorius as the placing of this narrative in the historical 
context would have indicated.
Finally, Clark's investigation of Der arme Heinrich focuses 
on further evidence of Hartmann's use of terms relating to 
speech and sensory faculties as indications of perception. 
This is apparent in the maiden's absolute determination to 
express her plans and her parents' unwillingness to listen 
to her proposal (Landscapes, pp. 143f.). In addition, Clark 
highlights the presence of terms referring to sight and 
hearing at Heinrich's conversion. She maintains that his 
sensory perception thus symbolizes his breakthrough into 
self-knowledge (Landscapes, p. 155). Clark reveals evidence
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of inner awareness in Heinrich and the maiden before this 
point which demonstrates their desire to govern their own 
destinies. Heinrich's mind is described as having been 
consistently turned away from God, thus revealing the source 
of his troubles, and indeed the solution. He demonstrates 
the progression of his self-insight after several years with 
the peasants by revealing his awareness of the true cause of 
his leprosy. However, his insight does not yet extend to 
recognizing the power of God's forgiveness as a solution 
(Landscapes, pp. 136f.). Similarly, the maiden seeks to 
engineer her own salvation by offering herself as a virgin 
sacrifice. Her extreme reaction to Heinrich's intervention 
ultimately reveals the essential self-interest behind her 
offer despite her demonstrated reflective capacity. Both 
main characters thus ultimately achieve full insight as 
Heinrich realizes the need to be mindful of God and to trust 
in his mercy, and the maiden similarly accepts God's role in 
her destiny.
For exhibiting the mechanics of Hartmann's interest in 
perception, Clark's analysis of his narratives is extremely 
useful and rich in detail. On this evidence, it is difficult 
to agree with VoB, Fischer, and Ehrismann that Hartmann's 
characters display no evidence of psychological progression. 
However, Clark's lack of an historical basis to her approach 
means that Hartmann's interest cannot be interpreted within 
the context of his age, Clark's conclusions are therefore 
necessarily reduced to being speculation about Hartmann's 
personal interest in perception. In this, Clark's approach 
is unusual in scholarship. Consequently, an analysis of a 
recent study of perception in Hartmann's works which 
involves a more traditional appraisal of the historical 
context will be considered.
51
Rüdiger SchnelL 'Abaelards Gesinnungsethik und die Rechtsthematik in Hartmanns 
Iwein"
Schnell's interpretation of Iwein is sensitive to the 
existence of subjective elements in Hartmann's narratives, 
but, unlike Clark, he firmly attributes these elements to 
justifiable historical influences. Schnell thereby also 
presents an alternative to the objective interpretation 
which he views as prevalent in Iwein scholarship 
('Gesinnungsethik', p. 15, p. 25), and maintains that the 
diversity of approaches to this text is due to the lack of 
clarity existing over the appropriate value system to be 
employed in its appraisal. Scholarship is thus divided, in 
Schnell's opinion, over whether the text should be viewed in 
the light of social responsibilities, Christian virtues, or 
secular judicial norms. Schnell responds to this complex 
state of affairs by arguing that Hartmann's main concern is 
to portray the ethical significance of his protagonists' 
intentions. He points as evidence for his claim to the 
widespread discussion of sin and the developing emphasis on 
private penance and confession in the twelfth century 
('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 16-18). This discussion was 
particularly inspired by the work of Abelard and his 
disciples, but also by the Schools of Laon and St Victor. 
Schnell argues that their influence was far-reaching, and 
even pervaded the secular judicial system. Thus, he 
interprets Iwein as Hartmann's vehicle for the exploration 
of intentions as prompted by these theological developments, 
and examines their effect on the military aristocracy, 
particularly in terms of judicial matters.
Schnell supports his claim by analysing Abelard's teaching 
in depth. This centred on the basic notion that sin is a 
subjective issue, existing in the decision to act against 
the conscience, rather than in the objective action:
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Was die Sünde eigentlich ausmacht, ist die Zustimmung zum Bosen, der consensus mall. Nur die Einwilligung in das, was man für unrecht hâlt, sei Sünde, wahrend der bloB âuBere Akt sittlich indifferent sei. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 19)
Abelard thus considered the sinner's intention, along with 
the ability to reflect and thereby inform that intention, to 
be of paramount importance. Guilt and sin therefore only 
exist in the realm of subjectivity, and are the results of 
inadequate self-awareness and sinful intent. A similar mode 
of thought, according to Schnell, had already been evident 
in penitential literature since the seventh century and in 
canonical collections since the tenth ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 
21). These works promoted the notion of self-enquiry which 
was adjudged to be a prerequisite, not only of good 
intentions, but also of virtue and true regret. Evidence to 
suggest that the issue of subjective guilt was debated in 
the twelfth century is apparent in the widespread influence 
of Abelard's ideas ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 21-3). Schnell 
reveals that manuscripts of Abelard's works and those of his 
pupils were to be found over an extensive part of the 
southern German empire, as well as being reflected in the 
highly-influential Sentences of Peter Lombard. Even if it 
appears tenuous to link any direct influence on Hartmann to 
Abelard, Schnell is confident that the debate on the nature 
of sin and the importance of self-enquiry was of such 
interest to many twelfth-century masters, that it is not 
necessary to prove any single influence of one master. Most 
certainly, it appears to Schnell, Hartmann was affected by 
the general scholarly debate at this time which centred on 
these issues. Schnell therefore contends that, by virtue of 
being composed against this background, Iwein offers itself 
for investigation along ethical lines, particularly in terms 
of intention and the nature of sin.
In applying this approach, Schnell identifies two distinct 
narrative levels, namely those of outward action and inner
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motivation, and argues that they correspond to the two 
halves of the plot which are separated by the missing of the 
deadline ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 29). Both levels have to be 
taken into account in order for the textual complexity to be 
fully appreciated. This can be achieved principally by 
analysing the monologues of the main protagonist. Schnell 
observes a distinct progression in Iwein's awareness of his 
inner motivation after he has recovered from his madness, 
Schnell's acknowledgment of the emergence of such a 
psychological dimension at this stage in the narrative 
subsequently leads him to argue that Iwein shows signs of a 
limited reflective capacity and a tendency towards 
impetuosity prior to missing the deadline. Thus, he 
maintains that in the initial episode Iwein does not reflect 
before he acts, does not wait to challenge Askalon, and does 
not hesitate to pursue him ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 33ff.). 
On this first point, Schnell is not quite accurate, however, 
as there is indeed evidence of Iwein reflecting after he has 
heard Kalogrenant's story (Iw 911-44). Thus, the issue is 
not so straightforwardly divided between non-reflection and 
reflection in the two narrative halves as Schnell implies. 
Instead, a finer distinction between the manner in which 
Iwein reflects before and after the missing of the deadline 
is called for. However, Schnell's observation concerning 
impetuosity is more justified. This tendency is evident in 
Iwein's immediate acceptance of Gawein's proposal to return 
to the tournament circuit. As Schnell remarks:
ohne darüber nachzudenken, daB seine eigenen Lebensbedingungen durch die Übernahme der Landesherrschaft und durch die Heirat sich entscheidend geandert haben, wendet er sich zehant (V. 2913) an Laudine, um ihre Zustimmung für die Turnierfahrt zu erbitten. ('Gesinnungsethik', p.34)
Schnell thereby locates Iwein's failure in the subjective 
sphere, owing to his inadequate reflection on his 
obligations;
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Iweins Versagen gründet nicht so sehr im VerstoB gegen AuBennormen (Askalon-Totschlag; Termin- versaumnis und Eidbruch), sondern in der mangelnden BewuBtheit, in der unreflektierten Zielrichtung seines Handelns, kurz, in einer fehlerhaften intentio. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 39)
Iwein thus fails to consider the consequences of his actions 
in advance. Objectively speaking, he is blameless because he 
makes no conscious decision to sin, but his failure to 
recognize his responsibilities implies subjective guilt 
because his lack of reflection renders him incapable of 
forming good intentions. The narrator's silence regarding 
any failure on Iwein's part is likewise interpreted by 
Schnell as proof of the absence of objective guilt 
('Gesinnungsethik', p. 38). However, this lack of 
recrimination by the narrator also prompts Schnell to claim 
that Hartmann is following Abelard's teaching on the 
maturity of conscience in this portrayal of his main 
protagonist ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 37f.). As subjective 
guilt requires the perpetrator to reject the advice of the 
conscience or to fail to reflect adequately, it follows that 
if that conscience is too immature to be aware of the 
necessity of reflection, that person is incapable of making 
such a decision. Schnell claims that this is the case with 
Iwein. He has not yet learned to reflect, and his 
shortcomings therefore lie in the subjective field, but do 
not qualify fully as subjective sin. However, Schnell's 
conclusion does not give enough credence to the emphasis 
which Hartmann is also placing on the severe objective 
consequences which Iwein's lack of self-awareness has for 
his court.
Schnell proceeds to trace the evolution of Iwein's 
awareness. His awakening from madness marks a new level of 
insight, as his first monologue portrays his new-found 
capacity to question his identity ('Gesinnungsethik', p.
35). This insight subsequently leads Iwein to acquire new 
ethical qualities throughout the second cycle of adventures,
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namely the ability to feel compassion and recognize his own 
guilt. These qualities in turn allow him to reclaim his 
former position as a superior knight and lord, capable of 
avoiding the same mistakes. He gains the ability, for 
example, to blame his muot for losing Laudine's love (Iw 
8135) ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 30). Similarly, he learns to 
question his motives before aiding the lion (Iw 3846-53), 
and also to feel sympathy for Lunete's plight (Iw 4075-9) 
('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 35f,). Schnell likewise underlines 
the fact that in each case Iwein carefully deliberates on 
the intentions of the other party before acting. This point 
is re-emphasized by Gawein's agreement to defend the older 
sister's inheritance claim, an occasion on which his failure 
to consider her motives results in his fighting for a 
dubious cause. In contrast, Iwein's new-found awareness of 
his own intentions and those of others permits him to 
recognize his responsibilities, to feel compassion for 
others, and to support purely worthy causes. These are the 
moral insights he has gained, as Schnell acknowledges;
das Reflektieren über sich, über die anderen, über die an ihn herangetragenen Forderungen und über die eingegangenen Verpflichtungen befahigt den Protagonisten zu einem neuen verantwortungsvollen Verhalten. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 36)
Schnell likewise traces inner motivation and subjective 
guilt on the part of other characters. As in Iwein's case, 
many display initial signs of a lack of awareness 
particularly regarding the intentions of others. Laudine 
represents a distinct example of this tendency by 
misunderstanding Iwein's reasons for marrying her ('Gesin­
nungsethik', pp. 43f.). She is only aware of his outer 
actions, namely his killing of Askalon and his esteemed 
membership of Arthur's court. Similarly, Iwein is unaware of 
Laudine's purpose in marrying him. Her own monologue reveals 
a desire for a faithful protector (Iw 2058-72). As Lunete 
discloses in her verbal attack on iwein, Laudine expected
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him to be grateful for her benevolence and to show her love 
and faithfulness (Iw 3164ff.) ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 41f.). 
Thus, the main protagonists commence their relationship with 
scant regard for each other's inner motivation. Iwein's 
demand for Laudine to grant him a wish, and her acquiescence 
whilst still in ignorance of the nature of his request, 
thereby represent a microcosm of their lack of 
understanding. This point is confirmed, in Schnell's 
opinion, in the final scene, as Laudine forgives her husband 
once she realizes the hardships he has suffered on her 
behalf ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 42). Her falling at his feet 
and begging his forgiveness thus demonstrate her own newly- 
awakened awareness of his inner resolve. However, this scene 
only exists in three of the surviving manuscripts. Its 
employment by Schnell to confirm his interpretation must 
therefore be seen within this context.
A major focus on the ability to be aware of the intentions 
of others is provided by Lunete. In her accusation of Iwein 
before Arthur's court, she outlines the dichotomy between 
Iwein's outer appearance and his inner motivation which has 
deceived her (Iw 3118ff.) ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 44-6). 
Later, at the spring, Lunete re-emphasizes this issue, 
describing her premature trust in and support for Iwein 
which had such adverse consequences (Iw 4191-5). In this 
way, her own failure to see beyond Iwein's outer actions to 
his inner mind highlights the problem existing between Iwein 
and Laudine.
Intention also plays a major role in the episode describing 
Guinever's kidnapping. Schnell contends that Arthur's 
knights display insufficient regard for the ambitions of the 
stranger knight, Meljaganz ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 39f.). 
They consider his outer courtly appearance to be proof of 
his moral integrity, and are likewise excessively concerned 
with the outward reputation of their court. This short­
sightedness underlies their recommendation to Arthur that he
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grant the knight his unspecified request, as a result of 
which the queen is taken from court by the stranger. This 
episode forms part of a sequence in which certain characters 
act without thinking as a result of their haughtiness 
(übermuot) or arrogance (hôchvart), thereby contrasting with 
Iwein's own subjective progression ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 
31). These characters include Kalogrenant (Iw 715), Aliers 
(Iw 3409), the young lord of the Jungfraueninsel (Iw 6328- 
30), Harpin (Iw 4963), and the count's elder daughter (Iw 
5661, 7657). All display arrogant tendencies which obscure 
their insight into their own and other people's intentions 
with disastrous results.
Schnell proceeds to cite two specific episodes in which the 
issue of intention is explicitly discussed. Firstly, when 
the maiden anoints Iwein with all the magic salve in 
defiance of her mistress, the narrator clearly states that 
her disobedience is forgivable because it is motivated by 
her desire to ensure Iwein's recovery (Iw 3475-86) 
('Gesinnungsethik', p. 28). However, in the second example, 
Iwein's horse is well cared for by the stablehand at the 
castle of Pesme Avanture for the explicit reason that he 
expects to own it himself before very long. The narrator 
thus highlights the selfish intentions motivating this 
seemingly generous behaviour (Iw 6654-75) ('Gesin­
nungsethik', pp. 26-8), These episodes may be of relatively 
small importance to the plot, but Schnell nevertheless 
employs them to illustrate this issue. In his opinion, they 
act as indicators to guide the audience's awareness of this 
subjective level in the narrative. Confirmation of 
Hartmann's portrayal of the need for a greater appreciation 
of intentions is found in the narrator's comment in the 
final combat scene between Gawein and Iwein. Here the 
narrator describes how it is preferable to be 
unintentionally hurt by an honest man than to be exposed to 
a person of bad intent, even if no physical harm is suffered 
(Iw 7358-68) ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 25f.). This preferable
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alternative is represented by Iwein and Gawein in the 
combat. Despite the suffering they inflict upon one another, 
their actions are devoid of evil intent. Schnell surmises 
from this comment that Hartmann is supporting the notion 
that knights should not expressly seek to kill their 
opponents in combat, a conclusion which causes him to 
question retrospectively, and somewhat tenuously, Iwein's 
subjective guilt in killing Askalon ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 
26). However, in doing this, Schnell overlooks the fact that 
Iwein's killing of Askalon is legitimate in terms of the 
secular honour ethic, as Fischer maintains. Instead, Schnell 
only evaluates the episode from a subjective viewpoint 
without giving credence to the question of honour which it 
also raises.
The final section of Schnell's essay concerns a perspective 
which he claims to have been overlooked by Iwein scholarship 
('Gesinnungsethik', p. 53). Concentrating primarily on the 
inheritance dispute between the count's two daughters and 
the resulting combat between Gawein and Iwein, Schnell 
extends his illustration of the concept of subjective guilt 
to incorporate the judicial practices of the twelfth-century 
German empire ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 48ff.). Schnell 
concludes that, despite the tradition in Roman law of taking 
intention into account, clerical and secular judicial 
practice in the twelfth century was primarily focused on the 
objective results of an action, although this is not to 
presume that intention was entirely disregarded. Schnell 
argues that there was widespread discussion of such concerns 
as crimes committed in ignorance, the repentance of 
criminals, or the practical difficulties in ascertaining 
criminal intentions. Thus, despite the problems of using 
intentions as reliable evidence, there was nevertheless an 
awareness of the importance of assessing the subjective 
guilt of the perpetrator of a crime by considering his or 
her inner motives. The advantage of this approach lay in its
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encouragement of compromise and arbitration, such as Schnell 
observes in Iwein.
Schnell supports his claim by comparing Hartmann's depiction 
of this final scene with that of his French source. In his 
opinion, Arthur's extra attempts at appeasing the older 
sister in Hartmann's version indicate a greater emphasis on 
this point than appears in the French text (Iw 6918-28, 
7282-90; Yv 6379-87) ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 55). Thus, this 
scene constitutes evidence of Hartmann's support for the 
judicial practice of minne or Schiedsgerichtbarkeit, that 
is, the practice of agreed settlements, rather than the 
pursuit of one's rights to the bitter end (reht or 
iusticia). Schnell admits that historical evidence of such 
compromises is somewhat sketchy ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 
57f.). Records of judicial arbitration only appear in the 
Church from 1158, but sources suggest that the concept was 
popular in eleventh-century France and even Germanic times. 
The idea was promoted by the Church after the mid-twelfth 
century, however, and the practice reached its height 
between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries. The 
concept appears to have developed from two separate strands 
('Gesinnungsethik', p. 60). The first was connected to the 
secular idea of suone or reconciliation, and the second to 
the clerical notion of misericordia or mercy. Suone's 
etymology reveals that it was used already in Germanic and 
early medieval times to indicate the avoidance of a feud by 
means of a private settlement between clans.Ultimately, 
this practice became incorporated into the peace legislation 
which was drawn up from the late eleventh century in the 
German empire to promote compromise. The second strand, that 
of misericordia or the mercy shown to a repentant sinner, 
was hotly debated in twelfth-century clerical circles with 
regard to its preferability to justice or iusticia 
('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 61f.). The establishment of the 
purity of repentance was a paramount consideration in these 
cases. This concept subsequently appears to have spread via
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the works of Isidor of Seville and Gratian to influence 
secular justice in the twelfth-century German empire. Thus, 
the issue of motivation was relevant to both secular and 
clerical judicial practice in Hartmann's age in the 
promotion of agreed settlements and reconciliation.
Consequently, Schnell argues that Hartmann is reflecting 
this concern for arbitration by exploring the manner in 
which the rigid pursuit of justice may be motivated by 
selfish intentions and may often prevent a less damaging 
settlement which can be achieved by a desire for compromise 
and a concern for others. These two alternatives are 
symbolized by the count's two daughters ('Gesinnungsethik', 
pp. 49-53). According to Schnell;
der Opposition zweier Rechtsverfahren entspricht die Opposition der zwei Rechtsparteien: derhartnackigen, verstockten, beharrlich auf das formalistische Beweisverfahren vertrauenden alteren Grafentochter steht die jüngere gegenüber mit ihrer Versôhnungsbereitschaft , ihrer Sorge um das Leben der Kampfvertreter, ihrem Appel1 zu 
minne. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 55)
The older sister refuses to relinquish her rights to a 
judicial combat despite Arthur's best attempts at 
persuasion, and even after her sister, who reveals her 
willingness to compromise long before this point (Iw 5729-
36), has abandoned her claim out of concern for the knights 
(Iw 7296-7320). This positive portrayal of compromise based 
on selfless motivation is further supported by the crowd's 
desire for conciliation and Gawein's and Iwein's own 
willingness to set aside their claims of victory 
('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 55f.). Ultimately, Arthur is able to 
settle the issue without an outcome in the combat by 
considering the intentions of the two sisters and giving his 
support to the younger sister whose concern for the knights 
outweighs her concern for her inheritance. In contrast, the 
older sister's selfishness and herter muot lose her Arthur's
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favour, and are accentuated by her need to be tricked into 
a confession and threatened with the loss of her inheritance 
before she will relinquish her claim. In this way, Hartmann 
demonstrates the possibility of a damaging and unjust 
outcome if formal justice is pursued at all costs. Likewise, 
he reveals that the key to settling a dispute by arbitration 
lies in the assessment of the motivations of the various 
parties.
Schnell proceeds to highlight earlier evidence of 
arbitration in Jwein. This is apparent in the character of 
Keii, Lunete's trial, and Laudine's reconciliation with her 
husband. Keii is considered by the queen and Kalogrenant to 
be undeserving of forgiveness because his infamous bad 
nature rules out any possibility that his repentance is 
genuine ('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 62f.). This initial scene 
thus forms an early introduction to the issue of inner 
motivation in the work. Later, Lunete is accused of 
falsehood by the steward and his brothers. However, her good 
intentions in advising her mistress are emphasized and 
confirmed by her supporters' conviction of her innocence 
which they base on her inherent good nature ( 'Gesin- 
nungsethik', pp. 65-7). In contrast, the steward and his 
brothers are blinded by their own evil ambition and pursue 
their cause to the bitter end, an approach which results in 
their ultimate defeat. Likewise, in the final scene of the 
narrative, Hartmann further portrays the rigid desire for 
justice as Laudine initially hesitates to forgive Iwein 
('Gesinnungsethik', pp. 63-5), Only when she is convinced of 
Iwein's good intentions does she do so, and in turn asks his 
forgiveness for her stubbornness. As stated earlier, 
however, the doubtful authorship of this episode places a 
question mark beside Schnell's otherwise plausible 
interpretation.
Schnell concludes his investigation by maintaining that his 
express aim is not to draw direct comparisons with judicial
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practices in the twelfth century in Germany as other 
scholars have attempted. Instead, he is concerned with 
focusing simply on the portrayal of intention in Jwein, an 
issue which incorporates a range of others in the narrative, 
including self-recognition, virtue, arbitration, justice, 
guilt, and reconciliation. Schnell's approach highlights in 
particular the monologues and other signs of self-awareness 
in the characters which were not taken into account by VoB, 
Fischer, and Ehrismann. By comparing these subjective 
elements with Hartmann's source and by monitoring their 
employment throughout the narrative, Schnell concludes that 
inner awareness and motivation were of paramount interest to 
Hartmann when he was composing Iwein, and are therefore 
crucial to an interpretation of this work. In the course of 
this approach, Schnell compares both halves of the narrative 
of Iwein to reveal a psychological progression in the main 
protagonist after the missing of the deadline. Unlike VoB, 
Fischer, and Ehrismann, therefore, Schnell takes a more 
holistic view of the narrative, rather than drawing his 
basic conclusions from the initial episode. Furthermore, and 
in contrast to Clark, Schnell firmly places Hartmann's 
interest in motivation in the context of the influential 
theological debate regarding the nature of sin in the 
twelfth century and the concern for motivation which was 
inherent in the penitential and judicial systems of this 
age. In so doing, Schnell illustrates those aspects 
influencing secular morality which were neglected by VoB, 
Fischer, and Ehrismann. However, Schnell elects to 
concentrate more fully on the issue of intention in his main 
protagonist, rather than the general concern with reflection 
and its association with action which was likewise of great 
import in the theological discussions pertaining to the 
remission of sins in the penitential system. Hartmann's 
protagonists are required to be aware of and respond to 
their obligations, and, should they fail to do so, to 
realize and act to rectify their mistakes. However, this 
aspect of Hartmann's work is more clearly defined in his
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earlier narratives as will be demonstrated in the course of 
this study.
Despite avoiding the disadvantages of an exclusively 
objective approach, Schnell's interpretation of the initial 
episode as a period of non-reflection for Iwein has its own 
limitations as it does not take sufficient account of the 
justifiable concern for the redress of honour which Iwein 
also displays. Iwein does indeed act with greater 
impetuosity in the first adventure, but nevertheless also 
reveals his powers of insight in his awareness of his 
legitimate obligation to pursue renown by going on 
adventure, defending the honour of his kinsman, and chasing 
Askalon, The pursuit of honour when guided by insight is 
thus presented in positive terms. Problems only arise when 
his awareness fails to match the expansion of his 
obligations on marrying Laudine, leaving him dangerously 
short-sighted in a position which calls for a clear overview 
of a range of duties. Iwein is subsequently required to gain 
an awareness of his broader obligations in the second part 
of the narrative, a process which is revealed, as Schnell 
states, in his monologues and his improved perception of the 
intentions of others.
Schnell therefore provides evidence of the remaining threads 
combining to form the concept of secular morality which 
Hartmann appears to be discussing in his work. Whereas 
Fischer points to the influence of the secular honour ethic, 
Schnell proposes the twelfth-century theological debate on 
self-awareness and the nature of sin as an influence on 
Hartmann. However, by not taking the aspect of honour and 
the serious social consequences of Iwein's failure into 
account, Schnell is perhaps relying too heavily on clerical 
rather than secular concepts of morality. Schnell reveals 
his belief that subjective issues are of greater relevance 
in this genre by stating;
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daB die hofischen Romane und der Minnesang der inneren Einstellung, der Ausrichtung des Handelns an "Innennormen" (triuwe, steete, giiete, kiusche, 
minne, erbermde u .a .) den Vorrang vor der Einhaltung von âuBeren Konventionen, von "AuBennormen" (Sitte und Brauch, Rechtsnormen) einraumen, ist unverkennbar. ('Gesinnungsethik', p. 23)
However, it is perhaps dangerous to conclude in this way 
that objective issues are of little significance. The 
missing of the deadline, for example, does indeed suggest 
that Laudine and Iwein have misunderstood one another's 
intentions, but such a failure has important social 
implications also. It is a blatant breach of trust on 
Iwein's part, undermining the feudal bond and leaving his 
dependants helpless. Iwein's inability to consider his 
obligations thus has far-reaching social consequences, an 
aspect to which Schnell does not give enough weight. This is 
the result of not taking into account the fact that the 
emphasis on self-awareness reflected in Hartmann's works 
stems both from theological debate and also from economic 
and social factors affecting twelfth-century society in the 
German empire.
All of the scholars discussed above have found ample 
evidence in the texts to support their different 
conclusions, and their attempts to provide a single 
interpretation are therefore only made possible by 
disregarding other relevant issues. The justifiability of 
all these points of view suggests that Hartmann was 
concerned with portraying a broad range of issues. Central 
to this approach is Hartmann's concern for the inner lives 
and thoughts of his protagonists in their attempts to 
respond to a variety of obligations, both secular and 
religious. One may therefore speculate as to the degree to 
which Hartmann might hereby be reflecting a general concern 
of his age for individual awareness which stems from 
theological developments and Christian religious practice.
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and also from economic and social demands. Similarly, one 
might consider how Hartmann presents these issues in terms 
relevant to an audience drawn from the military aristocracy. 
This present study will therefore attempt to analyse these 
different sources of influence and apply them to Hartmann's 
earlier works with particular regard for his depiction of 
the inner reflective capacity of his characters.
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Social and Theological Background to Hartmann’s Works
The background against which the perceptive powers of 
Hartmann's protagonists are to be measured incorporates 
social, religious, and philosophical factors. These factors 
will provide an image of the mentality of Hartmann's age and 
the role of self-awareness within it. The history of 
mentality has received much recent discussion in
scholarship, particularly regarding its definition. One
alternative has been ventured by Peter Dinzelbacher;
Mentalitat ist das Ensemble der Denk- undEmpfindungsweisen und -inhalte, von denen ein bestimmtes Kollektiv in einer bestimmten Zeitgepragt ist. Mentalitat manifestiert sich in AuBerungen und im Verhalten.^®
More specifically, Charles Radding proposes assessing the 
categories of legal and penitential codes, monastic 
practices, and literature in order to create a mental 
history of the military aristocracy in the twelfth 
century.^' Radding's approach therefore matches this present 
study in its own consideration of the evolution of private 
penance, the thought and influence of scholastic and 
monastic theologians of the late eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, and also social and economic developments. All of 
these factors will provide a broad insight into the 
mentality of the age and create a context for the burgeoning 
self-consciousness within the military aristocracy which 
Hartmann reflects and discusses in the fictional framework 
of his narratives.^®
First of all, however, brief mention should be made of other 
cultural changes which influenced the notion of individ­
uality in the twelfth century. Colin Morris maintains that 
it is possible to detect an increased self-awareness in this 
age in the wake of a cultural and intellectual flowering
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which engendered a revival of humanist principles.^® The 
intellectual renaissance in the twelfth century was 
principally the result of increasingly peaceful travelling 
conditions which created opportunities for study and an 
exchange of ideas. The revival of ancient learning, 
particularly the reading of Cicero and Seneca, reintroduced 
humanist ideas, as did the development in Christian thought 
of the doctrine of salvation by which each Christian became 
responsible for his or her own deliverance, rather than 
playing a more passive role in the struggle between Good and 
Evil. As a result of this evolution in thought, each 
Christian gained a new responsibility and a new value. 
Likewise, this approach stressed the humanity of God through 
his experience of human suffering, thereby provoking a 
reaction of human compassion towards God in the Christian 
believer. It is by means of this compassion that redemption 
is achieved.^® This new development found tangible 
representation in the form of crucifixes which from this 
period began to portray the figure of Christ as a suffering 
and dying human, rather than a stylized, expressionless, or 
triumphant figure. Similarly, in carvings and paintings, the 
infant Christ was increasingly depicted as a human baby and 
the Virgin as a human m o t h e r . A  new emphasis on the 
individual, which stems both from this development in 
theology and from other sources, is similarly visible in the 
evolution at this time of a natural realism in secular forms 
of art, for example in portraits or tomb e f f i g i e s . I n  
addition, the importance of the individual is reflected in 
the rise of vernacular literature and the expansion of a 
Latin literary culture.Furthermore, it is evident in the 
focus of histories, chronicles, and biographies on the deeds 
of humankind, rather than on the Divine o r d e r , a n d  in the 
greater tendency for the author to present himself as a real 
person, or for the artist or architect to have a personal 
style or leave an individual mark on their work.^® There is 
much evidence to suggest, therefore, that a new sense of
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worth was being attributed to humankind as a result of the 
renaissance of thought in this age.
Caroline Walker Bynum observes the burgeoning self-awareness 
in the individual in the twelfth century particularly in 
terms of the spiritual life.^® Whereas to the modern 
individual the concept of individuality incorporates not 
only the inner self, but also the unique self in the sense 
of personality, to the medieval mind individuality was a 
spiritual process of drawing closer to God. By searching for 
the soul or the inner person made in the image of God, the 
medieval individual hoped to become more like God. However, 
it is also possible to perceive in the twelfth century the 
tentative beginnings of the social and political concept of 
individuality, which dominate the modern definition of the 
term. This social strand played a substantial role in 
shaping the new awareness of individuality in the twelfth 
century, and will form the initial point of discussion in 
this chapter.
Social developments
On a social level, the worth and responsibility of the 
individual had long been established as inherent components 
in the structure of the feudal system. As Walter Ullmann 
describes, despite the enduring theoretical notion of 
descending government based on Christian principles in which 
the ruler embodied the law and his subjects relied on his 
favour rather than any rights of citizenship, and in which 
the common weal was accorded greater importance than the 
good of the individual,^' in practice the personal 
relationship between a lord and vassal caused the 
obligations of each party to be considered v i t a l . T h i s  
feudal bond was thus a reciprocal agreement between two 
individuals. Moreover, the obligation to hold to this 
agreement was as strong on the side of the lord as the
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vassal. The breakdown of these relations through laxity or 
faithlessness on the part of either side constituted a 
breakdown in the very fabric of society. Even amongst the 
peasantry and urban craftsmen, the co-operation of 
individuals to form a community or, in the craftsmen's case, 
a guild, which functioned by means of mutual obligation, was 
the pattern of social order. It is from this basic pattern 
of citizenship that constitutions based on customary law and 
the notion of civil liberty eventually developed in western 
Europe.^® In the upper reaches of society, the position of 
the ruler was therefore a paradox. On the one hand, he was 
invested with power by God, but on the other hand, he was 
still a feudal lord with obligations to his vassals. 
Furthermore, such obligations demanded the recognition of 
personal responsibility on the part of both individuals if 
they were to be fulfilled. As Ullmann states;
one thing seems clear, and that is that the feudal arrangement, at whatever level it was practiced, of necessity presupposed the responsibility of the individual. It was not just a matter of receiving a command or a law, but it was necessary to employ one's own critical faculties. Facts, situations, circumstances, ways of means, and so forth - all had to be weighed and assessed properly if lord and vassal were to co-operate, if, in other words, the system were to work at all
The focus on the individual caused by the personal 
responsibility inherent in the feudal structure therefore 
'fostered individual liberty'.®^
Obligations amongst the military aristocracy likewise 
extended to the essential matter of kinship ties which 
continued to be of great import in the twelfth century. The 
notion of equal affront to all members of a kinship group 
caused by the grievance of one member sharpened the 
awareness of duty towards one's kin. In spite of measures to 
discourage the blood feud, this practice nevertheless 
remained an important method by which reciprocal aid and
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restitution functioned across a broad social network.®^ Both 
on the level of feudal and of familial obligation, each 
member of society was thus required to be aware of his or 
her position and the demands imposed on it.
In addition to the basic functioning of feudal society, the 
economic and social changes which were taking place in 
western Europe from the mid-eleventh century played a role 
in underlining the role of the individual.®® Despite the 
political unrest of the German empire, trade flourished and 
towns expanded at this time. As a result, both the rural and 
urban populations were faced with new opportunities in life, 
such as learning a different trade or escaping from the land 
and moving to a town. Possibilities for change likewise 
became available in administration, scholarship, and the 
Church. Life thus became a more complex system of choices 
which caused the medieval individual to take one small step 
along the road to modern individuality. Furthermore, the 
development of a monetary economy contributed to the greater 
scope for individual enterprise throughout society, as did 
the great expansion eastward and land clearances which were 
prompted by a population boom throughout the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries. All of these factors thus permitted 
members of different social strata to reappraise and even 
transform their lot in life.
The changing times which created the opportunity for 
individual enterprise also accounted for the pressure placed 
on the older and lesser families of the military aristocracy 
in the German empire.®'* Several factors contributed to the 
threat of extinction faced by these families, including the 
consolidation of hereditary lands by the greatest nobles and 
the creation of the ranks of the Reichsfürsten by Frederick 
Barbarossa in 1184. Other factors included the rise in 
influence of the ministériels, the obligation for nobles to 
assist with the emperor's foreign campaigns, and the rising 
costs of maintaining a knightly lifestyle against the
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background of the development of a money-based economy. 
Furthermore, pressure also arose from the practice of 
primogeniture amongst noble families. Although primogeniture 
was not universally practised in the German empire in 
Hartmann's day, it was nevertheless on the increase, and was 
pursued in an attempt to avoid the breakup of family lands 
through the marriage of daughters and younger sons.®® 
Likewise, evidence suggests that, even within the imperial 
dynasty, the marriage of the eldest son was delayed for as 
long as possible, as such an event would result in the 
establishment of a separate household. Thus, both the threat 
to the lesser or older sections of the military aristocracy 
at one end of the scale, and the consolidation of power and 
territory by families at the other end, resulted in an 
emphasis on familial identity at this time. Evidence of this 
development is apparent in the increased use of heraldic 
devices and surnames.®®
In the light of all of this evidence, it can therefore be 
claimed that the individual awareness demanded by feudal 
status and duty, combined with a strong familial tie, was of 
paramount importance for the functioning of society in this 
age. Furthermore, the increased opportunities made available 
to the various social strata by social and economic changes 
in the eleventh and twelfth centuries on the one hand, and 
on the other hand the pressure to which particularly the 
older and lesser noble families were subjected drew 
attention to the issue of self-awareness.
Secular ethics
An increased sense of the inner life also arose from 
attempts to promote a recognized form of secular morality 
amongst the military aristocracy in the twelfth century. A 
need existed for a means of ethical control within this 
social stratum to combat problems of endemic violence. Such
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aggression was the consequence of the revenge mentality and 
sensitive honour ethic inherent in this level of society, 
which demanded the retention of the warrior retinues whose 
existence had been perpetuated by the anarchic conditions of 
the latter half of the eleventh century.®^ However, the 
solution to the threat of disturbance posed by these groups 
in less anarchic times was not straightforward, as violence 
was not merely arbitrary or vicious in all cases, but also 
a recognized form of legal redress. Furthermore, a 
traditional attitude of independence existed amongst the 
nobility in the German empire which had been given extra 
impetus by the troubles of Henry IV's reign. Subsequent 
German emperors were thus faced with particularly acute 
logistical problems in ruling without any established form 
of centralized bureaucracy.®® Such noble independence 
inevitably encouraged the pursuit of private feuds and 
therefore also necessitated the cultivation of particularly 
large retinues.
The problems caused by the presence of so many trained 
warriors were compounded by attempts to avoid the division 
of a family's patrimony. The exclusion of younger sons from 
marriage and lordship as a result of these practices 
inevitably left these young men with little useful purpose 
in society. Efforts were made to alleviate this problem in 
order to avoid tension within families and provide an outlet 
for youthful exuberance. For example, noble sons were sent 
to be educated and provide service in the households of 
other families, or else encouraged to follow tournament 
circuits.®® Nevertheless, despite these efforts, the 
restrictions imposed upon this section of the population, 
which contrasted starkly with its training in arms, 
presented considerable problems in terms of discipline.
In addition to this threat within its ranks, the social and 
economic changes which were occurring in this period caused 
the military aristocracy to become increasingly threatened
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by its own traditional feuding lifestyle. The disruption 
caused by feuding was particularly damaging to the 
peasantry, but as the wealth of the nobility became tied to 
the land, feuds gradually began to present a serious threat 
even to their perpetrators. As a result, the military 
aristocracy lent its support to imperial and clerical 
efforts to contain feuding and engender peace. These efforts 
centred on the clerical edicts known as the Truce and Peace 
of God which were first issued in the German empire in 1082, 
but more particularly around the secular peace laws or 
Landfrieden, which were based on the French model and issued 
across the empire from 1103.'*° These secular laws were 
principally utilized by Frederick Barbarossa, who depended 
on them to keep the peace in his many absences. Despite 
these legal efforts, however, evidence suggests that the 
traditional feuding lifestyle was only minimally influenced 
by such moves to promote self-control.'*^ Violence and self- 
assertion were too deeply engrained in the independent and 
military traditions of the ruling aristocracy. Nevertheless, 
the support which these efforts received demonstrates an 
awareness amongst this class of the essential role which 
self-control had to play in reducing the violence of their 
lifestyle. In addition, the involvement of the military 
aristocracy in the moves for peace points to a desire to 
discuss and establish grounds for the acceptable use of 
violence. These issues in particular form an important part 
of the background to Hartmann's portrayal of self-knowledge 
and restraint in his works of literature.
The behaviour of the military aristocracy was influenced by 
an additional source to the legal efforts of the emperor and 
Church. As the status of knighthood increasingly became the 
hereditary privilege of the various levels of the 
aristocracy in the later part of the twelfth century owing 
to rising costs, it began to be associated with aristocratic 
ethical principles.'*^ As a result of this process, the 
practice of knighthood became party to the age-old
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discussion concerning the definition of nobility which 
existed in the classical and patristic traditions. This 
discussion centred on the question of whether nobility was 
inherent in birth (nobilitas carnis) or in virtue (nobilitas 
morum). '*® The promotion of the nobility of virtue in the 
literature of the twelfth-century German empire corresponds 
to the attempts of the ministériels to establish themselves 
in society and compensate for their lack of lineage. 
However, these definitions of nobility were also part of a 
broader and much older debate concerning all levels of the 
military aristocracy, as Wilhelm Stormer argues;
Man hat diese Hoherbewertung der nobilitas mentis, die in den Dichtungen der Zeit ofter begegnet, in Zusammenhang mit dem Aufstieg der Ministerialen gebracht, die auf ihre Leistung, auf ihre virtue pochten. Dies ist sicherlich nicht ganz falsch.Aber es kann andererseits nicht übersehen warden, daS diese Hôherbewertung des 'Tugendadels' in engem Zusammenhang mit den kirchlichen Reform- tendenzen des 11. Jahrhunderts stand, daB sie aber auch nicht ein grundsatzlich neues 'Programm' dieser Zeit war, sondern bereits auf spatantike Adelsvorstellungen zurückgeht und auch in früh- mittelalterlichen Heiligenviten durchaus bisweilen ihren Niederschlag fand. I
The notion that nobility lies in virtue and that all -3
virtuous men are equally noble found particular reflection 
in works of literature, for example Thomasin's Der Welsche 
Gaet.*® However, nobility bestowed by birth was never fully 
discredited."*® Indeed, it appears that the transformation 
of knighthood into a hereditary estate in fact gave new 
support to the concept. These two conflicting views were 
widely discussed throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. 
However, a compromise was ventured which maintained that the 
ethical qualities associated with nobility were indeed 
hereditary, but nevertheless still had to be proven by good 
deeds. Such a notion corresponded to the Christian concept 
that virtue relies on the active execution of good 
intentions, and to the secular concept that each new
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generation is required to perpetuate the honour of its 
ancestors by following their example, This compromise 
between the two notions of nobility received widespread 
expression in secular literature at this time, including the 
works of Hartmann.**®
The Church had a complex attitude towards the use of 
violence. On the one hand, it condemned force, but on the 
other hand, recognized its own reliance on the military 
aristocracy for protection and to provide crusading armies. 
Thus, the Church sought to promote the military function of 
the aristocracy, but, at the same time, to limit its 
destructive capacity by means of the crusading and Christian 
knightly ideal."*® As a result of the successful implemen­
tation of this ideal, knighthood became imbued with ethical 
connotations particularly in the course of the twelfth 
century.®® In addition, the duty of the sovereign to 
dispense justice and keep the peace gradually came to be 
associated with the nobility, as may be seen in the 
Fürstenspiegel in which the most common lordly virtues 
described include justice, mercy, wisdom, generosity, and 
keeping the peace.®^ This judicial duty, coupled with the 
obligation to defend the Christian faith, caused formerly 
secular knightly values and virtues to become linked with 
Christian virtues. In consequence, a military lifestyle, 
otherwise associated with violence and disruption, became 
promoted as a path to salvation.®^
The source of this notion of secular morality was not 
entirely Christian, however, despite the Church's 
involvement in its promotion. This subject has been the 
focus of fierce scholarly conjecture, specifically within 
the 'Ritterliches Tugendsystera' debate which emerged in 
German scholarship. This centred on the work of Gustav 
Ehrismann and concerned the existence of a lay code of 
ethics based on the classical tripartite system of summum 
bonum, honestum, and utile, which had survived into the
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twelfth century in Cicero's De officiis,^^ The basis for 
accepting the existence and influence of such a system in 
the Middle Ages appears less than secure, however, and 
scholarship has perhaps been overeager to accept Ehrismann's 
ideas. The lack of research into the traditions underpinning 
lay moral didacticism in the Middle Ages which looks beyond 
the 'Ritterliches Tugendsystem' debate allows one to 
speculate that the influences on Hartmann regarding this 
issue may have been diverse. His notions of virtue and inner 
perception may ultimately be traced to classical as well as 
Christian sources, but would most likely have reached him 
through clerical channels. For the purposes of this 
investigation, it is sufficient to conclude from this debate 
that the sources of these generally-accepted moral guide­
lines were probably both clerical and secular, and were not 
formulated into any kind of clearly-defined code.®"*
A major influence on the development of a secular morality 
was the court, at which the military aristocracy came into 
closer contact than ever before with clerics and clerically- 
educated courtiers and their ideas. The more stable social 
climate of the twelfth century contributed to the estab­
lishment of these administrative centres which were staffed 
by educated clerks. It was in this arena that a melting pot 
of ideas, clerical, martial, and noble, was created and came 
to define the notion of courtly behaviour. The courts 
therefore acted as restraining forces upon the excesses of 
the nobility, providing institutions in which acceptable 
courtly behaviour could be manifested as the knightly 
ideal.®® The growth in the number of aristocratic courts, 
which in France were modelled on the courts of the great 
vassals, and in the German empire particularly on the 
imperial court, thus brought together the forces of violence 
and the forces of civilization under one roof. The resulting 
cross-fertilization of influences established the courts as 
focal points for the development of the courtly behavioural 
ethic.
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Ethical guidelines for the lay nobility are further 
reflected in all forms of clerical and secular literature 
from the tenth century onwards. Here the ideal combination 
of an honourable secular existence and acceptable Christian 
behaviour found representation. The Church reformers 
produced such guides to behaviour as Odo of Cluny's Vita 
sancti Geraldi and the Livre des manières composed in the 
vernacular by the Bishop of Lisieux, Étienne de Fougères, in 
the 1170s.®® Similarly, William of Conches' adaptation of 
Cicero's De officiis known as the Moralium dogma 
philosophorum, and the Policraticus, written by William's 
pupil, John of Salisbury, drew on antique notions of 
lordship but combined them with the ideal and duties of the 
militia christi.
Such examples reveal that Hartmann was working within a 
broad tradition of didactic Latin literature which was aimed 
at the military aristocracy. In addition, many of the 
vernacular texts which survive reveal on the part of the 
authors a knowledge of and positive attitude towards the 
values of the secular nobility. Examples include the
fragmentary Rittersitte of circa 1150 which extols the 
merits of attending Church, but also provides advice
regarding the correct armour for hunting, which verbal
insults to avenge, and how a young knight should respectably 
behave towards a noble lady.®^ In addition, it is posited 
that riches granted by God should be wisely and properly 
used, and that wealth gained by the undeserving is sinful. 
This point is reminiscent of the teaching of the heart
regarding virtue in Die Klage, Similarly, the Herger- 
Sprucif^ of 1150-80 advocates pleasing both God and secular 
society, and in the Bilchlein vom Heimlichen Boten of 1170- 
80, the notion that virtuous behaviour will lead to success 
in love is expressed. The first part of the Heimlicher Bote 
advises that men should be less concerned with their 
appearance and athleticism than with living virtuously in 
order to merit the love of a lady;
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den wol minnenden manden kan ih wol irkennen,wande uns Phaset saget ein buchvon guoter minnen gnuoo.iz sprichet: swer so gutliche lebeund wize wol alle phade,der sol den frouwen wesen liep. (HB 47-53)'
In a work dated slightly later than Hartmann's narratives 
known as Der Wlnsbecke (1210-20), such sentiments are again 
expressed as a father instructs his son on the ethical 
merits to be gained from courtly love service and the need 
for self-control. These works thus provide a parallel to the 
didactic aims of the Fürstenspiegel, or of dynastic 
histories which incorporate elements of the Fürstenspiegel 
such as the Historia Welforum, and find direct reflection in 
scenes in which moral guidance is offered within works of 
courtly narrative themselves, for example the advice given 
by the old duke to his son in Gregorius (Gr 243-65), and by 
Gurnemanz to Parzival (P 170,7ff.).
Secular treatises written in the vernacular and devised for 
the instruction of knights which combine practical and moral 
teaching are more visible from the end of the thirteenth 
century, for example in the works of Ramon Lull and later 
Geoffrey de Charny.®° One example which was nearly 
contemporary to Hartmann was the Ordene de chevalerie, which 
has been dated at pre-1250. However, biographical accounts 
of the lives of Arnold of Ardres and William Marshal from 
the late twelfth century provide evidence of works 
contemporary to Hartmann and relating to knighthood which 
promoted the ethics of chivalry.
All the works of literature mentioned above are of a more or 
less didactic nature. This didacticism, rooted in the 
concern to promote greater self-awareness and restraint 
amongst the military aristocracy, is likewise visible in the 
courtly love tradition. The courtly love lyric acts as a 
form of inner debate in itself, depicting a search for the
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self and exploration of morality which is provoked by the 
conflicting demands of love and secular duty. Similarly, 
this is true of the courtly narrative and its depiction of 
a series of lone adventures representing a process of 
burgeoning self-awareness which has been prompted by a 
crisis of love. It has been argued that the didactic note in 
courtly literature is aimed for the most part at solving the 
problems caused by the iuvenes, a particularly disruptive 
section of the secular aristocracy,®^ or else that these 
young nobles were themselves the patrons of courtly 
literature.®® Whatever the specific aims of this genre may 
have been, the didactic element in the tradition is evident 
in its promotion of courtly virtues. In addition, love is 
frequently presented as a process which can lead to moral 
improvement. ®®
The influence of ideals portrayed in literature in general 
on the defining of a lay code of morality is difficult to 
ascertain directly. On the whole, it appears as if 
literature, in the form of the courtly love lyric, the 
crusading lyric, and the courtly narrative, as well as more 
purely didactic works, was a major contributor to the spread 
of the ideals of behaviour which were directed at the 
military aristocracy and drawn from a variety of sources - 
clerical, classical, social, political - as it offered 
itself as an arena for the discussion and promotion of these 
ideals. The success of these works of literature was 
probably also due to the fact that they were rooted in the 
factual experience of knights, as well as depicting an ideal 
deriving from various influences and sources to which they 
should aspire.
Hartmann was thus working within a literary tradition which 
already emphasized inner awareness in the context of the 
assessment of feelings and loyalties as a result of falling 
in love. Nevertheless, Hartmann's particular concern with 
this concept calls for a broader consideration of the forces
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which influenced him. In addition to social change and the 
promotion of secular moral guidelines, Hartmann also appears 
to have been profoundly affected by the contemporary 
theological debate concerning ethics and penitential 
practice. R.W. Southern takes a similar view in considering 
the narratives of Chrétien to be a response to the same 
internalization which was promoted by the Cistercians, and 
describing these works as 'the secular counterpart to the 
piety of Citeaux'®®. However, Southern does not consider 
Chrétien's narratives to be religious works in themselves. 
Instead, he claims that the inner tribulations of the heart 
in Chrétien's works are only an indirect reflection of the 
increasing emphasis on personal piety in this age:
Chrétien probes the heart, but it is the enamelled heart of the twelfth-century secular world, not yet made tender by the penetration of strong religious feeling.®®
Southern therefore claims that there is no religious 
treatise to be found in Chrétien's narratives. However, 
Hartmann's augmentation of the subjective elements of his 
source secures a closer link with developments in personal 
piety than Southern is able to detect in Chrétien's works. 
These developments in theology and religious practice hence 
merit more detailed investigation.
Personal piety
As mentioned previously, the twelfth century was the age of 
re-acquaintance with the works of the ancients and the 
Church Fathers which promoted the practice of seeking God in 
the self by means of contemplation, but which also 
encouraged the adoption of logic and thereby lent this form 
of personal piety a more systemized and authoritative basis. 
Before analysing this development, the relevance of such an 
approach merits discussion.
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... ;
The social, cultural, and economic changes described earlier 
in this chapter affected all levels of society. One could 
argue that the intellectual disputes of a small handful of 
theologians could not have achieved this breadth of 
influence, as indeed several Hartmann scholars have 
maintained. These scholars claim that Hartmann's education 
would probably have acquainted him with the work of Peter 
Lombard, but no specific connections between Hartmann and 
any of the great clerical thinkers of the twelfth century 
can be securely identified.^' This cannot be denied, 
however, it is possible to avoid such specific connections 
and yet still to draw relatively solid conclusions 
pertaining to the influence of the major theologians on 
Hartmann by arguing that Hartmann was basing his interest in 
self-analysis on the vulgarized versions of theological 
developments which were to be found in vernacular sermons.®® 
The increased use of vernacular sermons from the mid­
eleventh century was partly a response to the threat of the 
heretical movements, but also a result of the evangelical 
dynamism of the new monastic orders.®® This wave of 
preaching informed all levels of society of new theological 
developments to some degree.’® Pastoral literature was 
produced, which was designed to be used by the clergy in 
their sermons. This literature included miracle stories and 
saints' lives which were collected into such works as 
Gregory of Tours' Book of Miracles and Caesarius of 
Heisterbach's early thirteenth-century Dialogue on 
M i r a c l e s A further means of disseminating new ideas came 
in the form of the catechism, such as the enormously popular 
twelfth-century Elucidarium of Honorius of Autun, which 
presented dialogues between a priest and pupil on a wide 
variety of points of faith.’® Each of these forms of 
pastoral literature enabled new theological concepts to 
infiltrate the consciousness of all levels of lay society. 
As Aron Gurevich says:
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In these types of literature, the reader will not find sophisticated theology, comparable to the treatises of John the Scot, Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard or Thomas Aquinas, but a general, simplified or extremely condensed version of it. ... We find here an impressive attempt to transform Christian doctrine from the learned heritage of the ecclesiastical élite into the world-view of the broadest strata of the population.’®
The authors of the many kinds of pastoral literature were often highly educated people, famous theologians and writers, preachers and members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Yet, when they composed sermons or saints' lives, formulated questions for the penitentials or described visions of the elect, they had in mind that audience to which the parish priests and monks were to read or paraphrase their work.
In addition to pastoral literature, the clergy was provided 
with guidance for the administration of penance. The 
evolution of the penitential system at this time encouraged 
a greater degree of self-analysis. Although penance was not 
the only means by which ordinary Christians became aware of 
the importance of personal piety, nevertheless the universal 
influence of the penitential system over all of western 
Christendom set it apart from other means of implementing 
theological developments. It is possible, therefore, to 
assume an awareness of these innovations on behalf of 
Hartmann and his audience. Moreover, in the light of the 
contention that Hartmann received a clerical education, it 
is justifiable to claim a more specific awareness on his 
part.
In addition, the arena of the court as a world in which the 
clerical and lay communities mixed with unprecedented 
freedom would have provided a further opportunity for 
Hartmann and other members of his class to be influenced by 
clerical thought. Such influences would also have resulted 
from the close connections which existed between the lay 
founders and patrons of local monasteries, many of which had
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been affected by the monastic reform movement. The desire 
for reform had originally been instigated in the late tenth 
century in reaction to the excessive control of the local 
nobility over the monasteries. However, from the second half 
of the eleventh century, these reforms, which had been 
spearheaded by the Cluniac movement, and which had 
encouraged a close adherence to the original Benedictine 
Rule, were themselves subject to reform in some circles. 
This was due to an increasing discontent with the rigidity 
of the Benedictine Rule and its emphasis on order and 
obedience, which left little room for personal experience or 
growth. Such discontent, coupled with a lack of faith in 
secular society which was shared by elements in the lay 
community, led to an increased number of people adopting the 
hermitical lifestyle, or else joining hermitical orders such 
as the Carthusians. The drive for reform likewise resulted 
in the establishment of new monastic orders, notably the 
highly-influential Cistercians, which were based on 
variations of the Rule but which placed greater emphasis on 
personal piety and pastoral care, rather than communal 
perfection.’®
Southern describes the ties between the lay community and 
the monasteries in general as involving vassals as well as 
the lord founder or patron. The reform monasteries of the 
late eleventh century in particular tended to be very local 
in their focus, and similarly the lay population, itself 
demanding more personal forms of devotion at this time, 
looked particularly to the monasteries for religious 
guidance. As a result, lay forms of private devotions based 
on monastic practices, such as the penitential, psalter and 
the Book of Hours, were produced in response to these 
demands, and enjoyed great popularity amongst the literate 
laity of the twelfth century.’®
In the light of this demonstration of the means by which 
general theological developments affected lay society, a
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doser scrutiny of the changes involving the concept of 
self-knowledge is now called for.
Self-knowledge
The pursuit of knowledge by the dialectical method, and a 
concern with ignorance and self-awareness in the twelfth 
century can be traced to the influence of Socrates. By the 
method of question and answer, as a result of which an 
individual could be brought to doubt his or her opinions, 
Socrates sought to destroy a false opinion and suggest, but 
not enforce, a preferred opinion. In particular, such a 
method could persuade an individual to become aware of his 
or her ignorance or ill-founded knowledge. In Socrates' 
view, the awareness of ignorance formed the basis of wisdom 
and virtue. His equation of the human soul with human 
knowledge likewise prompted the conclusion that knowledge is 
goodness or a means to virtue. This is reflected in his 
principle that 'virtue is knowledge; vice is ignorance'. The 
oracle at Delphi, whose two basic commands were to know 
oneself and to practise moderation, stated that no one 
surpassed Socrates for wisdom. In this way, the oracle 
confirmed Socrates' emphasis on self-awareness.
Such fundamental principles mark the thought of Plato, a 
pupil of Socrates, and influenced the twelfth century 
primarily through the works of Augustine, whose thought was 
dominated by the Neoplatonists.” Plato incorporated the 
principle of self-knowledge into his doctrine of Form in 
which each individual soul exists only as a reflection of 
its Form which dwells in the realm of reality.’® The soul 
is imprisoned within a mortal body in a state of discord, 
and its existence is governed by a yearning to be in harmony 
with its ultimate self, namely its Form. This harmony is 
only achieved by pursuing a moral ideal. The soul engages in 
this pursuit by utilizing its immortal potency of reason, 
which is situated in the brain. Plato's thought received
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further expansion from Plotinus in the third century A.D. in 
his notion that the immortal part of the soul is united with 
the Divine Being after death. According to Plotinus, 
however, this union occurs beyond the cognitive progress 
initiated by the reasoning powers of the soul.’®
Augustine inherited the thought of Plato through the works 
of Plotinus and other Neoplatonists.®® Augustine's 
combination of Neoplatonist and Christian principles 
prompted him to equate the Christian God with the Platonic 
Supreme Being. Consequently, he considered human souls to be 
reflections of God which yearn to be united with their 
Maker. The pursuit of self-knowledge by utilization of the 
soul's powers of intellect is thus represented in 
Augustine's thought as a means of finding God. Self- 
awareness reveals the truth of God reflected in the soul. 
Augustine described the fundamental nature of this approach 
in his comments relating to his personal search for the 
inner self :
I desire to have knowledge of God and the soul. Of nothing else? No, of nothing else whatsoever.®^
0 God, always one and the same, if I know myself,1 shall know Thee.®®
Augustine further investigated the potencies of the soul 
which permit this process, basing his thought once again on 
Neoplatonist principles.®® The two characteristics of the 
soul were described by Augustine as the anima vitae or life 
potency, and the anima rationalis or mens, which comprised 
the capacities of memoria, voluntas, and intellectus The 
characteristic of mens, however, was ascribed by Augustine 
to the heart, rather than to the brain, as was claimed by 
the ancient philosophers. In this, Augustine was following 
the example of the Bible. Thus, the heart, the index ratio, 
acts as a voice of conscience which enables humankind to 
distinguish good from evil.®® As such it has a duty to
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overcome its innate proneness to evil, which exists as a 
result of original sin, by cleansing itself and devoting 
itself entirely to God (Prov. 2.3-6; Exod. 31.6).®^ In 
addition, Augustine not only adopted the Bible's definition 
of the heart as the seat of the rational faculty, but also 
as representing a point of connection with God by means of 
which God can enter and illuminate a person (Mark 4.15; 
2. Cor. 1.22; Gal. 4.6; Rom. 5.5).®^ Thus, the prerequisite 
for receiving divine illumination is the purification of the 
heart achieved by rational thought. Unlike Aristotle's 
theory of abstraction, Augustine saw no essential role for 
empirical sensory information. Instead, the rational force 
in the heart alone renders a person capable of receiving 
illumination from God. As Wolf Gewehr comments;
Wahrend nun gemâB der aristotelisch-thomistischen Abstraktionstheorie die Sinneserkenntnis unabdingbare Voraussetzung fur die Intellek- tualerkenntnis bildet, 1st es bei deraugustinischen Illuminationslehre so, daB die Seele aufgrund ihres rationalen Vermogenserleuchtungsfahig ist und dadurch ersterkenntnisfahig wird.®®
The heart in its role as the centre of the intellect and the 
point of contact with God is a fundamental component of 
Augustine's theory of epistemology even to the extent that 
he considered the heart to represent the whole person.®® 
These threads of learning were ultimately revived in the 
cultural and intellectual renaissance in the twelfth century 
in which works of classical and patristic learning were 
revisited and reformulated. Augustine's teaching on inner 
enquiry as a means to achieving true faith had enormous 
influence on twelfth-century thought. In addition, however, 
Aristotle's theory of rationality, based on Socrates' 
dialectical method, also found resonance at this time. Thus, 
the revitalized concept that the ultimate truth was to be 
found by turning inward was accompanied by a revival in 
interest in the methods involved in questioning and
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investigating, such as those proposed by Socrates. This 
dialectical methodology survived in Boethius' translation of 
parts of Aristotle's works in his Consolation of Philosophy• 
Larger sections of Aristotle's thought emerged only in the 
thirteenth century. However, Boethius' work, which applied 
logic to theological problems, formed the basis of the 
methodology of enquiry in the twelfth century.®® This 
century therefore saw an increasing emphasis on the use of 
reason to attain self-knowledge and to find God's presence 
in the soul. Moreover, reason was similarly lauded as the 
essential component in the dialectical approach to 
systematizing and clarifying, but not ultimately 
challenging, theological and classical texts,®^ The first 
major exponent of dialectic in the Middle Ages, Berengar of 
Tours, caused huge controversy by claiming that reason was 
superior even to the authority of the Scriptures, because it 
was by employing reason that Man most closely resembled 
God.®“ The majority of theologians, however, regarded reason 
as a useful tool to be employed in faith, but one which 
could not ultimately explain its mysteries.
Just as the thought of St Augustine combined the classical 
tradition of self-enquiry with the Christian notion of 
embracing God's truth by an inner search, the figure of St 
Anselm stands at the threshold of the twelfth century as the 
major force in the unification of classical and Christian 
notions of self-awareness. Anselm employed the rationalist 
notions bequeathed by Boethius for the clarification of 
theological texts, as is evident in his work Cur Deus Homo?, 
These rational principles augmented theories of humankind's 
role in its own salvation. From the end of the eleventh 
century, the redemptive interpretation of humankind as 
helpless bystanders in the struggle between Good and Evil 
became increasingly overtaken by a more humanist approach. 
Anselm himself was instrumental in this development, 
rejecting the older view and interpreting God's entry into 
the world in human form as a divine gift to humanity.
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providing it with the means to redeem its original sinful 
act in voluntarily obeying the Devil. He taught that in 
order to attain the salvation offered by this opportunity, 
a combination of faith and introspection was necessary. 
Anselm insisted that faith was necessary to provide the 
correct conditions for reason to be employed. Faith was a 
prerequisite for understanding, or, as he stated, credo ut 
intelligam. Although Anselm's logical approach was 
considered too timid by the following generation of 
scholars, he acted as a stepping-stone to the more confident 
and widespread employment of logic in the appraisal of 
theological texts in the future.
Anselm's use of logic thus clarified the means to attain 
greater personal piety and, ultimately, salvation. In an 
attempt to encourage a personal search for God rather than 
an unthinking obedience to the law of the Benedictine Rule, 
Anselm underlined the importance of the mind in the inner 
pursuit of truth. Firstly, the mind has to be freed from 
dullness to allow a process of self-examination to begin:
Excita mentem tuam, he wrote, "stir up your torpid mind, dispel the shadows which sin has cast on it... chew over in thought, taste in under­standing, swallow in longing and rejoicing". It was in the innermost recesses of the conscious and awakened soul that God was to be found; "Flee awhile your occupations, hide yourself a little from your tumultuous thoughts, throw off your burdensome cares and postpone your laborious distractions; enter into the chamber of your mind and exclude all else but God and those things which help you in finding Him; close the door and seek Him".®®
As a result of this search, it is possible to gain an 
insight into one's true sinful nature. Subsequently, Anselm 
taught that one is able to escape from this sinful state by 
means of contrition and by loving God, and ultimately by the 
gift of grace.®'*
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Anselm was instrumental in generating a movement towards 
greater personal piety by producing prayers and meditations 
for both secular and clerical audiences which were based on 
meditative monastic prayer, such as the Proslogion quoted 
above. In this way, Anselm was responding to a widespread 
demand from lay members of society for prayer books that 
enabled them to achieve a greater intimacy of prayer. He 
himself sent such works to both monks and educated laity, 
for example to the court of Mathilda of Tuscany and to 
Princess Adelaide, the daughter of William the Conqueror. 
The popularity of these works contributed to the extension 
of Anselm's influence well into the next centuries.®®
Anselm's influence also took an additional route. He was 
responsible for creating a series of seven steps to 
humility, which were based on the twelve steps of the 
Benedictine Rule, but which were imbued with Anselm's own 
emphasis on self-awareness and contemplation. The seven 
steps are:
self-knowledge, grief, confession, persuasion of guilt, acquiescence in judgement, suffering of punishment, love of the punishment.®®
Anselm's ideas were adopted and accorded greater impact by 
the Cistercian movement. In particular, Bernard of Clairvaux 
followed Anselm's example by further reworking the 
Benedictine twelve steps into a more logical progression, 
thereby creating a system which encouraged even greater 
intimate spirituality.®^ He wrote that self-knowledge leads 
to the truth by means of three steps, of which the seven 
steps to humility constitute the first. The second is 
achieved by compassion and the third by contemplation. 
Beyond these steps the ultimate heights of human knowledge 
are to be found when the soul leaves the body in ecstasy and 
achieves union with God. The driving force behind this 
journey towards union is love. As humankind was created as 
an act of Divine Love, all human beings can align their will
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with the will of God by loving themselves as God loves them. 
Ecstasy occurs when these two wills unite. According to 
Bernard, therefore, the journey of self-awareness can 
ultimately lead to a mystical union with God.
Anselm and Bernard based their systems of thought on logical 
principles despite the personal and contemplative nature of 
their ideas. This approach has since been termed spiritual 
psychology or even clinical theology, denoting the study of 
'the Godward movement of the soul'®®. Such a study involves 
the application of logic to the Rule and the encouragement 
of a personal search for the ultimate truth. Anselm and 
Bernard thus adapted existing ideas relating to a search for 
God in the self to create a logical programme. Southern 
notes that:
this logical habit gave them a formidable tool for investigating the internal movements of the soul. They are more interested in analysing states of mind and in distinguishing the motions of the will than any writers since St Augustine.®®
Furthermore, through the spiritual literature created in 
particular by the Cistercians, the ideas of these two 
thinkers had extensive influence on the spiritual and lay 
communities in western Christendom.
As has been stated, for the majority of twelfth-century 
thinkers, logic was only to be employed in the wake of 
faith. Thus, it was faith which provided the scope for 
greater understanding. Logic was not a means to achieve or 
understand such belief. One scholar in particular disagreed 
with this view. Nevertheless, despite his controversial 
ideas, Peter Abelard's work had lasting influence. However, 
before considering his ideas more closely, a consideration 
of two of the leading and most influential scholars of the 
school of thought closer to Anselm, namely William of St 
Thierry and Hugh of St Victor, will be undertaken in order
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to gain a broader view of the influence of the new 
psychology.
À fellow Cistercian and close acquaintance of St 
Bernard,^®® William of St Thierry broadcast the principles 
of the Cistercian programme, namely the seeking of truth 
through self-knowledge, in his hugely popular works, the 
Epistola ad fratres de monte dei (the Golden Epistle), and 
De natura corporis et animae. In De natura, William 
demonstrated the classical and Christian tradition of the 
practice of self-examination;
The answer of the Delphic Apollo was famous among the Greeks: "Man know yourself". The same thing was said by Solomon, or rather Christ in the Song of Songs: "If you do not know yourself, goforth".
In each of these major works, William revealed the three 
stages of self-knowledge which correspond to the Body (an 
ignorant love of the self), the Reason (a limited love for 
God guided by the intellect), and the Spirit (pure and 
limitless union with God made possible by the gifts bestowed 
by the Holy Spirit). These three stages alone lead to true 
wisdom:
For this is the uniting of man with God, or his likeness to God; in so far as he cometh nigh to God, in so far he conformeth his lower part unto himself, and his lowest part unto that; so that spirit and mind and body being ordered after their right manner, disposed in their own places and reckoned after their just deserts, may also be thought of according to their own properties; that a man may begin perfectly to know himself, and through knowing of himself to advance and ascend unto the knowledge of God.^®^
Thus, by utilizing reason to control the will, one obeys 
one's moral duty and becomes a candidate for an infusion of I
God's grace through the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, one is |
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obliged to establish this ordered relationship between the 
powers of reason and will, as William illustrates;
it belongeth to the man ever to make his heartready, by freeing the will from strangeaffections, the reason and understanding from all manner of care, the memory from idle, and busy, and sometimes also from necessary occupations; that in the good day of the Lord and in the hour of His pleasure, when he heareth the voice of the Spirit that breatheth, those things that makethought may lightly run unto each other and work together for good, preparing as it were a feast together unto the joy of him that thinketh; the will bringing a pure affection unto the joy of the Lord; the memory, a faithful matter; theunderstanding, the sweetness of experience.^®®
Human reason is thus held to be an essential component in 
the inner search for truth, but cannot itself achieve full 
understanding without the gift of grace. However, reason can 
create the suitable conditions necessary for grace to be 
bestowed:
And when reason advancing ascendeth upward unto love, to him that loveth and desireth, grace condescendeth.
Similarly, William pronounces the correct implementation of 
the will and the power of reason to be the means, not only 
to receive grace, but also to attain virtue:
What is virtue? The daughter of reason, but more of grace. ... Virtue is an evenness of life, in all things agreeing with reason. Virtue is a using of free will according to the judgment of reason. Virtue is a humility. Virtue is a patience. Virtue is an obedience. The virtues are prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice and many others; in all of which virtue is nothing else than the using of free will according to the judgment of reason.
All of the major points described by William concerning the 
inner search for God by means of the intellect were commonly
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found throughout Cistercian literature. They were repres­
ented, for example, as David Duckworth has illustrated, in 
the anonymous De spiritu and Isaac of Stella's Epistola de 
anima.
The preoccupation with inwardness and the search for the 
self also found reflection in the works of the theologians 
known as the mystics. Hugh of St Victor in particular 
enjoyed great contemporary fame and influence, being 
described as the 'new Augustine'®®^. The term mystical is 
misleading in that it does not describe a practice in 
itself, but rather an existing component of Christianity 
which appeared in the thought of Augustine and those 
influenced by him and which concerned the ultimate union of 
the human soul with God in a state of heightened 
consciousness. Introspection may contribute to this 
attainment of ecstasy, but, according to the mystics, it is 
not a direct route to this state which lies beyond the 
control of conscious thought.^®® Apart from this 
distinction relating to the achievement of union with God, 
the thought of the Victorine school was in fact very close 
to other Cistercian scholars. Hugh's approach is evidence of 
this:
[he] accepted dialectical theology as part of a progressive schema of knowledge. According to this, intellectual apprehension of eternal truths, attained under the guidance of faith, culminates by divine grace in direct experience.^®®
Hugh rejected Abelard's tenet that reasoning alone could 
unlock the mysteries of faith. Instead, he ventured that 
reasoning follows in the wake of faith, and, at a certain 
point beyond human intellectual powers, the truth of the 
mysteries of faith is revealed by God's grace. Reasoning in 
this scheme nevertheless remains an essential component and 
companion to faith. As Hugh's disciple, Richard, noted:
94
It ought to be insufficient for us ... to hold on faith the truths of eternal realities, unless it be given to us also to establish by the witness of reason that which is held on faith. And let not that knowledge of eternal truths which is by faith ionly be sufficient for us, unless we may grasp also that knowledge which is by understanding, even if we are not yet capable of that which is by experience.
The pursuit of divine truth as a means to virtue was also a 
fundamental concept in Hugh's teaching. He considered the 
rational mind of man to be restricted by the physical body, 
and consequently excluded from the liberation afforded by 
the pursuit of wisdom. However, the path of virtue 
demands the co-operation of the body in acting to complete 
the instructions of the powers of reason. Without this co­
operation, virtue is not attainable, no matter how pure the 
thoughts of the intellect may be. As Hugh states:
Truly a work of justice is in the movement of the rational mind which advances according to God, arising from a conception of the heart and proceeding outside even to the completion of the corporeal act. ... The sound man operates; operating he is remunerated.
Such emphasis on the combination of good intentions with 
actions likewise formed an essential component of the 
penitential code as will shortly be demonstrated.
The work of Peter Abelard provided a further contribution to 
the analysis of introspection in the twelfth century.
Although the distribution of his own works was limited, 
Abelard caused a great and lasting impact in theological 
circles and left a legacy in his wide network of 
followers. Abelard was an expert dialectician and 
sought, despite his controversial methods, to clarify 
traditional Church doctrine rather than rebel against it.
Unlike St Anselm and the Cistercians, Abelard insisted that 
understanding was a prerequisite to faith, and declared that 
faith without reason was merely an opinion.
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By his application of dialectic, Abelard lent new emphasis 
to established notions of spiritual psychology by defining 
sin and virtue as stemming solely from good or bad 
intentions. Abelard based his notion of intent on 
Augustine's theory, mentioned above, that the faculty of 
reason has the capacity to distinguish good from evil as it 
is itself informed by divine law. Consequently, Abelard 
concluded that virtue is only present in the consent to 
abide by the reasoning powers of the conscience and to act 
on its guidance. Conversely, he argued that sin is a 
voluntary rejection of the same guidance. Thus, sin lies in 
the consent to act against conscience. As a result of this 
conclusion, Abelard claimed that those of immature reasoning 
powers, for example children, are not capable of 
sinning.However, the controversy surrounding Abelard's 
thought stemmed in particular from his consequent assertion 
that actions in themselves are morally neutral. He therefore 
postulated that a crime committed unintentionally is not a 
sin, and similarly an act of goodness has no moral value if 
it likewise occurs without intent. Abelard thus concluded 
that an act is only virtuous if it arises from a good 
intention, in other words, from an actual consenting to 
good. Likewise, a criminal act is not sinful in itself, 
rather the sin lies in the evil intent. It therefore follows 
that an absence of evil intent denotes the absence of sin. 
Abelard proceeded to explain his approach at length in the 
Ethica :
The will itself or the desire to do what is unlawful is by no means to be called sin, but rather, as we have stated, the consent itself. The time when we consent to what is unlawful is in fact when we in no way draw back from its accomplishment and are inwardly ready, if given the chance, to do it. Anyone who is found in this disposition incurs the fullness of guilt; the addition of the performance of the deed adds nothing to increase the sin. On the contrary, before God the man who to the extent of his power endeavours to achieve this is as guilty as the man who as far as he is able does achieve it - just as
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if, so the blessed Augustine reminds us, he too had also been caught in the act.^^®
Abelard found greatest notoriety and fame by declaring that 
the persecutors of Christ did not commit a sin because they 
were unaware that they were displeasing God and did not 
therefore actually consent to e v i l H o w e v e r ,  Abelard's 
definition of sin likewise caused great controversy as a 
result of its implications for cases of civil law and the 
question of penance. As Michael Haren comments:
the thesis that the actual execution of an intention is morally indifferent ran counter to a well established penitential tradition, the spiritual counterpart of the old Germanic laws governing redress of injuries, which required minute examination of the external content of the sinful act.^^®
Nevertheless, despite the continued greater significance of 
exterior actions, the consideration of interior disposition 
was not unknown in civil law.^^® The same was true of the 
penitential system, as will presently be demonstrated. In 
this system, the clarifying work of the scholastic and 
monastic thinkers in the twelfth century, including Abelard, 
caused the notion of contrition, i.e. the true, inner sorrow 
experienced by a sinner, to be more clearly defined and to 
increase greatly in significance.
The works of Hugh and Abelard found representation and 
widespread influence principally in the hugely popular Liber 
quattuor sententiarum of Peter Lombard which appeared 
between 1150 and 1157 and which came to form the basic text 
for theological instruction into the sixteenth century and 
b e y o n d . T h i s  work was an immediate success throughout 
the West as it catalogued all aspects of theology, including 
the varying opinions on the definition of sin and the 
importance of inner piety. However, the ideas of these 
masters achieved extensive influence in another way. As
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mentioned above, the revived interest in self-awareness 
amongst twelfth-century intellectuals gave a greater impulse 
to developments in the penitential system which had been 
taking place since the sixth century. Whereas the external 
elements of penitential practice were already established by 
the twelfth century, the internal, subjective elements had 
yet to be systematized. In this respect, the penitential 
system received substantial input from the work already 
undertaken by theologians regarding the role of intropection 
in sin and virtue. Thus, the evolution of the penitential 
system, the most universal method by which the concept of 
self-awareness affected all Christians at this time, now 
demands investigation.
Penance
The development of the penitential system throughout the 
twelfth century culminated in the decree of the Fourth 
Lateran Council of 1215 that all Christians were required to 
take confession at least once a year. The Council was 
attended by bishops from every country in Latin Christendom 
as well as the representatives of numerous princes. Its 
decree demanded that;
every Christian of either sex, after attaining years of discretion, shall faithfully confess all his sins to his own priest at least once a year, and shall endeavor according to his ability to fulfill the penance enjoined him, reverently receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter, unless perchance, on the advice of his own priest, for some reasonable cause, he determines to abstain for a time from receiving it. Otherwise he shall both be withheld from entrance to the church while he lives and be deprived of Christian burial when he dies. Wherefore this salutary enactment shall be frequently published in the churches lest anyone assume a veil of excuse in the blindness of ignorance.
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As Morris comments, the decree of the Lateran Council;
was an attempt to introduce the idea of self- examination throughout society; at this point, at least, the pursuit of an interior religion did not remain the property of a small élite, but entered every castle and every hovel in western Europe. 122
This ruling therefore marks a vital step in the evolution of 
the penitential system on the continent of Europe. However, 
the importance of inner reflection in confession had already 
been established and was already influential throughout 
society long before this legislation was enforced. The 
reformers of the twelfth century whose theories informed 
this decree thus based their thought on the theology of 
introspection, but also drew on the concept of heartfelt 
contrition which had been evident in the penitential system 
from its inception. Furthermore, the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries also saw a greater emphasis on the interior 
aspects of penance as a result of gradual external changes 
to the penitential system which had been evolving since the 
birth of Christianity itself. From the practice in the first 
centuries A.D. of public confession and penance which could 
be undertaken only once in a lifetime, penance and 
confession evolved into a private, obligatory and repeatable 
undertaking. The decree of 1215 was therefore the legal 
confirmation of a system which had already been steadily 
developing, but which had seen particular change in the 
previous century.
Before tracing the evolution of penitential practice, it is 
worth underlining the fact that contrition had always been 
a component of penance. The teachings of Christ and the 
Apostles abound with statements relating to the need for 
true penitence to merit forgiveness.^® The early Church 
fathers took their cue from this guidance. St Clement, for 
example, calls for 'repentance from an upright h e a r t ' ^ 2 4 ^  
and Hermas insists that God can distinguish between those
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who undertake penance as a result of true contrition and 
those who do not:
To those, whose heart He saw about to become pure ... to them He gave repentance; but those whose craftiness and wickedness He saw, who intend to repent in hypocrisy, to them He gave not repentance.
Origen even claimed that all sins are forgivable except 
where repentance is l a c k i n g ,  anticipating Abelard's
later theories, he stated that repentance is of greater 
significance than the nature of the actual sin.^®® 
Augustine's teaching embraces the public nature of penance 
of his age, but nevertheless maintains that penitence is an 
essential component, in claiming that 'it is not the length 
of time but the depth of sorrow that has to be 
measured'^®®.
Penitence was thus recognized in the first centuries of 
Christianity as an inherent part of the procedure of 
penance. Nevertheless, as penance occurred only once in a 
lifetime, penitence was prevented from becoming a regular 
feature of life, apart from in the case of minor sins 
(peccata venialia) which could be remitted through daily 
prayer or alms-giving (paenitentia quotidiana). Otherwise, 
the single, unrepeatable procedure of penance was of an 
overwhelmingly exterior and public nature. Although sins 
were confessed in both public and private, satisfaction 
consisted of stern public acts which were not to be 
undertaken lightly. They included being excommunicated for 
a certain period, usually for Lent, being forbidden to marry 
if the sinner was single, or to have sexual relations if 
they were married, and being barred from entering military 
service or the priesthood. Remission was ultimately granted 
by a bishop.^®® As may be expected, apart from cases of 
grievous crime, such a serious undertaking with such far- 
reaching consequences was generally avoided until 
forgiveness was finally sought on the deathbed. By the sixth
100
century, this practice of deferral had become commonplace, 
and penance for the healthy occurred in only a very few 
ca se s.Penanc e had therefore become far removed from the 
lives of ordinary Christians. As Bernard Poschmann 
concludes:
these excessive demands, more than anything else, were the shoals on which the system of canonical penance would inevitably be wrecked. How could average worldly Christians be persuaded to renounce forever, not only sin, but life in the world, in itself permissible, in exchange for a kind of monastic life? ... As a result of such impracticable requirements, ecclesiastical penance gradually ceases to have any part in the ordinary course of life, and becomes merely a means of preparing for death.
The unrepeatable nature of public penance in these early 
years of Christianity appears to indicate a greater concern 
with severity of punishment than with contrition. In fact, 
it is evident from the writings of Hermas that this system 
resulted from the definition that penance necessitates a 
sincere change of heart. To allow a repetition of the 
procedure would be to imply that such a change of heart was 
not so significant.^®^ Despite this theoretical emphasis on 
penitence, in reality the consequences of such a severe and 
unrepeatable mode of satisfaction made it a practice only 
for the dying. The repetition of penance had to become 
acceptable for this impasse to change.
Until the sixth century therefore no alternative to the act 
of public penance in the form of repeatable private penance 
appears to have existed. However, an isolated call for inner 
contrition to be held in greater esteem than external acts 
of penance did occur in the latter half of the fourth 
century in the work of St John Chrysostom.^®® St 
Chrysostom's support of repeatable, private penance and 
reconciliation, and his emphasis on inner contrition make 
him a precursor of a later age. He even took the step of 
creating his own system of penance in which confession,
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contrition, humility, or alms-giving could in themselves 
wipe away sin.®®^ As a result of these theories and his 
insistence on repeatable penance, St Chrysostom was heavily 
criticized and eventually deposed from his position as 
bishop.
In one area of Europe, however, namely in Britain and 
Ireland, the practice of penance had evolved into the 
virtual mirror-image of the continental style. As a result 
of geographical isolation, public penance was rare in these 
countries, and instead private confession and repeatable 
private penance were the norm. This practice is demonstrated 
in surviving examples of penitential handbooks which were 
produced for the guidance of a priest in imposing penance. 
The most famous examples are the Penitential of Finnian 
(circa A.D. 550) and that of Cummean (circa A.D. 650). It is 
believed that this practice originated from the monastic 
system of electing a spiritual adviser (Irish anmchara, 
Welsh beriglour) to each monk, to whom regular confession of 
faults was made and who imposed a penance. This system 
subsequently spread to the lay community which looked as a 
result of its isolation to the influential abbeys for 
spiritual guidance.^®® The penances prescribed in these 
works were based on the practice of like curing like, so 
that the punishment aided the process of moral 
restructuring. They also took serious account of the 
circumstances of the sin and the intent of the sinner. This 
latter point is evident, for example, in the penitential of 
Cummean:
But this is to be carefully observed in all penance: the length of time anyone remains in his faults; with what learning he is instructed; with what passion he is assailed; with what courage he stands; with what tearfulness he seems to be afflicted; and with what oppression he is driven to sin,^®®
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In addition, the element of contrition is emphasized, as is 
evident in the penitential of Columbanus, which incorporated 
that of Finnian:
But it is commanded to make confessions very diligently, chiefly regarding the motions of the mind, before one goes to mass, lest perchance one approach the altar unworthily, that is, if he has not a pure heart. For it is better to wait until the heart is whole and a stranger to vexation and envy than boldly to come to the judgment of the tribunal; for the altar of Christ is the tribunal, and his body thereon judges with blood those who approach it unworthily. Therefore, just as one must avoid the capital sins before taking communion, so also must one abstain from and wash away the indeterminate vices and fevers of the sick mind before the conjunction of true peace and the covenant of eternal salvation.
However, the Celtic penitential system also incorporated a 
means of commuting long penances to alternative shorter 
forms of satisfaction such as alms-giving, prayer, or even 
money payments. Such commutations laid the whole penitential 
system open to abuse, particularly in the manner in which 
they diminished the emphasis on confessional and 
contritional elements.
The Celtic penitential system spread to the continent 
through missionary activity, particularly the missions of St 
Columbanus at the end of the sixth c e n t u r y . T h e  
penitentials of Columbanus, Cummean, and the Anglo-Saxon 
Theodore appear to have enjoyed the most profound influence. 
These works themselves provided the basis for penitentials 
produced on the continent itself in the eighth and ninth 
centuries, for example the works known as the Frankish 
penitentials. The popularity of these works and their 
message of private penance had enormous resonance on the 
continent where the practice of repeatable, private penance 
came to be pursued alongside the public version. John 
MacNeill and Helena Gamer acknowledge the huge impact of 
this new system:
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That the penitentials exercised a wide influence upon church discipline and social morality can hardly be seriously denied. They furnished the basis for the practice of the confessional in the West. Without their convenient help it is difficult to see how the local priest could have carried on his task of personal guidance.Defective as they are when viewed from the standpoint of modern ideals, a sound historical judgment will ascribe to them a civilizing and humanizing rôle of no small importance.
This alternative practice answered a need amongst the 
continental clergy for a practical method of providing 
continuous spiritual guidance. Initially, the Celtic 
system was also warmly welcomed by the Church authorities, 
as is apparent in descriptions of the Council of Chalon in 
circa 640.^“'® Further indications suggest, however, that 
eventually a long struggle ensued between the popular 
embracing of the concept of private penance, and the 
Church's attempts to ban the use of penitentials. The Church 
was persuaded to modify its original acceptance of the 
penitentials based on the Celtic system because of the 
confusion created by their number and variety and their 
indiscriminate use. Their condemnation appears, for example, 
in the ruling of the Councils of Chalon (813), and of Paris 
(829), which referred to the penitentials as 'erroneous 
booklets '. Attempts were therefore made, notably by 
Halitgar of Cambrai and Hrabanus Maurus in the ninth 
century, to systematize the penitentials and imbue them with 
biblical and patristic authority. These initial efforts at 
systematization foreshadow the incorporation of penitential 
teaching into works of canon law, most famously in the 
influential Decretum of Burchard of Worms in the eleventh 
century and Gratian's Decretum in the twelfth. By the mid­
tenth century, the private system of penance had j
substantially overtaken the public form throughout western I
Europe apart from the Italian peninsula.^"* In the eleventh 4
century, Burchard took this practice for granted in his |
consideration of penance in the influential nineteenth book 
of his Decretum, known as the Corrector, The public form
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did not die out entirely, however, and by the thirteenth 
century, the three strands of solemn, public, and private 
penance had emerged to exist side by side in the penitential 
system as a whole. As Payer observes:
solemn penance was, in effect, similar to the ancient public penance and carried with it the harsh disabilities of the latter. Public penance (nonsolemn) referred to the openness of the penance, such as going on pilgrimage, and could be imposed by an ordinary priest at any time. Private penance was the penance that took place in private before the priest - what in more recent times is generally called confession.^'*®
The Celtic missionaries had brought to the continent the 
concept of obligatory and frequent penance. This notion 
subsequently received further emphasis as a result of the 
existing concern that communion was being taken by those who 
had not sought remission of their sins. Attempts to combat 
this undesirable state of affairs promoted the practice of 
compulsory penance. The earliest recorded example of such 
efforts is from 760 when Chrodegang of Metz required his 
canons to confess at least twice a year. This practice 
became widespread even before the decree of the Fourth 
Lateran Council^ '*®, as is demonstrated by the evidence of 
the Synodical Constitutions of Odo, bishop of Paris of 
1197,148 the Provision of the Council of London of
1200.®^ '*® Both of these texts reveal that the process of 
obligatory private penance was already in general and 
regulated use by this time.
The fact that satisfaction was conducted in private under 
the Celtic system had two major consequences for the older 
practice. The immediate reconciliation of the sinner became 
the norm on the continent by the eleventh century because 
the original significance of receiving the penitent sinner 
back into the Church after the completion of public works of 
satisfaction had been lost. Likewise, the progression from 
a public to a private style of satisfaction caused a greater
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role to be ascribed to confession. This was a result of the 
fact that confession was the only remaining external 
expression made by the penitent in the procedure. There were 
no other signs by which to ascertain the genuineness of 
contrition. The significance of confession increased to the 
extent that it eventually became equated with penance per 
se. As Poschmann argues:
when public humiliation ceased to be practised [confession] is seen as the concrete expression of the sinner's penance in the sight of the Church. Here we have the explanation of a change in linguistic usage which is discernible from the eighth century. From that time onward confessio was used to designate not only acknowledgement of sin to a priest, but also with increasing frequency ecclesiastical penance as a whole.
The procedure of repeatable private penance thus eventually 
resulted in confession, the imposition of satisfaction, and 
reconciliation becoming fused into one single act, the act 
of confession, which became the sole outward expression of 
contrition. The self-enquiry which confession entails and 
which had long been taken for granted in the penitential 
system also thereby gained a heightened significance.
This was the stage of evolution which had been reached in 
penitential practice before it was inherited and 
subsequently given greater impetus by the intellectuals of 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Although the external 
elements which still constitute modern-day practice were 
already in place, i.e. confession, the imposition of 
satisfaction, and reconciliation all functioning as a 
single, unified process, the subjective elements of the 
procedure had yet to be clarified. The work of the 
theologians of the twelfth century in particular in 
systematizing the diverse and confusing sources of learning 
which they had inherited allowed certain major aspects of 
theological thought, including penance, to be approached and 
investigated with greater thoroughness and precision, and as
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a result to be implemented more effectively. A comparison 
between theological works written in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries reveals the extent of the progress made in 
the latter. The majority of eleventh-century theological 
tracts concerning penance merely list the tariffs which are 
to be found in earlier penitentials. The twelfth-century 
theologians, however, had the benefit of being able to draw 
on canonical works, such as those compiled by Burchard of 
Worms, which had already established a tentative system for 
the discussion of penance, and which included material from 
ancient penitentials and collections of pastoral 
questions. These works, and in particular the anonymous 
work De vera et falsa poenitentia of the mid-eleventh 
century,^®® bridged the gap between the older material and 
the twelfth-century thinkers as the interior aspects of 
penance and their relationship with the exterior elements 
were already present in these works. De vera et falsa 
poenitentia in particular stressed the importance of the 
attitude of the sinner on confessing his or her sins in its 
fifth chapter. This work had extensive influence on later 
theologians owing to the fact that it was ascribed to 
Augustine until the fifteenth century. In this fortuitous 
manner, it paved the way for those works, for example those 
by Abelard, which became the most influential treatments of 
the issue of penance in the twelfth century.
A particular spur to the revision of penance in this age 
arose from the numerous heretical groups which criticized 
the doctrine of the sacraments. The Cathar and Waldensian 
movements, for example, rejected the necessity of confession 
to a priest acting as a mediator between the sinner and God. 
Such polemic encouraged orthodox theologians to defend 
themselves by developing more systematic and authoritative 
works regarding penance in direct response to their 
heretical critics.^®'*
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As stated previously, the external changes which had already 
taken place in the penitential system created new areas of 
subjective focus which received clarification in the twelfth 
century. The major result of these external changes was the 
focusing of forgiveness on the contrition or sorrow of the 
penitent, rather than on the completion of external works of 
satisfaction. Poschmann notes that;
after the bringing together of confession and reconciliation it was no longer possible to represent the penitential works (which still had to be done) as the cause of the forgiveness of sins expressed by reconciliation. The only cause of forgiveness which came into consideration was antecedent and concomitant repentance or sorrow.
As a result of the universal acknowledgment that the source 
of forgiveness lay in contrition, even the necessity of 
undertaking confession and satisfaction came into question, 
as did the role of the priest in the whole proceedings. 
These were the essential questions which concerned the
theologians of the twelfth century.
The most influential amongst the group of thinkers concerned 
with the issue of contrition was Abelard. Despite his
controversial approach, Abelard did not desire to overthrow 
the existing penitential system, nor did he offer a direct 
challenge to it. Rather, he aimed to provide greater 
clarification and to lend support to a system which already 
emphasized the inner disposition of the penitent.^®® As 
indicated earlier in this chapter, Abelard considered that 
the essential element of sin or virtue lies in the intent of 
the sinner. As a logical consequence of this emphasis on 
subjective aspects, he concluded that God responds in his 
forgiveness to the contrition of the sinner in the
penitential process, i.e. to the belated choice made by 
the sinner to accept the advice of the conscience.
Forgiveness is therefore not achieved by any act of 
confession or satisfaction.^®^ Abelard thus defined true
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contrition as a step beyond the fear of punishment, 
comprising instead a response to God's love, and to the 
hatred of one's sin:
And this indeed is truly fruitful repentance for sin, since this sorrow and contrition of mind proceeds from love of God, whom we consider to be so kind, rather than from fear of punishments. Moreover, with this sigh and contrition of heart which we call true repentance sin does not remain, that is, the contempt of God or consent to evil, because the charity of God which inspires this sigh does not put up with fault. In this sigh we are instantly reconciled to God and we gain pardon for the preceding sin.®®*
Despite this recognition of the role of confession, Abelard 
nevertheless only regarded this process as a complement to 
the remission of sins achieved by contrition in that it 
allowed a sinner to be reconciled with the Church. He did 
not, however, regard it as an intrinsic part of that 
remission.®®® As a result, Abelard proceeded to conclude
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Thus, contrition is identified in Abelard's thought as the i|
element which prompts God's forgiveness, rather than the ]
outward actions of confession and satisfaction. Abelard 
still accorded these actions an important role in the |
reconciliation of the sinner with the Church, but not in the |
remission of sins. Nevertheless, he conceded that the shame |
experienced by a sinner in confession is conducive to |
sincere repentance, and that the process likewise allows a i
priest to establish whether true contrition is present so ï|
that he may decide upon an appropriate means of {
satisfaction: I
In the humility of confession a large part of satisfaction is performed. ... Priests, to whom have been committed the souls of those who confess, have to impose satisfactions of penance upon them, so that those who have used their judgement wrongly and proudly by showing contempt of God may be corrected by the judgement of another power.®®®
that confession to a bad priest does not prohibit 
forgiveness, as forgiveness is dependent on the contrition 
of the sinner only:
The error of prelates does not damn their subjects, nor does their vice reproach them. Repentance had already beforehand ... reconciled them to God, that is, before they came to confes­sion or got their satisfaction determined.®®®
Abelard's views regarding the role of confession in the 
remission of sins encountered particular opposition from the 
Victorine scholars. Hugh of St Victor claimed that 
confession to a priest is essential, not only for the 
imposition of a suitable means of satisfaction and for 
reconciliation with the Church, as Abelard maintained, but 
also for the actual remission of sins. Despite agreeing that 
a contrite heart is required to perform confession 
appropriately, Hugh did not consider contrition to be the 
single, fundamental prerequisite of forgiveness, as Abelard 
asserted. Hugh reveals his argument thus:
The salvation of the sinner begins then when he truly grieves for his sins, which salvation, however, is fully accomplished at the time when he also confesses by mouth what he grieves. Likewise what is said: "While still you speak, I shall say. Here I am," (Isaias 58, 9), can be acceptedfittingly thus: that God is present first through grace to sting the heart to repentance; then that He is present to assign the forgiveness of sins to him who confesses.®®^
Hugh's argument was based on the understanding that pride is 
the basis of all sin. As pride is negated by the humiliation 
inherent in confession, this process is fundamental in 
attaining God's forgiveness:
Since ... every sin is committed through pride, it is necessary for all repentance to be tempered through humility, in order that obedience may crush disobedience and the devotion of humility suppress the swelling of elation. Therefore, it is
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very fitting that we who have been insolent to God by sinning be suppliants also to the servants of God by repenting to men.®®®
Furthermore, in contrast to Abelard's view, Hugh claimed 
that priests are given full powers to remit sins at 
ordination. As evidence, Hugh cited the words of Christ in 
the Bible when he granted the apostles the power to forgive 
sins :
Hear what He says to all the Apostles and thereby to all the successors of the Apostles and to those who function in place of the Apostles. He says: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; whose sins you shall retain, they are retained," (John 20, 22, and 23) .®®'*
As a consequence, Hugh concluded that if confession to a 
priest does not actually occur, in spite of feelings of 
penitence, full remission cannot be granted.
The divergence of views on this issue arose out of a lack of 
biblical guidance pertaining to the need for confession. On 
the one hand, the Bible presents the example of Peter 
receiving forgiveness for denying Christ without undertaking 
any form of confession. This was frequently cited as 
evidence that confession was not essential.®®® On the other 
hand, however, Hugh countered this argument by claiming that 
confession should essentially be undertaken voluntarily. He 
therefore argued that its stipulation by Christ in his 
teachings was unnecessary.®®®
Both schools of thought were ultimately combined in the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard, the fourth book of which 
recorded and systematized passages of scripture and 
patristic writings concerning the sacraments, as well as the 
attitudes of various theologians. This book in particular 
had the most profound influence on the development of the 
issue of penance in the latter half of the twelfth
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century.^®’' The Master of the Sentences presented his 
understanding of the role of confession and satisfaction 
thus:
For some say that without confession of the mouth and satisfaction of act no one is cleansed from sin, if he have time to effect these things. But others say that before the confession of the mouth and satisfaction, sin is forgiven by God on the contrition of the heart; if, however, the person have the desire to confess.^®®
He subsequently concluded from this that:
the penitent ought to confess his sins if he have time: and yet, before the confession is in his mouth, if the intention be in his heart, forgive­ness is accorded him.^®®
Thus, the willingness and intent to confess and perform 
satisfaction if adequate time is available indicates 
sufficient contrition, rather than the actual confession 
itself. This intention therefore constitutes the essential 
element in the remission of sin. By this conclusion, Peter 
Lombard supported Abelard's insistence that contrition is 
essential for the remission of sins, but also emphasized 
that the intent to confess should be actively fulfilled. In 
this sense, he also included Hugh's notion of obligatory 
confession in his definition.
Peter Lombard's compromise, however, did not answer 
questions concerning the role of the priest in the remission 
of sins. Furthermore, from the mid-twelfth century onwards, 
greater emphasis was placed on the definition of penance as 
a sacrament in which the deeds of satisfaction act as 
external signs of true contrition.^’® The role of the 
priest thus needed urgent clarification. In response, Peter 
Lombard offered a further compromise between the opposing 
views of Abelard and Hugh by claiming that God and his 
priests collaborate in the remission of sins. In this way.
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the priest confirms the pardon which has been accorded by 
God in response to true repentance on behalf of the sinner. 
The priest thus acts as an interpreter between God and the 
Church, enabling the Church to recognize that the sinner has 
been converted and forgiven. The priest's role is therefore 
secondary, but essential for the imposition of the 
appropriate means of satisfaction on those sinners whom he 
discerned to be truly penitent, and for the full reconcil­
iation of the sinner into the Church.
The theologians of the latter half of the twelfth century 
embraced Peter Lombard's thought wholeheartedly, and the 
issue of penance continued to enjoy prominence in theologi­
cal debate. These masters made their contribution by 
confirming and making minor clarifications to the Lombard's 
basic formula, underlining the practical application of 
these ideas, and considering specific questions raised by 
them. Consequently, they bequeathed the methods and results 
of a highly-systematized investigation into the issue of 
penance to the thinkers of the thirteenth century. The 
influence of these late twelfth-century masters is therefore 
not to be underestimated. Peter the Chanter in his Summa de 
sacramentis, and his disciple, Robert of Courçon in his 
Summa theologie moralis, were both instrumental in the 
widespread application of the Lombard's work. All of these 
late twelfth-century masters accepted as given that 
contrition is a prerequisite of forgiveness. As a result, 
they concerned themselves with issues arising from this 
basic tenet. In particular, they debated the conditions 
necessary for true contrition, establishing that the 
intensity of penitence depends on the presence of God's 
love, the sorrow of the penitent, and the severity of the 
sin, and discussing the relationship between these three 
elements.
One important aspect relating to interior penance which 
evolved in the latter half of the twelfth century was the
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distinction between contrition and attrition. It is first 
accredited to Simon of Tournai who claimed in his Summa that 
true contrition consists of three elements, namely heartfelt 
sorrow, the intention to confess, and the determination to 
avoid repetition of the sin. Attrition is the existence of 
only the first of these requirements, and is not engendered 
by God's grace. As a result, attrition alone cannot gain the 
remission of sins, even though it possesses its own degree 
of sincerity which can reduce the severity of the sin. 
Consequently, all three elements are required in order to 
attain true repentance.^’® Simon's definition found 
resonance in the works of Alan of Lille, Godfrey of 
Poitiers, and Raoul of Ardent. Alan of Lille's celebrated 
Liber poenitentialis reveals the extent of the emphasis 
which was being placed on repentance as the prerequisite for 
forgiveness by this stage, rather than on outward acts of 
satisfaction. In this work, Alan claimed that confession 
should be undertaken even if one is unaware of having 
committed any sin:
And although in a general confession secret sins are remitted, yet it is our counsel that he betake himself to the priest that he may not seem to set aside a rule of ecclesiastical institution, saying to the priest that he is conscious with himself of no sin, but inasmuch as in many things we offend all and the just man falls seven times a day, let him call himself miserable and a sinner, demanding from the priest the imposition of some satis­faction, by which his sins, if there be any hidden ones, may be purged, though none are manifest.
The evolution undergone by the penitential process towards 
frequent confession based on inner repentance is expressly 
apparent in Alan's words.
The role of the priest was likewise more closely defined by 
these masters. By building once again on the basis provided 
by the Lombard, the priest's role was described as essential 
in confirming the forgiveness accorded by God, but also in 
imposing a special dispensation on the truly repentant
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sinner for time in purgatory. The priest, as claimed 
particularly by Peter the Chanter, therefore had the power 
to alleviate temporal punishment to a partial extent.
The influence of the late twelfth-century masters percolated 
down to the lower ranks of the clergy particularly by means 
of confessional guides or Summae confessorum. Spurred on by 
the threat of heresy and the need for systematization, works 
such as the Liber penitential is of Robert of Flamesbury (ca. 
1208-15), the Penitentiale of Bartholomew of Exeter (ca. 
1150-70), and the anonymous Summa of Bamberg (1180-5) were 
produced, all of which were intended to provide priests with 
guidance in the matter of penance and to emphasize the 
importance and obligatory nature of confession. Despite 
their practical nature, these works were based on the major 
theological developments of the age. All of them therefore 
placed the element of contrition at the forefront of 
penitential procedure. The influence of these works was also 
widespread, and they continued to be copied frequently 
throughout the Middle Ages.^’®
Furthermore, the sermons of the great masters of theology 
provided an alternative route by which these ideas and 
developments reached the ordinary clergy and lay society. 
Although they were conducted in Latin, these sermons were 
frequently adapted into a vernacular form, as Paul Anciaux 
comments : ]1
Ces sermons cependant n'étaient pas sans contact ;avec la vie religieuse du peuple; les prêtres y 1puisaient les matériaux de leur prédication en |langue vulgaire, plus spécialement dirigée au 1peuple chrétien. j
The subject matter of such sermons towards the end of the 
twelfth century emphasized in particular the interior 
aspects of penance and the need for this procedure to be 
performed regularly. As a result, the theories of the great 
theologians and canonists became increasingly widely
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available and understood, and proceeded to influence the
religious practice of ordinary Christians at this time.
In addition, reference should be made to the Bamberger 
Beichtef a model confession in the German vernacular from 
the twelfth century or possibly earlier.^’® This work is 
considered to be exceptional amongst its kind for its
expansiveness, which has prompted speculation that it was 
used as an exemplary text for priests, or as a special 
prayer to be used by a religious community on specific days, 
and for its emphasis on personal belief and regret.^®® As 
an exemplary text, this prayer appears to be reflecting and 
therefore dispersing the developments in the theological 
thought of this age. Such a claim may be supported by 
evidence from the text which speaks frequently of true
repentance (BB 1.97 'ware riuwa', 1.72 'rehte riuwa', 1. 76, 
86 'rehto riuonte', 1. 105 'rehte riuwiga') and pleas from 
the heart (BB 1.99f., 107 'bitte vone herzan'). The final 
lines of the prayer are worth quoting in full in order to 
demonstrate the emphasis on the inner contrition of the 
penitent, crying tears of regret:
Nu ruof ih, vile gnâdige got, mit allemo herzan zi dir, daz du durch dîna guoti unde durh die dige der frouwun sanctae Marîun und aller diner trute mir gistungide gilazzist, daz ich inniglicho biweinon joh biwuoffin joh bisûfton muge unde mitten reinen trahinen nu gitoufan muge die unreinesten mina giwizzide von alien minen sundon unde von aller der bewôllinheite der sela joh des lichamen, unde gila mir, du vile gnâdige got, daz ich rehte riuonte vone dir enphahe giwissen unde vollen den dinen tiuren antlâz unde den vurder stâten willen des unsundonnis unde die tiurun stâtmuoti iemêrrehtwerchis unde ailes guoten lebennes. Amen.
Self-Awareness in Hartmann’s Works
By drawing together the various strands of social and 
economic change, developments in theology, and in the
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penitential system, a mental history of Hartmann's age 
emerges which is marked by a greater awareness of the 
individual in both the secular and spiritual spheres. The 
economic and social changes which brought new opportunities 
for altering one's role in life, pressure on the older and 
lesser military aristocracy, increased influence for the 
greater families, and extended demands for restraint and the 
establishment of a secular ethic amongst the noble classes, 
all serve to demonstrate this. In addition, it can be
claimed that Hartmann and his audience were likewise aware 
of theological developments which prompted greater personal 
piety thanks to various means of dissemination. The produc­
tion and use of pastoral literature to inform vernacular 
sermons, literature for personal devotion, and, most 
importantly, confessional guides and penitentials all 
support the conclusion that not only Hartmann as a 
clerically-educated knight, but also his audience, whether 
educated or not, would have encountered the call for 
increased self-awareness. This may have come from the
pulpit, the confessional, or from the moves aimed
specifically at the military aristocracy to promote greater 
restraint and more responsible behaviour which appeared in 
didactic and other forms of literature. However, the extent 
to which such a Mentalitatsgeschichte is discernible in 
Hartmann's own works still remains to be seen. It is to 
these works that this investigation will therefore now turn.
In terms of an introduction to the analysis of perception 
and self-awareness in Hartmann's works, however, a prior 
consideration of the influential work of Thomasin von 
Zerklaere will be undertaken. Despite Thomasin's clerical 
background and the dating of his work to shortly after 
Hartmann's active years, Der Welsche Gast particularly 
demonstrates a keen emphasis on the acquisition of
perception by the knights he seeks to instruct. This is 
likewise the case in the second half of the Helmlicher Bote, 
which is written in a different hand to the first half, and
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is concerned with outlining to an audience drawn from the 
nobility how virtue, and especially the Christian virtue of 
humility, can be gained through reflection (sin). Such 
virtue is presented as a means to achieve increased social 
standing, even in the face of economic disadvantage. 
Likewise, the pursuit of virtue is described as a means of 
protection against the false rumours of r i v a l s . T h i s  
emphasis on perception is shared by both Thomasin and 
Hartmann, who appear to be aiming to promote self-awareness 
with regard to a combination of spiritual and secular 
factors as a means of achieving both worldly and heavenly 
reward. Their shared emphasis on self-awareness as the basis 
of virtue suggests the influence on both authors of the 
penitential movement, the theological developments, and the 
social factors mentioned above.
Insight and virtue are described by Thomasin as the only 
distinctions between humans and animals. Furthermore, the 
human intellect guides the body and the will in order to 
keep them on the right path:
der man der sol sinne han,wan daz vihe ist sinnes an.anders ist niht zwischen inniwan tuogene unde sin. (WG 1339-42)
dem viehe dunchet niht ze vilze tuone, swaz ez tuon wil,wan es des sinnes niht enhat,der im ze rehte gebe rat.mit sinne man sines willen phlege,daz man niht trete uz dem wege. (WG 1355-60)^®®
The use of the intellect is likewise described as the means 
to achieve virtue, both in secular and spiritual terms. 
Thomasin thus claims that the faculty of reason provides the 
flag for virtue's army against sin:
den vanen sol dir geben der Sin, daz duo diner tugende herleiten chunnes wol ze wer. (WG 8110-2)
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He also reminds the audience of the active nature of a 
knight's struggle against sin:
warumbe sit ir ritter worden?durh slaffen, weiz got, irn sit.da von, daz ein man gern lit,solde er dar umbe ritter wesen? (WG 8422-5)
This corresponds to Hugh of St Victor's premise described 
earlier in this chapter that intellect has to be accompanied 
by action in order to achieve virtue. Furthermore, Thomasin 
cautions against allowing one's thoughts and deeds to be 
focused primarily on the goal of love or lust. The direction 
of one's thoughts is of vital importance;
vor dem sol er sich bewarn,wa man hin welle varnmit gedanchen und mit getat:daz ist wiser liute rat. (WG 4777-50)
This point is further highlighted in Thomasin's advice that 
prayer has to be accompanied by the intention to act:
wil immer bitten ein man und wil denne tuon niht, sin gebet ist enwiht. so ist daz gebet guot,swenne man dar nach rehte tuot. (WG 10904-8)
Both of these points likewise correspond to the definition 
of true contrition as it appears in the work of the Master 
of the Sentences, i.e. incorporating regret and at the same 
time the intent to confess and perform satisfaction.
In addition, Thomasin addresses the notion of nobilitas 
morum by stating that the nobility of birth has to be 
accompanied by noble acts in order for true nobility to be 
proven:
niemen ist edel denn der man, der sin herce und sin gemuote
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hat gecheret an rehte guote,1st ein man wol gebornund hat sines muotes adel verloren,ich chan iu sagen wol fuer war,in schendet sin gebuorte gar,wan swer wol geborn ist,sin gebuort gert zaller fristdaz er wol und reht tuo. (WG 4496-4505)
The failure to achieve true nobility is also specifically 
described by Thomasin as a consequence of the inadequate 
powers of sin:
hie bi moeht ir merchen wol, das niemen edel heizzen sol, niwan der, der rehte tuot. swer aber hat unrehten muot, der muoz ane tuogende leben und hat sin edeltuom gegeben durh der untuogende minne.daz chuomt von chranchem sinne. (WG 4537-44)
Thomasin's work thus provides an introduction to the 
association of virtue with the power of the intellect and 
the willingness to take action which are similarly reflected 
in Hartmann's works. It is these works themselves that this 
study will now address.
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CHAPTER THREE 
DisÆage
Widely accepted as the earliest of Hartmann's narrative 
works, Die Klage has not been accorded the same degree of 
attention in scholarship as his later narratives, nor has it 
been widely considered to be a work against which the later 
narratives might usefully be measured. The difference in 
genre is no doubt the major cause of such disregard. 
However, as will be demonstrated in the course of this 
chapter. Die Klage is highly pertinent to the present inves­
tigation into Hartmann's interest in the issue of perception 
owing to the fact that it portrays the relationship between 
the powers of perception and the physical body in the debate 
held by its two protagonists. The entire work is concerned 
with the mechanics and rewards of such a relationship and 
the dangers presented by its failure to function properly. 
Die Klage may thus be regarded as Hartmann's initial 
statement on the subject of perception, and a useful guide 
by which to judge this aspect of his later narratives. The 
role of this narrative as a comparative work has indeed been 
recognized by Hedwig GroB:
In dieser Minnelehre [ist] schon die ganze Weltanschauung des spateren Hartmann teils als fertiges Programm, teils im Keim enthalten.
This initial narrative will therefore constitute the first 
stage of the present investigation into the portrayal of 
perception in Hartmann's works. In addition, in the course 
of this chapter, the concept of perception in the lyric 
poetry of Hartmann and other twelfth-century poets will be 
examined in order to provide a further insight into the 
portrayal of this concept within another genre employed by 
this author.
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The Protagonists and their Characteristics
The protagonists in this work represent the intellect (the 
heart) and the physical body of an unsuccessful lover. 
Throughout the course of their debate, the attributes of 
both protagonists, their relationship, and their aims, 
become evident. The features and role of each protagonist 
will be considered in turn.
The characteristics which the heart ascribes to itself 
denote it as the organ of intellectual capacity. Its 
foremost function is to advise the physical body, using the 
information provided by the body's sensory organs to select 
the most appropriate lady to woo. In the performance of 
this task, the heart utilizes its special powers of sin or 
intellectual processing. This ability is so fundamental to 
this organ that the heart is described as being synonymous 
with this capacity in the body's address 'Owe, herze unde 
sin' (DK 33). The terms sin and sinne act therefore as 
beacons in an investigation of this nature as they signify 
the faculty of inner deliberation.^®® In Die Klage, the 
term sin is also used with reference to the body, but only 
in the sense that the body has the capacity to be aware of 
its relationship with the heart, rather than denoting it as 
an organ of similar intelligence (DK 171, 348, 1086). When 
referring to the heart, the term sin describes this 
protagonist's major function as the seat of reason and its 
corresponding abilities, namely the capacity to provide good 
advice and to realize the need to work hard and avoid sloth. 
Each of these properties will now be examined in greater 
detail.
The heart's power of perception is frequently qualified as 
'guoter sin'/'guote sinne' (DK 852, 894), or 'schoener
sin'/'schoene sinne' (DK 558, 608, 949, 1292). These
adjectives identify the power of the intellect as a positive 
force, a claim which the heart emphasizes by protesting that
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its advice is always well-intentioned and sensitive, as 
befits its guiding role in the pursuit of virtue. Leslie 
Seiffert fittingly translates 'schoener sin' as 'fair 
sensibility'^®’, a term which reveals the element of 
refinement in this potency. The heart's capacity of sin thus 
renders it superior to the body in their relationship. It 
also refers to itself specifically as 'ratgebe' on two 
occasions (DK 923, 1253), and advice is mentioned in a
positive sense frequently throughout this work. ^®® Such an 
emphasis on the heart's provision of singularly good advice 
is not to deny that this protagonist is also accused of 
being a bad and unintelligent adviser. However, this is only 
the case in the initial exchanges during which the body 
makes unenlightened accusations (DK 77, 245). Repeatedly, in 
its reply to the body, the heart refers to the fact that it 
has always had their best interests in mind:
ze guoten dingen ich dir riet, von allem valsche ich dich schiet: dar umbe dulde ich dinen haz. doch wil ich gerne liden daz swaz mir da von geschehen sol:ichne rat dir nimmer niht wan wol. (DK 565-570)^®®
Despite the heart's powers of awareness, however, it is 
physically unable to put its ideas or intentions into 
practice because it does not directly control the body. 
Instead, it is forced to rely on co-operation from the body 
in carrying out its directions (DK 913-19, 960-2). If the 
body elects to disobey the superior organ, then the heart 
remains as weak and ineffectual, in its own words, as a 
flower struggling under the snow (DK 821-36). Acting alone, 
therefore, the heart is powerless, despite its best efforts 
and perceptive abilities (DK 852-8). The capacity of sin, 
however, endows the heart with an understanding of the 
mechanics of its relationship with the body which enables it 
to reveal to the body the importance of their co-operation 
as the true means to achieve success in love. Thus, the two 
protagonists exist in a hierarchy which depends entirely for
123
.,i|
its proper functioning on the body's recognition of its 
inferior role. When the body listens to reason in the form 
of the heart's advice, the heart is able to execute its 
ideas and to reverse their lack of success. Such a 
relationship, in which the body acts as the servant or 
instrument of the heart or soul, is well catalogued in 
twelfth-century scholastic and monastic writing, as is the 
emphasis on co-operation within such a relationship. 
Frequent images used to describe this partnership are those 
relating to the mutuality of friendship, marriage, or 
alliance, or the relationship between the protector (the 
body) and the protected (the heart), for example the walls 
of a house, clothing, or in Hartmann's own image, a nutshell 
(DK 445-50)."»°
The heart's role as adviser is combined with a commitment to 
strenuous effort, which, as it reminds the body, is a vital 
ingredient in a successful love suit;
swer ahte hat uf minne,der darf wol schoener sinneund swer ir lere rehte wil phlegender muoz lazen under wegenswaz anders heizet denne guotund minnen rehtes mannes muot.da gehoeret arbeit zuobeide spate unde fruound daz man vil gedenke an si.minne machet niemen frize grozem gemache. (DK 607-17)
Unlike the body, therefore, with its varied pursuits and 
sleep to provide distraction and rest, the heart is 
ceaseless in its quest to attain success (DK 673-701). Thus, 
the heart frequently makes the body aware of its own past 
exertions, and emphasizes the need to strive in order to 
achieve success (DK 662-7, 712-18, 869-71). Furthermore, it 
illustrates its advice with the observation that those men 
who achieve success with no endeavour on their own part, but 
who prefer to rely on their connections and material wealth, 
are to be pitied rather than envied;
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Swem iz anders niht gefüeget (des manegen doch genüeget) wan friundes hilfe und sin guot, wil er da von sin wol gemuot, des gan ich im vil sere, ez ist ein betrogen ere unde ein kintlicher wan. als ich nu gesprochen han, so kan ich dir bescheiden wol wes ein man geniezen sol: tugende unde sinne,so sint ez reine minne. (DK 769-80)
In this manner, the heart emphasizes the fact that it is 
only by striving to become virtuous that requited love is 
achieved. Consequently, it claims that their own lack of 
success has been caused by the body's failure to recognize 
and fulfil its role as the provider of sensory information 
and to obey and act on the heart's superior judgements. 
Unless the body rectifies this situation, they will remain 
perpetually at odds. As the heart stresses:
mine sinne sint so guot, vil bezzer danne din. du muost mir gehorsam sin: swenne du daz niht tuost, so wizze daz du haben muost manege müeliche zit:ez wirt ein ewiger strit. (DK 894-900)
The body's initial complaint to the heart provides an 
insight into the consequences of such an unbalanced 
relationship. Apart from its obvious lack of success with 
the chosen lady, the body additionally displays symptoms of 
laziness, egocentricity, and an inability to comprehend its 
own intentions and those of others. Thus, as a result of 
ignoring the heart's reminders of their shared need to 
struggle to attain their goal, the body has fallen into a 
state of idleness or gemach which is anathema to the heart 
and prohibits their pursuit of virtue. As the heart 
complains:
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niwan ze gemache stet din muot, des ich dir harte sere erban. sit ich an dir niht kan deheine tugende vinden noch mit lere überwinden, sone wær mir niht so wæge so daz ouch ich verphlæge aller eren aise du: so lebete ich mit gemache nu. wan ich an ganzem sinne doch niht me gewinnewan not unde ungemach. (DK 860-71)
The body has no inherent concept of the need to strive. The 
actual achievement of virtue thus depends totally on the 
body's acceptance of the heart's reminders of its respons­
ibilities. In addition, the body reveals the egotism which 
is generated by its lack of insight. Thus, it believes that 
it could have won the lady's favour by means of the simple 
assurance that she is the single target of its affections. 
To the body's consternation, the lady's reaction is contrary 
to its expectations;
'ich wande mich ir næhte swenn ich si innen bræhte daz ich uz al der werlt ein wip ze frowen über minen lip fur si hæte niht erkorn:da mite han ich si verlorn.' (DK 105-110)
The body's lack of comprehension in this final line is 
almost palpable and is echoed by its reaction when the heart 
later accuses it directly of arrogance:
lip, du gevellst dir selbe wol.'niht me danne ich ze rehte sol.' des einen habentz die toren guot.'wes?' da dünkent si sich selbe fruot,'herze, daz meinest du an mich.'entriwen, lip, ja ich. (DK 1239-44)
The vice of egocentricity is accorded particular gravity by 
the inclusion of its antithesis, 'diemuot', or humility, in 
the group of God-given virtues which the protagonists in
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this work must seek to attain (DK 1303). As is evident from 
medieval Trees of Virtue diagrams, this particular virtue 
forms the root from which all others grow. The body's 
egocentricity, caused by its disregard of the heart's 
advice, is therefore a major obstacle to the attainment of 
the virtue which will bring them success. The lady appears 
to have recognized the body's high opinion of itself, and to 
have reacted accordingly by refusing its service. The 
heart's choice of lady is therefore vindicated, as this 
reaction suggests that she possesses the powers of 
reflection necessary to evaluate the intentions of others. 
The body, in contrast, demonstrates a deluded estimation of 
other people's motivations by concluding that the lady is 
acting out of stubborn spite and is intent on seeing the 
body suffer:
'sit si rehte wart gewar daz min freude also gar an ir einer gnade stet, sit enruocht si wiez mir get: daz ist ein starker wibes muot.ichne weiz wes si mir niht ist guot.' (DK 93-8)
It even proceeds to project its own inability to judge 
intentions onto her:
'Noch ist si weiz got also guot, erkante si rehte minen muot, und ob ich wære ein heiden von der kristenheit gescheiden, daz si durch niemens rate so sere missetæte, swenne si bekante daz daz ich ir noch nie vergaz eines halben tages lane,si sagte mirs etlichen danc.' (DK 207-16)
The body's belief that the lady should be grateful for the 
rather unremarkable constancy of its attentions reveals a 
note of irony on the part of the author aimed at demonst­
rating the body's unbalanced view of the situation. This 
point underlines both the body's inability to exert itself
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to any significant extent in its wooing and also its limited 
comprehension of its own culpability in its failure. In 
addition, the body misunderstands the heart's role in their 
relationship. Its inability to reason causes it to become 
possessed of a persecution complex, believing, in its state 
of paranoia, that the heart is withholding advice in order 
to turn it into an object of ridicule or torture:
'sit ouch du mir niht rates gist so grife ich dicke da du list und kæme dir es gerne ze klage: so ist als guot daz ichz verdage, wan so verest du dar inne (daz heize ich unminne) vor freuden als ein vogellin. wie mohtest du ungetriwer sin? wan ich soit zuo dir haben fluht, und wære ez niht ein unzuht, ich schrire "wafen" über dich.nu warumbe toetest du mich?' (DK 319-330)"®
This suggests a complete incomprehension on the body's part 
of its own role in their failure. Furthermore, the body's 
demonstration of its misguidedness devalues its reference to 
the heart's bad advice and consequently confirms the heart's 
earlier claim of being only a good adviser (DK 77, 243-5).
The heart retaliates against this attack by accusing the 
body of making false accusations and by suggesting that the 
body is utilizing the ploy of a guilty man to conceal his 
own culpability (DK 501-16). In direct response to the 
body's claims, the heart states unequivocally that its own 
superior capacity of reflection will prevent the body from 
persuading or tricking it into following evil:
du maht ez uz dem muote Iandaz dehein din meisterschaftan mir neme die kraftdaz ich durch valschen ratgein deheiner missetatgewinne ie deheinen muot.mine sinne sint so guot,vil bezzer danne din. (DK 888-95)
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The body's initial response to the heart is based on its 
conviction that the heart's accusations are unjust. However, 
the body is eventually persuaded to accept the heart's 
teaching with regard to their different roles and their need 
for co-operation. For example, the body demonstrates its 
acceptance of the heart's role as adviser:
'herze, dar nach rat mir wie du wellest daz ich tuo, und verleite mich niht dar zuo, da von wir verloren sin:wan min dine ist daz din.' (DK 1056-60)
Similarly, as a result of the heart's guidance, the body 
comes to appreciate its own responsibility to prove itself 
by means of its actions, thereby rejecting its earlier 
inertia and inability to recognize its role in their 
partnership (DK 1061-8, 1095-8), This insight is subseq­
uently surpassed by the body's acknowledgement of the fact 
that it may never gain reward for its service, but that its 
endeavours will nevertheless earn it the praise and renown 
of society:
'enphahe ichs nimmer Ion von ir,dannoch frümet ez mirdaz mirz diu werlt ze guote verstatund mich deste gerner hat.' (DK 1099-1102)
The body likewise proceeds to accept the heart's choice of 
lover and to refute its earlier paranoia which had been 
directed against both the heart and the lady (DK 1485-1502). 
Thus, the body gains the ability to analyse and criticize 
its own previous behaviour, thereby demonstrating that, with 
the heart's assistance, it has now achieved an awareness of 
its role in the partnership and an appreciation of its 
partner and the lady:
'Owe waz han ich getani ja wæne ich mich vergahet han daz ich so nahen sprechen sol; si gunde mirs danne wol,
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wær ich ie solhes heiles wert des doch min gemüete gert.min rede wær ir von rehte zorn.' (DK 1457-63)
The successful reconciliation of the heart and body allows 
a solution to the problem of displaying honest motives 
within the confines of a properly conducted love 
relationship to be ventured. If pursued with constancy, the 
reflection of the heart combined with action by the body 
will lead the lady eventually to recognize their loyalty (DK 
1542-66). As the heart recommends, they should be as 
constant as a drop of water on a stone, and wilT in time 
wear the stone, or the lady's doubts, away (DK 1613-32).
The body's achievement of the required measure of insight 
into its role allows it finally to address the lady as the 
representative of its partnership with the heart and to 
confirm the progress it has made. For example, it is able to 
externalize its virtuous modesty and its intention of 
pursuing constancy;
'ich wæne e wazzer unde wait und diu erde verbrinne,(deist zuo dem suontage gezalt)und uns der tage zerinne,môhte ich werden also alt,e ich von dir die sinnebenim: swie lützel ez noch gait,ich diene umb dine minne.' (DK 1831-8)
The body's awareness of the need for reflection is likewise 
underlined in its entreaty to the lady to consider its words 
and to realize that its feelings of loyalty are genuine (DK 
1845-8). The teachings of the heart have been successful, 
therefore, even to the extent that the body recommends them 
to the lady. Perception is thus proposed as an essential 
prerequisite for both parties in a love relationship.
The potencies of the two protagonists and their situation as 
sketched above provide ample evidence of the author's
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interest in the essential roles played by the intellect and 
the physical self in the attainment of the virtues which 
lead to success in love. The heart's powers of insight are 
described as superior to the body's physical attributes, but 
the need for these two potencies to combine their respective 
talents and the undesirable consequences of their failure to 
do so are likewise emphasized and portrayed in detail. The 
heart's superiority and ceaseless pursuit of success 
corresponds closely with the notion in the teaching of Plato 
and those influenced by him of the strenuous and constant 
journey undertaken by the soul in striving to attain union 
with its Form. This is preserved in the thought of Augustine 
and the twelfth-century masters in the concept of achieving 
union with God's truth by the process of inner searching, 
either by contemplation or questioning. The intellect is 
therefore traditionally engaged in a relentless pursuit of 
its goal. In its relationship with the physical potency, it 
acts as the spur to counter the body's inherent idleness. In 
its depiction of the faculties and the nature of the 
relationship between the heart and the body. Die Klage 
appears to reflect in particular the teaching of twelfth- 
century thinkers such as Hugh of St Victor regarding the 
acquisition of virtue. The same criteria also apply to the 
notion of true contrition which was encouraged in 
penitential practice in the twelfth century under the 
guidance of scholastic and monastic masters. As mentioned 
previously, Hugh's concept of true contrition as a 
combination of sincere repentance and acts of penitence 
passed into the mainstream of penitential practice by means 
of its inclusion and modification in the influential 
Sentences of Peter Lombard. In the case of both virtue and 
true contrition, the co-operation of both perceptive and 
active faculties as reflected in Die Klage was required.
Another important indication of a connection between Die 
Klage and twelfth-century thought appears in the prologue. 
Here it is stated that the heart and body in the debate
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belong to a young man (DK 7), thus bringing into play in 
this work the issue of mature conscience which found such 
resonance in the thought of Abelard. This allows the 
imbalance of reflective and active faculties depicted here 
to be ascribed to the young man's inexperience, rather than 
any innate wickedness. Conversely, maturity is equated in 
this work with a balanced relationship between perception 
and action. This is subsequently restated towards the end of 
Die Klage once the heart and body have resolved their 
differences. The body is aware that it has not reached the 
age at which it will join the ranks of those people in tune 
with their powers of 'fair sensibility'. Thus, the body 
still has time to develop its harmonious relationship with 
the heart before it reaches the point at which such maturity 
would be expected, such as the age of consent for penitents 
stipulated by the Fourth Lateran Council. However, the 
body's determination to achieve this status is now explicit;
'ich han den willen und den muot, ob mir got des günnen wil, daz ichz noch brings uf daz zil daz mir die liute beginnen jehen mir SÜ1 von rehte wol geschehen, und des ich noch niht wert bin; ganze tugent und wisen sin den vordert mir noch nieman zuo, wan daz wær mir noch al ze fruo; sine sint von minen jaren nihtden man der grozen sinne giht.' (DK 1474-84)
Also inherent in this statement is the suggestion that, 
through its experience of failure, the body has progressed 
towards that very level of maturity which was initially 
lacking. Thus, a young man has achieved an insight into the 
prerequisites of mature behaviour during the course of this 
dialogue. In addition to the concern of the theologians with 
maturity in establishing culpability, this issue is also of 
consequence in the light of the sociological problems caused 
by the iuvenes, as discussed in the previous chapter. The 
portrayal of such an issue in this work suggests that 
Hartmann is attempting to promote a discussion amongst these
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members of aristocratic society or to educate them. This 
point is also of major consequence in the consideration of 
each of Hartmann's later texts which depict the experiences 
of successful young men who encounter periods of failure as 
they enter situations which demand a certain degree of 
mature responsibility. Die Klage therefore provides a 
general introduction to the relationship between perception 
and maturity in Hartmann's whole output.
The Symbolism of the Heart
Having thus established by means of the preceding appraisal 
of textual evidence that the heart in Die Klage is cast in 
the role of rational entity, it still remains necessary to 
consider the influences behind this choice of organ. Such an 
investigation is pertinent in view of the fact that the 
ancient and modern tendency is to locate the capacity for 
perception in the brain, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Possible sources of influence from twelfth-century 
thought and literature will therefore be considered in an 
attempt to explain Hartmann's choice.
Comparisons between works of literature which are near 
contemporaries of Die Klage have given rise to speculation 
that Hartmann was in fact mistaken in associating the heart 
with the power of reflection. Disputations between the body 
and soul were more common in literature at this time, a fact 
which has caused Gustav Ehrismann to postulate that 
Hartmann's substitution of the heart for the soul indicates 
the creation in Die Klage of a secular treatise on human 
love rather than a spiritual thesis. Ehrismann supported 
this interpretation by claiming that the heart represented 
the seat of passion in early scholastic psychology which had 
been influenced by the thought of Augustine. Consequently, 
Ehrismann ventured the conclusion that Hartmann's use of the 
heart as the organ of intellect demonstrated his amateurish
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grasp of scholastic psychology."® Later Hartmann scholars, 
such as Wolf Gewehr, have revised Ehrismann's hypothesis, 
however, and established that Hartmann's substitution of the 
heart for the soul as the organ of reason in fact reveals 
Hartmann to be extremely aware of and well-schooled in the 
thought of a wide range of twelfth-century scholastic 
masters.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the main body of 
influence for this definition of the heart's function came 
from the works of Augustine which drew heavily on the Bible. 
These sources described the heart as the place of contact 
between a person and God, and as the location of the potency 
of the soul known as mens or reason, which is capable of 
gaining divine illumination. Although the heart is described 
in the Bible as possessing the ability to deliver bad advice 
if it uses its free will to choose to follow a course of 
evil (Mark 3.5; Eph. 4.18), the particular depiction in Die 
Klage of the heart as the dispenser of singularly good 
advice denotes an emphasis in this work on the heart's 
function as a point of connection with divine truth,
Augustine likewise influenced twelfth-century thought 
concerning the relationship between the body and the soul.. 
Unlike Plato, Augustine was of the opinion that these two 
entities existed in a harmonious dualistic relationship, 
rather than one based on antagonism. Often this relationship 
was compared by those twelfth-century scholars influenced by 
Augustine to that existing between a lord and servant, a 
musician and an instrument, or in a marriage arrange­
ment."’ This concept may be directly related to the 
heart's teaching in Die Klage regarding the need for both 
the active, sensory capacity and the rational, spiritual 
capacity of the lover to co-operate within their hierarch­
ical arrangement. However, Hartmann does not use the term 
sêle to describe the body's partner in the disputation. Sêle 
is mentioned on only one occasion in this work. This takes
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place at a central point in the poem as the body realizes 
the fundamental need for co-operation with the heart in 
order for them to care for the soul and to advance their 
quest for salvation (DK 1029-60). Sêle is thus portrayed in 
this work as a separate entity which incorporates the 
essential life source of the lover. Hartmann therefore 
appears to be making the same distinction as Augustine 
between the anima vitae and the anima rational is 
Hartmann's sêle may thus be said to correspond to the 
highest potency of the soul, whereas the heart in Die Klage 
represents the rational potency. By focusing on the rational 
potency of the soul which is present in the heart, rather 
than on the soul in general as represented in the body/soul 
debates, Hartmann is thus creating a psychological rather 
than a theological focus in his disputation. His interest 
therefore lies in the need for the intellect and the body to 
act in harmony in order to care for and save the immortal 
part of their soul. Salvation is thus their joint respons­
ibility, and the sêle provides them with a common aim and 
need for harmony. Ultimately, it acts as the unifying 
element in their confrontation. Therefore, it is possible to 
conclude that Die Klage echoes the Augustinian definition of 
the potencies of the soul and their relationship with the 
body which found resonance in twelfth-century thought. Even 
though the terminology is notoriously lacking in uniformity, 
many twelfth-century masters distinguished between the |
notion of reason (usually termed cor), which existed in a 
state of intimate contact with God, and the immortal 
dimension of the soul (usually termed anima)."® Gewehr 
concludes that the attributes of the protagonists in Die 
Klage demonstrate Hartmann's adherence to these principles:
Hartmann hatte nur dann gegen die herrschenden Anschauungen der frühscholastischen Psychologie verstoBen, wenn er die verschiedenen Seelen- potenzen der sêle zugeschrieben hatte und diese zum Gesprachspartner des Leibes gewahlt hatte.
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Thus, the evidence cited suggests that Hartmann is 
reflecting the tendency to distinguish between the rational 
potency and the eternal life force of the soul which was 
already established in twelfth-century thought, and is 
emphasizing the role of the former. However, it is also 
necessary to establish the extent to which Hartmann might be 
drawing on contemporary literary sources in his adoption of 
this psychologizing imagery in Die Klage.
Hartmann’s Symbolism in the Literary Context and in his Lyric Poetry
In the literary context, the unusual mixture of elements in 
Die Klage compared with earlier and contemporary examples of 
the disputation genre such as the salut d'amour, and
body/soul debates like the Visio Fulberti,. causes Hartmann's 
work to appear somewhat experimental.^^ However, the
depiction of the heart and body and their respective 
potencies in Die Klage reflects an already established,
broader literary tradition, even though Hartmann's use of 
these elements in a disputation is undeniably unusual. From 
the middle of the twelfth century, there is evidence of the 
depiction of the heart/body relationship in the German 
empire in vernacular religious literature and in the genre 
of secular love poetry. An example of the heart as
counsellor in the Schwabenspiegel in fact causes Roswitha 
Wisniewski to conclude that the relationship between the 
heart and body was common in medieval psychology as may be 
seen from its broad manifestation in religious, secular, and 
judicial l i t e r a t u r e . Die Klage reveals a close kinship 
with these works in the additional sense that it is
concerned with the prospect of success in love and the 
attainment of salvation, rather than with portraying the 
post-mortem apportioning of blame to be found in the
traditional body/soul debates.^® The works of vernacular
religious literature and love lyric thus provide a more
suitable context against which to measure Die Klage. In the
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case of early vernacular religious literature, there is a 
reluctance to confirm that God actually dwells in the heart. 
However, the notion of the heart as the organ of inner 
reflection is well represented. These early works include 
the Bûcher Mosis^°^ (ca.1130-40), which describes the heart 
as an inner altar on which to lay personal offerings to God. 
Similar images are present in Frau Ava's Leben Jesu^^^ and 
Das jüngste Gericht^°^ (ca.1130). The continued acceptance 
of the heart as the organ of inner reflection is evident in 
later works. This is visible particularly in Armer 
Hartmann's Rede vom Glauben^ '^^  (ca.1150), in which there is 
also the suggestion that God actually dwells in the heart in 
the guise of the Holy Ghost, and in Heinrich von Melk's Von 
des todes gehugde (ca. 1180), which describes an unenlight­
ened heart as lost and to be redeemed by penance.^®®
The use of the heart image in this way to represent the 
intellect is likewise attested in secular love poetry and 
crusading songs, for example in the works of Dietmar von 
Eist (MF 32,2; MF 33,12), Albrecht von Johannsdorf (MF 
88,29; MF 86,4), and Heinrich von Veldeke (MF ,56,7; MF 
57,26). Similarly, the distinction between the functions of 
the heart and body in Die Klage finds forerunners in the 
image of the departing lover leaving his heart in his lady's 
keeping. This is evident, for example, in the work of 
Friedrich von Hausen (MF 47,9; MF 51,29-30), Reinmar von 
Hagenau (MF 159,19), and in Hartmann's own love lyrics and 
crusading songs (XIII,2 = MF 215,30; V = MF 209,25).™»
In this lyrical genre, the heart's frequent representation 
as the organ of intellect and thought resembles that of Die 
Klage, However, the heart also acts as the representative of 
the force of love as a result of the influence of Ovid and 
Virgil on this genre. The work of these ancient poets 
portrayed the heart as the organ in which love, joy, sorrow, 
hatred, and other emotions are e x p e r i e n c e d . I n  
consequence, the heart is also identified in secular love
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lyric poetry with dubious, love-blinded advice as a result 
of its association with this ancient tradition. Such a 
negative image of the heart in this genre may also possibly 
result from the influence of the biblical concept of the 
heart as the place in which free will is exercised in 
choosing between good and e v i l W h a t e v e r  the case, the 
heart is nevertheless associated in the genre of the secular 
love lyric and crusading songs with the process of intro­
spection, whether as a result of the forces of love in the 
heart and the emotional experience of the lover in the 
Ovidian tradition, or through the heart's innate 
intellectual powers and its role as the point of contact 
with God reflected in the Augustinian tradition. A certain 
degree of fusion between these two streams of influence 
resulted in the association of secular love with improved 
moral behaviour, particularly in the secular love lyric 
tradition of the German e m p i r e . I n  this way, the love of 
the lady in the heart inspires introspection in the lover 
just as the love of God in Augustine's teaching is portrayed 
as inspiring the inner awareness which will lead to virtue. 
The lover's insight therefore engenders a greater apprecia­
tion of the moral benefits of love service and its 
preferability to a capitulation to sensual desire. In this 
sense, the association of the heart image in Die Klage as 
the instrument of thought and of love with the attainment of 
moral improvement is in keeping with the secular love lyric 
genre.
In an example from Hartmann's own secular love lyrics, and 
in a poem which closely matches the Provençal style, the 
lover celebrates his love with the insight that it will 
enable him to improve his awareness of his responsibilities 
towards God and society:
wol mich, daz ich den muot ie dar bewande!Daz schat ir niht und ist mir iemer mere guot, wand ich ze gote und ze der welte den muot
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deste baz dur ir willen kêre.sus dinge ich, daz sich min vrôide noch gemêre.(XIII,1,4-8 = MF 215,17-21)
Conversely, in 'Sit ich den sumer truoc', the lover is able 
to reflect on his failure to pursue the service of his lady 
faithfully owing to his lack of insight. Thus, the virtue of 
constancy is directly connected with perception in this 
poem:
Min vrowe gert min niht: diu schulde ist min. sit sinne mâchent sældehaften man, und unsin state sælde nie gewan, ob ich mit sinnen niht gedienen kan, dâ bin ich alterseine schuldic an.(I,2,5-9 = MF 205,14-18)
In 'Ob man mit lügen', a lady realizes the need for members 
of her own sex to display 'schoener sin' in order to attract 
a constant lover (IX - MF 212,37). At first, this particular 
lady blames her heart for its betrayal in making an 
apparently unsuitable choice (IX,l,7f. = MP 213,5f.; IX,2,1- 
4 = MF 213,9-12). In the final stanza, however, in an echo 
of the body's own change of insight in Die Klage, she 
associates success in love with the powers of perception 
(IX,3,5-8 = MF 213,23-6).
Hartmann's crusading songs transcend the association of 
secular love service with the attainment of moral 
improvement. 'Ich var mit iuweren hulden' (XVII = MF 218,5), 
for example, depicts the rejection of the pursuit of such 
secular love, and reveals that the love of God, rather than 
the love of the lady, is the reason for undertaking the 
crusade. The circumstances of the crusade demand the sole 
allegiance of the crusader to God. The superiority of such 
focused love is demonstrated by its relationship with action 
and reciprocity in this poem, in contrast to the inaction 
and the vain hopes of the courtly lovers (XVII,2,If. = MF 
218,13f.; XVII,3 = MF 218,21-8). In particular, the
association of love with action implies the influence on
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this poem of penitential practice and the theory which 
shaped it. As action is described according to this theory 
as a prerequisite of virtue, Hartmann appears to be 
disassociating secular love service from the acquisition of 
virtue in this particular poem in order to emphasize the 
superior calling and reward of the crusader's service to 
God.
The focus of Hartmann's remaining crusading songs is placed 
primarily on the pure intentions and powers of perception 
which are demanded of any true crusading knight and his 
lady. 'Dem kriuze zimet wol', for example, emphasizes that 
the outward show of the crusader's cross has no bearing upon 
success if it is not accompanied by the honest intentions of 
the heart:
waz touget ez uf der wat,der sin an dem herzen niene hat?(V,l,llf. = MF 209,35f.)
If accompanied by appropriate behaviour, however, inner 
awareness is proposed in this poem as a means to achieve 
secular and heavenly virtue:
Dem kriuze zimet wol reiner muot und kiusche site, so mac man sælde und allez guot erwerben da mite. (V,1,1-4 = MF 209,25-8)
The crusading enterprise is likewise described as the spur 
for any young or foolish man who lacks the required powers 
of insight to achieve such a balance of faculties (V,1,5-8 
= MF 209,29-32).
A similar call is made in 'Swelch vrowe sendet ir lieben 
man' (VI = MF 211,20) for the lady of the crusading knight 
to cultivate the same pure and honest intentions based on 
insight. In this way, she will play her part and share in
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the reward even though she remains behind. The crusade is 
thus portrayed as a situation in which the participants in 
a love relationship, if they act with purity of heart, can 
both achieve a measure of reward. The reciprocity which is 
not forthcoming in a secular love relationship is thus 
achievable in these particular and superior circumstances.
Such an extension of the normal boundaries of a love 
relationship is nevertheless surpassed in 'Ich var mit 
iuweren hulden' by the rejection of unreciprocated secular 
love, a notion which is likewise evident in 'Dem kriuze 
zimet wol'. In the latter, the attractions and concerns of 
the world are condemned in comparison with the more 
deserving need of the crusade (V,2,5-8 = MF 209,41-4; V,3 = 
MF 210,11; V,6 = MF 211,8).
The crusading songs therefore lay great emphasis on the 
heavenly rewards awaiting knights with pure hearts who are 
willing to participate in the action of the crusade. Such 
prizes transcend the reward of the lover in a love 
relationship. Despite the emphasis on the moral superiority 
of the crusade, however, the call for perception and 
application remains equally strong in all Hartmann's lyric 
poems, whether in order for a lover to achieve the virtues 
which will earn reward for his love service or for a knight 
to undertake his crusading service. Both goals, if pursued 
in this way, will ultimately attain the virtue which will 
secure the praise and reward of both God and secular 
society.
Die Klage as a Discussion of Lay Morality
The prerequisites for virtue and success which are portrayed 
in Hartmann's lyric poetry are likewise evident in Die 
Klage, in a genre which permits a more detailed 
investigation of the ethical value of secular love. This
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work describes a love relationship, but, as is the case in 
many of the lyric poems, love is not depicted as an end in 
itself. In fact, following the description in the 
prologue of love's great power (DK 1-13), the pursuit of 
love becomes gradually less significant in the course of the 
narrative. Eventually, the notion of love in the Ovidian 
sense as an overwhelmingly powerful force is abandoned. 
Furthermore, the achievement of success in love becomes 
overshadowed in this work by the recognition that the 
virtues required for such success will attract both heavenly 
and social r e w a r d . I n  addition, the means to attain such 
virtue in order to achieve these ends are described as a 
combination of the power of perception and action. 
Consequently, a love relationship is accorded ethical 
significance, a notion which is emphasized in Die Klage by 
the heart's teaching. The pursuit of love is presented, 
therefore, as a means of improving one's morals as the two 
goals represent stations on the same path. Thus, desire, 
if used in conjunction with sense and sensitivity, can be 
transformed into an ethical force. This point is emphasized 
by the body when it eventually expresses its intention to 
continue to serve the lady, even for no reward, because of 
the moral gains it will achieve in doing so:
'1st daz ez mir ab so ergat daz mich daz unheil bestat und mir da niht gelingen sol, dannoch tuot mir daz vil wol daz ich diensthaft belibe einem also schoenem wibe. ich lebe ir gerne miniu jar: ja troestet mich baz deiswar, ein vil ungewisser wan den ich zuo ir minne han danne ein also swachez heil des ich ze maze wurde geil. ouch gewinne ich me dar an: swaz ich mac oder kan, daz ich mich durch si vlizen sol ze tuon rehte unde wolund valsches durch si ane bin.' (DK 1069-85)
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In an initial insight into its subsequent observations 
regarding virtue, the heart prompts the body to aspire to
attain 'triuwe', 'milte', and 'manheit' as a means of
gaining favour amongst the ladies (DK 621-34). It likewise 
describes secular privilege and salvation as elusive goals 
which require active and strenuous pursuit (DK 742-54). At 
a later stage in the work, the relationship between the
quest for love and the attainment of virtue is expanded. As
a result of pursuing love and virtue by the means described 
by the heart, a lover becomes eligible to acquire certain 
other virtues. These are described as magical herbs which 
are only bestowed by God's grace:
ez ist dar umbe so getan, swer in ze rehte sol began, der muoz haben driu krut, diu tuont in liep unde trut. derne darft du aber niht warten in deheines mannes garten, ouchne vindet si niemen veile. ezne ste an sinem heile daz er si gewinne von dem mit schoenem sinne der si in sinem gewalte hat, sone hilfet in dehein rat, er wæn ir iemer enbære. got ist der würzære, der phliget ir alters eine. sin kamer diu ist reine; dar uz git er si swem er wil: der hat ouch immer heiles vil.Diu krut sint dir unerkant; also sint si genant;milte, zuht, diemuot. (DK 1283-1303)
These three herbs therefore are only granted to those people 
in possession of 'schoener sin', who are capable of 
positively using their reflective faculties. Furthermore, 
the magic of these three herbs requires the acquisition of I
additional virtues to achieve full potency. These virtues I
are listed as 'triuwe unde stæte', 'kiuscheit unde schame', |
and 'gewislichiu manheit'. Furthermore, all of these virtues |
are required to be gathered in a heart free of hate, as the |
heart explains :
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ouch hoerent ander würze derzuoe daz man im rehte tuo:triwe unde stæte.swer die dar zuo niht hæte,so müese der list beliben;ouch muost du dar zuo tribenbeide kiuscheit unde schame.dannoch ist ein krutes namegewislichiu manheit.so ist daz zouber gar gereit.und swem also gelingetdaz er si zesamen bringet,der sol si schütten in ein vaz:daz ist ein herze ane haz.da sol er si inne tragen,so wil ich dir daz zeware sagendaz im diu sælde ist gereitunz er si bi im treit. (DK 1309-26)
In this way, the heart stresses its function in the 
acquisition of virtue and as a place of contact with God. 
Thus, the use of balanced reason and action in the pursuit 
of love is described as the means to attain the virtues of 
God's grace which will inevitably attract the favour of 
ladies and secular praise in general:
wan sol dir von wibeimmer rehte wol ergan,so muost du ditz zouber han.ouch ist ez eines dinges guot,daz man ez ane laster tuotund ane groze sünde.wol in der ir hat künde!daz ist zer werlte ein sælekeitund ist gote niene leit,ez ist bedenthalp ein gwin,got und diu werlt minnet in;swer den selben zouberlist kan,der ist zer werlt ein sælec man. (DK 1336-48)
It is significant that the virtues listed in this work do 
not correspond directly with Christian or cardinal virtues. 
Instead, they may be termed a list of courtly virtues which, 
on the one hand, incorporate certain aspects which are 
mutually acceptable to both the Church and the military 
aristocracy, for example loyalty, and, on the other hand, 
purely secular virtues such as 'gewislichiu manheit'. Such
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a combination of secular and clerical virtues implies that 
Hartmann's aim was to create a lay analysis of virtue in 
this work, which places the respected characteristics of a 
knight or courtly lover within a theological framework based 
on Augustine's notion of sola gratia Dei, according to which 
God alone dispenses the three Christian virtues of faith, 
hope, and charity. The fact that these three virtues are not 
openly identified in Die Klage implies that Hartmann is not 
attempting to portray the ethical guidelines prescribed by 
the Church directly. Nevertheless, the parallel between 
Augustine's teaching and Hartmann's description in this work 
of God's discretionary powers in the apportioning of certain 
superior virtues suggests that neither is Hartmann seeking 
to contradict the Church's teaching entirely. Instead, he 
presents a treatise on secular virtue which is lent 
theological weight by its similarity to the means prescribed 
in the teaching of the Church to achieve divinely-granted 
virtue. As Volker Mertens states:
diese inhaltlich laikale Tugenddidaxe wird mit Hilfe der gelehrten kirchlichen Gnadenlehre entfaltet, indem die transzendente Seite unverandert belassen wird.
Thus, Hartmann may be advocating broadly secular virtues, 
but he nevertheless portrays the manner in which they are 
achieved as being identical to that of Christian virtues. 
Indeed, it can be argued that just such a combination of 
courtly and Christian virtues would be most fitting for the 
work of a clerically-trained secular poet with the interests 
of his audience in mind. Die Klage therefore represents a 
didactic moral treatise which reflects the lay concerns of 
the military aristocracy. Thus, the portrayal of virtue in 
this work does not have a wholly theological basis and is 
mostly restricted to the secular realm. However, these 
secular virtues are nevertheless accorded strong moral 
overtones by being presented as a means of pleasing God
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owing to the fact that they are achieved in the same way as 
strictly Christian virtues.
The relationship between the secular and the theological 
dimensions has been interpreted in different ways in 
Hartmann scholarship. Antonin Hrubÿ, for example, maintains 
that Hartmann apparently implies in this work that secular 
virtues contain moral value in themselves, a notion which 
contravenes the definition accepted by the majority of 
twelfth-century theologians that virtue is only attained by 
the divine acknowledgement of an action. Secular virtues are j
therefore incapable of earning such God-given approval. As I
Hrubÿ states : jJ
es ist nur allzu begreiflich, daB die absolute Mehrzahl mittelalterlicher Theologen den Tugenden nur dann moralischen Wert zuschrieb, wenn ihnen Idurch gottliche Gnade übernatürliches Verdienst jverliehen wurde. Somit sind aber die sogenannten |politischen Tugenden der heidnischen Philosophen |wie auch die natürlichen oder erworbenen Tugenden jder Christen, die fur die weltlichen Sittenlehren jder hofischen Dichter in Betracht kâmen, aus der jmittelalterlichen Moral im strikten Sinne ausge- 1schlossen. I
Hrubÿ acknowledges that Hartmann is aware of the procedure 
for receiving virtue from God, but also that he substitutes 
secular for heavenly virtues. By investigating both Die 
Klage and Erec, Hrubÿ observes the function of the heart as 
the organ of intellect and its role in guiding the body to 
achieving success in love. According to Hrubÿ, Hartmann 
emphasizes the manner in which the striving of the heart and 
body towards this goal inevitably results in the acquisition 
of additional virtues. Thus, the struggle to achieve 
worldly goals is a potential means of earning God's grace, 
even if it is not a causal means. The potential nevertheless 
contains an element of moral gain in itself. Such an 
interest in the depiction of a Gesinnungsmoral in which the 
powers of perception and the intentions of the protagonists 
are of paramount importance, causes Hrubÿ to link Hartmann's
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works with the teaching of twelfth-century scholastic 
thought, a view shared by Schnell and this present 
study. However, Hrubÿ proceeds to draw the further 
conclusion on the basis of this evidence that Hartmann was 
ahead of his age in bestowing moral worth on worldly virtues 
in this way. Consequently, Hrubÿ relates Hartmann's thought 
more closely to Aquinas' thirteenth-century theory that 
political virtues contain an element of morality.™® 
However, such speculation can be avoided by taking into 
account the fact that Hartmann's work is not a purely 
theological treatise, but instead represents the moral 
values of the secular aristocracy set against a clerical 
background. The combination of these issues is explicable 
within the context of twelfth-century values, and does not 
need a forward reference to Aquinas' later system.
Hartmann's creation of a fine balance between the lay and 
clerical spheres has also provoked attempts to identify the 
source of greatest influence on his lay moral philosophy. 
Mertens, for example, observes a secular model for Die Klage 
in the Moralis philosophia of William of Conches which was 
influenced by Cicero's De officiis and may have been known 
to Hartmann through Wernher of Elmendorf's translation.™^ 
In the Moralis,, there is no mention of Christian virtues, 
nor of God's part in their distribution. Mertens' reason for 
suggesting this model is based on the fact that these three 
Christian virtues are similarly absent in Die Klage, 
although he acknowledges that some of the virtues listed by 
Hartmann have religious overtones and that religious themes 
are integrated. In essence, Mertens concludes that 
Hartmann's education permits him to draw on antique sources 
and the contemporary secular love lyric genre to create in 
Die Klage a code of ethics for the military aristocracy 
which is based broadly on secular rather than on clerical 
influences.
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Wolf Gewehr, however, rejects the possibility that the 
Moralis philosophia provided a model for Die Klage for 
precisely the same reason that Mertens accepts it, in other 
words because Christian virtues and God's involvement are 
not mentioned.™^ Gewehr supports his claim by highlighting 
Hartmann's superimposition of heavy religious overtones on 
the secular virtues mentioned in Die Klage, and perceiving 
evidence of a clerical bias to this work in this emphasis. 
Furthermore, Gewehr underlines Hartmann's virtual equation 
of certain secular virtues with the three Christian virtues 
in terms of the exclusive manner in which they are dispensed 
by God. Similarly, Gewehr highlights the significant 
inclusion of humility as the single unequivocally Christian 
virtue in the heart's teaching. Humility occupies a role of 
central importance in Christian morality as it forms the 
root of all virtues. The inclusion of this virtue in this 
work, combined with evidence to suggest that Hartmann was 
influenced by Augustine's teaching regarding the acquisition 
of virtues, leads Gewehr to conclude that the secular 
courtly virtues listed by the heart are equated by Hartmann 
with Christian courtly virtues. Unlike Mertens, therefore,
Gewehr is of the opinion that Die Klage constitutes a 
fundamentally religious work which discusses secular virtues 
from this basic Christian standpoint.
Both Mertens and Gewehr acknowledge the combination of 
secular and religious notions in Die Klage, but attempt to 
attach greater significance to one sphere of influence at 
the expense of the other. In Mertens' case. Die Klage is 
cast as a secular work with religious overtones, and, in 
Gewehr's case, it becomes a religious work with secular 
overtones. However, such emphasis on one sphere of influence i
detracts from the fact that this work is a skilful and |
appropriate combination of both spheres by a clerically- j
educated secular author. The framework for this exposition
on the acquisition of virtue is based on theological 
influences. However, the lack of any direct reference to the
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three Christian virtues in Die Klage implies, quite 
appropriately for a work directed at a secular audience, 
that Hartmann's aim was not to create a purely theological 
treatise. Such a combination of the clerical and secular 
instead creates an emphasis on the means to achieve virtue, 
which is based on the teaching of Augustine, but which 
Hartmann relates to a secular context. In this manner, the 
portrayal of the acquisition of virtue in this work can be 
interpreted in terms of achieving success in love and 
secular honour, as well as encouraging a recognition of the 
advantages of adhering to the social hierarchy of the feudal 
system.™®
The format of Die Klage permits a clear and detailed account 
of the issue of perception and its value in both a love 
relationship and in terms of secular renown and heavenly 
salvation. The clarity of presentation likewise aids an 
evaluation of the sources of influence underlying the 
didactic principles in the narrative. Unfortunately, there 
is no evidence to support the existence of a direct source 
for the narrative itself. The extent of Hartmann's own 
interest in subjective issues in this work can only 
therefore be assessed with the hindsight gained from a 
consideration of his later narratives.
In Die Klage, the breakdown of the partnership between the 
heart, representing rational powers, and the body, 
representing physical action and desire, provides abundant 
scope for the function and duties of each protagonist to be 
revealed, as well as the consequences of their lack of co­
operation. Their debate ultimately serves to describe the 
need to establish a balance between rational thought and 
appropriate action in order to achieve both secular and 
clerical virtues and by extension to be rewarded in a love 
relationship and in heaven. One may contend therefore, on 
the basis of this evidence, that this work demonstrates the 
influence of the teaching of the early scholastic and
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monastic masters, particularly regarding penitential 
practice, as described in the previous chapter. Although it 
is not a theological treatise employing the corresponding 
terminology, the detail of the relationship between the 
protagonists in this work nevertheless reveals clerical 
influence. In addition, this is suggested by the employment 
of the heart image in contrast to the soul in the literary 
tradition of body/soul disputations. The preference for the 
heart may be linked to the biblical notion of the heart 
containing the potency of the intellect, a concept which was 
transported into the works of twelfth-century masters via 
Augustine. Nevertheless, despite the evidence for clerical 
influence on Hartmann's portrayal of the function of 
perception, he creates a secular background for this 
depiction, thereby drawing lay notions of morality and the 
importance of introspection into this framework.
Hartmann's own status and education hold the key to placing 
this work in its most appropriate context. The influence of 
twelfth-century thought concerning the role of perception 
and the willingness to act as the means to achieve true 
contrition and virtue is visible in the roles played by the 
heart and body. The appropriateness of these means for the 
acquisition of secular virtues is likewise emphasized in the 
heart's teaching. A secular love relationship is thus 
posited as an opportunity to attain moral improvement. 
Hartmann therefore reveals his interest in the role of 
perception in lay morality in this initial work. Indeed, the 
experimental nature of Die Klage as a modification of the 
disputation genre into which Hartmann has introduced 
established imagery denoting inner awareness implies an 
effort to create an arena in which to express such interest. 
The diverse elements constituting lay moral thought demand 
the creation of a hybrid genre such as this. In addition, 
the disputation genre offers Hartmann the means to devote 
himself entirely and in great detail to the question of 
achieving virtue and success in love. The issues discussed
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in this work remain of essential importance in the 
underlying ethic of his later narratives. In these later 
works, an imbalance of the perceptive and the physical
faculties occurs in certain aspects of the protagonists'
lives, either with regard to secular or spiritual 
responsibilities. The situations may change between 
Hartmann's works, therefore, but the mechanics of ethical
behaviour remain the same. Die Klage thus acts as an
introduction to this philosophy. As Seiffert states, with 
regard to this disputation;
[Hartmann] must have been helping to form the critical sensibilities of an audience that will also have occasion to observe his epic heroes - Erec, Iwein, even Gregorius - in their self- conscious moments as they encounter the career- making stages of their passage through life.™'*
It is these 'self-conscious moments', therefore, which will 
form the focus of the present study's consideration of Erec 
and Gregorius.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Erec
In terms of genre, Erec differs from Die Klage in that it is 
a fictional narrative which is free from the restrictions of 
the disputation. The opportunity for a continued invest­
igation into inner awareness in a broader context therefore 
presents itself to Hartmann. Although Erec, like Hartmann's 
fictional self in Die Klage, is cast in the role of youthful 
lover, he is subject to a range of responsibilities beyond 
this role in a variety of different environments. This work 
therefore offers a more expansive portrayal than Die Klage 
of the specific ways in which a lover can serve both secular 
society and God. In addition, the existence of a direct 
source in the form of Chrétien's Erec et Enide enables an 
investigation of the depiction and significance of the 
perceptive faculty in this work to detect Hartmann's own 
particular concerns in the form of his adjustments to his 
source.
The change in genre likewise offers Hartmann the opportunity 
to employ different methods of depicting inner perception. 
In Die Klage, the heart enjoyed this role. However, the 
heart image in Erec is not accorded the same specific 
capacity. It is predominantly described as a vessel of
emotion, or of such knightly virtues as courage. There is no 
overriding sense of the heart as the organ of intelligence 
or as the connecting point with God. Only on three occasions 
does the heart appear to represent the organ of intelligence 
(Er 4364, 5804, 6129). Nevertheless, references are also
made to the heart's foolish or inadequate advice (Er 1224,
8480). Special attention will be paid to these references in 
the course of this chapter. However, the different genre 
allows the depiction of reflection in Erec to move beyond 
the use of this image. The additional methods employed to 
this end will become evident in the course of this
investigation.
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The Ÿre-verligen Episode
In the events prior to the verligen episode, there is ample 
evidence that Erec is in possession of a sound capacity for 
inner awareness and the ability to respond promptly to his 
thoughts. He displays this astuteness by assessing 
situations and reacting accordingly to them. This assessment 
is signified by references to his thought processes (denken, 
muot, sin, erkennen), and the indirect or direct portrayal 
of his train of thought. These references and interior 
monologues form the basic vehicles for expressing inner 
awareness in this work. Their significance to Hartmann 
becomes particularly apparent when they are compared with 
Chrétien's version. In the initial episode, for example, 
Hartmann's Erec acts decisively on the basis of his own 
judgement of Maliclisier's brutal treatment of the queen's 
maiden. Thus, in the German version, Erec requires no 
prompting from the queen to demand an explanation from the 
dwarf. Instead, his own powers of perception lead him to 
take action;
Êrec do ahten began,der ritter wære dehein vrum man,daz er ez vor im vertruocdaz sin getwerc die maget sluoc.er sprach: 'ich wil riten dar,daz ich iu diu maere ervar.'diu vrouwe sprach: 'nu rltet enwec.' (Er 66-72)
Likewise, Erec undertakes an inner analysis of his chances 
of retrieving his armour in time to pursue Iders. This 
process is introduced by a term describing thought, followed 
by an indirect depiction of those thoughts and the actions 
they engender;
ouch gedâhte der juncherre, im wære daz ze verre, ob er zen selben ziten hin wider wolde riten da er sinen harnasch hate, und daz er also drâte
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in nimmer genaeme,swie schiere er wider kaeme,so wæren si im entriten gar,und ilte in nâch also bar. (Er 150-9)
It is worth noting that this description of Erec's thoughts 
is portrayed in speech in the French source. Hartmann 
therefore appears to be focusing on the inner life of his 
main protagonist from an early stage of the narrative. 
However, this is not to claim that Chrétien lacks interest
in this issue. On many occasions, Hartmann reproduces
instances of deliberation which appear in his source. 
However, it is often the case that Hartmann accentuates
these instances of perception in some way, either by
transforming them into inner monologues in direct speech, 
rearranging their position in a scene, or extending them 
considerably. Further such comparisons with Hartmann's 
source will be made throughout this chapter.
To return to the pre-verligen episode, Erec's sharp powers 
of perception are likewise apparent in the cunning he 
displays against Iders. He is able, for example, to conceal 
himself whilst pursuing the knight to Tulmein (Er 165f., 
225-7). However, these relatively minor instances of 
shrewdness are overshadowed by Erec's subsequent devising of 
a plan which will not only restore his own honour and that 
of Koralus' family, but which will also win him a wife. His 
perceptiveness further manifests itself in his willingness 
to reveal his plan to Koralus. Thus, Erec explains his 
needs, intentions, and his impeccable credentials as a 
husband, in a long, fluent speech (Er 474ff.). This 
outpouring of ideas and information reveals the astuteness 
and energy of Erec's mind, as does his curiosity regarding 
the situation of Koralus' family, the town, and Iders, which 
is manifested in his relentless questioning (Er 447, 457, 
470f.).
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A comparison with Hartmann's source reveals the different 
emphases of the two authors on Erec's perceptiveness here. 
The corresponding information in Chrétien's scene is 
depicted in a more balanced conversation with the vavasour 
(EeE 501ff.). Chrétien's arrangement, with its steady supply 
of answers from Erec's host, does not therefore create the 
same impression of quick-mindedness as the rapid and 
uninterrupted flow of ideas emanating from Hartmann's main 
protagonist. Similarly, Hartmann's Erec is markedly 
forthcoming earlier in this episode in his demands for 
information from Maliclisier (Er 76-82). The dwarf provides 
a sullen contrast to this attitude by his unwillingness to 
communicate and his mockery of Erec's demands (Er 83-94). 
Furthermore, a comparison with Hartmann's source on this 
point is again telling as neither Erec nor the queen's 
maiden address the dwarf in the French version (EeE 159- 
220). An increased emphasis on communication is therefore 
already being developed in Hartmann's adaptation, 
particularly with regard to the main protagonist. These acts 
of enquiry are all prompted by an alertness and inquisitive­
ness which characterize Erec's behaviour at this stage in 
the text.
Erec's execution of his plan provides further evidence of 
his powers of thought. For example, he is able to make 
skilful compensation for his inferior strength and arms in 
the combat against Iders (Er 790-7). Similarly, the focus of 
his thoughts is revealed during the combat, thereby 
highlighting the motivation of shame and his desire for 
Enite which eventually guide him to victory (Er 930-9). Both 
of these points are apparent in Chrétien's narrative also 
(EeE 910-24). However, a contrast between the two versions 
is evident in the tournament scene after the wedding. Here 
Hartmann's Erec displays exemplary insight by keeping 
himself apart from the other knights in the knowledge that 
he is not yet a proven and established equal (Er 2381-90). 
It is his self-awareness that enables him to act with such
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sensitivity. Furthermore, Erec is shown to be fully aware of 
the importance of deporting himself well in his debut 
tournament for the sake of his later reputation. He is 
described as deep in thought before the tournament (Er 2248- 
58), and during the action he is intent on winning renown, 
rather than booty (Er 2613-22). Although he displays great 
physical dexterity, Erec's mental alertness also enables him 
to become aware of and to judge the dangerous situation of 
his team (Er 2638-2707). His immediate actions, prompted by 
this perceptiveness, lead to his ultimate success and the 
acclaim of his peers. His exemplary powers of insight are 
therefore depicted as the primary forces which allow him to 
act responsibly and appropriately as a knight in this 
situation.
Inner awareness is likewise portrayed in this initial 
episode as a prerequisite for experiencing pity and concern 
for others. In this sense, Erec portrays the same formula 
for the acquisition of such virtues as Die Klage. For 
example, Erec is sufficiently sensitive to Koralus' 
situation to refuse Imain's hospitality after his defeat of 
Iders, in order to avoid offending his proud but impover­
ished host (Er 1341-55). Similarly, Erec remembers in the 
midst of his joyful reception at Arthur's court that he has 
promised to release Koralus from his poverty (Er 1806-10). 
His concerns, even in the midst of his triumph, are for 
others. In this way, Erec reveals his ability to achieve 
caritas, the topmost branch of the Tree of Virtue, the 
associate virtues of which include pity, compassion, and 
gratefulness.™® All of these virtues are demonstrated by 
the perceptive hero in the initial episode of this work.
It is worthy of note, with regard to this last point, that 
Hartmann is following his source quite closely. Chrétien's 
Erec is also depicted remembering his promise to the 
vavasour (EeE 1845-50). Nevertheless, Hartmann displays an 
emphasis on concern for others over and above his source in
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an earlier scene, namely when the queen's concern for Erec 
prompts her to ask Arthur to postpone claiming his kiss 
until they hear news of the young knight;
'gedingen unde sorgen han ich umbe den jungelinc, wie nu sten siniu dine, ich enmohte in nie erwenden. got welle in uns senden. geselle, nu bite ich dich durch sine liebe und durch mich daz dû dins rehtes niht nemest ê daz dû danne vernemestwie im sin dine ergangen si.' (Er 1137-46)
By contrast, in Chrétien's version, the queen's request 
occurs earlier and is not based on her fears for Erec (EeE 
321-41). Hartmann's delaying of this scene until after the 
depiction of Erec's victory emphasizes his queen's long- 
lasting concern which stems from her initial attempts to 
dissuade Erec from following Iders (Er 144-9 compared with 
EeE 272-4). Furthermore, on seeing Iders approach Arthur's 
court, Hartmann's queen herself expresses her fear that Erec 
has been defeated and her fervent hope that he has survived 
(Er 1171-93). In Chrétien's version, by contrast, the 
question of Erec's fate is expressed mainly by Gauvain, 
despite the queen stating her interest in the outcome (EeE 
1145-70). Hartmann's adjustments to this initial episode 
therefore underline the virtue of caring perceptiveness 
through the characters of both the queen and the main 
protagonist. This constitutes another early indication that 
Hartmann's adaptation is powered by the desire to highlight 
and extend his source's depiction of such subjective 
aspects.
A further dimension to Erec's powers of thought which is 
evident in this initial episode is apparent in his ability 
to perceive the intentions of others. This aspect of 
Abelard's theory of sin, which was discussed in relation to 
Iwein by Rudiger Schnell,™’ and in the previous chapter of
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this present study regarding Die Klage, receives similar 
expression in Erec. For example, when Iders defends himself 
in defeat by stating that Erec could have expected mercy if 
their roles had been reversed, Erec is swift to remind his 
adversary of his actual earlier intentions:
'und gedenke dar andaz ich dir, tugenthafter man,selh herzenleit niht han getân:dû maht mich wol bi libe Ian.'des antwurte im Êrec dô,er sprach: 'wie redet ir nû so?ir spottet min âne nôt.jâ woldet ir niuwan minen tôt;so stüende iuch ze ringeiuwer vürgedingeund iuwer grozer übermuot.jâne næmet ir dehein guotan disem strite vür min leben.' (Er 960-72)
Êrec erbarmde sich dô. zuo dem ritter sprach er sô;'nû wil ich iuch leben Ian:des enhetet ir mir niht getân.' (Er 1010-3)
In addition, Erec uses his perceptive cunning to deal justly 
with Iders and his dwarf, after having established their 
evil motivation. He thus disguises his own intentions by 
pretending to be on the verge of punishing his opponents 
harshly, thereby frightening them into submission and regret 
(Er 951-5, 1052-63). Although Erec appears to be acting in 
a manner at odds with the expected conduct of a victorious 
knight in combat, he does not demonstrate signs of any real 
malevolence. Instead, Erec is merely intent on frightening 
his opponents by skilfully concealing his motives.
This initial episode thus provides extensive evidence of 
Erec's reasoning powers and their role in his endeavour to 
clear his name, his concern for others, his just punishment 
of miscreants, and his promotion of his knightly reputation. 
He proves himself to be an astute and virtuous knight in all 
respects.
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Further examination of the fruits of inner awareness can be 
made with regard to the figure of the repentant Iders. 
Hartmann has again added his own emphasis to his source by 
greatly altering Iders' arrival scene at Arthur's court (Er 
1214ff.). Thus, Chrétien's Yder presents himself to the 
queen as her prisoner and informs her of events at Tulmein:
Et dist: 'Dame! an vostre prison M'anvoie ci uns jantis hon.Uns chevaliers vaillanz et preuz.Oil cui fist ier santir les neuz Mes nains de la corgiee el vis;Outré m'a d'armes et conquis.Dame, le nain vos amain ci:Venuz est a vostre merci.Moi et ma pucele et mon nain An vostre prison vos amainPor feire tôt quanque vos plest.' (EeE 1187-97)
(He said; 'My lady. I'm sent here as your prisoner by a noble man, a valiant and gallant knight, the one who yesterday felt the knots of my dwarf's scourge across his face. He has overcome and vanquished me in armed combat. Here, my lady, I bring you the dwarf, come to throw himself on your mercy. I bring and surrender to you myself, my maiden and my dwarf, for you to do with us whatever you please.' )™»
Yder's factual account does not include any indication of 
regret. Indeed, Yder appears to hold his dwarf accountable 
for his own behaviour, despite the fact that Erec drew 
Yder's attention to his responsibility for the dwarf 
directly after their combat (EeE 1013ff.). Hartmann's Iders, 
in contrast, emphasizes that he himself as the dwarf's 
master is guilty of the crime:
'ich wil mich schuldic ergeben; iu ist von mir geschehen leit. jich binz der iu widerreit :gester ûf der heide.daz ist mir komen ze leide idaz ich die unzuht vertruoc daz min getwerc die maget sluoc. der unvuore umbe den geiselslac hat mich Êrec fil de roi Lac wol ze buoze gesat,als in min wâriu schulde bat.' (Er 1237-47)
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similarly, these differences are revealed in the two 
versions of the earlier conversation between the knights 
following the combat at Tulmein. Hartmann's version 
emphasizes Iders' guilt in failing to prevent his dwarf's 
maliciousness and in thereby causing the queen great 
distress (Er 1022-55). As a result, Iders is required to 
realize his fault and make reparation to the queen for his 
shameful behaviour. In the French source, however, no 
mention is made of reparation or regret. Yder is simply 
required to throw himself on the queen's mercy (EeE 1028- 
37).
Hartmann's contrasting emphasis on Iders' insight into his 
own behaviour and his expression of remorse is further 
evident in his address to the queen. Whereas Chrétien's Yder 
simply states the facts of his defeat (EeE 1187-1213), 
Hartmann's Iders undertakes an extensive evaluation of his 
behaviour (Er 1213-59). For example, Iders maintains that 
the motivation for his behaviour was his own malice and the 
advice of his foolish heart:
'wider iuch vergahete ich mich;des entwanc mich dehein not,wan daz mirz min schalcheit gebot.des sol ich iu ze buoze stan:wan ich dar an gevolget hantumbes herzen rate.' (Er 1219-24)
The image of the foolish heart, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, appears here to represent humankind's capacity for 
free will. Although the term 'tump' is somewhat 
ambiguous,™^ in this instance there is no notion of 
inexperience or youthfulness which might vindicate Iders. 
Iders' heart has instead elected to take the path of 
wrongdoing, thereby responding to its natural inclination 
for evil.
Iders' confession to the queen reveals that his defeat has 
precipitated an insight into his own culpability. This
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speech is particularly significant as it constitutes one of 
three comparable points in the text at which characters 
consider their behaviour in an external monologue. The other 
two occasions are Keii's plea after being defeated by Erec 
and his subsequent relating of the incident to Arthur's 
court (Er 4756ff.), and Erec's own monologue after his 
second encounter with Guivreiz (Er 7007ff.). These three 
occurrences are not of equal significance, however. The 
direct speech and terminology of Erec's monologue link it 
more closely with that of Iders', whereas Keii's discussion 
with Erec and his indirect speech to the court create a less 
emphatic depiction of regret. The external monologue serves 
to reveal the characters' insight into themselves, and 
therefore constitutes highly significant evidence in a study 
of this nature.
It is apparent from Iders' speech that he has gained the 
necessary perceptiveness to accuse himself of arrogance. He 
regrets, however, that he only achieved it after this vice 
almost caused his death:
'ez ist eht als man dâ seit, daz unrehter hochmuot dem manne llhte schaden tuot. des hân ich mich enstanden nâch grozen minen schanden und bin es an ein ende komen: wan er hat mir nâch benomen zuo den êren daz leben.' (Er 1229-36)
There are distinct echoes here of penitential practice. 
Iders' brush with death can be interpreted in theological 
terms as indicating the need for penance before the death of 
the body in order to avoid the death of the soul. Iders has 
had a narrow escape, and his new powers of inner awareness 
allow him to comprehend this. His speech essentially acts as 
an exposition on the need to pursue self-knowledge in order 
to avoid vice, in this case arrogant behaviour. Iders now 
accepts that he was responsible for his dwarf's actions, and 
that he was motivated by wrongful intentions which have been
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justly punished by Erec. Iders thus reveals that his new­
found awareness allows him to feel remorse and to 
acknowledge his faults. He is likewise ready to present 
himself for punishment. In the course of this address, 
therefore, Iders effectively demonstrates pure contrition, 
which is only achieved by means of a clear insight into his 
motives, and confesses his faults to the court. The detailed 
steps of penance, i.e. contrition, confession, and the 
intent to perform satisfaction, are all evident in Iders' 
address. Significantly, however, Iders does not make 
confession to a priest. Hartmann's investigation of these 
issues does not therefore extend to following the Church's 
instruction on confession to the letter. Nevertheless, his 
exploration of the underlying causes of Iders' wrongdoing, 
and his demonstration of the importance and nature of 
contrition in his adaptation of Iders' speech suggest the 
influence of the developing emphasis on private penance 
which permeated his age and which is here applied to a 
secular, knightly sphere.
Furthermore, the terminology used by Iders is significant. 
The term buoze must be viewed with caution because of its 
secular connotations regarding reparation.However, its 
use in this context of insight, confession, and regret would 
suggest that it denotes the desire to make reparation based 
on heartfelt inner repentance. Hartmann's use of the term is 
very selective. Of its seven occurrences in the narrative, 
five are used with reference to Iders. Thus, after the 
combat, Iders protests his innocence, but offers to repair 
any wrong he may have caused Erec (Er 1005), which Erec 
demands that he should do (Er 1029). In addition, Iders uses 
the term twice in his address to the queen (Er 1222, 1246), 
and the queen herself employs this term to describe the mild 
punishment she will inflict upon him (Er 1279). The 
corresponding section in the French source makes no mention 
of regret or punishment, and Chrétien's queen again uses the 
language of chivalrous etiquette in releasing the knight
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from his vow (EeE 1234f.). The other two occasions on which 
buoze appears are both in Erec's monologue after his defeat 
by Guivreiz (Er 7020, 7023). These constitute two occasions 
in Hartmann's text, therefore, on which buoze denotes a 
character's regret in an appraisal of his past behaviour. 
This point will receive further attention in the course of 
this chapter.
A similar emphasis on regret is revealed in a comparison of 
the term riuwe in Iders' speech with its use in the rest of 
the narrative. Iders states:
'nû riuwetz mich ze spate.jâ warne ich mich ze unzitsam der hase so er in dem netze lit:des 1st min riuwe worden breit,' (Er 1225-8)
On the one hand, this term is used to denote general sorrow 
and grief, such as in the case of the eighty widows. 
However, on the other hand, it is used on specific occasions 
in combination with evidence of a character's inner 
awareness to denote contrition. In Iders' case, his 
employment of this term occurs amidst an outpouring of 
regret and an admission of guilt. The term is likewise 
applied to Enite's insights in the verligen episode and to 
her decision to warn Erec about the robbers' attacks (Er 
3002, 3142, 3366), as well as to Keii after his defeat by 
Erec (Er 4639), Its appearance on these occasions alongside 
indications of the characters' inner awareness thus suggests 
a connection between both riuwe and buoze in this secular 
context and the depiction of true contrition to be found in 
the twelfth-century works which shaped the subjective 
aspects of penitential practice.
The interpretation of riuwe as denoting inner contrition, 
and as therefore containing an ethical value, can be placed 
in a wider perspective in order to reveal Hartmann's 
interest in secular morality. This is achieved by comparing
163
the use of riuwe with that of schame and its relation 
schande in Hartmann's works. David Yeandle maintains that 
for the most part Hartmann's use of schame/schande in Erec 
remains within the bounds of secular honour.Thus, there 
is no spiritual dimension attached to these terms unlike in 
Wolfram's Parzival in which there is a greater emphasis on 
shame being internalized and used to promote spiritual good. 
Yeandle argues that Hartmann's employment of these terms 
only suggests courtly, knightly, or erotic shame in front of 
others. Examples cited by Yeandle include Erec's humiliation 
by Maliclisier, Enite's modesty on being presented to 
Arthur's court, and Keii's uncourtly behaviour. As Yeandle 
concludes :
it can be confidently stated that Hartmann's romances operate with few exceptions within the confines of the (Arthurian) shame culture, where reputation and honour are paramount and where shame leads to alienation from that society, requiring restoration of êre.^^“
Parzival, by contrast, straddles the gap between shame and 
guilt cultures. Yeandle's conclusions, like those of Fischer 
and Vo6, are timely reminders of the importance in the text 
of secular honour. However, by taking into account the use 
of riuwe in combination with inner deliberation in Erec, it 
is apparent that Hartmann nevertheless demonstrates a 
substantial interest in contrition which also extends to his 
employment of schame. Thus, although there are indeed 
instances of shame denoting modesty or concern for 
reputation in Erec, this term is also used on occasions on 
which elements of broader secular moral standards and a call 
for inner deliberation are portrayed. This is apparent, for 
example, when Erec judges that Iders (Er 990), Galoain (Er 
4203), and the giants (Er 5469) should feel ashamed of 
themselves with the implication that they should revise 
their behaviour in moral terms and not only in terms of the 
honour ethic. In the light of this evidence, it seems
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inappropriate to consider Hartmann to be completely 
unconcerned with the ethical dimension of shame.
An investigation into the perceptive qualities of the 
characters in this work must also take account of the 
frequent references to Erec's youthfulness which occur in 
this initial episode. Erec's tender years are mentioned, or 
he is described as der junge man or with derivatives of 
junc f on fourteen occasions before his verligen. I n  
addition, the queen's concern for Erec and her initial 
reluctance to let him seek his revenge focus on his 
inexperience.^^ Such numerous references to Erec's 
youthfulness in Hartmann's work may be compared with the 
single reference in the initial episode of Chrétien's 
version which emphasizes that, despite his young years, Erec 
is an established and successful knight (EeE 89-92). 
Hartmann's additions therefore imply considerable emphasis 
on this issue in his adaptation.
Erec's youthfulness is further suggested in Hartmann's work 
by Iders' false impression that he is about to join combat 
with a mere child (Er 763-5). His mistake reveals the manner 
in which his arrogance interferes with his perceptive 
faculties, but also reinforces the fact that Erec is still 
a youth. The use of hint as opposed to junc is significant. 
This is the only occasion on which kint is used to refer to 
Erec in order to indicate his present age, rather than his 
childhood. Elsewhere, it is a term used only to refer to 
Enite and Mabonagrin's lady This gender-specific use 
appears to stem from the fact that whereas junc suggests 
undeveloped potential, kint denotes a more dependent person 
who is still far from maturity. Its employment with 
reference to these two female characters therefore indicates 
the author's estimation of their status. Hence, its use by 
Iders with reference to Erec appears all the more 
condescending and misguided.
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As Silvia Ranawake indicates, however, youthfulness is an 
ambiguous issue. It can indicate potential and energy, as is 
evident at the wedding tournament which Hartmann's Erec 
approaches with an eager determination to prove himself, but 
it can also imply harmful inexperience and immaturity. 
Erec may thus be considered exceptional for his years, but 
the frequent references to his youthfulness can also be 
interpreted as highlighting a certain lack of maturity on 
his part. It appears as if Hartmann is creating, on the one 
hand, an image of a young man who has enjoyed remarkable 
success, but on the other hand, he is indicating that Erec's 
youthfulness nevertheless implies an incomplete process of 
maturity.
There are indeed notes of ambiguity regarding Erec's 
behaviour in this initial episode which have led certain 
scholars to conclude that Erec's youthfulness is portrayed 
in a negative light. They argue that he displays brashness, 
impetuosity, and a blinkered single-mindedness in gaining 
revenge.*^® However, the proposals of these scholars are 
based on a heavily ironic reading of the narrator's positive 
comments regarding the main protagonist, as well as on 
interpreting Erec's own behaviour as devious. Nevertheless, 
there is further evidence to suggest a degree of ambiguity 
in Erec's behaviour in this initial episode. Erec's 
presentation of his plan to Koralus, for example, hints at 
a certain immature lack of judgment. Koralus misunderstands 
Erec's motivation in asking for his help, and thereby 
invites the speculation that Erec has impetuously 
miscalculated the effect his words might have on a man in 
Koralus' impoverished position (Er 525-63). Another example 
of such ambiguity is evident in Erec's initial perception of 
Enite. His refusal to provide her with finer clothes may 
indicate an ignorance of her personal worth, and a 
concentration on her physical beauty.®*® However, Erec's 
reply to Imain's offer of clothes may also be interpreted as 
revealing his awareness of her inner worth, which is
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symbolized by her person, rather than her outward appear­
ance. A final note of ambiguity occurs when Erec enters 
Koralus' ruined house and mistakenly believes it to be 
uninhabited (Er 260-2). This may indicate that his powers of 
perception are as yet inadequate. Indeed, Clark proceeds to 
draw this conclusion, and makes a connection with Erec's 
false impression of his wife:
Erec ... makes what will be for him a characteristic misperception. Just as he will later not recognize the full value of his wife, ... so he here is unaware of the presence of inhabitants in what he takes to be an abandoned house; in each instance he takes control of, or occupies, a space/enclosure/woman before he has information on the nature of the person he comes to love or the house he enters.®*^
However, this point is of relatively slight significance in 
the initial episode as a whole. A clearer assessment of 
Erec's behaviour is reflected in his comparison with certain 
figures from the Old Testament and classical antiquity who 
represent positive attributes such as wisdom, beauty, and 
honour, but who were all brought low by the love of women 
and who therefore represent the transience of earthly glory 
(Er 2815-21).®*® This comparison provides a firm indication 
that troubled times await Erec, but likewise confirms his 
previously exceptional behaviour. One may conclude, 
therefore, that any hints of harmful immaturity before his 
verligen are to be considered relatively insignificant, but 
that his inexperience will nevertheless have a role to play 
in his future downfall.
The verligen episode
Until Erec returns to Karnant, he is only required to prove 
himself as a knight. Certainly, Erec attains an extra­
ordinary degree of success in this field by drawing on his
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already we11-developed powers of insight. These faculties 
enable him to demonstrate a high level of prowess, as well 
as the virtues of humility and a concern for others. 
However, on marrying Enite and succeeding his father, Erec's 
social position undergoes radical change. In social terms, 
Erec leaves the class of knights known as luvenes and enters 
the realm of lordship with all the responsibilities this 
entails.®*^ Consequently, after the wedding tournament, all 
references to Erec's youthfulness cease, reflecting the new 
maturity of his position. However, this advancement is not 
matched by a new level of maturity in his perceptiveness. 
Although Erec's youthfulness may protect him from any 
accusation of subjective guilt in theological terms, this is 
not the focus of Hartmann's depiction. Erec's inner 
awareness which previously appeared to be mature beyond his 
years during his first exploit as a knight, proves to be 
incapable of accommodating the extra dimensions of 
responsibility which he acquires as lord. There is no 
evident rebalancing of his perceptive faculties to match his 
changing identity and duties. Therefore, despite the fact 
that Erec's failure is not the result of any deep-seated 
ethical flaw which was evident in the initial episode, his 
inability to take into account his extended obligations has 
dire consequences in secular, social terms. He is required 
to be aware not only of the responsibilities of his search 
for personal success as a knight, but also of the honour and 
basic functioning of his court.®** Only by taking the wider 
range of his identity as lord into consideration can Erec 
act in the interests of all his dependants. In this way, 
emphasis is placed on the awareness of obligations which is 
an essential prerequisite for the functioning of a feudally- 
structured society.®*® Hartmann thus appears to be 
highlighting the pitfalls in achieving success and acquiring 
responsibilities at an age at which one is too young to 
appreciate them, and the disastrous effect this can have on 
a society which relies on individuals to acknowledge and 
fulfil their obligations.
168
One may speculate on the possible background to Hartmann's 
emphasis on youthfulness in his male protagonist. The 
depiction of Erec's youthful energy and desire for success 
may reflect a certain autobiographical wistfulness on the 
author's part. Likewise, Hartmann's highlighting of the 
impact of immaturity on social responsibilities may 
demonstrate a preoccupation amongst the nobility with heirs 
being aware of their new obligations when they undergo the 
transition to lord.®*® This particular emphasis on lordly 
duties may also be seen against the broader background of 
concern over the undesirable behaviour of unmarried noble 
sons which was described in Chapter 2.
In Erec, the protagonist's problems begin with his taking a 
wife;
Êrec was biderbe unde guot, ritterliche stuont sin muot ê er wip genæme und hin heim kæme: nû sô er heim komen ist, dô kêrte er allen sînen list an vrouwen Ênîten minne. sich vlizzen sine sinne wie er alle sine sachewante zuo gemache. (Er 2924-33)
This passage contains an explicit explanation of the changes 
in Erec's perception at this stage. Previously, Erec's 
thoughts were focused on the pursuit of knighthood, and his 
perception was broad enough to enable him to be successful. 
Once he takes a wife, however, his thoughts turn only to 
loving her and to gemach, a familiar term from Die Klage. 
The employment of terms in this passage which specify the 
rational mind ('sinne', 'muot') in conjunction with the 
terms 'kêren' and 'wenden' reveal that this alteration is 
essentially a change of mental outlook. The previously 
astute Erec, whose newly-acquired status demands that he 
expand his powers of perception to accommodate these 
additional aspects of his identity, now only knows himself
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as the lover of Enite. As Ursula Schulze indicates, Hartmann 
emphasizes Enite's erotic attractiveness far more than 
Chrétien, thereby implying that her beauty is the specific 
cause of Erec's distraction.®*"^ However, it is also 
significant that Erec's transformation is not ascribed 
specifically to the objective influences of love which might 
have deflected blame from him. Rather, the objective 
consequences of Erec's restricted awareness are of such 
import that the interfering role of love, like that of 
youthfulness, cannot be fully exculpatory. This question 
receives further discussion in the Galoain episode. 
Significantly, evidence of Erec's inner awareness ceases 
completely, if only temporarily, after his verligen. One may 
conclude therefore that Erec's desire for Enite obscures his 
awareness of his responsibilities. A comparison with Die 
Klage, in which the love-sick body ignores the advice of the 
heart, also supports this assumption. Without this 
perceptive guidance, both Erec and the body lapse into the 
pursuit of pleasure and comfortable living, and pay no 
attention to their obligations.
Hartmann emphasizes the overall effect on Erec of such a 
lack of inner awareness, for example on his personal and 
social relationships, and on his status as a Christian and 
a knight. All of these aspects of Erec's identity suffer 
when the balance between his powers of reasoning and his 
physical desires is lost. His crisis is therefore 
existential in nature.®*® In addition, the term verligen 
implies a particularly moral failing which reflects Erec's 
disastrously lax attitude towards his court. This stands in 
contrast to the French source in which Erec's failure to 
find a balance of love in marriage in particular, and his 
neglecting to pursue martial prowess, are emphasized, but 
his change in attitude is not accorded such significance. 
Similarly, particular blame is laid in Chrétien's version at 
Enide's door as a result of her dubious accusations of her 
husband of 'recréantise' (EeE 2555), which suggest cowardice
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as well as laziness.®*® Her guilt is also implied by her 
own self-accusations of pride (EeE 2606-9).®®° Although 
Hartmann's Enite is implicated in Erec's verligen for her 
inadequate awareness of her responsibilities as a wife, the 
fault lies in a shared neglect of duties as a married 
couple. Enide's pride receives a large percentage of the 
blame in Chrétien's version to create an onus in their 
ensuing adventures on her rather than her husband's 
improvement.
The existence of a moral failing on Erec's part in the 
verligen episode has long been a bone of scholarly 
contention. Certain scholars, as mentioned earlier, claim 
that Erec acts impetuously and arrogantly already in the 
pre-verligen episode, and that his failure at Karnant 
therefore derives from subjective causes. The portrayal of 
Erec's reasoning powers in this initial episode, however, 
suggests that he is a virtuous and perceptive knight. This 
has provoked a further interpretation of the events 
surrounding the verligen episode, as represented in the work 
of Silvia Ranawake, Rudolf VoB (as discussed in Chapter 1), 
and Hugo Kuhn, who consider Erec's predicament to be the 
result of a visitation of objective sin on a perfect, 
representative individual. Each of these scholars argues 
that the medieval mind regarded sin primarily as humankind's 
inheritance from the Fall. As a result, sin affects even the 
most perfect individual.®®® In the light of this interp­
retation, Erec cannot have committed a moral transgression. 
As Kuhn sums up, regarding Erec's guilt;
Gibt es darum aber ... hier ... keine Entwicklung? Es gibt sie sicherlich ... aber nicht im Sinne moderner psychologischer Subjektivitat - sondern als Seinsverwirklichung in mittelalterlichen 'Universalien'. Das ist der Hintergrund dieses Schematismus. Die Schuld Erecs ist objektiv: sie wird ihm nicht psychologisch zugerechnet - sie 'geschieht' ihm.®®®
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Ranawake likewise maintains that Erec reveals perfect 
potential in the initial episode. He subsequently undergoes 
a sudden transformation which may be attributed to the 
effects of the sinful human condition. There is no 
possibility of a moral failing as Erec is aware of the 
dangers of sloth, to which he ultimately submits, already at 
the wedding tournament. According to Ranawake, moreover, his 
lapse is followed by immediate restitution. There is, 
therefore, no sign of psychological development as a result 
of Erec's verligen, even though the hero is elevated in a 
spiritual sense by his experiences.®®®
The theory of inherited sin did indeed play a role in the 
medieval understanding of the subject, as these scholars 
argue.®®* However, as will be demonstrated, a consideration 
of the issue of perception as it occurs not only before, but 
also during and after the verligen episode suggests that 
Hartmann is creating a focus on the role of perception in 
sin in terms of a secular morality. The crucial role of 
personal inner awareness in the fulfilment of secular and 
Christian obligations thus determines Erec's failing as one 
of subjective responsibility.
The focus of Erec's perceptive faculty before and at the 
start of the verligen episode has already been considered. 
During this episode, a reversal between the reflective 
capacities of the two main protagonists takes place. 
However, the gradual nature of this process suggests that 
Erec's loss of insight is only temporary. Perceptiveness is 
signified predominantly in this reversal by the powers of 
sight, speech, and hearing. Erec's earlier insistence on 
speaking in the face of Maliclisier's rejection of speech, 
and in his persistent questioning of Koralus, has already 
been identified as denoting an active perceptive 
faculty.®®® The use of the senses as indications of inner 
awareness now continues in the verligen episode. Thus, Erec 
is still able to hear Enite's expression of anguish (Er
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3033), although it is Enite who hears the complaints of the 
court (Er 2999-3002). It is also apparent that Enite does 
not mean to be overheard in her lament, as she believes Erec 
to be asleep. Her speaking out in this first instance does 
not qualify as a significant example of her perceptiveness 
therefore. Thus, Enite articulates her fear of losing Erec, 
but only in an ambiguous fashion. Both her initial silence 
on hearing the court's complaints and her murmured lament 
are based on this selfish fear.®®® Similarly, as Erec plies 
her with questions, thereby echoing his previous sharp 
awareness, Enite demonstrates a reluctance to repeat her 
words (Er 3034-49). It appears at this stage that Erec is 
indeed justified in his subsequent punishment of his wife 
for her failure to fulfil her obligation to warn him of the 
unease at court. However, despite Erec's ability to perceive 
in this scene, his powers are intermittent. For example, he 
hears Enite's words, but there is no evidence of his 
considering their pertinence in terms of his own 
behaviour.®®’ Instead, he appears to focus on Enite's 
criticism only. A connection can be made here with Kalo- 
grenant's comment in Iwein on how to listen:®®®
'maneger biutet diu oren dar:ern nemes ouch mit dem herzen war,sone wirt im niht wan der dôz,und ist der schade alze groz:wan si verliesent beide ir arbeit,der da hoeret und der da seit.' (Iw 251-6)
The true functioning of the sensory organs is therefore 
linked to the power of perception in the heart. Erec's 
hearing is not accompanied by any indication of thought 
processes and may therefore be interpreted as a merely 
physical function which does not lead to his acknowledgement 
of his own guilt. Nevertheless, glimmers of inner awareness 
remain evident in Erec's cunning departure from Karnant (Er 
3064-92) and indeed in his active response to the situation. 
However, once he has left the court, he no longer displays 
any signs of perceptiveness until well into his course of
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adventures, when the re-emergence of these indications 
suggests his awakening powers of reflection.
Erec's behaviour in the robbers episodes confirms that he 
does not retain the powers of perception which would make 
possible an immediate restitution of his failure at Karnant. 
Instead, his complete loss of inner perception is emphasized 
by his rejection of his wife's perceptive faculties as they 
set out from court;
[er] gebôt ir da zestunt daz ze sprechenne ir munt zer reise iht uf kæme, swaz si vernæmeOder swaz si gesæhe. (Er 3098-3102)
This implies that Erec is effectively spurning any kind of 
reflective process or insight. In addition, his lack of 
awareness in the wake of the verligen episode is indicated 
by an unwillingness to communicate, an absence of thought 
processes or monologues, and a state of disorientation 
resembling the madness experienced by Iwein.
Some scholars deny, however, that Erec undergoes a complete 
shutdown of his perceptive faculties. Ranawake, as mentioned 
earlier, bases her assumption that Erec is affected by 
objective sin on his awareness of his actions after his 
verligen and on his ability to take measured decisions. Kuhn 
likewise concludes that Erec voluntarily jeopardizes 
everything he has gained by electing to pursue a journey on 
which his marriage relationship might be tested.®®® Such an 
argument again assumes a level of consciousness on Erec's 
part which is conspicuously lacking at this juncture of the 
text. In addition, Christoph Cormeau claims that, although 
Erec's powers of thought are not evident at this point, his 
later actions reveal that he was in fact responding on 
leaving Karnant to his own self-criticism:
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Erec reagiert abrupt, ohne Erklarung und Reflexion in einem HandlungsentschluB. Der steht zunachst nur dafür, daB Erec die Berechtigung der allge- meinen Vorwürfe nicht von sich weist; was an selbstkritischer Einsicht hier angestoBen wird, wird erst am spateren Verhalten ablesbar.
Similarly, Roy Boggs concludes that Erec's treatment of 
Enite on their departure disguises his actual trust in her, 
a trust which again presupposes a certain level of cognitive 
ability on Erec's part:
That Erec might entertain some thoughts about any possible misconduct on Enite's part is under­standable because Enite has told him of the court's charges against her. But although Erec takes no punitive action at this point to correct the court's unrest and discontent, it is safe to assume that he doubts the justice of the charges.
It is difficult, however, to support such safe assumptions 
with evidence from the text, as will shortly be demons­
trated ,
In contrast, other scholars, including Rodney Fisher, argue 
that Erec experiences a change at this juncture, 
particularly with regard to his powers of inner awareness:
Als Erec in Karnant seine Schande vor Augen geführt wird, ist seine erste Reaktion allés andere als eine Erkenntnis der Schuld oder der Verantwortlichkeit. ®*®
Fisher returns to this point in a later article:
Das Sprechverbot stellt also keine Treueprobe dar, sondern einen verwirrten Versuch, die Realitât der tadelnden Stimmen zu verdrangen. Im Gegensatz zu Chrétiens Held, der die Kritik zu akzeptieren scheint (2572; Dame, fet il, droit an eüstes, et 
cil qui m'an blasment ont droit), handelt Hartmanns Erec abrupt, ohne jegliche Erklârung zu geben (geben zu kônnen?). Der Dialog, soweit man ihn SO nennen darf, wird abgebrochen. Es folgt
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dann das Sprechverbot selbst, das sofort durch die beiden Rauberepisoden in Frage gestellt wird.®®®
As Fisher indicates, by considering Erec's reaction to 
Enite's words in the verligen episode to be based on solid 
powers of reasoning, one is to forced to conclude that his 
subsequent treatment of her is completely intentional. He 
would therefore be guilty of cruelty in the light of Enite's 
display of loyal motivations in the robbers episodes, 
despite her initial lapse at Karnant. Unlike the French 
source, however, in which Enide's guilt is portrayed with 
less ambivalence and Erec's punitive measures are therefore 
more justified, no reason is offered in Hartmann's narrative 
to explain Erec's inappropriate treatment of his wife apart 
from his sudden loss of perceptiveness.
Fisher's comments concerning Erec's lost powers of percep­
tion are expanded upon by Thomas Heine in his investigation 
into the parallels between the narrative perspective of the 
work and Erec's own self-knowledge.®®* Prior to the 
verligen episode, the narrator frequently comments on Erec's 
thoughts, thereby drawing attention to his inner awareness 
as well as his external behaviour. However, just as Erec 
lapses into silence, these comments abruptly cease. From 
this point onwards:
the narrator demonstrates a striking reluctance to penetrate Erec's silence or to explain Erec's enigmatic statements: ... [he] reports Erec's actions and conversations, but he never reveals what Erec thinks.®®^
This shift in narrative strategy is made all the more 
remarkable by its contrast with the narrator's earlier 
informativeness. The reader is now given no greater insight 
into Erec's sudden aloofness than his companions and 
adversaries. Instead, the dearth of narrator's comments 
contributes to the thematic nature of this work in the sense
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that it prompts an aware audience into resolving the
unclarities for themselves.
Erec's refusal to communicate, which signifies his loss of 
inner awareness, is rapidly discredited in the robbers
episodes. The theory underlying his punishment of his wife 
is based on the sound penitential principles of 'contraria 
contrariis sanantur' or like curing like.®®® However, as
was demonstrated in Chapter 2, particular emphasis was
placed on the motivation and contrition of sinners in 
penitential practice in the twelfth century. As Erec 
displays no evidence of taking Enite's real motivations into 
account, his punishment is soon revealed to be 
inappropriate. Furthermore, the similarities between Erec's 
demand for silence and that of the uncourtly Maliclisier in 
response to the questions of the queen's maiden highlight 
the undesirable change in Erec's insight.
In contrast to Erec's loss of perceptiveness, the verligen 
episode reveals Enite in a startlingly new light. Whereas 
she was previously depicted as a lust object, who was 
virtually silent and who displayed no thoughts of her 
own,®®’ her speaking out at Karnant marks the beginning of 
a transition to a role in which she reveals powers of 
perception to rival Erec's former abilities. This 
transformation corresponds with Erec's loss of awareness, 
therefore creating the impression of an exchange between the 
two main protagonists. As Clark maintains:
the several and related functions of perception, thought, speech, and action are parcelled out variously to each member of the couple and shift over the course of the romance,®®®
Thus, unlike Erec, Enite hears the voices of criticism at 
court and realizes the import of the vassals' grievances (Er 
2999-3006), Which she proceeds to express (Er 3029-32). The 
significance of the physical senses as indications of inner
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awareness, which was mentioned earlier with regard to Erec, 
is now revealed in relation to his wife. Furthermore, at 
this juncture, several references to Enite's thought 
processes occur in quick succession, for example 'muot' (Er 
3002), 'gedâhte' (Er 3004), 'erkennen' (Er 3007) and 
'denken' (Er 3024), all of which denote her as a reasoning 
being. This sudden emergence of Enite's reflective qualities 
may be contrasted with Chrétien's early description of Enide 
as 'sage' (EeE 537-40). Hartmann therefore emphasizes the 
issue of inner awareness by creating a more marked contrast 
between Enite's pre- and post-verligen powers of insight.
This demonstration of Enite's reasoning powers has 
implications for assessing the nature and degree of her 
guilt in the verligen episode. The issue has long been a 
point of disagreement in scholarship. Enite's supporters and 
opponents fall into three main categories: those who regard 
Enite as essentially guilty, either as a direct result of 
her gender which casts her in the role of temptress,®®® or 
on the basis of her self-analysis in her later lament;®’® 
those who see Enite as perfectly innocent and undeserving of 
Erec's punishment;®^^ and finally, those who consider Enite 
to share the blame for their verligen with her husband. This 
third grouping includes Schnell, who maintains that Enite 
displays an excessive fear of losing her husband, as well as 
Kathryn Smits and Ursula Schulze, who argue that the whole 
work concerns the fortunes of a married couple attempting to 
establish a harmony between their personal relationship and 
their social obligations.®’® Likewise, Wendy Sterba 
recognizes Enite's shared guilt for their verligen, even 
though only Erec is clearly blamed in the narrative.®’®
By considering the situation in terms of perception, this |
last body of opinion receives the greatest support from the I
text. Erec is not mindful of the obligations of lordship. |
However, Enite fails to warn Erec of his lapses, even though I
she is aware of them herself, owing to her underlying fear
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of losing him. In this way, Enite can be accused of failing 
to fulfil her role as a wife. As Frank Tobin asks:
does not her position as Queen of Karnant demand that she be aware from the beginning of the effect of her marital love on the kingdom? This is of course a lot to expect from someone of such limited experience, but the fact remains that she gives much evidence of not being equal to her role.®’*
The neglect of the obligations arising from a new social 
position therefore constitutes the basis of both the hero's 
and the heroine's failure. The series of adventures upon 
which they subsequently embark thus serves to test both main 
protagonists,
Erec's imposition of silence on his wife as a punishment 
serves to introduce the ideal of the silent woman into the 
narrative. As Sterba argues, Erec's punishment of Enite, 
which initially appears quite appropriate, would in fact 
have directly caused his death if she had obeyed him:
It is ... evident that Enite learning to hold her tongue would not lead to happier circumstances for our duo. Quite the contrary, Enite's voice saves them from an untimely death three times during the first half of the story and the episode that follows sheds light on the entire matter, especially in view of recent feminist criticism which finds the feminine locus of power situated in the female voice.®’®
There appears, therefore, to be an implicit criticism in 
Hartmann's text of the ideal of the silent and obedient 
woman. As will be demonstrated, Enite's inner deliberations 
in the robbers episodes allow her immediately to rectify her 
earlier mistake by being aware of her obligations. The same 
criteria are thus being investigated with regard to Enite's 
role as a woman and wife, as to Erec's role as husband, 
knight, and lord, namely that speech or any kind of action 
should be based on reason, and expressed or undertaken at a
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suitable time.®’® Consequently, a note of criticism of the 
ideal of the silent woman becomes apparent as Enite is 
required to disobey her husband in order to implement the 
conclusions she reaches in her inner monologues. Patrick 
McConeghy makes a similar observation;
In these inner monologues she is torn between traditional values, which demand her unquestioning obedience, and new, higher values of love and companionship, which demand self-confidence and self-sacrifice.®”
Enite concludes in these monologues that her love for Erec 
is more important than her conforming to an ideal. She 
therefore learns to transcend the restrictions placed upon 
her and to speak up on the right occasion by employing her 
powers of inner deliberation. Erec eventually comes to 
appreciate her motivation, and to accept her voice as an 
instrument of inner awareness. Once this occurs, Enite's 
display of reasoning promptly disappears from the narrative.
From this, McConeghy concludes;
Hartmann is only mildly progressive in assessing the role of women in courtly society. Although he shows that women's speech is indispensable if a knight is to live and to live honorably, he does not give Enite a voice again after the couple has returned to the courtly arena. Here, Enite has the responsibilities of a good queen: to be beautiful and to comfort women in need but apparently not to speak. The muted role of women within the public sphere seems to be reaffirmed.®’®
However, Enite has already fulfilled her role in the sense 
that she has demonstrated the indispensable nature of a 
wife's powers of perception in a marriage. Although she 
remains essentially inferior within the tradition of sex 
polarity, as her return to a passive role in the narrative 
suggests, Enite nevertheless demonstrates by her inner
deliberations that both partners contribute diverse but I1essential powers of self-knowledge and wisdom to the
marriage partnership, consequently, both partners have |
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different obligations within their relationship which 
require insight in order to be fulfilled and which should 
not be restricted by traditional sexual stereotypes.
Such notions of sex complementarity in terms of perceptive 
faculties are visible in the teachings of certain twelfth- 
century thinkers such as Anselm, Abelard, Hildegard of 
Bingen, and Hugh of St Victor who appear to draw on both 
Christian and classical notions of woman's essential role in 
man's moral and intellectual well-being.®’® Hugh of St 
Victor, for example, emphasizes Eve's status as an equal 
companion to Adam and her important contribution to his 
moral development.®®® Similarly, a popular image from the 
Song of Solomon depicts marriage as symbolizing the 
relationship between God and the Church. The Church playing 
the role of bride is therefore a female symbol used to 
represent humankind. Such examples of sex complementarity 
also appear in the works of classical and medieval allegory 
which traditionally depict the figure of wisdom as female 
and identify the female with virtue and the higher parts of 
human nature. Enite's perceptive powers and the parameters 
within which she is required to demonstrate them as the 
partner of her husband, appear to reflect these notions. 
Hartmann is not representing a wholly patriarchal viewpoint 
on this specific issue, therefore. Indeed, his concern with 
the power of perception leads him to discredit the 
misogynistic ideal of the silent and obedient woman. 
However, against a broader background, Enite remains 
essentially subordinate to her husband, despite Hartmann's 
acknowledgement of her important role as a perceptive wife.
The Robbers Episodes
A close examination of the issue of inner awareness in the 
robbers episodes is necessary at this juncture. These 
initial encounters reveal further consequences of Erec's
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loss of insight to add to his failure as lord. His inability 
to protect his wife in these episodes, or to survive himself 
without her help, is evidence of how vital perception also 
is for his fulfilment of his knightly role. Erec now becomes 
totally reliant on Enite whose perceptive abilities are 
represented by her voice.
Enite's insight is depicted partly in terms of sensory 
awareness. Thus, she spies their enemies (Er 3123, 3297f.), 
whilst Erec remains completely unaware of their presence 
until she calls on him, significantly, to look up and see 
them (Er 3132, 3180-2, 3348, 3378-81). Her powers of
intellect also lead her to attempt to signal cunningly to 
Erec in order to warn him without disobeying his orders. 
Unfortunately, the absence of any reasoning power in her 
husband renders her clever tactics ineffectual (Er 3129-31). 
The robbers themselves further highlight Erec's loss of 
perceptiveness by displaying signs of sharp awareness in 
terms of sight (Er 3193f., 3197f., 3211, 3312f., 3320,
3332f.), or the ability to reflect upon the status and 
vulnerability of their intended victims (Er 3200f., 3318- 
30). It is also significant that Chrétien's narrative 
includes fewer references to perception than Hartmann's 
version at this juncture. Although Chrétien's second robbers 
episode contains some such references (EeE 2925-54), 
Hartmann employs examples in both episodes, thus creating a 
continuous focus on Erec's lack of awareness, particularly 
when contrasted with the abilities of his social inferiors. 
In addition. Chrétien does not describe Erec as totally 
imperceptive in the robbers episodes. Enide is merely afraid 
that he will be taken unawares by the first band of robbers 
approaching from behind (EeE 2838f.), and in Chrétien's 
second robbers episode, Erec himself spots the robbers 
before Enide (EeE 2961-5). In contrast, Hartmann's Erec 
remains totally unaware of his surroundings in an emphatic 
depiction of his loss of perceptiveness.
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In addition to Enite's display of sensory awareness and 
cunning, these initial episodes reveal her powers of insight 
in detail in a series of inner monologues. Moreover, a 
comparison with the corresponding monologues in Chrétien's 
version reveals a further emphasis on the issue of insight 
in the German narrative. For example, Enite's first 
monologue has been relocated by Hartmann from its position 
after the debate between the robbers. Its new position 
before this debate serves to highlight Enite's concerns 
rather than the robbers' deliberations. A comparison between 
the nature of these monologues in Hartmann's and Chrétien's 
versions is likewise revealing. Even though both heroines 
are shown to be thinking (Er 3023f., EeE 2480-2) and 
speaking out at Karnant (Er 3029-32, EeE 2496-2508), 
Hartmann extends Enide's monologues in the robbers episodes, 
thereby highlighting the essential role of intellectual 
deliberation in overcoming such a difficult situation, and 
also detailing Enite's motives for warning her husband. In 
addition, Hartmann stresses the inwardness of Enite's debate 
by the use of terms denoting thought processes (muot, 
gedanc), rather than having her speak her thoughts aloud 
like Enide in an exterior monologue.
Both heroines find themselves in a position in which their 
lives and those of their husbands depend on their taking 
appropriate action despite the restrictions imposed on them. 
Robert Hanning has used the Greek term kairoi to denote such 
times of critical reflection at which a character is forced 
to select a course of action which will have far-reaching 
consequences.®®’- Such depictions of the inner thoughts of 
a character in secular literature were still very unusual in 
Hartmann's day. Dinzelbacher notes the adaptation by Benoit 
de Seinte-Maure of his sources for the Roman de Troie as 
involving an increase in the use of inner monologues, which 
Dinzelbacher relates to the trend towards more personal 
forms of piety in the latter half of the twelfth 
century.®®® The rarity of this technique is likewise noted
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by Diane Stielstra. However, Stielstra differentiates 
between predominantly rhetorical inner monologues which 
portray a lament, the making of a relatively straightforward 
decision, or the expression of strong emotions, such as in 
Ovid's love poetry, and those which are more psychological, 
involving the internalization of a situation or conflict in 
emotions, such as are to be found in Augustine's 
C o n f e s s i o n s Stielstra argues that Enide's deliberations 
in the robbers episodes constitute practical decision-making 
rather than any real psychological dilemma.®®* Although 
Stielstra does not consider Hartmann's adaptation, it could 
be argued that a comparison between the contents of these 
two pairs of inner monologues reveals a move towards a more 
psychological exploration in Hartmann's heroine in terms of 
the extended and detailed depiction of her dilemma and her 
stating of the motivation behind her decision. The portrayal 
of Enite's thoughts as a complex inner process is thus more 
fully described by Hartmann.
The content of these monologues will now be considered in 
detail. In her first deliberation, Chrétien's heroine 
considers the possible outcome of a confrontation with the 
robbers :
'Deusl', fet ele, 'que porrai dire?Or iert ja morz ou pris mes sire;Que cil sont troi, et il est seus.N'est pas a droit partiz li jeus D'un chevalier ancontre trois.Cil le ferra ja par detrois;Que mes sire ne s'an prant garde.Deus! serai je donc si coarde Que dire ne li oserai?Ja si coarde ne serai:Je li dirai, nel leirai pas.' (EeE 2833-43)
('God,' she says, 'what can I say? Now my lord will be killed or captured, for there are three of them, and he's alone. One knight against three isn't fair odds. That one's going to strike him from behind, taking my husband unawares. God, shall I then be such a coward as not to dare tell him?I'll never be so cowardly! I'll tell him straight away!')
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Thus, Enide demonstrates concern about the danger into which 
Erec is about to stumble unwittingly, and also about her own 
cowardice. Furthermore, her decision to disobey her husband 
is swiftly taken. Hartmann's heroine is similarly concerned 
about the threat to Erec and calls on God to aid her (Er 
3149-66). Her interior monologue also resembles her French 
counterpart's as an example of reasoning out a course of 
action and the various consequences which may ensue (Er 
3149ff.). However, Enite's monologue is almost twice as long 
as Enide's, thereby highlighting the difficulty of the 
dilemma and her consequent hesitation. In addition, 
Hartmann's Enite displays no preoccupation with cowardice. 
Instead, she reveals that she is motivated to disobey her 
husband by feelings of humility and loyalty:
nû kam der muot in ir gedanc:'bezzer ist verlorn min lip, ein als unklagebaere wip, dan ein alsô vorder man, wan da verlür maneger an. erst edel unde riche: wir wegen ungeliche. vür in wil ich sterben ê ich in sihe verderben,ez ergê mir swie got welle.' (Er 3167-76)
Enite's deliberations prompt her to embark on the course of 
action which will cause least regret to others. It is also 
apparent that her disobedience is based on virtuous motives 
supported by a solid consideration of her options. The 
detail of her thoughts in this monologue provides an insight 
into how awareness and deliberation constitute the essential 
components of good intentions and virtuous actions. All of 
these factors are likewise evident in her subsequent 
monologue in the second robbers episode (Er 3353-77).
Erec, however, fails to appreciate Enite's break from 
traditional obedience. After defeating each band of robbers, 
Erec reveals his inability to comprehend Enite's motives for 
warning him by blaming and punishing her (Er 3238-76, 3403-
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39). In addition, his lack of insight is made apparent in 
his tirade against women in general and likewise by Enite's 
repeated explanation of her disobedience. In these 
statements, Enite clearly demonstrates her motivation of 
loyalty and her insight into the consequences of failing to 
act:
si sprach; 'herre, haete ichz niht getân durch iuwers libes gewarheit, ich enhætez iu nie geseit.ich tetez durch mine triuwe.' (Er 3259-62)
'genâde, herre1' sprach daz wip.'ir suit mich des geniezen lândaz ichz durch triuwe hân getân.noch dulde ich baz iuwern zorndan iuwer lip wære verlorn,swaz mir nû von iu geschiht.' (Er 3413-18)
Erec's imperceptive state only renders him capable, however, 
of seeing Enite's objective guilt, that is her disobedience, 
rather than the subjective innocence which is evident in her 
virtuous motivation.
This exchange is also accorded a particularly dramatic 
emphasis in the German narrative by its appearance as a 
dialogue in direct speech.®®® Although Chrétien's Erec 
chastises Enide in direct speech before attacking the 
robbers (EeE 2849-56, 2997-3010), their exchange after the 
combat is far less extensive, appears predominantly in 
indirect speech, and includes no statements of accusation 
and justification (EeE 2916-24, 3079-85). The virtuous
motives which underlie Enite's disobedience and Erec's 
incomprehension of them do not therefore receive the same 
degree of emphasis in the French source.
Thus, this initial pair of adventures illustrates the ways 
in which Hartmann has highlighted the elements of inner 
awareness existing in Chrétien's narrative. This is achieved 
by means of extra references to sensory perception, the 
rearrangement of the sequence of events, and the varied use
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of monologue and indirect and direct speech. Hartmann 
likewise extends Enite's monologues and places great 
emphasis on her motives which she expresses here and in her 
later justifications to her husband. These insights into her 
thoughts reveal that the part she played in their failure at 
Karnant is immediately atoned for. Likewise, Erec's 
continued blind punishment of his wife is discredited in 
this way. The addition of these exchanges therefore points 
in particular to Hartmann's desire to emphasize the 
intentions of his characters, and also the part played by 
perception in the formation and the appreciation of those 
intentions.
Hartmann's emphasis on inner awareness continues in the 
couple's subsequent meeting with the count's squire. The 
squire is exceptionally astute and able to draw the correct 
conclusions about the situation. For example, he assumes 
that Erec has been in a fight (Er 3510-4). In addressing the 
couple, he also repeats the phrase 'mich dunket' three times 
(Er 3520, 3523, 3532), thereby emphasizing the thought
processes which inform his assumptions. In addition, he 
reveals the good intentions behind his questions (Er 3519), 
and demonstrates a concern for Enite's struggles with the 
horses which echoes Erec's own earlier concern at Tulmein.
The contrast between that earlier occasion and Erec's 
determination here to make Enite suffer in this manner 
because of his mistaken comprehension of her motives, 
clearly reveals the decline in his perceptive faculties (Er 
3576-9). Although Hartmann inherits an already astute squire 
from his source, his own version departs from Chrétien's 
narrative in its continued depiction of the limited 
awareness of the main protagonist at this juncture. Despite {
courteously thanking the squire, Erec's unwillingness to I
communicate on the subject of his wife's punishment j
contributes to the portrayal of the main protagonist as a |
man out of touch with himself (Er 3590). The sagacity of the |
squire in the German narrative therefore creates a more i
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pronounced contrast with Erec's lack of perception than in 
the French source. The figure of the squire may therefore be 
counted amongst the series of characters encountered by Erec 
who provide a contrast with his own lack of insight. Even 
though the powers of thought displayed by these characters 
may be restricted in some way, they nevertheless serve to 
highlight a particular aspect of perception which is lacking 
in Erec himself.
Galoain
The episode with the count named Galoain by Chrétien^®^ 
provides a further opportunity for Enite to demonstrate her 
loyalty and cunning. In addition, the count himself, like 
Oringles to a greater degree later, reveals the manner in 
which love can affect a person's capacity for thought, and 
the consequences of this power. This situation is therefore 
essentially a repetition of the imbalance which Erec 
experienced as a result of his earlier desire for Enite. 
Enite's ability to comprehend and rectify the situation 
again demonstrates the means which Erec himself lacks. The 
root of the overall problem and the seeds of its solution 
are thus depicted in the microcosm of this episode.
It is significant that Hartmann's narrator stresses that the 
count is not intrinsically evil, merely a man overwhelmed by 
feelings of desire (Er 3684-721). Hartmann is therefore 
adapting the figure whom he inherits from his source and who 
is depicted there as vain from the outset (EeE 3226-54). The 
German version points only to Enite's beauty as the cause of 
the count's distraction (Er 3620-2, 3673). However, the
count's actions are not entirely excused by love's influence 
as is made evident in a short appraisal of the powers of 
love. In this discussion, the exceptional strength of love 
and its effect on the mind of the afflicted lover are 
acknowledged, but love is not regarded as an excuse for
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unacceptable behaviour or for any undesirable objective 
consequences:
nu enhât aber niemen selhe kraft,und ergrifet in ir meisterschaft,er enmüeze ir entwichen.swer aber ir gewislichenze rehte kunde gephlegen,den enlieze si niht under wegen,im enwære der Ion von ir bereitdaz in sin arbeitniht dorfte riuwen,huote er siner triuwenbaz dan der grâve tæte.der enwas dar an niht state,wan in vrou Minne betwancuf einen valschen gedanc,daz er dem vil biderben mansin wip ze nemenne muot gewan, (Er 3706-21)
Such a consideration of the relationship between love and 
subjective guilt may be used to appraise not only the 
count's behaviour in this episode, but also Erec's 
transgression at Karnant. Both men may therefore be said to 
share a degree of guilt as a result of their actions under 
the influence of love. The emphasis on a lover's subjective 
responsibility in this work may represent contemporary 
concerns regarding the far-reaching social repercussions of 
love's influence, or else may reflect the growing focus on 
the subjective nature of sin in the twelfth century. In 
either case, love is not depicted in this narrative as an 
objective force which renders the lover inculpable in 
matters of sin.
Love's influence on the count's inner awareness receives 
particular emphasis from Hartmann. For example, the scene in 
which the count meets Erec and Enide has been adjusted to 
include Galoain's telling inner monologue. Although the 
French source refers indirectly to the effect of Enide's 
beauty on the count's thoughts (EeE 3287-91), Hartmann 
highlights the change taking place in the count's attitude;
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nû begunde den grâven riuwen,und gedâhte wider sînen triuwen,daz er die vrouwen verliez,daz er si im niht nemen hiez.manecvalt wart sîn gedanc,als in der vrouwen schoene twanc,wie er si môhte gewinnen.untriuwe riet sinen sinnendaz er dar sô kæmedaz er si im benæme. (Er 3668-77)
dô tete im untriuwe kunt diu kreftige minneund benam im rehte sinne. (Er 3691-3)
Thus, the count's perceptive capacities become affected and 
channelled towards claiming Enite for himself. This 
constitutes an alteration in attitude which is not evident 
in Chrétien's count whose self-interest is apparent from the 
start. Instead, the shortened conversation between Galoain 
and his squire before Erec and Enite arrive removes any 
indication in the German version that Galoain may be an 
essentially unsavoury character. Thus, the suddenness and 
profundity of the effect of love on his thoughts receives 
particular emphasis. Galoain's desire likewise results in a 
lack of loyalty and a falseness as a host, as is repeatedly 
stressed (e.g. Er 3669, 3691, 3709-16, 3734, 3841). Just as 
love caused Erec to ignore his own lordly duties, so Galoain 
fails to protect his guests and keep the peace on his land. 
Instead, his lust drives him to break that peace himself, 
thereby underlining the destructive influence of love on 
social obligations.^^
The effect of love on Galoain's insight likewise extends to 
his assessment of his motives. He claims to be acting in 
Enite's best interests (Er 3792-6), but his narrow 
perception prevents him from acknowledging that her desires 
differ from his own. Furthermore, the pity Galoain claims to 
feel for Enite's suffering proves to be meaningless as it 
stems from his own selfish desires. This is apparent when he 
comments :
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'mir erbarmte nie sô sere weder man noch wipals iuwer wætlîcher lip.' (Er 3757-9)
His reference to her person, which may be interpreted in 
this context as her physical body, echoes an earlier comment 
(Er 3738-42) and reveals his actual lascivious intentions. 
His lust and self-interest are additionally evident in his 
threat to kidnap Enite himself after she has rejected his 
proposal despite his earlier sympathetic response to her 
account of her kidnapping (Er 3826-37). This contrasts with 
his threat to kill Erec in the French source (EeE 3357-9). 
Hartmann appears therefore to be highlighting the hypocrisy 
of Galoain's pity for Enite, rather than his danger as an 
opponent for Erec.
Erec's total blindness in terms of the count's attraction to 
his wife and his persistent uncommunicativeness further 
reveal his incapacity to reflect (Er 3727-9, 3744-51). Here 
a contrast with the French source in which Erec chatters 
politely to Galoain is evident (EeE 3274-6, 3283). In
Hartmann's text, Erec keeps conversation to an absolute 
minimum, refusing to explain his treatment of his wife to 
Galoain, as he did to his squire. Enite, however, maintains 
her earlier perceptiveness and loyalty in contrast to her 
husband's loss of awareness. Thus, she alone is able to 
assess the count's motives accurately. In addition, her 
capacity for cunning receives greater scope for expression 
here. Thus, once she realizes the count's intent, she 
proceeds to conceal her own:
als si sînen ernest sach und daz erz von herzen sprach, vil güetlichen sach si in an, den vil ungetriuwen man,und lachete durch schoenen list. (Er 3838-42)
The narrator proceeds to draw further attention to Enite's i
cunning (Er 3907, 3940), and her conversation with the count
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is measurably altered from the French source in terms of her 
utilization of fine, psychological tactics. Instead of 
deceiving the count by claiming that she sought to test his 
love (EeE 3368-71), Enite displays exemplary ingenuity by 
pretending that she originally misunderstood the count's 
intentions (Er 3843-53). Her account of her kidnapping also 
provides him with a valid excuse for his designs (Er 3865- 
84). In addition, the fact that she was kidnapped as a child 
echoes the references to her kintheit prior to the verligen 
episode. Her implied defencelessness bolsters the count's 
sense of self-justification. Her child-like exterior also 
implies that she is incapable of the mature powers of 
thought necessary for deception, and this provides her with 
the means to outwit the count (Er 3873, 3876). Furthermore, 
the truthful elements in her tale regarding Erec's cruel 
treatment (Er 3885f.), and her cliché concerning the need 
for women to beware the wiles of men (Er 3848-55), similarly 
encourage the count to accept her story. Her advice on 
capturing Erec completes her disguise of her real intent. By 
telling the count what he wants to hear, Enite re-enforces 
his own delusion that he is freeing her from Erec's tyranny. 
The count, like Erec previously, is unable to recognize 
Enite's mental powers as a result of his blinded perceptive 
faculties. This is suggested by his delighted reaction to 
her story;
der rede was der grave vrô. lachende antwurte er ir so:'ir enmuget iuch des niht erwern,wan ich wil iu staete swern.' (Er 3896-9)
His laughter reveals his supreme confidence in his victory 
and his total acceptance of Enite's tale. In fact, his offer 
to swear loyalty to her confirms the blindness caused by his 
desire and seemingly easy conquest in a point of dramatic 
irony for an audience acquainted with Enite's thoughts.
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Enite's own loyalty to Erec is restated directly after her 
deception of the count (Er 3943), thus creating the 
impression that the narrator is afraid that Enite's 
brilliant trickery will have duped the audience. 
Furthermore, Enite repeats her earlier soul-searching in an 
inner monologue before she warns her husband (Er 3972ff.). 
Her hesitation to speak out and her detailed deliberation 
again emphasize the need for speech to have a basis in solid 
perception. This monologue also reveals that Enite continues 
to take Erec's threat seriously (Er 3983f.). Likewise, her 
loyalty and devotion to him are restated (Er 3974-8), as is 
her humility:
'waz aber von diu, wirde ich erslagen unde nimt er mir den lip? dannoch lebet manec vrum wip. ich enbin ouch niht sô klagelich:
SÔ ist er edel unde rich, min lieber herre. ê im iht gewerre,
SÔ wil ich kiesen den tôt.'ir triuwe ir daz gebôtdaz si ze sinem bette gieund bôt sich vür in an ir knieund sagete im die rede gar.von vorhten wart si missevar. (Er 3985-97)
Enite's inner reasoning and its depiction by Hartmann in 
direct speech reflect the earlier emphasis on her monologues 
in the robbers episodes. Erec's reaction to her warning is 
likewise identical to their previous adventures. Although he 
responds immediately and successfully to the situation, he 
later displays his persistent misunderstanding of Enite's 
intentions in his repeated threats of punishment (Er 4122- 
32). As before, Enite clearly states her motivation and 
describes the actual consequences if she had obeyed him, but 
to no avail (Er 4133-38). The whole process is subsequently 
repeated in her warning of their pursuit (Er 4139-49) and in 
Erec's later chastisement (Er 4258-67). The lack of 
communication between the two protagonists thus appears to 
remain entrenched at this point.
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As regards their pursuer, Galoain's meagre retinue and his 
ignominious defeat by Erec portray him as an ineffectual 
figure in contrast to his counterpart in Chrétien's version. 
His confusion on awakening and his petty exchange with the 
innkeeper again reveal his reduced powers of awareness (Er 
4028-39, 4059ff.). A further echo of Erec's situation is 
revealed, however, in the count's self-accusation of having 
overslept;
er sprach;'swer sine sachewendet gar ze gemache,als ich hinaht hân getân,dem sol ere abe ganunde schande sin bereit.wer gewan ie vrumen âne arbeit?mir ist geschehen vil rehte.' (Er 4096-102)
The count is thus still capable of a glimmer of insight into 
his actions, providing a comment on Erec's behaviour at 
Karnant. However, Galoain's lust drives him on and 
ultimately blinds him to his own motives, as is exemplified 
by his claim that he intends to deliver Enite back to her 
parents (Er 4194). This self-deception remains complete in 
the German version. Unlike his source, Hartmann does not 
allow his character an insight into his own failure (EeE 
3632-56). His creeping home and the shamed silence of his 
men are confirmation of his foolish and uncourtly behaviour 
and his downfall (Er 4243-57).
The Galoain episode thus re-emphasizes the issues of the 
verligen scene through the behaviour of the count. His 
ignominious defeat also constitutes a warning of the 
continued disaster which awaits Erec if he persists in his 
unenlightened state. Nevertheless, concealed in an episode 
which appears to portray Erec at his least perceptive are 
indications of change. Their barely perceptible presence 
makes their validity appear doubtful, but this very fact 
could confirm their importance in a work which demands such 
a high degree of thematic response from its audience. For
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nû endarf niemen sprechen daz, von wanne kæme daz diu vrouwe baz beide gehôrte und gesach. ich sage iu von wiu daz geschach. diu vrouwe reit gewæfens bar: dâ was er gewâfent gar, als ein guot ritter sol. des gehôrte er noch gesach sô wol ûz der isenwæteals er blôzer tæte. (Er 4150-9)
Erec is thus incapacitated by the very equipment which 
accords him his identity as a knight. The contrast with his 
earlier defeat of Iders using inferior armour thus re­
emphasizes the point that Erec has lost the perceptiveness 
which brought him such knightly success. The implication in 
the narrator's ironic comment is that Erec's true knightly 
identity is housed in his awareness and his attitude, rather 
than simply in the armour he wears. This is a point which is 
likewise significant in the subsequent encounter with 
Guivreiz.
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example, on this occasion Enite fails to complete her 
warning of the count's approach (Er 4166f.), whilst Erec is 
not only aware that they will be pursued (Er 4119), but also 
that the count's subjects may take revenge, a fear which he 
expresses in a prayer to God (Er 4232-8). These contrasts to 
the robbers episodes may indicate that the division of 
perceptive faculties between the two main protagonists is 
again shifting. It is likewise significant that Erec does 
not actually punish Enite on this occasion despite railing 
at her supposed disobedience (Er 4258-67). In a study of 
inner awareness, such observations are significant. However, 
they are nonetheless countered by the fact that Erec fails 
to hear the approach of their pursuit, which implies that 
his powers of awareness remain essentially compromised 
despite this glimmer of improvement. An aside by the 
narrator re-enforces this point by revealing that Erec's 
senses were restricted by his helmet; J
The First Encounter with Guivreiz
Erec's first contact with Guivreiz reveals further 
indications of a change in his awareness. However, these 
glimmers of progress are still interspersed with signs of 
continued inner blindness, thus giving the impression of a 
gradual and uneven process. One less ambiguous example of 
perceptiveness, however, is apparent in Erec's powers of 
sight and hearing on Guivreiz' approach:
nu sahen si also drâte in dort zuo riten. nu gruozte er vrouwen Ênîten. als er Êrecke sô nâhen kam daz er slniu wort vernam,er sprach: 'willekomen, herre.' (Er 4321-6)
Erec is likewise able in this episode to recognize Enite's 
loyalty (Er 4319), realize that combat is unavoidable (Er 
4378f.), calm Enite's fears, and confirm his own loyalty to 
her (Er 4425-31). Thus, his appreciation of his wife, when 
compared to his previous rejection, shows signs of re- 
emerging at this juncture. Likewise, Enite reconfirms her 
own insight and loyalty in this episode. Although the 
textual lacuna blurs the issue (Er 4317), one can argue that 
it is justifiable in the light of Hartmann's previous 
alteration of Enide's monologues to expect that Enite 
undergoes a further inner deliberation and confirmation of 
her loyalty at this stage.
Guivreiz' equal status to Erec suggests the possibility of 
the main protagonist's rehabilitation into the courtly 
world. His reputation as a king who is nevertheless diligent 
in his pursuit of knightly deeds represents the ideal 
combination of duties which Erec failed to achieve at 
Karnant (Er 4314-8). As a result, Erec has much to learn 
from this character, and the inclusion of the ethic of 
knightly honour and activity in Hartmann's portrayal of 
secular morality in this work is thus evident. Guivreiz is
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described in terms of physical strength, bravery, and 
readiness to engage in combat, but also most importantly 
with regard to the greatness of his heart and his 'richen 
muot' (Er 4304-18). In other words, he possesses the correct 
mental attitude required for the active pursuit of adventure 
by a knight. His diminutive stature, which would otherwise 
act as a hindrance, serves to reinforce the importance of 
such mental alertness in a knight. This forms a contrast 
with the well-equipped but unaware Erec of the past three 
episodes. Erec's encounter with Guivreiz therefore 
represents a test of his 'psychological fitness for 
combat
Guivreiz' mental alertness nevertheless lacks a necessary 
degree of restraint. Like Erec's earlier adversaries, 
Guivreiz is perceptive on a certain level. He clearly states 
his challenge and motives, both before and after their 
discussion prior to the combat (Er 4326ff.), and is depicted 
considering the situation and his opponent (Er 4366-77). 
However, Guivreiz' initial reaction is to start fighting 
almost immediately (Er 4347). Likewise, he is only able to 
interpret Erec's enigmatic behaviour in terms of cowardice 
(Er 4407-20).^®® His motives in initiating combat are 
therefore called into question. As such, he resembles the 
love-blinded Galoain in that he is perceptive only in terms 
of the aspect of Erec which he is designed to highlight. 
Guivreiz is altogether a more noble and positive character 
than the count, both in terms of status and in the aspect of 
Erec which he represents, but this does not imply that this 
character's motivation is left unquestioned. Guivreiz' 
awareness is restricted to one level, that of seeking combat 
and acting bravely. In itself, this is a valid approach for 
a knight, but, as his defeat by Erec suggests, it needs to 
be balanced by a broader perspective.
The question of the correct procedure for joining combat, 
which is discussed in this episode and which is not evident
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in the French source, may be connected with specifically 
German legislation and ethical concerns in this period. As i
W.H. Jackson maintains, this episode reflects: |
an intensified concern of the German military aristocracy in the 1180s to preserve, andethically regulate and legitimize, its right of carrying arms, a concern of social history which informs Hartmann's chivalric poetry and the imperial legislation of the day on specific common points of substance and terminology.^®®
Between them, Guivreiz and Erec represent the different 
aspects of this debate on military ethics, namely the need 
for a knight to be brave and to remain active in justified 
pursuits, and the equal need to avoid violence without good 
cause and without giving thought to the proper procedures 
involved- Both characters display a degree of perception and 
non-perception, and both may be lauded and criticized for 
their attitudes which are represented in a discussion 
introduced by Hartmann before the combat. This specific 
context thus reveals further evidence of Erec's reawakening 
perception as he advises Guivreiz on the suitable 
circumstances for joining combat (Er 4348ff.). The uneven 
nature of Erec's recovery, however, is suggested by the ill- 
founded mockery with which he also addresses his opponent 
(Er 4348). No ultimate solution to this complex debate is 
offered by Hartmann, and the equal justification of these 
characters' actions is evident in the outcome in which Erec 
as victor is wounded as a result of his cowardice.
In particular, the motivations of both protagonists are 
being questioned here. Guivreiz bases his desire to join 
combat on Erec's cowardice and armed appearance (Er 4326- 
47). His approach therefore borders on the belligerent as he 
appears determined to fight without justifiable cause. 
Similarly, although Erec is able to discern Guivreiz' 
shortcomings, the reasons underlying his avoidance of combat 
and his loss of control whilst fighting are dubious. In the
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first case, he pleads tiredness and a desire to be left in 
peace (Er 4359-65). This has overtones of his idleness at 
Karnant, particularly in the use of the terms 'arbeit' and 
'gemach'. In the second case, he is overwhelmed by a fear of 
death and shame (Er 4407f.), and makes as if to strike the 
defeated Guivreiz (Er 4439-41). This reaction is reminiscent 
of his earlier trick on Iders, but there is no evidence here 
that Erec is again feigning his attack. His mental attitude 
towards combat thus leaves much to be desired. Erec 
therefore represents the argument in this debate that combat 
should only be pursued with good cause, but also demonst­
rates the negative reasons for avoiding combat, namely a 
desire for ease, and a fear of dying or being shamed, 
Hartmann's introduction of the debate before the combat and 
the possible motives of fear, shame, and laziness underlying 
Erec's refusals to fight reveal the focus of his adaptation. 
In addition, Erec's attempt to strike Guivreiz is accorded 
an ambiguity in Hartmann's narrative in terms of his 
motivation. This is in contrast to Chrétien's explanation 
that Erec is intent on frightening Guivret as a punishment 
(EeE 3855-61). The introduction of these aspects therefore 
suggests a questioning of the attitudes and actions of both 
combatants which is entirely absent in the French source.
On surrendering, Guivreiz comments on the nobility which 
Erec has demonstrated by his prowess (Er 4457-9), a remark 
which introduces the concept of the nobility of virtue or 
achievement.^^ However, this must be interpreted in 
combination with Guivreiz' additional hopes that his 
opponent is of noble stock (Er 4514-34), and his joy at 
hearing Erec's confirmation of his status (Er 4541ff.). It 
is notable, therefore, that both components of the debate 
concerning nobility find representation here. Erec's 
behaviour suggests an inherent nobility to Guivreiz which is 
later confirmed by his admission of noble blood. Although 
the notion of the nobility of virtue is touched upon at this
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juncture, therefore, the discussion here concludes with an 
affirmation of inherited nobility.
In the aftermath of the combat, Erec reveals communicative 
skills which have been rarely apparent since leaving 
Karnant. He is also willing to rest temporarily and to 
reveal his identity (Er 4535-40). Despite still being far 
from his goal of rehabilitation, Erec undergoes an important 
breakthrough in terms of perception here, as he demonstrates 
a greater awareness of others and his own knightly 
obligations than has been apparent since the verligen 
episode. Martin Jones describes the effect of this encounter 
thus:
In the first confrontation with Guivreiz, embodiment of the ethos of active knighthood, Erec is purged of the disabling psychological consequences of his verligen, and there is reinstated in him the knightly frame of mind which is a precondition of his accomplishing the tasks which lie ahead of him, leading ultimately to his assumption of the throne in Karnant.®®^
Moreover, the issue is complicated by the additional 
discussion of the conditions under which a 'knightly frame 
of mind' justifies violent action. The implication is that 
the pursuit of active combat is essential to the knightly 
lifestyle and is an accoutrement of nobility, but should 
nevertheless be subject to an awareness of the need for 
restraint in the light of wider responsibilities.
Keii and Gawein
Hartmann's emphasis on subjective issues in his adaptation 
of his source continues in Erec's encounter with knights 
from Arthur's court. Chrétien's Keu is depicted as the 
evilly-motivated sneak and coward familiar from many 
Arthurian romances, not least Hartmann's own Iwein. In Erec,
200
however, Hartmann's Keii possesses perceptive abilities 
which reveal a new angle on his role. In keeping with the 
depiction of Erec's other opponents, Keii is capable of a 
measure of perception and intellectual deliberation. Thus, 
he sees Erec, recognizes his wounded state (Er 4629.30-.35), 
and devises a plan to capture him which he cunningly 
conceals behind his welcome (Er 4629,36-.39). His real 
motivation is likewise explicitly stated, namely to bring 
Erec to court and claim to have defeated him in combat (Er 
4629.56-4632). However, Hartmann also includes a direct 
insight into Keii's heart, his organ of intellect, in order 
to demonstrate that Keii is not only capable of evil 
thoughts. His heart is described as divided on itself (Er 
4636ff.), an image which suggests the free will granted to 
humankind to choose between good and evil. As with Iders, 
Keii's attempt to win false glory is caused by his following 
the malicious section of his heart. In Keii, Hartmann is 
thus demonstrating the manner in which egoistical motivation 
restricts the scope of inner awareness to the extent that it 
causes a disproportionate sense of one's abilities and an 
underestimation of the perceptive capacity of others. Keii's 
immodesty, for example, fuels his belief that he can deceive 
Erec (Er 4694-700), in the same way that Galoain's lust 
rendered him vulnerable to Enite's plan. Keii's cunning 
therefore indicates a degree of perception, but the 
interference of his false motives ultimately leads to his 
failure.
Keii's ineptness in combat and his modest relation of his 
story make him an altogether more benign figure than 
Chrétien's Keu, possibly as an attempt to deflect blame from 
a member of Arthur's court, or else to highlight a further 
aspect of perception. Keii's realization and free admission 
of his faults after his defeat are significant as examples 
of self-appraisal and the acknowledgement of guilt:
'mich hât ûf selhe schande hie brâht min zageheit
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daz doch mir ein herzeleit von den dingen muoz geschehen, sol ich iu mines namen jehen,wan ich hân wol garnet iuwern spot.' (Er 4763-8
His demonstration of modesty is subsequently rewarded by the 
forgiveness of Arthur's court. This humility and insight in 
Hartmann's Keii are accorded a greater significance by 
Hartmann's exclusion of Galoain's self-accusation at the end 
of the previous episode. Keii's achievement and demonst­
ration of self-knowledge thus stands alone at this juncture 
of the text. A connection may be drawn instead with Iders' 
address to the queen. Like Keii, Iders demonstrates an 
awareness of his faulty motives, and the confession which 
this insight permits results in a reward and the acceptance 
of others, rather than in punishment. Keii's statement thus 
acts as a bridge between Iders' confession and Erec's later 
speech after his defeat by Guivreiz, both of which portray 
the rewards to be gained from an insight into and admission 
of one's faults.
In addition, the episode with the 'refreshingly brash' =**
Keii is distinguished by a mood of light relief. Rather than 
the comedy being an end in itself, however, it serves to 
create a sense of consolidation in the narrative.^®® The 
humorous dimension highlights in particular Erec's progress 
in terms of perception at this juncture, but also his 
lingering limitations. For the first time since Karnant, for 
example, he is able to recognize the deceitful intentions of 
an opponent for himself (Er 4665f.). Despite the lacuna in 
the Wolfenbüttel fragment which bridges this absent section 
of the Ambraser manuscript, one can surmise that Erec's 
angry reaction to Keii's trickery is caused by his 
perception of his opponent's dubious motives (Er 4629.44). 
Furthermore, Erec pretends to ride away with Gawein's horse I
(Er 4770-7), which is reminiscent of his trick on Iders and I
Maliclisier at Tulmein. This earlier episode finds a further 
echo in Erec's feigned attempt to cut off Keii's hand (Er j
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4707-11), which is a notable addition to the French source. 
The narrator expresses his approval of this punishment, and 
the connection with Erec's legitimate trick on Maliclisier 
implies that he is dealing perceptively with this opponent 
in contrast to his dubious move to strike Guivreiz in the 
previous episode.
A further point of comparison with his encounter with 
Guivreiz is provided by Erec's demonstration of a more 
correct approach to combat in this episode. Thus, he 
ascertains Keii's motives, and only engages in combat when 
Keii's provocation gives him sufficient cause (Er 4687-704). 
After his victory, Erec proceeds to re-emphasize his growing 
awareness by listening to Keii, asking for his identity and 
that of the horse's owner, and commiserating with him on his 
defeat:
dô kêrte der guotemit lachendem muoteund vernam sine klage.er sprach; 'ritter, nu sage,wie bistû gênant?unde tuo mir erkantdises rosses herren.ez enmac dir niht gewerren:ich wil wizzen dinen namen.dû endarft dich niht sô sere schamen.ez ist geschehen manegem mander doch nie zagen muot gewan.' (Er 4744-55)
This speech reveals the first sign on Erec's part of the 
concern for others which was so evident before his verligen, 
but which has been strikingly absent since. This aspect of 
perception now reappears and receives repeated emphasis in 
subsequent episodes. It is also the first occasion on which 
Erec is depicted laughing. A connection between laughter and 
perception was evident in Enite's conversation with Galoain. 
On that occasion, she laughs in order to disguise her 
cunning (Er 3842), thereby encouraging the count to believe 
in her, but also suggesting Enite's confidence in her 
abilities. The count's answering laughter indicates his own
203
i
-J
expectation of success (Er 3897). Thus, laughter appears to 
signify a confidence in one's perceptive abilities, however 
ill-founded this may be. Erec's laughter in combination with 
signs of perceptiveness at this stage may thus be 
interpreted as a significant indication of his expanding 
awareness.
A further alteration to Chrétien's version of this episode 
involves recognition and the revelation of identity. In both 
versions of the first Guivreiz episode, Erec asks his 
opponent's name and offers his own on request (Er 4468-73, 
4535-40; EeE 3864-83). Erec's relatively sociable actions 
here indicate an advance in Hartmann's version from his 
earlier refusal to name himself to Galoain. In the encounter 
with Keii and Gawein, a further step is taken with regard to 
this issue, and the German narrative again reveals a marked 
departure from its source. Paul Salmon, in his investigation 
of Hartmann's Jwein and Wolfram's Parzival, notes how both 
German authors adapt their sources to make the lack of 
identification between characters an element of dramatic 
i r o n y . S u c h  audience stimulation is similarly apparent 
in Erec. However, this issue is also closely connected to 
awareness as the ability to identify others and reveal one's 
own identity requires a degree of self-knowledge. The issue 
of revealing identity is explored in four stages prior to 
Erec's sojourn with Arthur's court:
1) the failure to enquire about identity/unwillingness to 
provide one's own identity (Maliclisier, Erec with Galoain);
2) providing one's own identity on request (Erec with 
Guivreiz);
3) asking others for their identities (Erec with Guivreiz 
and Keii);
4) providing one's name without being asked/recognizing and 
naming others (Keii, Gawein, Erec with Iders).
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The fourth stage implies that the character is confident in 
his self-knowledge, which enables him to initiate contact 
with and readily identify other members of his society. This 
is a goal which Erec has yet to achieve, and an issue which 
Hartmann emphasizes in his protagonist's encounter with Keii 
and Gawein by altering his source with regard to this issue. 
Whereas Chrétien's Erec is able to recognize both Keu and 
Gauvain whilst they are oblivious to his identity, Hart­
mann's Erec remains ignorant of his opponents' identities, 
whilst even Keii is able to guess who Erec is (Er 
4856f.).^®’ Keii's conclusions are subsequently echoed by 
Arthur's court, and confirmed by Gawein who demonstrates the 
fourth stage of awareness by recognizing and naming Erec (Er 
4905-9). This also constitutes a complete reversal of 
Chrétien's version in which Gauvain remains ignorant of 
Erec's identity and Erec names himself first (EeE 4087-90, 
4149-57). These alterations serve to demonstrate that this 
episode is a stage in Erec's recovery of his inner awareness 
by associating identity with perception and by comparing 
Erec with these more perceptive figures. Thus, as well as 
revealing the remaining deficiency in Erec's perceptiveness, 
this episode confirms Erec's ability to enquire after his 
opponent's identity which he demonstrated against Guivreiz, 
even though he does not recognize Keii. In addition, Erec's 
subsequent refusal to name himself at Keii's request 
suggests a conscious withholding of identity from a 
disgraced opponent rather than a sign of uncommunicativeness 
(Er 4747f., 4830-2).
Nevertheless, Gawein proceeds to reveal further obstacles to 
inner awareness which Erec has yet to overcome. His plan to 
bring Erec to court and his assessment of Erec's refusal 
establishes him as a perceptive character. His cunning is 
referred to significantly as 'schoene trügeheit' (Er 5034), 
a term which implies positive motivation, and echoes Enite's 
plan to outwit Galoain. It is this positive attitude which 
is emphasized in this encounter and which Erec is unable to
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grasp despite his earlier recognition of Keii's negative 
intentions. Thus, Gawein's greeting of Erec openly 
demonstrates his friendly motives (Er 4896-904), and he 
tries to excuse his well-intentioned trickery, although Erec 
misunderstands him:
'wan sol ich iuch beswæret hân,daz hân ich doch durch guot getân.ouch rihtet selbe über mich.' (Er 5078-80)
However, Gawein is able to comprehend Erec's misperception 
and subsequently takes no offence at Erec's misplaced 
accusations (Er 5068-76). Gawein's total control of his 
perceptive faculties thus lends him an insight into those of 
others. Erec's own misunderstanding, however, is evidence of 
the progress he has yet to make, and likewise of the 
different focuses of the French and German versions 
regarding this episode. Thus, Chrétien's Erec displays no 
anger on realizing the deception, and merely acknowledges 
Gauvain's superior cunning (EeE 4149f.). Hartmann's Erec, 
however, initially accuses Gawein of malice, although he is 
subsequently reconciled with him on hearing his explanation 
(Er 5081f.).^®® Ultimately, therefore, Gawein acts as a 
catalyst for Erec's progression as he precipitates Erec's 
attainment of insight into the motives of others.
Another significant issue introduced by Gawein in this 
episode is the role of perception in fulfilling society's 
demands. This is apparent in Hartmann's emphasis on Erec's 
capacity to bring joy to Arthur's court which is revealed in 
the king's reaction to Keii's description of the combat (Er 
4860-79) and in Gawein's entreaty to Erec to attend court 
(Er 4929-58). In Chretien's version, by comparison, Gauvain 
merely informs Erec that his presence is required at court 
(EeE 4095-4101). As joy may be interpreted in social terms 
as indicating the proper functioning of a court through its 
sense of community,^®® Erec's negative reaction to the 
request appears to indicate that he is not yet ready to
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fulfil his social obligations. At court, there is no 
evidence of Erec communicating with his hosts, which forms 
a contrast with Enite's open exchange of information with 
the queen (Er 5107-15). However, Erec's mind is indeed 
active, as he thinks only of renewing his journey (Er 5249- 
51, 5291f.). Furthermore, his rejection of the comforts at 
court indicates an improvement over his failure at Karnant. 
His desire for action and arbeit, coupled with indications 
of insight, demonstrates the gradual establishment of a 
balance between his thoughts and actions, as was propounded 
in Die Klage, Thus, Erec's encounter with Arthur's court 
reveals his progress in terms of rejecting comfort, but his 
unease and uncommunicativeness at court nevertheless imply 
that progress has yet to be made before he is able to fulfil 
his social obligations appropriately.
Cadoc
On leaving Arthur's court, therefore, Erec has already 
demonstrated considerable signs of progress in his ability 
to perceive. His subsequent encounter with Cadoc, however, 
constitutes his ultimate breakthrough as the glimmers of 
insight and communication which had previously begun to 
manifest themselves are here revealed with less ambiguity. 
Similarly, there is a gradual dissipation of the narrator's 
reluctance to provide access to the workings of Erec's mind 
since his crisis. Attention is therefore again drawn to 
Erec's thought processes, as was the case before his 
verligen. The re-emergence of Erec's powers of insight is 
thus emphasized by this reflection in the narrative 
perspective.
Additional confirmation of Erec's progress is apparent in 
the manifestation at this juncture of God's support (Er 
5517, 5561-4). As Rodney Fisher states:
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Gott antwortet ... nicht auf die Stimme, sondern auf die Gerechtigkeit der Handelnden, Oder - urn es "mittelalterlich" auszudrücken - auf das Herz.
From this stage onward, Erec's heart, his organ of 
perception, functions in harmony with his body, and is thus 
capable of acting virtuously with regard to both secular and 
Christian values. The appearance of such references to 
prayer and God's assistance thus attest to Erec's 
achievement of the self-awareness needed to carry out God's 
will.
The Cadoc episode confirms this progress through ample 
evidence of Erec's sensory awareness and inclination to 
communicate. This is evident in his ability to orientate 
himself in order to find Enite and Cadoc in the forest (Er 
5586-8, 5710-5). Most significant, however, is Erec's
response to an unknown woman's voice which triggers thoughts 
of curiosity in him;®®^
als er daz rüefen vernam,michel wunder in des namwaz diu rede mohte sin. (Er 5302-4)
Furthermore, he is subsequently guided to the woman by her 
voice (Er 5312-19). Once again, therefore, a woman's voice 
is able to penetrate Erec's disorientation. However, on this 
occasion his reactions are perceptive and stem from 
altruistic motives. Erec proceeds to ask Cadoc's lady about 
her plight (Er 5339-44, 5354, 5362). This questioning is
greatly extended from the French source and given extra 
emphasis by being in direct speech. Similarly, Erec proceeds 
to communicate with the giants in an attempt to discover 
their identities and their motives for torturing Cadoc (Er 
5435-45). These repeated requests for information 
demonstrate Erec's pursuit of a restrained approach to 
combat as he seeks to establish the facts of the situation 
before using force. Unlike his encounter with Guivreiz, 
there is no evidence that his hesitation here is due to
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cowardice. When combat is inevitable, he immediately takes 
action. Hartmann's emphasis on the correct approach to 
combat stems from the premise that action must be based on 
sound powers of perception which permit an assessment of 
motives. Erec adheres to this premise by establishing that 
the giants are conscious of their cruelty, and by clearly 
announcing his opposition to their actions (Er 5460-75, 
5489-5501). Once Erec is satisfied of their evil purposes, 
he needs no further justification to act.
This scene is also significant as the depiction of an 
encounter between the previously uncommunicative Erec and 
other characters who are unable or unwilling to communicate 
for various reasons. For example, Cadoc and his lady are 
incapable of speaking because of their emotional and 
physical suffering (Er 5417-20, 5345-9). Cadoc's lady
finally makes a superhuman effort to overcome her grief in 
order to give Erec information. Thus, her love for her 
companion surmounts even this obstacle to her communication, 
as did Enite's loyalty in previous episodes. The giants, 
however, reject Erec's questions and scorn his attempts to 
help Cadoc (Er 5446-55, 5476-86).®°^ As such, they
represent the displaying of evil intent or lack of awareness 
by rejecting speech, as was the case with Maliclisier and 
indeed Erec on previous occasions. |
!
Erec's questioning of the giants likewise signifies that he |
has regained the ability to conceal his purposes. In this J
case, he disguises his intent to save Cadoc by assuring the j
giants that he is merely curious (Er 5462-4). In fact, as i
the narrator reveals, Erec is attempting to delay them in an 
effort to protect Cadoc and gain himself time to assess the 
situation (Er 5458f.). All of these elements constitute 
additions by the German author. Erec's mental and linguistic 
nimbleness is subsequently matched by his physical dexterity |
in combat with the giants (Er 5529-33, 5546-8). They, like I
Maliclisier and Iders before them, fail to comprehend Erec's I
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cunning intentions, and consequently consider him foolish 
and cowardly (Er 5448, 5452, 5496f.). This mistaken belief 
condemns them to the ranks of those adversaries, including 
Iders and Keii, whose arrogance causes them to disregard 
Erec as a threat with disastrous consequences. The narrator 
highlights this lack of awareness by identifying it as the 
direct cause of the giants' defeat (Er 5506-11, 5524-7). The 
above evidence therefore links this episode in particular 
with the combat at Tulmein, as various factors are evident 
on both occasions. These include the aware and cunning 
approach to a justifiable combat and the folly which 
arrogance can cause. Erec's return to Tulmein in this manner 
likewise points to a return to his earlier pre-verligen 
perceptiveness.
Furthermore, this combat is linked to a network of themes in 
this work in another specific way. It forms the last of 
three occasions in the text on which the term 'list' 
specifically denotes cunning and is accorded significance by 
its repetition in a relatively short space (Er 5458, 5530, 
5664). The other two occasions include Enite's deception of 
Galoain (Er 3842, 3907, 3940) and Gawain's scheme to trick 
Erec (Er 4998, 5010, 5028), both of which are positive
displays of cunning.®®® Previously, Erec's own 'list' has 
only been mentioned in a more negative sense in referring to 
his skill in lovemaking at Karnant (Er 2929). Against the 
giants, however, the portrayal of Erec's perceptive 
abilities suggests that the repeated use of the term list 
here denotes Erec's attainment of the more positive skill of 
perceptive ingenuity.
Erec's ability to reflect likewise forms the basis of his 
compassion for Cadoc and his lady, which is heavily 
emphasized in Hartmann's text in contrast to his source. 
Whereas Chrétien's Erec merely registers astonishment and 
puzzlement on encountering Cadoc's lady (EeE 4336-8), 
Hartmann's Erec is nearly moved to tears by her suffering
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(Er 5335-8). This concern is repeated when Erec witnesses 
the giants' treatment of Cadoc. In fact, Erec's pity is so 
great that he is moved to share the punishment;
Als diz Êrec ersach,nû bewegete des ritters smerze
SÔ sere sin herzedaz er bi im ê wære erslagenê er inz haete vertragenund daz ez an siner varwe schein. (Er 5429-34)
Although Chretien's Erec is similarly affected (EeE 4401-4), 
there is no corresponding wish to suffer with the knight. 
Erec's pity is intensified by the giants' recommencement of 
their beating despite his pleas (Er 5489-5500). It is this 
renewed display of cruelty, rather than the giants' insults, 
which finally causes Hartmann's Erec to act.
Such pity for a stranger highlights the progress which Erec 
has made since his merciless treatment of his wife in the 
initial stages of their adventure. In particular, Erec's 
tears confirm that he is experiencing heartfelt sympathy on 
this occasion, as does the use of the term 'erbarmen' in 
reference to his reaction to Cadoc's lady (Er 5300, 5334) 
and the giants' lack of mercy (Er 5408). These indications 
suggest a deep level of concern for the suffering of 
another, such as Erec has not displayed previously. Even his 
earlier sympathy for Koralus is surpassed in this episode.
Erec's concern continues in his words of solace to the 
rescued but crestfallen Cadoc. This again constitutes an 
adaptation of Chrétien's narrative in which Cadoc merely 
expresses his thanks and Erec directs him to Arthur's court 
(EeE 4475-579). In Hartmann's version, Erec's sympathy is 
emphasized as he seeks to dispel Cadoc's discomfort by 
referring to his own shameful experiences;
als Êrec hâte vernomen wie im sin dine was komen, durch schoenen list er sprach,
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im ze benemen sin ungemach:'herre, missehabet iuch nihtumbe dise geschiht,daz iu die risen bant getàn.jâ enwirt es nieman erlânswer so manheit üeben wil,in enbringe geschiht ûf daz zildaz er sich schamen lihte muoz:dar nâch wirt im es buoz.wie dicke ich wirs gehandelt bin!'mit dirre rede troste er in. (Er 5662-75)
The term 'schoener list' is familiar from Enite's trickery 
of Galoain, and also reminiscent of the concept of schoene 
sinne in Die Klage which was used to denote the positive and 
superior function of the perceptive heart. Erec's 
sympathetic treatment of Cadoc also echoes his earlier 
expression of consolation to Keii, which constitutes a 
further addition by Hartmann to his source (Er 4753-5). Both 
of these aspects thus point to a desire by the German author 
to emphasize the concepts of pity and humility as conseq­
uences of inner awareness and to portray this association 
through his main protagonist.
In the Cadoc episode, Erec is also demonstrating his 
recovery of the capacity to distinguish between subjective 
guilt and innocence. His generosity of heart stems from the 
perceptive ability to ascertain the genuineness of feelings 
of shame or regret, and subsequently from the desire to ease 
this discomfort out of a sense of sympathy and humility. 
Hartmann's Erec thus not only saves Cadoc, as in the French 
version, but displays an empathy for him which arises from 
his own recovery of his powers of inner awareness.
Hartmann's alteration of his source in this episode is 
further evident in the manner in which the characters 
identify themselves. At this point, a significant change is 
evident in Erec's powers of insight as he not only asks 
Cadoc for his identity (Er 5640-45), but also voluntarily 
states his own name (Er 5697f.). This stands in direct 
contrast to the French source in which Erec refuses to name
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himself in response to Cadoc's enquiry (EeE 4519-25). 
Hartmann's alteration implies that he is using this issue to 
suggest a progression in Erec's relationship with himself. 
In the earlier episode with Guivreiz, Erec demonstrated the 
ability to reveal his identity on demand, and subsequently 
was able to ask Keii to reveal his name also. Now, however, 
Erec takes the final step of offering his own name. This 
recalls his earlier perceptiveness in identifying himself to 
Iders at Tulmein (Er 1089f.). By taking this step at this 
juncture, Erec reveals his restored confidence in his 
perceptive capacities which permits him not only to 
communicate with other people, but also with himself.
At this point in the narrative, Erec demonstrates his 
command of a full range of knightly attributes which require 
fully functioning powers of perception for their legitimate 
implementation. This awareness is evident in his sharp 
senses and desire for information in this episode, which 
fuel his ability to experience pity and sympathy for others, 
to understand their motivations, and to engage in restrained 
and justified action. The Cadoc episode thus constitutes a 
decisive stage in the depiction of Erec's somewhat uneven 
progress towards regaining his former awareness.
Enite's Lament
Erec's revelation of his newly-found awareness is succeeded 
by a period during which he lies unconscious which 
ultimately leads to his reconciliation with his wife. This 
episode likewise depicts Enite in a new light as a result of 
her monologue lament. The change in such a previously aware 
protagonist has caused controversy in scholarship. 
However, it is important to take into account the context of 
emotional turmoil in which this monologue occurs, partic­
ularly when comparing it to Enite's earlier monologues. By 
doing so, one can view this lament as an arena for a
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fascinating psychological portrait beyond that already 
achieved in relation to this protagonist.
Enite's lament reveals certain similarities with her earlier 
monologues. Thus, her previous deliberations concerning her 
faithfulness in the face of disobeying her husband find 
reflection here, as does her belief that she herself is 
dispensable. The pain of witnessing her husband's apparent 
death thus confirms her absolute loyalty to him. However, 
Enite's expression of devotion is nevertheless affected by 
the grief and disorientation which she experiences as a 
result of her despair. Her lament thus provides Hartmann 
with the opportunity to portray the effect of grief on a 
character possessing already proven powers of inner 
awareness. Her earlier role as foil to the imperceptive Erec 
has now become essentially redundant as a result of his 
improving insight, but Enite's former perceptiveness 
continues to be significant here as a yardstick against 
which the psychological effects of her sorrow can be gauged.
Unlike other characters who undertake an inner questioning 
of their previous motivation, such as Iders and Keii, 
Enite's grief-affected powers of perception lead her to 
display a dubious understanding of her guilt and motives at 
Karnant (Er 5940-59). Thus, she expresses regret at having 
voiced her concerns, and at having thereby destroyed her 
happiness and comfort. In a character whose inner 
deliberations have been revealed with such clarity, these 
regrets strike an ambiguous note. Enite now appears unable 
to comprehend the worthiness of her earlier motives. 
Instead, she considers her honour and comfort to have been 
of greater importance (Er 5955-9). Thus, the restriction of 
Enite's powers of perception has the same effect as Erec's, 
that is the limiting of her awareness of her obligations to 
her husband and society, and the tendency to place value on 
comfort and individual joy. Furthermore, Enite's inability 
to comprehend her own motives accurately even extends to a
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misconception of God's powers of compassion (Er 5774-86). 
Similarly, she displays an unfounded regret for her parents' 
optimism on her departure with Erec (Er 5974-84). Her 
anguished appeals to Death, Erec's sword, and the forest 
animals likewise reveal the manner in which her pain has 
affected her sense of reality. Her emotional turmoil has 
such a profound effect that her normal clear-sightedness is 
lost. Her self-accusations therefore should only be 
considered against the background of this confusion, rather 
than be interpreted as confirmation of an earlier failure. 
As Tobin suggests:
rather than seek the answer to the guilt question in these anguished laments, we would do better to see in them the confused and contradictory yet eloquent verbal expression of Enite's all- consuming love for Erec which she has already shown so often in deed.®°®
To this one might add that Enite's love for her husband has 
also previously been revealed in the thoughts which guided 
her deeds. By taking this altered perceptiveness into 
account, Enite's lament becomes less a vehicle for revealing 
previously concealed guilt, and more a platform for 
exploring the effects of despair on a character's ability to 
reason and the changed priorities which this limitation 
provokes.
Pringles
Enite's grief subsequently influences her encounter with 
Oringles. As a result, this episode forms a contrast with 
the corresponding earlier encounter with Galoain in the 
sense that Enite is not in total control of her perceptive 
faculties on her second meeting with a would-be suitor. In 
addition, this episode reflects aspects of the Cadoc and 
verllgen episodes in a manner which particularly emphasizes 
the thought processes and motivation of the characters. It
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thereby acts as a yardstick against which to judge Erec's 
regaining of his perceptive powers.
In reflection of the Cadoc episode, Oringles responds out of 
curiosity to the voice of an unknown woman in the forest (Er 
6140-5 compared with 5302-4). However, despite the 
narrator's insistence that Oringles is a saviour sent by God 
(Er 6115-24), the count's apparently altruistic initial 
response vanishes on seeing Enite. Despite Enite's 
demonstration of anguish, Oringles does not display the pity 
experienced by Erec towards Cadoc's lady. Instead, Oringles' 
response to such sorrow is to demand repeatedly that Enite 
cease her inappropriate grieving (Er 6225-9, 6281, 6463-66). 
Such insensitivity immediately contrasts Oringles' attitude 
with Erec's earlier sympathy. Rather than being moved by 
Enite's grief, Oringles is instantly affected by her beauty:
nu begunde der grâve ahten und bi im betrahten daz er bi sinen ziten nahen noch witennie schoener wip hete gesehen. (Er 6178-82)
Such a reaction recalls Galoain's change of heart on being 
affected by lust for Enite. In addition, Oringles holds a 
similar inner monologue to the earlier count, which, 
although only referred to indirectly, suggests that a 
profound change of motivation is occurring as the result of 
the influence of desire on his powers of perception.
The reduced ability to perceive which was apparent in Erec's 
former antagonists is thus also evident in Oringles. 
However, this issue is emphasized by means of repetition and 
the contrast between the two main characters in this 
episode. Thus, Oringles reveals his sensory awareness in his 
ability to hear and question Enite, and to interpret her 
actions (Er 6140-74). In addition, his conversation with his 
companions, which acts as a form of monologue echoing 
Galoain's earlier thoughts, is peppered with terms denoting
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perception, either referring to his own thought processes 
(Er 6199 'mich dunket', 6201 'erkant', 6225 'dunket', 6242 
'erkiesen', 6251 'wæne') or his heart's advice (Er 6197f., 
6203f.). Likewise, Oringles calls on Enite to alter her own 
thinking (Er 6235, 6267-9). This emphasis on insight and
understanding merely serves, however, to highlight the 
additional limitations of Cringles' own perception. 
Furthermore, the overall impression of Oringles as a man of 
shallow awareness is confirmed by the failure of Enite's 
repeated appeals to him to see or understand (Er 6168, 6291, 
6301, 6571-5). Additional indications of this restriction of 
insight occur in the repeated references to Cringles' 
ability to see Enite's beauty, with the implication that his 
desire blinds him to anything beyond outward appearance (Er 
6160-66, 6178-82, 6187-93). It is also notable that, like 
Galoain, Oringles refers to Enite as a child (Er 6451). He 
is thus unable to consider her capable of commanding a 
mature level of perception.
The limitations which Cringles' lust imposes on his 
awareness also affect his understanding of Enite's motives, 
particularly in her refusal to marry him. Hartmann 
highlights Cringles' misconception by having him learn the 
details of Enite's situation before leaving for Limors (Er 
6175-7). In contrast, Chrétien's count does not enquire 
about the causes of Enite's predicament. This alteration 
suggests a greater concern in the German version to 
emphasize the interference of lust in the ability to 
appreciate the suffering of others. For her part, Enite 
demonstrates her loyalty to her husband by refusing 
Cringles' proposal despite being almost struck dumb by grief 
(Er 6167, 6282-5). Like Cadoc's lady, and in confirmation of 
her own earlier decisions to speak, Enite overcomes even 
this sizeable obstacle to speech. Moreover, the motivation 
behind her refusal is categorically stated, as she 
explicitly instructs Oringles to recognize her heartfelt 
resolution:
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si sprach so si daz herze twanc:'lât, herre, die rede lanc:herre, lât iuwern spotmit mir armen durch got.und sit ir riche, deist iu guot.erkennet, herre, minen muot.des wil ich iu kurze bejehen:ez enmac nimmer geschehendaz ich iuwer wip werdeode iemens ûf der erdeüber kurz od über lanc:ez geschæhe sunder minen danc,mir engebe got wider minen man.' (Er 6286-98)
À comparison may be drawn here with her earlier rejection of 
Galoain (Er 3797-825). Despite this clear stating of 
intention, Oringles does not repeat Galoain's angry reaction 
to Enite's words, a response which indicates a degree of 
comprehension regarding Enite's purposes. Instead, Oringles 
reveals his total disregard for her suffering in his 
misogynistic dismissal of her statement which contrasts so 
starkly with her own appeal for his understanding (Er 6302- 
7). Furthermore, his refusal is subsequently compounded by 
his hypocritical prompting of Enite to act selflessly and to 
reflect on her supposed good fortune (Er 6219ff.).
On removing to Limors, the whole sequence of misunder­
standing is repeated as the two characters clash over 
Enite's disobedience. Like Erec in the depths of his 
imperceptiveness, Oringles is incapable of comprehending 
Enite's motives (Er 6457-62). Furthermore, his perception 
remains so impaired that he continues to believe that he can 
change her mind (Er 6369-74, 6388-410, 6451ff.). His lustful 
intentions are made still more explicit by references to his 
thoughts of their wedding night (Er 6355f.). Unlike Galoain, 
however, Oringles does not degenerate into a comical figure. 
Instead, the effect of lust manifests itself in a more 
brutal way than even his earlier lack of pity could suggest. 
Oringles therefore demonstrates the blinding effects of lust 
to a degree beyond that portrayed by Erec and Galoain. His 
inability to understand Enite is likewise apparent in his
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accusation of foolish and childish behaviour for which he 
appropriates the term 'tump' (Er 6491, 6505). Like the
giants when referring to Erec, Oringles uses this term to 
accuse another of a child's incapacity to reason, but, in 
effect, merely reveals his own perceptive shortcomings.
A further comparison with the Galoain episode is apparent in 
the neglect by both counts of their duty of protection. In 
this way, they echo Erec's own laxity towards his social 
obligations by responding to their desires. In addition, 
Oringles, like Erec, becomes so desirous of Enite that he 
flouts his court's wishes in his haste to marry and in his 
brutish treatment. His lust therefore severely affects his 
personal credibility amongst his subjects. The blinding 
influence of love is thus shown to interfere in social and 
personal relations and duties to a devastating extent.
The intractability of Enite's and Cringles' positions 
reaches a climax at Limors where a total breakdown in 
communication occurs. This is evident in further references 
to sensory perception. Thus, Enite does not hear Cringles' 
messenger because her grief focuses all her perceptive 
faculties on Erec (Er 6375f.). In addition. Cringles refuses 
to hear criticism of his actions, enforcing silence on both 
his retainers and Enite, whom he symbolically hits on the 
mouth (Er 6549, 6518-23, 6577-9). He thereby joins the ranks 
of those characters (Maliclisier, the giants, Erec himself) 
who inappropriately reject the opinions of others by 
demanding silence. In her desperation, however, Enite 
recovers something of her former cunning by realizing that 
her insistent voice will aggravate Cringles to the point of 
murder:
und als si den slac emphie, wan er von mannes krefte gie, do hete si gedingen unde trost si würde des lîbes belôst, und swaz si mère gespræche daz erz mit slegen ræche
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unz er si gar erslüege.des wart vil ungevüegeir klage, und schrê wider dera site,und wande den tôt gedienen mite. (Er 6560-9)
In contrast to the Galoain episode, Enite's grief-affected 
perceptive faculties prohibit her from achieving a complex 
deception of her adversary in this encounter. An under­
standing of the power of her voice, however, enables her to 
pursue the only plan of which her grief will allow her to 
conceive, by seeking death. Once again, in spite of an order 
to be silent, her voice acts as an instrument for 
emphasizing the need to be aware of others. Thus, Enite 
highlights Cringles' faults by mocking his commands, 
demanding that he himself be silent (Er 6508f.), and 
continuing to defy him with her cries.
Enite's capacity for speaking out at the appropriate moment 
is once again confirmed, as her voice, which precipitated 
Erec's earlier emergence from his state of non-perception, 
here awakens him from a physical state of unconsciousness. 
Erec's revival scene symbolizes a rebirth of his inner 
awareness. It has also undergone extensive alteration from 
the French source with the result that Erec's sight, 
hearing, initial bewilderment, and finally his comprehension 
of the situation are all emphasized:
er lac in einem twalmeund erschrihte von ir galmeals der da wirt erwecket,von swærem troume erschrecket.er vuor ûf von der bârein vremder gebâreund begunde mit den ougen sehen.in wunderte waz im wære geschehen,und enweste wie er dar kam.anderstunt er si vernam,wande si vil dicke schrê:'ouwe, lieber herre, ouwêî diner helfe ger ich âne not, wan dû bist eht aber leider tôt.' als si in dô nande.
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zehant er si erkande und vernam wol daz si wære in etelicher swære, er enweste wie Oder wa. er enlac niht langer dâ: als er erkande ir stimme, ûf spranc er mit grimmeund rûschte vaste under si. (Er 6594-616)
The corresponding section of Chrétien's narrative describes 
the same processes, but in less detail:
Antre cez diz et cez tançons Revint Erec de pasmeisons Aussi con li hon qui s'esvoille.S'il s'esbai, ne fu mervoille.Des janz qu'il vit anviron lui;Mes grant duel ot et grant enui,Quant la voiz sa fame antandi. (EeE 4853-9)
(In the middle of these arguments and disputes, Erec recovered consciousness like a man waking from sleep. It was no wonder if he was startled to see the people around him; but when he heard his wife's voice, he was troubled and filled with grief.)
Hartmann's tautological phrase 'begunde mit den ougen sehen' 
acts as an indication to the alert reader that Erec has 
achieved a breakthrough in insight, as does his emphasis on 
the perceptive processes which Erec experiences on 
awakening. Thus, just as Kalogrenant persuades his 
companions in Iwein to listen with their hearts, Erec's use 
of his eyes indicates here a perceptiveness which stems from 
the rational faculty. Similarly, Erec's ability to hear is 
portrayed in terms of the mental deductions which it 
inspires. Furthermore, Hartmann emphasizes Erec's 
recognition of his wife's voice by the repetition of the 
term 'erkande', and it is significant that Erec now responds 
to the note of suffering in this voice in the same manner in 
which he reacted to Cadoc's lady. His recovery of his 
sensory, rational, and compassionate faculties is therefore 
explicitly detailed in this passage.
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Hartmann also draws a neater parallel than his source 
between the verligen scene and this episode. Thus, he states 
more clearly than Chrétien that it was Enite's voice which 
actually caused Erec to awake. Furthermore, Hartmann 
includes the actual content of Enite's cries, including her 
belief that Erec is dead, which corresponds to her belief at 
Karnant that he was asleep. In addition, Erec's reaction on 
both occasions is to act swiftly, but at Limors his action 
is expressly prompted by fears for his wife's safety.
Each of these points thus serves to create a contrast with 
the verligen scene in order to highlight Erec's more 
perceptive reactions at Limors.
In killing the lust-blinded Oringles, Erec is destroying a 
major component of his own earlier failure, an aspect termed 
by Schulze 'die letzte Objektivierung zwanghaft destruktiver 
Erotik'^ ®"^ . The confirmation that Erec's period of 
imperception has been overcome is subsequently implied by 
the couple's reconciliation. In addition, Erec's request to 
Enite for information and subsequently for forgiveness 
constitutes a significant alteration to the French source 
(Er 6792-803). The corresponding passage in Chrétien's 
narrative depicts Erec forgiving Enide for speaking out 
against him at Carnant (EeE 4919-31). The difference in 
focus of the German version thus confirms that both main 
protagonists were to blame for the verligen episode. 
However, Hartmann's version also stresses Erec's newly- |
acquired ability to appreciate Enite's loyalty (Er 6783-91). ]
The ironic suggestion that Erec's treatment of his wife was |
justifiable implies that Enite's loyalty was apparent from !
a very early stage, and that Erec imposed this trial whilst \
still experiencing a limitation of his inner awareness. His 
request for forgiveness now confirms that he has regained 
the means to appreciate Enite's motives.
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Erec's Second Encounter with Guivreiz
The second encounter with Guivreiz comprises a virtual 
mirror-image of the first. In so doing, it presents for 
further discussion the question of the proper mental 
attitude to combat. Erec's recently proven ability to 
recognize Enite's loyalty is therefore immediately followed 
by the need to demonstrate his appreciation of the 
restrained but active approach to knighthood which was so 
lacking at Karnant.
Alterations to the French source again reveal Hartmann's 
tendency to highlight issues relating to awareness. For 
example, Hartmann's Guivreiz is fully informed about the 
incident at Limors before setting out to help Erec, whereas 
Guivret receives earlier and incomplete news, and is 
consequently intent only on retrieving Erec's body (Er 6814- 
39, EeE 4939-64). In both versions, this character displays 
reasoning power by drawing conclusions about Erec's identity 
from the information he receives and feeling concern for 
him. Hartmann's adaptation additionally depicts Guivreiz 
reflecting on the consequences of his failure to help (Er 
6837-51). By being fully informed of events, however, 
Hartmann's Guivreiz has less excuse for joining combat with 
Erec than his French counterpart, who believes Erec dead, 
and who therefore could not be expected to recognize his 
opponent. Hartmann is thus introducing the question of the 
culpability of both parties in the forthcoming combat, 
thereby establishing closer links with issues explored in 
their earlier encounter.
This second meeting also constitutes a direct contrast to 
Erec's earlier reluctance to join combat. Although he now 
hears and sees his adversaries for himself (Er 6873-7), he 
intends to engage the oncoming men in combat because, 
despite his weakened state, he fears being branded a coward:
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er sprach ze vrouwen Ênîten;'vrouwe, ich hoere riten engegen uns ein michel her. nu enwil ich âne wer also zagelichenûzem wege niht entwlchen.' (Er 6878-83)
This echoes Guivreiz' earlier doubts about Erec's bravery. 
Although Erec is aware of his physical weakness, his fears 
of gaining a reputation for cowardice on this second 
occasion prevent him from establishing a more worthy basis 
for combat. His attitude to combat has therefore changed, 
but nevertheless remains inappropriate in the broader 
picture. In Chrétien's version, this incident is presented 
slightly but significantly differently in that Erec is more 
willing to assess the situation before engaging in combat;
'Remenez ci, dame!' fet il,'Un petit delez cest sevilTant que cez janz trespassé soient.Je n'ai cure que il vos voient;Car je ne sai, queus janz ce sont.Ne quel chose querant il vont;Espoir nos n'avons d'aus regart.Mes je ne voi de nule part.Ou nos nos poïssiens refuire.S'il nos voloient de rien nuire.Ne sai, se maus m'an avandra;Ja por peor ne remandra.Que a l'ancontre ne lor aille.' (EeE 4977-89)
('Stay here, lady,' he says, 'next to this hedge for a little while until these people have gone by. I don't want them to see you, for I don't know what people they are, nor what they're after. Perhaps we have nothing to fear from them; but I don't see anywhere a way for us to escape if they wanted to cause us any trouble. I don't know if I shall come to any harm, but I'll not be stopped by fear from going to meet them.')
Thus, Chrétien's Erec is aware of the need to assess an 
opponent's intentions before engaging in combat, and to 
fight bravely once the cause has been considered worthy. 
Such concerns formed the conclusion of the first encounter 
with Guivreiz in Hartmann's version. At their second 
meeting, the same issues are reinvestigated and re­
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emphasized. On this occasion, however, Erec's eagerness to 
join combat and his concern with cowardice resemble the 
earlier Guivreiz. Although Erec initiates the combat, 
Guivreiz himself displays little restraint in reacting to 
Erec's appearance despite his mission to search for his 
friend. Again, the avoidance of cowardice is posited in the 
narrative as underlying Guivreiz' actions here (Er 6902-7). 
This issue is given additional emphasis by Hartmann's 
alteration of the scene to include sufficient moonlight for 
the characters to recognize one another. Erec and Guivreiz 
must therefore blame themselves, rather than a natural 
cause, for failing to justify the combat (Er 6894f. compared 
with EeE 5000-2). In a further alteration, Guivreiz copies 
Erec's earlier unmotivated attack after overcoming him (Er 
6937f.), and is only restrained by Enite's revival of her 
role as a voice of good sense to remind Guivreiz on this 
occasion of the need for restraint in combat (Er 6946-53). 
This has the desired effect as Guivreiz' insight resurfaces 
on hearing Enite's voice, and causes him to question her and 
realize his mistake (Er 6957-70). Subsequently, his initial 
intent to aid the couple is revealed, as is his relief and 
joy at seeing them (Er 6971-94).
As Guivreiz proceeds to express his regret for the hurt he 
believes he has caused, Erec interrupts him with a request 
for silence (Er 7003-7). Such demands previously denoted 
Erec's rejection of good advice. Here, however, he signifies 
his recovery of awareness by recognizing the correct moment 
to speak, whilst his less culpable friend is silent (Er 
7007-9). Erec proceeds to apportion blame to himself for 
foolishly believing that the road belonged to him alone:
'sit daz ich tumber man ie von tumpheit muot gewan so grozer unmaze daz ich vremder straze eine wolde walten unde vor behalten so manegem guoten knehte, do tâtet ir mir rehte.
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itiîn buoze wart ze kleine, do ich alters eine iuwer aller ere wolde hân:ich solde baz ze buoze stân.' (Er 7012-23)
Erec thus demonstrates his insight into the cause of his 
limited perception, that is the 'tumpheit' which led him to 
believe that he could defeat so many opponents single- 
handedly. He realizes here that an exaggerated belief in 
one's own strength is detrimental in combat and may lead to 
unjustified violence. He therefore considers his defeat to 
be justified, and muses on how he has escaped relatively 
lightly. The acceptance of his words suggests that his 
companions consider it uncourtly to demand further 
punishment for Erec. In effect, their lack of contradiction 
confirms the conclusions Erec himself has reached.
The concept of tumpheit links Erec's statement here with 
previous episodes. This was discussed earlier with reference 
to Iders' confession in which he blamed his foolish heart 
for advising him to act wrongfully, and also to the giants 
and Oringles, whose limited insight rendered them incapable 
of assessing the mature perceptiveness of others. Such self­
judgement is also evident with regard to Keii. However, the 
shared term 'tumpheit' links Erec's statement here 
particularly with Iders' confession. This is likewise the 
case with the term 'buoze' with which Erec and Iders express 
their willingness to make reparation. This term only appears 
on these two occasions, thereby establishing a parallel 
between the two scenes. These scenes are thus distinguished 
as the two occasions on which protagonists undertake a 
consideration of their past actions and culpability, and, in 
a demonstration of contrition, offer themselves up for 
punishment. They therefore constitute the closest links 
between Hartmann's work and the steps of contrition, 
confession, and readiness to undertake satisfaction inherent 
in contemporary penitential practice.
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The shared terminology between Iders' confession and Erec's 
statement also serves to highlight Erec's recovery of 
insight. A comparison with Chrétien's version likewise 
reveals Hartmann's emphasis on this statement. Its increased 
length and portrayal in direct speech also contrasts with 
the indirect mode of Guivreiz' self-blame and Erec and 
Enite's earlier reconciliation. Thus, Erec's own insight 
here constitutes a culmination of the signs of growing 
awareness which are evident throughout his later adventures. 
In addition, however, this speech also represents a specific 
parallel of the earlier Guivreiz encounter in stressing the 
importance of insight in terms of proper combat procedure.
As Martin Jones points out, Erec's speech has often been 
interpreted as a sudden turning-point in his understanding 
of his previous behaviour. Such interpretations claim 
that at this juncture Erec finally realizes the foolishness 
of his pursuit of personal honour rather than the service of 
others. Jones justifiably questions whether Erec's words 
here can support such weight of meaning, particularly as 
Erec has already demonstrated an improvement in terms of his 
mental approach to combat since his previous encounter with 
Guivreiz. His words thus have no bearing on his previous 
behaviour because his inner progress has already been 
completed before this encounter.^* As a result, Jones 
concludes that Erec's speech is a sign of courtesy towards 
Guivreiz which is intended to alleviate his opponent's sole 
guilt in joining combat on this occasion.
However, it is also possible to view Erec's speech here in 
terms of a concluding step in his uncompleted progress 
towards greater inner awareness. Erec's words therefore act 
as a culmination of all the aspects of his recovery of 
perception, but also as a further, specific reference to the 
proper approach to combat, which he has not adopted on this 
occasion. As previously demonstrated, Erec has performed 
acts of altruism stemming from the restitution of his powers
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of insight already in the Cadoc episode. This earlier, 
gradual recovery of his inner awareness thus allows him to 
reflect on his behaviour at this juncture. Seen in these 
terms, therefore, Erec's speech does not constitute a sudden 
insight, but rather a confirmation of the progress he has 
already demonstrated, but which he has not yet completed. 
The last step of this journey pertains to the proper 
approach to combat, and therefore complements his initial 
encounter with Guivreiz. Erec's mental attitude to knightly 
activities is thus being specifically reinvestigated in this 
encounter. On this occasion, Erec has taken over Guivreiz' 
former belligerent role, and must accept a large share of 
the blame for inappropriately initiating combat. His speech 
therefore refers to a specific aspect of his identity and 
obligations which he has violated as a result of his 
incomplete progress. However, as his words demonstrate, it 
is his previous recovery of his perceptive powers which 
allows him to appreciate his fault and to take that final 
step towards achieving true insight into his obligations.
Erec's recovery of his insight subsequently receives further 
verification from Hartmann as Erec and Enite sleep together 
for the first time since Karnant, and significantly reside 
apart from Guivreiz' retinue (Er 7091-7101). Unlike 
Chrétien's couple who are reunited at Penefrec, Hartmann 
immediately demonstrates that his main protagonists are able 
to pursue the private side of their marriage without 
resorting to social i s o l a t i o n . I n  a further note of 
contrast with the verligen episode, Erec is subsequently 
healed at Penefrec, a place which Hartmann depicts as 
symbolizing active and fruitful leisure, but is no longer 
satisfied to remain even here. Instead, he is preoccupied 
with leaving to resume his knightly pursuits (Er 7237-63). 
This restlessness is again an addition to Chrétien's text. 
It points towards a further adventure, but also confirms 
that Erec has achieved a balance of insight and desire which 
permits the active pursuit of his knightly lifestyle.
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Joie de la curt
This concluding episode comprises a drawing together of 
disparate elements which have been apparent throughout the 
text. It allows Erec to demonstrate all the aspects of 
virtuous and responsible knighthood which his journey to 
self-awareness has enabled him to attain. Moreover, in 
Mabonagrin, Erec encounters a more complete image of his 
former self than any of his previous adversaries and a 
figure who causes him to reveal his new capacity to act in 
the best interests of society. Finally, this adventure forms 
a conclusion to the work as a whole by invoking aspects of 
Erec's first combat against Iders and the verligen episode 
in order to demonstrate the extent and nature of Erec's 
progress throughout the narrative.
Erec's complete recovery of his powers of perception is |
evident in his curiosity and bravery in this episode, which j
are balanced by an awareness of the need to justify force, 
and by his pity for the victims of unnecessary violence. In 
particular, his powers of sensory perception are high­
lighted. Thus, on his approach to Brandigan, Erec is forced 
to press a reluctant Guivreiz for information (Er 7924ff.), 
and at first appears to be foolhardy in repeatedly 
disregarding Guivreiz' warnings (Er 8043-5, 8054f., 8147- 
53). The townsfolk are similarly confused by Erec's 
confidence and express their certainty of his impending 
defeat in a low murmur (Er 8086-8111, 8159-69). Erec |
proceeds to laugh and even sing in the face of these j
concerns (Er 8028f., 8154-8, 8442). However, this reaction 
acts as a demonstration of aware confidence rather than 
blindness on Erec's part. As Gertrud Hohler notes:
man wird der Szene des 'Volksgemurmels' eher gerecht, wenn man sie als willkommenen AnlaB fur den Dichter begreift, die Qualitaten desHaupthelden noch einmal in alien Schattierungen vorzuf ühren.
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Erec's display of sensory and reasoning powers subsequently 
continues in his repeated questioning of Ivreins, whom he 
also cunningly misleads in order to learn about the 
adventure (Er 8443ff.). Erec thus demonstrates his ability 
to obtain information by disguising his intentions.
A further dimension to Erec's awareness is revealed in this 
episode in the shape of his relationship with God (Er 
8527f., 8855-9). This is expressed in Erec's inner prayer 
which is significantly portrayed in direct speech, a style 
which has not been employed to reveal Erec's thoughts since 
before his verligen (Er 8147-53). The depiction of a 
religious dimension at this juncture confirms that Erec is 
able to act in God's name as a result of his recovery of 
self-knowledge. Erec's expression of trust in his abilities 
and in God at this stage likewise recalls the teaching in 
Die Klage concerning the acquisition of virtue. Erec reveals 
a confidence that his actions, guided by his new awareness, 
will be accorded both God's blessing and the praise of 
secular society. The episode at Brandigan thus confirms the 
broader implications, both secular and spiritual, of the 
progress in insight which Erec has achieved.
It should be noted, however, that the devices employed 
earlier to depict awareness are affected in this episode by 
Hartmann's creation of suspense. Thus, the reluctance of 
Guivreiz, Ivreins, and the townspeople to speak of the 
adventure does not constitute criticism.Instead, their *
actual motivation is to protect Erec (e.g. Er 8390-414), and ]
their silence and timidity contrasts with Erec's self- j
confidence to create a sense of foreboding. Hartmann's |
addition of Guivreiz' mistaking the path and the j
descriptions of the night and morning before the combat also I
create an escalation of tension, as does the sorrow which I
the inhabitants of Brandigan and the widows feel for Erec i
and especially Enite. Their confidence in a negative outcome
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reflects the risk Erec is taking, however, rather than 
calling into question his wisdom in pursuing this adventure.
Erec's own reasons for accepting the challenge are based on 
a combination of factors. The acquisition of booty is of no 
consequence to him, unlike the pursuit of honour. Thus, he 
sees an opportunity to bring aid to Brandigan, but also to 
re-establish his own knightly credentials by defeating an 
opponent with a fearsome reputation (Er 8540-62). However, 
Erec is not guided by a blind confidence in his abilities. 
As well as carefully establishing the facts of the 
situation, he also fears the task ahead. As the narrator 
indicates, however, this fear is not based on cowardice but 
is indicative of the natural reaction of a perceptive knight 
who is aware of the risks and who has listened to the advice 
of others (Er 8619-31). Thus, the inappropriate mental 
attitude towards combat which was demonstrated in his 
encounters with Guivreiz has been overcome. This is also 
highlighted by Ivreins' information that the knights who 
previously attempted the adventure disregarded all warnings 
on account of their foolish hearts. The knight in the garden 
has killed all those:
'die des niht wolden haben ratvon tumbes herzen stiure,sine suochten aventiure.' (Er 8479-81)
Erec's contrasting approach thus confirms his own heart's 
mature perception.
Moreover, Erec's attitude is coloured by an altruistic 
desire to comfort the widows (Er 8334-42). Hartmann's 
addition of this aspect implies that he is again intent on 
highlighting pity as a major factor in Erec's undertaking of 
an adventure. This emphasis is apparent in Erec's two inner 
monologues on seeing the widows, firstly chiding God for 
depriving such women of their happiness (Er 8294-305), and 
secondly hoping that Enite will not join them (Er 8350-5).
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a,-i.
His inner emotions of pity and reasonable fearfulness are 
thus again presented in the most direct form possible, in 
confirmation of his recovery of his perceptive faculties.
Having thus established that these faculties are again 
active, Erec proceeds to undertake the adventure. Parallels 
may be drawn between his own situation at Karnant and the 
seclusion in which Mabonagrin and his lady live. They too 
have established a love relationship apart from society to 
the detriment of their court. Nevertheless, contrasts may be 
drawn between Enite and Mabonagrin's lady, both in terms of 
their beauty (Er 8926-36), and also their attitudes towards 
their spouses. Furthermore, Mabonagrin brings sorrow to the 
court because his pursuit of love has caused his knightly 
activity to become channelled into pointless aggression. 
This contrasts with Erec's earlier knightly inactivity. The 
anti-social consequences of Mabonagrin's love relationship 
are described by Schulze as:
eine epische Konkretisierung des lyrischen Minne- dienstmotivs, das in dieser sinnlos perpetuierten Form ad absurdum geführt wird.^^*
Like Erec at Karnant, therefore, Mabonagrin experiences the 
negative effects of love which result in such social 
disruption.
At Brandigan, however, Erec's superior power of awareness 
over his adversary continues to reveal his progress since 
his verligen. Thus, for example, he sees the pavilion (Er 
8901f.), the lady (Er 8926f.), and Mabonagrin (Er 9009f.), 
and also hears his voice (Er 8992-4). His approach is also 
careful and unaggressive. Despite some degree of sensory 
awareness being attributed to Mabonagrin, the limited scope 
of his perception nevertheless becomes evident. On seeing 
Erec talking with his lady, Mabonagrin immediately draws the 
wrong conclusions about his motives (Er 9003-6), and his 
abrupt address of Erec likewise demonstrates his absolute
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intention of fighting, as is in keeping with his warlike 
inclinations;
sin wapenroc alsam was, er selbe rôt, als ich ez las, gewâfent nâch sinem muote. ich wæne sin herze bluote swenne er niht ze vehtenne vant:
SÔ mordic was sin hant. (Er 9018-23)
Mabonagrin's belligerence and love restrict his perceptive 
powers in the same manner in which Erec's earlier 
adversaries were influenced by lust or desire for combat.
His address subsequently provides an opportunity for Erec's 
motivation and superior perception to be displayed as well 
as the Red Knight's own unfounded jealousy and aggres­
siveness. Erec, by contrast, seeks calmly and courteously to
understand how he has insulted Mabonagrin and rejects his
accusation as immoderate:
er sprach: 'valschaere, nu sage an, wer hiez iuch der vrouwen sô nâhen gân?''waz hân ich dar an missetân?''ez ist eht vil toerlich.''herre, wes scheltet ir mich?''da dunket ir mich der vrouwen ze bait.''herre, ir sprechet iuwern gewalt.''saget, wer brâhte iuch her?''guote vriunt.' 'nu saget doch, wer?''min herze und min selbes muot.''dâ enriet ez iu dehein guot.''ez hât mich noch gewiset wol.''daz endet sich hie.' 'ez ensol.' (Er 9027-39)
Furthermore, Erec's reference to his confidence in his 
heart's perception in guiding him to this adventure is met 
by Mabonagrin's incomprehension. Like the giants, Mabonagrin J
considers Erec to be foolish and to have limited awareness, !
but in so accusing him, Mabonagrin only reveals his own :
blindness. Furthermore, Mabonagrin's incapacity to evaluate |
the advice of Erec's heart is matched by his lady's comment I
on Erec's arrival in the garden: i
I
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'wes rât hât iuch her brâht?Oder habet ir iuz selbe erdâht durch iuwers herzen gelust? sô traget ir under iuwer brust einen ungetriuwen râtgeben,wan er hât verrâten iu daz leben.' (Er 8980-5)
Neither of them, therefore, has the insight to appreciate 
the solid advice of Erec's perceptive heart.
Mabonagrin's belligerence is further revealed in his 
inability to comprehend Erec's attempts to establish his 
opponent's intentions:
'wiltu vehten wider mich?''welt dan ir, sô wil ouch ich.''wes ist dir, tumber gouch, gedâht?''des werdet ir wol innen brâht.' (Er 9042-5)
Erec refuses to be intimidated by Mabonagrin, and in the 
image of the two mountains, demonstrates his assessment of 
his adversary's empty boasting (Er 9049-66). Erec's approach 
is therefore tempered by moderation, and guided by a concern 
to evaluate the situation in advance. In contrast, 
Mabonagrin's uncomprehending aggression and mockery serve to 
underline the soundness of Erec's careful approach.
The description of their ensuing combat incorporates the 
image of a love relationship, as if to stress that the two 
knights are defending their own definitions of this issue in 
the social context (Er 9106ff.). Both combatants also share 
an equal dedication to the fight (Er 9101). However, they 
reveal disparate motives and sources of strength. 
Mabonagrin's thoughts, for example, reveal a significant 
lack of mercy on his part:
dô gedâhte der grôze dar an:'mirst zorn daz dirre kleine man also lange vor mir wert.' mit grimme begreif er daz swert und gedâhte eht vellen sinen kamphgesellen.
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er warf ez umbe in der hant: der vil michel valant in kunde niht erbarmen: sin herze gap den armen krefteclicher sterke genuoc,mit guotem willen er ez sluoc. (Er 9190-201)
His strength is thus drawn from his heart's desire for 
victory. However, the true significance of this statement is 
revealed by the ensuing ironical comment concerning 
Mabonagrin's good intentions. In contrast, the source of 
Erec's strength is made evident in his reaction to the 
pivotal moment when a blow on the head affects his sensory 
faculties :
dirre grimmecliche slac Êrecke in sin houbet erschal, daz er vil kume meit den val. siniu ôren und diu ougen begunden ir ambtes lougen, daz er gehorte noch gesach. wan daz daz swert enzwei brach, ez wære gewesen sin ende. vil schiere der ellende sine kraft herwider gewan, daz er gesach und sich versan und gehôrte alsam ouch ê. (Er 9211-22)
Erec's sensory confusion is reminiscent of his lack of 
perception in the verligen episode. However, his quick 
recovery at Brandigan confirms his recent reacquisition of 
those powers. Erec also proceeds to draw on his earlier 
proficiency as a wrestler, which suggests an element of 
cunning and innovation. Finally, he is fortified both before 
and during the combat by thoughts of Enite. From being the |
object of his destructive lust at Karnant, his wife now i
becomes a source of strength in his knightly activities (Er 
8864-73, 9183-7, 9230f.). A parallel may be drawn here with i
his thoughts of Enite in his combat against Iders. However, i
whereas there was a sense of ambiguity on that occasion !
regarding whether Erec received greater inspiration from 
Enite or his sense of shame, there is no doubting the source j
of his strength at Brandigan. This implies that Erec and I
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Enite have now established a love relationship in which 
their mutual affection combines to act as an inspiration 
rather than an obstacle to Erec's activities as a perceptive 
knight. This is further demonstrated by the contrast with 
Mabonagrin's thoughts of his own lady. He is inspired by the 
actual sight of her beauty (Er 9174-9), whereas Erec's 
thoughts are of the love of his absent wife. Her absence 
emphasizes the inner bonds which have been forged between 
them from which Erec is able to draw strength:
Êrec, ze swelhen ziten er gedâhte an vrouwen Ênîten,SO starcten im ir minnesin herze und ouch die sinne,daz er ouch mit niuwer mahtnâch manlicher tiure vaht. (Er 9182-7)
Ultimately, Enite's love and Erec's own perception ('herze' 
and 'sinne'), which has been renewed by his wife's love, are 
the weapons with which Erec attains victory. It is also 
significant that these descriptions of the sources of the 
knights' inspiration are additions to the French narrative, 
thus indicating Hartmann's continuing emphasis of the issue 
of inner motivation in this concluding episode.
In the aftermath of the combat, Erec's perception is again 
confirmed, not least by his relaxed compliance with 
Mabonagrin's unusual request that Erec as victor identify 
himself first (Er 9325ff.). The humour of this strange 
reversal of roles underlines the significance of this 
moment. Obviously, Erec is now so comfortable with his 
identity that he is even capable of complying with such 
peculiar demands.
Erec subsequently questions and advises Mabonagrin, 
demonstrating his own insight by referring frequently to his 
knowledge and experience. Thus, Erec utilizes the 
information he gained from Ivreins (Er 9406-12), and 
displays curiosity regarding Mabonagrin's situation. In
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fact, Mabonagrin's life story reflects Erec's own initial 
failure and his subsequent recovery. The ability of both 
knights to recognize their social identities has been 
impaired by the force of love. Erec now proceeds to confirm 
his progress by recommending the company of others as a 
pleasurable experience. It is noteworthy that Erec's advice 
does not directly include the issue of social obligation, 
although this is implied. Instead, his advice focuses on the 
happiness to be gained by living in a love relationship 
which exists positively within a community by limiting the 
time spent in isolation. His address could well have been 
directed towards himself at Karnant:
'saget, wie vertribet ir die zit,iu enwaere me der liute bi?swie wünneclîch eht hinne siund swie deheiner slahte guotso sere ringe den muotso dâ liep bi liebe lit,als ir und iuwer wip sit,so sol man wærlichenden wiben doch entwichenze etelicher stunde.' (Er 9415-24)
Such a positive existence is now so self-evident to Erec 
that he cannot contemplate Mabonagrin's ability to live in 
such a limited environment:
'wie ir mohtet belibenein also wætlicher man,wie mich des niht verwundern kan!wan bi den liuten ist so guot.' (Er 9435-8)
Erec subsequently poses three questions which demonstrate 
the thoroughness of his own progress. He encourages 
Mabonagrin to consider his position in all its aspects, 
including its underlying causes, his relationship with God, 
and his future;
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'nû weder habet ir disen muotvon iemannes gebote?oder welt irs Ion haben von gote?Oder suit ir immer hinne sîn?' (Er 9439-42)
Finally, Erec's advice is confirmed by Mabonagrin's own 
confession that he loves the company of others and only 
remains in the garden under duress (Er 9445-8).
The question of motivation and loyalty which is also raised 
in their conversation invites further parallels with the 
verligen episode. The situation at Brandigan has its origins 
in Mabonagrin's youthful promises to his lady (Er 9462ff.). 
Such immaturity was similarly disastrous for Erec and 
Enite's earlier sense of social obligation, and the 
Brandigan couple's relationship is indeed affected by 
factors stemming from a lack of perception. Mabonagrin, for 
example, has become such a destructive figure partly as a 
result of his lady's fear of losing him (Er 9550-5). Any 
notions of wifely duties have been negated by this fear 
which reflects Enite's earlier preoccupations. In addition, 
the situation in the garden is the result of Mabonagrin 
developing a false sense of loyalty by misreading his lady's 
intentions. His blindness to her self-centredness is 
demonstrated by his agreement to make an unspecified 
p r o m i s e . T h i s  initial acquiescence is based on the trust 
that his lady would never impose unreasonable demands on him 
(Er 9499-9509). However, her request that he repay her 
loyalty by agreeing to her every wish is indeed fuelled by 
self-interest based on fear (Er 9491-8). Mabonagrin 
nevertheless remains unaware of any reason to doubt her 
motives as a result of the blinding influence of his love. 
This blindness is evident in his appraisal of their 
relationship (Er 9510ff.). Although he rejects building a 
love relationship on physical attraction alone, Mabonagrin's 
belief that he shares the same spiritual plane as his lady 
is ill-founded. Nevertheless, Mabonagrin continues to think 
the best of her and his loyalty remains firm (Er 9520-31).
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Thus, the seeds exist for his blindness to continue. The 
rebuilding of his relationship on perceptive grounds depends 
on his ability to learn from Erec. However, the Red Knight's 
doubts about his situation, and obvious relief at the 
freedom that the saviour-like Erec has brought, which 
contrast so sharply with his earlier confidence, imply that 
Mabonagrin is already progressing towards comprehending and 
resolving his predicament (Er 9583-9).
A comparison between the loyalty demonstrated by Enite and 
by Mabonagrin and his lady is likewise revealing. Enite's 
proven ability to overcome her own self-centred thoughts 
after the verligen episode emphasizes the failure of 
Mabonagrin's lady to conquer her jealousy. Moreover, in 
contrast to Mabonagrin, Enite proves her loyalty by her 
decision to break her promise to her husband. Subsequently, 
her awareness of the true path of loyalty is the decisive 
factor in their survival during the initial stages of their 
adventure, whereas Mabonagrin's blind loyalty maintains the 
false security of the garden at Brandigan. In addition, 
neither Mabonagrin nor Erec can define the underlying causes 
of their female companion's loyalty. In effect, Erec rejects 
his wife's voice whilst Mabonagrin listens too well to his. 
Both lack the insight necessary to discern the motivation 
behind those voices.
Thus, the lady's jealousy and Mabonagrin's blindness have 
created a love relationship set apart from society which 
parallels the Karnant situation. Unlike at Karnant, however, 
this has provoked the use of prowess for destructive ends 
rather than the failure to use it as in Erec's case. 
Nevertheless, the socially-disruptive outcome is identical. 
Erec's defeat of Mabonagrin confirms his own reacquisition 
of inner awareness and highlights the need to use prowess in 
a socially-responsible manner. Moreover, it re-emphasizes 
the effects of love on a couple's awareness of their
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extended obligations and on their comprehension of one 
another's motives.
Despite playing no further major role as a perceptive being,
Enite undertakes one final important task by approaching 
Mabonagrin's lady in a spirit of pity, and by encouraging 
her to speak. Consequently, the discovery that they are 
related is news which they cannot contain (Er 9735-8). Once 
again, therefore, Enite uses her voice to return someone to 
the folds of society in the same manner in which she 
precipitated her own husband's recovery.®^®
Erec likewise has an important final task to accomplish, and 
one, moreover, which is not evident in the conclusion to 
Chrétien's work. Erec displays the compassion which the 
recovery of his insight has revived by arranging for the 
heads of Mabonagrin's victims to be buried (Er 9746-52). 
Furthermore, in the midst of the ensuing celebrations, Erec 
demonstrates conclusive evidence of his ability to feel 
concern for others and his sense of responsibility to them 
by being troubled by the continuing sorrow of the widows and 
arranging a better life for them at Arthur's court:
doch was er âne vreude hie, also daz er sin herze nie von swærem kumber brâhte. swenne er dar an gedâhte,
SÔ entweich im aller sin muot, als ez dem erbarmherzen tuot: dem ervollent dicke diu ougen offenlich und tougen, swenne er iht des gesiht daz wol ze erbarmenne geschiht. ouch was diz genuoc erbarmeclich: ez enwart nie man sô vreuden rich, Idem doch iht erbarmen sol, !ich wizze daz benamen wol,hæte er die nôt ersehen, Iim waere ze weinenne geschehen. (Er 9782-97) i
In particular, this passage emphasizes how deeply Erec is I
affected by the widows' plight. His pity and weeping reflect |
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the widows' own earlier sorrow for him as Mabonagrin's next 
victim (Er 8320, 8345). Erec's tears and the repetition of 
the term 'erbarmen' are likewise reminiscent of the way in 
which he was affected by the suffering of Cadoc and his 
lady. These therefore constitute the two occasions on which 
Erec's compassion is expressed. Erec's own pity is echoed by 
Ivreins in his selfless recognition that the widows can no 
longer find happiness at Brandigan (Er 9836-48). Further­
more, not only does Erec's thoughtfulness provide for the 
ladies, but it finds additional confirmation in the glory 
which his virtuous actions bring to Arthur's court (Er 9945- 
50).
Erec finally returns to Karnant having recovered those lost 
aspects of his awareness which precipitated his earlier 
failure in his verligen. This original problem was caused by 
the forces of love blocking the perceptiveness which Erec 
revealed in his youthful pre-verligen adventures, thereby 
rendering him incapable of acknowledging the expansion of 
his identity and obligations which occurred as a result of 
his marriage. Particular emphasis in this work is therefore 
placed on the dangers of bestowing social responsibilities 
on the young, no matter how successful or perceptive they 
may appear. Both Erec and Enite must learn to appreciate 
that a marriage can only have a positive social function if 
both partners are capable of perceiving their obligations 
beyond the narrow confines of their love relationship. 
Whereas Enite's failure is short-lived, however, Erec's 
persistent blindness continues to affect his credibility as 
a knight and lord, a failing compounded by his inability to 
judge his wife's loyalty, Erec's eventual recovery is 
prompted by contact with various characters, each embodying 
a different aspect of his own diminished perceptiveness. The 
recovery of each of these aspects as a result of these 
encounters enables Erec to engage in restrained and 
justified combat, to appreciate loyalty and experience pity, 
to judge motivation, avoid cowardice, and acknowledge social
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responsibilities. Eventually, Erec returns to his kingdom 
fully aware of his obligations as knight, husband, and lord.
The major source of evidence which emphasizes the nature and 
extent of Hartmann's focus on insight in this work is to be 
found in a comparison with Chrétien's version. The wide- 
ranging alterations which Hartmann makes to his source 
suggest a desire to highlight specifically this area of 
interest.
Erec thus continues the emphasis on insight which Hartmann 
demonstrated in Die Klage. The recovery of a balance between 
perception and physical desire in the wake of love's
disruptive influence in this work, however, is placed
against the complex background of social responsibilities in 
which knighthood and lordship operate. The virtues to which 
perception accompanied by action can lead are therefore 
primarily social, but the Christian virtue of pity is 
likewise present in this model of a responsible knight and 
lord. Erec thus continues Hartmann's depiction of secular
morality as a combination of clerical and lay moral
guidelines which was introduced in Die Klage.
A comparison with Die Klage also confirms the existence of 
a psychological progression in Erec. By observing this text 
in the light of the themes of the disputation, it is 
possible to conclude that Erec is guilty of a subjective, 
ethical failing which has severe objective consequences and 
for which he must take responsibility. A comparison with 
this earlier work also puts Hartmann's interest in 
perception in Erec into the context of twelfth-century 
notions of self-knowledge. In particular, the influence of 
penitential practice is evident in the confessions of Iders 
and Erec which demonstrate regret and a willingness to 
undertake reparation. However, the secular concerns of the 
military aristocracy are also clearly evident in the 
emphasis which this work places on the secular obligations
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of lordship and knighthood. All of these obligations are 
fulfilled in the same way, however, that is by the 
implementation of thought through action. By comparison, 
Hartmann's third work, Gregorius, takes the issue of 
perception into territory of a quite different kind.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Gregorius
Hartmann's third narrative poem constitutes a further change 
in genre. As an overtly religious narrative, Gregorius 
offers Hartmann a different context in which to pursue the 
issue of perception. This chapter will seek to establish the 
extent to which Hartmann does so, and to catalogue any 
differences in emphasis or external influences which might 
set this narrative apart from its predecessors with regard 
to its depiction of insight. Furthermore, Gregorius is an 
extremely contentious work in terms of its ambiguous 
depiction of the main protagonist's guilt. An appraisal of 
inner deliberation in the narrative may also prove a useful 
means of re-evaluating the evidence regarding this issue.
The Prologue
The prologue to Gregorius is missing in three of the six 
complete manuscripts and all of the five fragments of this 
work. This has caused some scholars to doubt its 
relevance to the main body of the text owing to its 
apparently disposable nature.However, it has also been 
suggested that the prologue was excluded from some of the 
earlier manuscripts because of its more personal style, an 
aspect which prompted later scribes to preserve it for its 
original and antique v a l u e . O n e  might also argue that 
this apparent disposability implies that the prologue is 
absolutely consistent with the conceptual content of the 
main body of the text. Its position as overture, introducing 
themes which are investigated later in more detail, could 
thus be said to render it dispensable. An examination of the 
content of Hartmann's prologue with regard to its discussion 
of inner disposition and its function as a detailed 
introduction to this concept will therefore be undertaken at
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this stage as its dispensability does not imply irrelevance 
to the rest of the narrative.
Hartmann's continuing concern with inwardness in this work 
becomes immediately apparent in the references of the 
author/narrator to his own self-awareness in the prologue. 
Such seemingly personal aspects are an inherent part of the 
literary device of the prologue which had infiltrated 
vernacular literature from the rhetorical tradition. 
However, Hartmann's self-depiction here is not merely a 
component of this rhetoric. His reference in the 
prologue to his own experiences can be compared with the 
strong authorial presence which Hartmann incorporates in his 
narratives, either by naming himself, taking part in 
audience discussion through his narrator, or creating the 
impression of authorial empathy for certain characters. The 
personal elements in his prologue thus increase the intimacy 
of the work, and this device functions as an opportunity for 
the author/narrator to portray his own achievement of 
insight into the nature of his mistakes:
Min herze hat betwungendicke mine zungendaz si des vil gesprochen hâtdaz nach der werlde lone stat:daz rieten im diu tumben jar.nu weiz ich daz wol vür war:swer durch des helleschergen ratden trost ze siner jugent hâtdaz er dar ûf sündet,als in diu jugent schündet,und er gedenket dar an:'dû bist noch ein junger man,aller diner missetâtder wirt noch vil guot rât:dû gebüezest si in dem alter wol',der gedenket anders danne er sol. (Gr 1-16)
Thus, Hartmann places the blame on his immature heart, 
which, encouraged by the Devil's machinations, fell into the 
trap of believing that it could enjoy the pleasures of this 
world whilst postponing atonement, a miscalculation
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generally referred to as præsumptlo.^^^ Eventually, 
however, experience revealed the error of his ways, and his 
powers of insight prompted him to seek the remission of his 
sins by composing this exemplary work;
Durch daz waere ich gerne bereitze sprechenne die wârheitdaz gotes wille waereund daz diu grôze swæreder süntlichen bürdeein teil ringer würdedie ich durch mine müezikeitûf mich mit worten hân geleit. (Gr 35-42)
His experiences have made him aware of the danger of 
postponing penance, in particular the possibility of being 
unable to receive God's grace in the event of an untimely 
death (Gr 17-34). However, he has also learned that 
forgiveness is available to all on condition that they 
achieve sufficient regret in their hearts:
wan dâ enzwivel ich niht an:als uns got an einem manerzeiget und bewæret hât,so enwart nie mannes missetâtze dirre werlde sô groz,er enwerde ir ledic unde bloz,ob si in von herzen riuwetund si niht wider niuwet. (Gr 43-50)
The leading role played by perception in achieving timely 
repentance and the dangers of immature thought are thus 
immediately introduced in the author/narrator's reference in 
the prologue to his own sinfulness. A direct connection with 
Hartmann's interest in subjectivity in his previous two 
narratives is therefore not only straightaway apparent in 
this work, but is accorded emphasis by being related to the 
author's personal experiences in this way.
In addition to the sin of præsumptio, the prologue offers 
particular advice on how the sin of despair can occur and 
can be avoided:
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swer sich bedenkethoubethafter missetâtder er vil lihte manige hât,SO tuot er wider dem gebote,und verzwivelt er an gote,daz er sin niht enruocheob er genâde suoche,und entriuwet niemer wider komen;
SÔ hât der zwivel im benomenden wuocher der riuwe.daz ist diu wâre triuwedie er ze gote solde hân:buoze nâch bîhte bestân. (Gr 66-78)
The sins of desperatio and præsumptio are well documented in 
theology as the two most serious crimes against the Holy 
Spirit.Here, Hartmann outlines the dangers presented by 
despair to a sinner, and highlights in particular the manner 
in which reflection on one's sinful condition can lead to 
such a destruction of hope. Although self-awareness is 
essential in combating sin, it is therefore not an approach 
which is completely devoid of dangers in itself. As Hartmann 
warns, the remorse achieved by reflection can result in 
despair, and, if this occurs, the means to achieve true 
contrition, namely the undertaking of confession and a form 
of satisfaction, are obstructed. Thus, Hartmann is 
describing the effect of despair on the achievement of true 
repentance in direct accordance with the steps portrayed in 
penitential teaching.
The Parable in the Prologue
In his references to his own experiences, Hartmann thus 
presents a concise introduction to the issues at hand. 
Subsequently, these concepts of reflection, regret, faith, 
and sinfulness, coupled with confession and satisfaction as 
essential components of penance, are further examined in the 
parable of the man attacked by murderers. There is a 
reflection here of the parable of the Good Samaritan, which 
has itself been interpreted as symbolizing the Fall of
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Humankind. Hartmann could have relied on his audience being 
acquainted with this parable because it was prescribed in 
the homilies for the thirteenth or fourteenth Sunday after 
Whitsun,®^® in addition to being widely used in the 
vernacular sermons and theological texts of his age.^^® 
Furthermore, frequent connections between the parable of the 
Good Samaritan and the Fall are to be found, for example, in 
the works of Origen, Ambrose, Augustine, and Bede. The 
victim of sin is associated by these theologians with Adam, 
who is saved by Christ in the guise of the Samaritan, and 
brought to the shelter of the Church to be healed of his 
sin. Augustine's teaching on the Fall had the greatest 
influence in the Middle Ages. Most importantly, it was 
reproduced in Peter Lombard's Libri guattuor sententiarum, 
the works of Hugh of St Victor and Gilbert de la Porrée, and 
found its way into Latin and vernacular sermons. 
Augustine taught that original sin was caused by humankind's 
disobedient use of free will.®^® The consequences of this 
disobedience include the loss of immortality, an eternal 
inclination towards Evil, and the entry of humankind into a 
state of concupiscence and ignorance. This inheritance from 
the Fall is of great importance for this chapter and will 
therefore be examined in greater detail.
The punishment inflicted by God in response to the 
disobedience of Adam's soul when it came under the influence 
of the Devil was to cause his body to become disobedient to 
his soul. The uncontrolled body is thus prone to 
concupiscence or carnal lust as part of the legacy of the 
Fall. Carnal sin was brought into existence as a result of 
Adam's transgression and is subsequently transmitted through 
the act of conception to each human being. Thus, humankind 
inherits the stain of original sin, for which all humans are 
answerable, through the act of procreation. As Augustine 
writes ;
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For after man had broken the precept, he was first forsaken of God's grace and confounded with his own nakedness: and so with the fig leaves (the first perhaps that came to hand), he covered his nakedness and shame. His members were before as they were then, but they were not shameful before, whereas now he felt a new impulse of his |disobedient flesh, as the reciprocal punishment of |his disobedience. For the soul, being now |delighted with perverse liberty and scorning to jserve God, could not have the body as formerly at |its command: and having willingly forsaken God its jsuperior, it could not have its inferior so jserviceable as it desired, nor could it have the jflesh subject as it might have had always, had it Iremained itself God's subject. For then the flesh ibegan to covet, and contend against the spirit; Iand with this contention are we all born, drawing jdeath from our origin, and bearing nature's Icorruption, and contention or victory of the first jtransgression in our members.^®® jII
4Augustine also claims that this overpowering lust inevitably I
effects the relationship between the body and the intellect: l|1[Lust] holds sway in the whole body, moving the awhole man, without and within, with such a mixture |of mental emotion and carnal appetite that hence )is the highest bodily pleasure of all produced: sothat in the very moment of consummation, it overwhelms almost all the light and power of cogitation.
As a legacy of original sin, therefore, every human is 
conceived with a predisposition towards physical desire and 
the consequent challenge to his or her powers of reasoning.
The imbalance between the rational and physical faculties is 
accompanied by an ignorance of God's demands and an 
inclination towards Evil. The free will of humankind thus 
undergoes a transformation from being able to avoid sin 
whilst in Paradise (posse non peccare), to being unable to 
avoid sin after the Fall (non posse non peccare). 
Augustine's rather incomplete thoughts on this matter were 
expanded by Hugh of St Victor:
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In [Adam], indeed, the spirit swelling with pride against the Creator did not keep obedience, and, therefore, the Creator to avenge His injury punished the spirit with ignorance indeed but the flesh with concupiscence, so that the spirit does not see in itself the good to be done but in its flesh desires to do evil. These two vices to punish man's pride are justly confirmed in him, ignorance, indeed, because the light of truth is taken from the mind, but concupiscence because the flesh is afflicted with the punishment of mortality. Therefore, nature, which was first vitiated, transfers this original corruption to posterity, furnishing ignorance to the soul but concupiscence to the flesh unto corruption.
Furthermore, Hugh designated this inherited ignorance as 
culpable. In other words, he described it as the omission of 
something which one ought to know, rather than a purely 
innocent mistake:
But those who say this do not consider carefully enough that not everyone who does not know something or knows something less perfectly should at once be said to possess ignorance or to be in ignorance, because the term ignorance is applied only when that which ought to have been known is not known. So such ignorance is understood to be present only through the punishment of sin, when the mind shut off from the light of truth is prevented by its own vice from being able to understand those things which it ought to know.
As a result, all humankind inherits a measure of guilt from 
the Fall. Abelard's theory that ignorance cannot be culpable 
because of a lack of conscious intention caused him to 
create a subtly different theory of original sin, namely 
that the inheritance of humankind is a debt to be paid on 
account of the first sin rather than actual guilt, as Hugh 
argued, owing to the fact that infants cannot exercise the 
will or reason necessary to incur personal g u i l t . B o t h  
approaches were recorded by Peter Lombard in his Four Books 
of the Sentences, but Hugh's approach on this subject had 
the most immediate impact. It is visible, for example, in 
the later work of William of Auxerre, who detached this
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approach from the theory that sin derives only from a 
conscious intention by stating that every human has an 
innate God-given knowledge which guides his or her reason, 
and the inclination of humankind to ignore this knowledge, 
which is the legacy of the Fall, is therefore sinful.^"® 
Odon Lott in suggests that the views of Hugh were influential 
before circa 1215, whereas Abelard's theory really only took 
hold from circa 1220.®®® This would suggest that Hartmann's 
emphasis on ignorance, carnal sin, and the need to be aware 
of one's sinful inheritance reveals the influence of ideas 
similar to Hugh's and William's.
Thus, as a result of its inheritance from original sin, 
humankind is left in a state in which the powers of the 
intellect are overwhelmed by the powers of libido. This 
interference results in the inclination of the will to Evil, 
which is accompanied by an innate, culpable ignorance of 
God's will. The only recourse is to cause the powers of 
reason to regain control of the body and the will. This is 
achieved by a cleansing of the heart, which involves the 
recognition of one's ignorant state and the initiation of a 
search for God's truth in the self, a course of action 
which, as described in Chapter 2, appeared in Augustinian 
thought as a result of the influence of classical philosophy 
and Christian teaching. The following represents one of the 
frequent occasions in the Bible on which such an undertaking 
is called for:
My son, if thou wilt receive my words, and hide my commandments with thee; So that thou incline thine ear unto wisdom, and apply thine heart to under­standing; Yea, if thou criest after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for understanding; If thou seekest her as silver, and searchest for her as for hid treasures; Then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of God.For the Lord giveth wisdom: out of his mouthcometh knowledge and understanding. (Proverbs, 2, 1-6)
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similarly, Hugh of St Victor stresses the need for humankind 
to recognize the need for help and counsel:
[Man] was placed in this world in a place of repentance ... It remains, therefore, that while there is time he seek counsel and ask help for his correction and liberation. But, since he is found sufficient of himself for neither, it is necessary that He, who by His grace postpones judgment, by the same grace meanwhile show counsel for escaping, and after counsel bring help. And thus there is need that He, meanwhile, lay aside the character of the judge, and assume first the character of counselor, then that of the helper, at least in such a way that He first leave man entirely to himself, in order that man himself may both experience his own ignorance and realize that he is in need of counsel, then also feel his lack and recognize that he has need of help.®®’
It is therefore imperative that the state of ignorance which 
is the inheritance of humankind should be overcome. Each 
human being must use his or her perceptive powers to realize 
the consequences of this inherited ignorance and to act 
accordingly. Looked at positively, however, the recognition 
of this state by humankind can also be seen as the first 
step towards salvation. It is, however, only by reacting to 
this impairment of the rational faculty by desiring to gain 
knowledge of God that salvation can be achieved.
The parable in the prologue of Gregorius contains evidence 
to suggest that Hartmann is indeed depicting the 
interpretation of original sin described above. This may be 
seen in Hartmann's description of the effect of the robbers 
(or Devil) on the intellectual powers of the victim:
Den selben wee geriet ein man: zer rehten zit er entran 
ÛZ der mordære gewalt. er was komen in ir wait, dâ hâten si in nider geslagen und im vravelliche entragen aller siner sinne kleit und hâten in an geleitvil marterliche wunden. (Gr 97-105)®®®
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It is instructive in interpreting this attack on the sinne 
to reconsider the symbolism of the heart in Die Klage. As 
was demonstrated, Hartmann's use of the heart symbol owes 
much to the works of Augustine, who attributes the potency 
of mens to the heart, but also describes it as the place 
through which God can enter a person. There is therefore a 
case for interpreting the term sinne in the Gregorius 
prologue in this way also. Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen, for 
example, interprets the term sinne here as ratio by 
referring to Hartmann's use of sinne in conjunction with lip 
in Die K l a g e . The symbol of 'aller siner sinne kleit' 
has caused some controversy amongst scholars. Sinne has been 
variously described as 'imago gratuita, die in der cognitio 
Gottes besteht' , 'alle leibgebundenen seelischen
Krâfte'^^, and 'alle hoheren Seelenkrafte'®"®. These 
scholars therefore argue that the loss of sinne indicates 
the loss of all the higher potencies of the soul, leaving 
only the baser physical functions. However, as will be 
demonstrated, it is also possible to interpret this image as 
symbolizing an attack on the powers of reason, but not 
necessarily their complete destruction, as these scholars 
maintain.
Bennholdt-Thomsen links Hartmann's text closely with Bede's 
teaching on the parable of the Good Samaritan. Bede states 
that the removal of the garments from the victim in the 
parable symbolizes the power of sin to deprive a victim of 
immortality and innocence, but also the incapacity of this 
power to destroy or steal his or her reason.®'*® In order to 
equate this teaching with Hartmann's narrative, Bennholdt- 
Thomsen suggests reading the phrase 'alle siner sinne kleit' 
as an objective genitive, denoting the garments which 
protected the victim's sinne, rather than a subjective 
genitive, denoting the garments which are synonymous with 
his sinne. This suggests that a layer of protection is lost 
but the rational capacity is not destroyed, even though it 
is laid bare to the machinations of the Devil. In this
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exposed condition, the capacity for reflection no longer 
protects the will from straying towards Evil. Furthermore, 
Hartmann describes the sinner as being half-dead after the 
attack by sin (Gr 109), an image which corresponds to Bede's 
concept of synderesis. In his definition of this concept, 
Bede posits that the mortal part of the soul may be 
afflicted by sin, but the immortal part, which is a 
reflection of God on the soul, can never be destroyed. A 
spark of consciousness always remains, thus rendering it 
impossible for a sinner to be so afflicted that he or she is 
no longer able to recognize his or her relationship with 
God.®'*'* The influential teaching of Bede therefore implies 
that reason, despite being affected by sin, nevertheless 
plays a role in the recovery of the sinner.
The victim in Hartmann's parable is thus able to recover 
from this exposure to Evil (Gr 98f., 146), and is aided by 
the gifts of hope and fear which God bestows upon him. Here 
Hartmann is adding an extra dimension which concerns the 
recovery from sin to the basic parable of the Good 
Samaritan.®'*® Used together, the gifts of hope and fear 
help to bring the sinner back from the edge of both 
præsumptio and des per at io.^ *^  These gifts find 
representation in Hartmann's parable as the two pieces of 
clothing which God sends to replace those stolen by sin:
do enhâte im got niht verzigen siner gewonlichen erbarmekeit und sande im disiu zwei kleit, gedingen unde vorhte, diu got selbe worhte daz si im ein schirm wæren und alien sündaeren: vorhte daz er erstürbe,gedinge daz er iht verdürbe. (Gr 110-18)®'*’
However, the sinner's own faith and remorse are also 
required to play their part in strengthening and cleansing 
him:
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dar zuo sô starcte in baz diu geistliche triuwe gemischet mit der riuwe. si tâten im vil quotesund ervurpten in des bluotes. (Gr 124-8)
The recovery from sin is therefore described as a reciprocal 
process, requiring input from both God and the sinner. God's 
gifts of hope and fear encourage the process of recognition 
and self-knowledge which permits the sinner to achieve true 
remorse. Such remorse is composed of two elements, namely 
riuwe and geistliche triuwe, or regret coupled with the 
intention to undertake penitential works and avoid 
committing the same sin in f u t u r e . T h e  use of the terms 
riuwe and geistliche triuwe in this work reveals an emphasis 
on the need for them to be employed together in this way. 
Similarly, their attributes indicate that they are to be 
interpreted in terms relating to penance. Thus, just as 
triuwe is distinguished in the narrative from its 
alternative definition of loyalty by the adjectives 
geistliche, wâre, and grôze, so riuwe is distinguished from 
general grief by the same adjectives, as well as herzliche 
and ganze.®'*® The combination of the two terms also 
suggests that true contrition is being described on this 
occasion, as opposed to a more secular grief, or a regret 
which is not coupled with the intent to perform good works. 
Hildegard Nobel interprets the distinction in this work 
between riuwe when it is used without an attribute, and when 
it is used either with an attribute or with the suggestion 
of a willingness to do penance, as the distinction between 
attritio and contritio. Here she appears to be drawing on 
the definitions devised by Simon of Tournai which were 
discussed in Chapter 2. Herbert Kolb draws a similar 
conclusion by concentrating exclusively on the term riuwe. 
Thus, he describes how the attribute ware transforms riuwe 
into a synonym of buoze in its widest sense, that is to say 
poenitentia. Without this attribute, riuwe merely denotes 
cordis contritio, that is the necessary sorrow in the heart 
but not the additional prerequisites of confession and
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satisfaction.®®® In the prologue, these attributes 
pertaining to both riuwe and triuwe appear three times (Gr 
49, 75f., 125f.), thus creating an awareness of the
connections between this work and penitential practice which 
reappear at significant moments in the course of the 
narrative.
Despite the emphasis on these prerequisites for gaining the 
remission of sins, the parable nevertheless describes their 
role as only one stage of this reciprocal process. Together, 
regret and the intent to achieve reparation allow the sinner 
to reach a sitting position in Hartmann's parable, and 
subsequently act as the agents which permit the oil of grace 
and the wine of law to free the victim from his disease of 
sinfulness;
si guzzen im in die wunden sin beidiu 61 unde win.diu salbe ist linde und tuot doch we, daz Ô1 diu gnâde, der win diu ê, die der sündære haben muoz: so wirt im siechtuomes buoz. (Gr 129-34)
This reciprocal process therefore demands regret and 
willingness to perform reparation on the part of the sinner, 
but also additional gifts which are granted by God. The 
relationship of the components described here echoes the 
teaching of the heart in Die Klage that grace is bestowed 
only after remorse has been shown, and even then is not a 
foregone conclusion, but is dependent on the will of God.
Finally, the role of the prologue as an introduction to the 
relevant elements of the plot is apparent in the connection 
established between the spiritual distinction accorded the 
victim in the parable and Gregorius' later triumph (Gr 
142f.). This introduction has thus primed the awareness of 
the audience regarding issues relating to the inheritance of 
humankind from the Fall, in particular ignorance and 
concupiscence. In addition, the means to escape this legacy
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have also been demonstrated, namely hope and fear combined 
with repentance and faith. Particular emphasis is also given 
to the sins of despair and the presumption of forgiveness. 
This is repeated in the final lines of the prologue as the 
fatal power of despair to obstruct remorse is described (Gr 
162-70). In addition to his re-emphasis of these issues, 
Hartmann further increases the intimacy of the prologue by 
directly confronting the audience with a call to learn from 
his tale (Gr 150-6).
A comparison with the French version of the prologue reveals 
how Hartmann sought to emphasize the main concerns of his 
work at an early stage. The French prologue similarly 
asserts that the text is concerned with presumption, 
despair, and penance. However, the personal bond between the 
narrator and the audience is not emphasized, and there is no 
use of an adapted parable to underline these specific 
concerns. Hartmann's use of this particular parable 
establishes a connection with original sin and its 
consequences far more clearly than the French text. 
Furthermore, his emphasis on the legacy of original sin is 
carried over into the main body of the narrative.
The prologue thus reintroduces the concern with remorse and 
insight which was apparent in Hartmann's previous 
narratives, and this is subsequently reinforced in the 
epilogue. In addition, however, the different focus which 
this work places on these issues also becomes apparent at 
this initial stage. Whereas all three works considered in 
this study reflect the call for self-awareness inherent in 
a secular morality which reflected both secular and 
religious concerns, Gregorius focuses these concerns more 
specifically on the issue of spiritual inheritance and 
identity, rather than the notion of insight leading to 
secular and spiritual success as was the case in Die Klage 
and Erec. Whereas a lack of perception in these earlier 
works implies either a youthful imbalance of faculties, or
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a reflection of humankind's inclination to follow Evil, 
Gregorius is concerned with the inherited ignorance of 
humankind, its consequences, and the means to overcome this 
taint through self-knowledge. Despite these differences in 
focus, however, it is apparent that the means to succeed 
remain the same, namely the achievement of insight into 
one's mistakes and obligations, whether they be secular or 
spiritual.
The Old Duke's Advice and the First Incest
In the first scene of the main body of the narrative, the 
old duke offers his son advice on how to care for his sister 
and become a successful ruler, earning both secular and 
heavenly reward. He recommends the virtues of humility, 
faithfulness, constancy, moderation, bravery, and 
uprightness (Gr 248-54). This may be seen as a typical 
example of Fürstenspiegel advice, along the lines of that 
given by Gurnemanz to Parzival, or by the heart to the body 
in Die Klage. In addition, the duke recommends:
'wis den wisen gerne bi,vliuch den tumben swa er si.vor alien dingen minne got,rihte wol durch sin gebot.' (Gr 255-8)
The boy should therefore learn to love wisdom, but above all 
to love God and rule according to his laws. By giving this 
advice, the old duke here plays the same role as God on 
leaving Adam and Eve in Paradise with a warning about the 
forbidden fruit. The duke similarly leaves sufficient 
instruction to enable his children to stay out of danger by 
pointing out to them the perils of folly and immaturity and 
the virtues of wisdom.
The contrast between this advice and the boy's later 
behaviour is striking and much detail is expended in
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explaining the process of change. The prologue provides the 
main clue as to how to interpret this transformation, as it 
too echoes the story of the Fall.®®** Thus, the brother, 
once left alone, succumbs to the influence of the Devil. In 
particular, however, Hartmann displays his interest in the 
inner workings of the mind by describing the effect of the 
Devil on the brother's thoughts;
so riet er im ze verreunz daz der juncherreverkêrte sine triuwe guotûf einen valschen muot. (Gr 319-22)
The brother is thus overwhelmed with desire owing to the 
exposure of his reason to the Devil's temptation. His former 
exemplary care for his sister is thus perverted into carnal 
lust. Minne can here be interpreted as concupiscence as well 
as affection, thereby establishing a further connection with 
the Fall. Indeed, incest serves to exemplify the view that 
concupiscence is a desire which transgresses against natural 
law.353 Once again, an accent is placed on the manner in 
which this desire affects the brother's ability to reason 
(Gr 323f.). However, there is also the sense of his free 
will being influenced as he is depicted making the final 
decision alone (Gr 329-31).®®“ Hartmann expands the French 
version at this juncture by emphasizing the elements of 
love, beauty, and youth which also affect the brother. Love 
and beauty suggest the inheritance of concupiscence from the 
Fall. Youth, as in Hartmann's previous two narratives and in 
the prologue to this present work, can be understood to be 
a positive or negative element. It is negative particularly 
in the sense that it indicates a state of immature mental 
capacity. As Rodney Fisher notes, youthfulness is associated 
with sinfulness in the case of both the poet and characters 
in this work. He refers to youth as:
the time of life when one is particularly prone to the blandishments of 'der hellescherge' (v.7). The interrelation of youth and the Devil working
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through secularism is the starting point for Hartmann's moral message.®®®
However, in contrast to Hartmann's earlier narratives, the 
equating of youthfulness with limited powers of thought has 
even deeper connotations in the case of Gregorius' father as 
his youthfulness also represents the innocence of Adam 
before the Fall which provided such fertile grounds for the 
Devil's schemes.
The sister's reaction to her brother's advances similarly 
points to the focus in this work on the characters' powers 
of perception. She is described significantly as 'diu reine 
tumbe' (Gr 347), which can be interpreted as indicating that 
she is similarly compromised in terms of her powers of 
reasoning owing to her youthfulness. Her young years 
likewise symbolize the innocence of the parents of human­
kind. However, the combination of rein with tumb in her case 
suggests that Hartmann is attempting to depict the sister's 
lesser culpability in this case. Her reaction is comprised 
of a sudden insight into the serious nature of her brother's 
actions, and a warning not to let the Devil influence his 
thoughts :
hie verstuont si sich mite daz ez ein ernest solde sin. Isi sprach: 'wie nû, bruoder min? jwes wiltu beginnen? ■lâ dich von dinen sinnen |den tiuvel niht bringen. waz diutet diz ringen?' (Gr 378-84) i1
Despite her innocence and youthfulness, the sister is aware i
of the danger of their situation. This again emphasizes the |
change which has occurred in her brother's powers of 1
thought. However, her warning is subsequently delayed by an 
interior monologue in which she debates the outcome of her 
possible course of action. Hartmann's interest in the inner 
workings of the mind is again demonstrated by this addition 
to the French source (compare La vie 193-200). The sister
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realizes that she has a choice between endangering their 
earthly or their spiritual honour:
si gedâhte: 'swige ich stille,so ergât des tiuvels willeund wirde mines bruoder brût,unde wirde ich aber lût,so habe wir iemer mereverlorn unser ere.' (Gr 385-90)
Her hesitation as she surveys her choices, a course of 
reflection to be admired in the context of Erec and Die 
Klage, is shown here to lead to disaster because it delays 
any active, spoken response.®®® Thus, the sister remains 
silent, not because she is incapable of reflecting, but in 
a demonstration of the failure to act:
alsus versûmde si der gedanc,unz daz er mit ir geranc,wan er was stare und si ze kranc,daz erz âne der guoten dancbrâhte ûf ein endespil. (Gr 391-5)
Thus, the dangers of immature reflection, but also of the 
lack of an effective implementation of reasoning are 
demonstrated by the characters in this episode. In addition, 
the sister subsequently becomes further implicated in the 
sin by losing her initial scruples (Gr 400-3). Her 
perceptiveness therefore becomes ultimately affected by 
desire.
This encounter results in the conception of Gregorius. On 
discovering the pregnancy, the siblings realize how they 
have jeopardized both their worldly honour and salvation. 
Their reaction is one of shock and helplessness, which re­
emphasizes their youthfulness. The attitude of the siblings 
towards their secular and spiritual well-being has received 
differing interpretations. The brother and sister indeed 
demonstrate concern for their worldly honour at this 
juncture. However, it is not so much a question of their
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choosing secular above spiritual honour, nor of the sister 
being exclusively concerned with secular honour.^®’ 
Instead, the need to comply with the demands of both types 
of honour is simply introduced at this stage. It 
subsequently receives further discussion in the debate 
between Gregorius and the abbot.
Furthermore, the sister demands that they attempt to assess 
the situation in terms of the effect on their child:
si sprach:'gehabe dich als ein m&n,la din wiplich weinen stan(ez enmac uns leider niht vervan)und vint uns etelichen rat,ob wir durch unser missetatâne gotes hulde müezen sin,daz doch unser kindelinmit uns iht verlorn si,daz der valle iht werden dri.ouch ist uns ofte vor geseitdaz ein kint niene treitsines vater schulde.ja ensol ez gotes huldeniht dâ mite hân verlorn,ob wir zer helle sin geborn,wande ez an unser missetatdeheiner slahte schulde hat.' (Gr 466-82)
Thus, the sister comforts herself with the teaching of the 
Church according to which their child will not be tainted 
with their personal sin. This forms a direct contrast to the 
French version which appears to follow the teaching of a 
more secular morality and in which the tablet consequently 
states that the child will inherit his parents' guilt (La 
vie 542f.). However, in addition to the depiction of the 
Church's teaching on the inheritance of personal sin in 
Hartmann's version, on the symbolic level at which 
Gregorius' parents represent the parents of humankind, the 
sister's words recall from the prologue the notion that the 
sin of the first parents only left a stain on the souls of 
humankind rather than the full weight of guilt. In this way, 
the discrepancy between the inheritance of personal and of 
original sin is made apparent. Gregorius' inheritance from
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his parents thus symbolizes the inheritance of all humankind 
of the sin of the Fall. As such, Gregorius is indeed 
innocent of a personal sin, but is nevertheless stained by 
humankind's inclination towards sinfulness which he must 
acknowledge. Running parallel to the theme of spiritual 
inheritance, however, is the notion of the stain of infamy 
which children of incest inherit in the social sphere.^®® 
Gregorius' parents are fearful of the damage done to their 
secular position as well as to their chances of salvation. 
In this sense, incest serves to reflect the notion of a 
lingering taint, despite the absence of inherited personal 
sin. One might add that the consanguinity laws made incest 
a very topical subject amongst the secular aristocracy in 
this period. As Elizabeth Archibald suggests, the topic of 
incest therefore becomes an ideal vehicle to provide 
education regarding sin and penance.^*
The brother turns for aid to their father's adviser, who is 
significantly referred to several times as 'wis' (Gr 491, 
554, 566, 657, 832), creating a contrast with the
insufficient capacity to reflect on the part of the 
children, particularly as the boy is described as 'unwise' 
(Gr 357). It is instructive at this juncture to recall the 
old duke's advice to his son to be fond of the company of 
wise men and to avoid the foolish. The son and daughter have 
neglected to follow these guidelines by acting foolishly 
themselves as a result of their immaturity, and calling on 
the advice of the wise only after the sin has been 
committed.
The adviser provides the children with sound guidance on how 
to solve their predicament in the secular sphere, as well as 
how to absolve themselves spiritually through penance.^'* 
The demands of both spheres are therefore accounted for in 
his advice without there being any indication that secular 
considerations are given a disproportionate emphasis. Thus, 
there is no implication that, on their part, the siblings'
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concern for worldly honour diminishes their ability to feel 
true contrition in any sense. Nevertheless, doubt has been 
expressed in some quarters with regard to the attitude of 
the parents to their enforced p e n a n c e . T h e  ambiguity of 
the situation is further increased by Hartmann's continued 
depiction of the parents and their love for one another in 
a positive light. In this way, Hartmann employs a psycho­
logical tactic to retain the sympathy and identification of 
the reader in a case in which the severity of the crime 
could perhaps have a repellent effect. In addition, the 
siblings' fear of God is described as greater than their 
fear of worldly dishonour (Gr 639-41). Subsequently, the 
brother dies of a broken heart whilst endeavouring on 
pilgrimage to rectify the damage he has caused to both his 
worldly position and his chances of heavenly salvation. A 
lack of detail in the narrative only permits one to 
speculate as to the genuineness of his regret.®®^ The 
mother's case is less ambiguous, however. She remains in the 
secular world, but adopts an ascetic lifestyle in order to 
achieve penance. Her attitude towards her penance is stated 
clearly as 'wâre riuwe' (Gr 897f.), which is inspired by her 
heart, the seat of her reason (Gr 883). In addition, her 
performance of penance, be it through prayer, fasting, 
giving of alms, or avoidance of comfort is described in 
great detail (Gr 886-98). Her heartfelt regret and also her 
penitential actions are thus made explicit. She therefore 
fulfils the criteria for forgiveness, even to the extent 
that she injures her secular position. There can be little 
doubt, therefore, that she has done her utmost to make 
reparation for her sin.^®^
Gregorius' Debate with the Abbot
This debate forms one of the most contentious parts of the 
narrative. However, it is possible to develop an interp­
retation and an appreciation of this part of the work by
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paying particular attention to the portrayal of the 
characters' powers of reasoning.
In the German version, Gregorius' childhood developments are 
indeed described primarily in terms of his intellectual 
faculties. This contrasts with the French version's 
concentration on his beauty and gentle nature (La vie 951- 
74). As a child, Hartmann's Gregorius demonstrates an active 
curiosity (Gr 1169-72), and surprises his master with a 
degree of intellect out of keeping with his youthfulness:
Diu kint diu vor drin jârenzuo gesetzet waren,mit kunst ez diu sô schiere ervuordaz der meister selbe swuor,er gesæhe von aller hande tugentnie so sinneriche jugent.er was (dâ enliuge ich iu niht an)der jâre ein kint, der witze ein man. (Gr 1173-80)
His intelligence permits him not only to master one academic 
subject after another (Gr 1181-97), but, once he has reached 
his fifteenth year, we are informed that Gregorius' 
intellectual qualities have enabled him to acquire great 
virtue. In addition, his patient and gentle attitude are 
stressed, which combine with his intellectual abilities to 
permit him to achieve moderation in himself and to act as 
moderator amongst others:
er was schoene unde stare,er was getriuwe unde guotund hete geduldigen muot.er hete künste gnuoge,zuht unde vuoge.er hete unredelichen zornmit senftem muote verkorn. (Gr 1238-44)
Gregorius' balance and self-control, which are based on his 
intelligence, thus make him the master of any situation. He 
is able, for example, to avoid impetuous action and shame by 
employing careful thought, and, in addition, is depicted
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keeping his thoughts turned to God, for which he is 
rewarded:
ern tete niht âne vürgedanc, als im diu wisheit gebot: des enwart er nie schamerôt von deheiner siner getât. er suochte gnâde unde rât zallen ziten an got und behielt starke sin gebot.Got erloubte dem Wunsche über in daz er lip unde sinmeisterte nach sim werde. (Gr 1256-65)
Gregorius' equal mastery over his body and his mind, a 
balance which was extolled in both of Hartmann's previous 
narratives, thus shows him here to be a virtuous individual.
However, this extensive description of Gregorius' intell­
igence and virtue also includes the possible inference that 
his perfection is not absolute. This can be observed in the 
portrayal of the issues of youth and wisdom, issues which 
were similarly depicted in the prologue and the first 
incest. On those occasions, youth and wisdom were considered 
to be mutually exclusive. The suggestion that they exist in 
combination in Gregorius, despite superficially implying 
Gregorius' unique nature, thus hints at the possibility of 
a negative undercurrent to this praise. In addition, the 
image of the path to wisdom, despite its chequered 
appearance in the manuscripts, increases this ambiguity in 
its implication that progress along this path has yet to be 
made (Gr 1254). Thus, the positive description of Gregorius' 
virtues is accompanied by these various notes of ambiguity. 
In a direct parallel to the experience of Erec, therefore, 
Gregorius has displayed admirable powers of intellect early 
in life. On the one hand, this is to be admired, but, on the 
other hand, like Erec, this early success contains within it 
a seed of doubt concerning the future. Thus, it remains to 
be seen whether Gregorius' perceptive capabilities will
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later prove sufficient to guide him through more complex 
experiences.
These more negative inferences further come to light when, 
directly after being described as wise and virtuous, 
Gregorius suddenly injures his foster brother. We are 
emphatically informed, however, in a double aside by the 
narrator, that Gregorius did not intend to cause harm and 
that this was the first occasion on which he had acted in 
this manner:
nu gevuocte ein wunderlich geschiht(ez enkam von sinem willen niht):er tet (daz geschach im nie me)des vischæres kinde also wedaz ez weinen began. (Gr 1289-93)
The narrator's insistence on Gregorius' subjective innocence 
suggests that Hartmann is concerned to deflect any blame for 
this action away from his main protagonist. Consequently, 
one might speculate that Hartmann is constrained by the 
demands of the plot and is therefore making a concerted 
effort to prevent the audience from focusing on Gregorius' 
actions here and drawing conclusions which might 
predetermine their reactions to issues addressed in the 
later debate. However, it is also possible to see in this 
behaviour the suggestion of an irrational element in 
Gregorius' nature which even his intelligence cannot deter, 1
or, more specifically, an initial sign of the inclination to 
sin which is the result of Gregorius' inheritance of the 
Fall.
The fact that there has been an undisclosed side to 
Gregorius' nature is further demonstrated by his revelation 
of his knightly instincts on learning the truth of his noble 
parentage. His conversation with the abbot also establishes 
the fact that Gregorius has the rational capacity and the 
appreciation of action which will bring him success as a
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knight. However, this is only one level of his identity 
which is revealed to him at this juncture.
This part of the narrative has undergone extensive expansion 
and reconstruction in Hartmann's hands, transforming it from 
a short and untidy argument into a balanced and courtly 
exchange of views.®®'* This allows Hartmann to include 
additional elements of complexity and to reveal the 
reasoning and motives of the two characters in detail. 
Unlike in the French version, therefore, Gregorius does not 
merely block the abbot's attempts to dissuade him from 
leaving the abbey.®®® Instead of baldly stating his 
intention to depart, Hartmann's Gregorius offers valid 
reasons for his choice. Furthermore, the French version 
makes an unambiguous judgement on the sinfulness of the 
secular world which can only lead Grégoire into further sin 
(La vie ll27f., 1207f.). The increased complexity which
Hartmann has accorded his version causes the unequivocalness 
of this statement, which is repeated by the abbot in the 
German version, to be called into question. In fact, 
Hartmann creates a more ambiguous scene overall in which the 
intentions and the attitudes of the characters are of major 
consequence, and in which the dangers of the secular world 
are debated, rather than broadly dismissed.
In the course of the debate, it becomes evident that 
Gregorius' desire to leave the abbey is based on several 
factors, including his shame of being known as a foundling, 
his longing to become a knight, and his desire to find his 
parents. The first two reasons have been seen by certain 
scholars as demonstrating arrogance on Gregorius' part.®®® 
In other words, in response to feelings of pride, he is 
wilfully turning his back on the clerical world for which he 
had been destined through God's guidance of the casket and 
his mother's request on the tablet, and is instead driven by 
dreams of glory to establish himself as a knight in the 
sinful, secular world. However, Gregorius' aims are not
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necessarily to be interpreted in such a negative fashion. In 
a work in which the secular world is not unequivocally 
rejected in favour of the clerical world, Gregorius' fear of 
dishonour and his noble instincts can be viewed as valid 
reasons in themselves for leaving the monastery. This is in 
keeping with the notion which was raised in Erec that the 
knightly lifestyle can be pleasing to God.®®’ Hartmann is 
thus continuing his depiction of secular, as opposed to 
specifically clerical morality, even in this more overtly 
religious narrative. The validity of Gregorius' choice is 
further strengthened by the fact that the abbot does not 
unequivocally cite the evils of the secular world as a 
reason for Gregorius to stay in the monastery. The abbot's 
rejection of the secular world (Gr 1517-29) is indeed 
followed by an immediate shift in his argument as he
suggests arranging a marriage for Gregorius in order to 
tempt him to stay nearby. Moreover, Gregorius' decision to 
leave is never referred to as a sin in itself. Instead, the 
terms siinde and missetât are used to refer solely to the two 
occurrences of incest and the fisherman's arrogance.®®® 
Furthermore, in reply to Gregorius' defence of knighthood as 
a lifestyle pleasing to God, the abbot concentrates on the 
practical problems of becoming a knight, rather than
condemning the knightly lifestyle as morally deficient (Gr
1530-42).®®® Similarly, his reasoning is based on his own 
personal desire that Gregorius should remain at the
monastery.
Gregorius' desire to leave is a reaction to an inherent and 
valid part of his identity. His noble instincts and his 
later success imply that he is indeed of noble origins and 
that his desire to flee on learning that he is a foundling 
is justified. There is no suggestion in the narrative that 
Gregorius is arrogantly seeking to reject the humbleness of 
his situation. Instead, he desires to respond to his noble 
instincts now that he has confirmation of their validity. 
Gregorius' reaction can likewise be justified in the light
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of Hartmann's previous explorations of this issue in Erec, 
The inherent distinction and nobility which accompany high 
birth was of serious issue to the secular aristocracy and 
would have been acceptable to such an audience as a 
legitimate reason for Gregorius to depart his old life.®’*
Gregorius' reasoning behind his desire to leave thus appears 
to be well founded. Furthermore, there is no mention of his 
being obliged to remain in the monastery beyond the abbot's 
warnings of the outside world. On the one hand, the tablet 
merely requests that Gregorius do penance, giving no 
indication that he is an oblate,®’^ and on the other hand, 
there is no evidence in the text to suggest that God's 
directing of the casket to the monastery denotes an 
obligation on Gregorius' part to stay there.®’® The only 
textual evidence to support the claim that God intends 
Gregorius to remain a monk is to be found in the words of 
the abbot who describes the unsuitability of the secular 
world for Gregorius' penance (Gr 1785-98). However, the 
abbot's personal desire for his ward to remain casts doubt 
on the true objectivity of his advice.®’® In this light, 
Gregorius' counter-argument that the secular world will 
provide him with a similar opportunity to serve God receives 
further justification:
Gregorius antwurte im do:'ritterschaft daz ist ein leben,der im die mâze kan gegeben,so enmac nieman baz genesen.er mac gotes ritter gerner wesendanne ein betrogen klosterman.' (Gr 1530-5)
As Walter Ohly comments, Gregorius' entrance into the 
secular world is not necessarily to be interpreted as a step 
towards sin:
Mit dem Eintritt des Klosterzoglings in die Welt ist keineswegs allés verloren, ist Gregorius nicht einfach aus dem Stand der Gnade getreten, der Weg
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zuiti zweiten Inzest Oder allgemeiner zur Sünde noch nicht unausweichlich festgelegt
In addition, Gregorius displays the insight in this debate 
which will enable him to succeed outside the monastery.®’® 
He is acutely aware of the disadvantages of his position in 
terms of material wealth and experience, and yet he is 
perceptive enough to realize that these can be overcome by 
enthusiasm and striving. In fact, Gregorius' point of view 
may be considered morally superior to that of the abbot in 
this way, because he himself is advocating an active 
lifestyle in the outside world, rather than a life of ease 
in the monastery. This point is given an emphatic triple 
repetition in one of Gregorius' addresses to the abbot (Gr 
1677-80, 1697-1706, 1714-21). Furthermore, a direct parallel 
may be drawn between Gregorius' words in this part of the 
debate and the advice of the heart in Die Klage, which 
likewise advocates action in order to achieve love and 
virtue. This is particularly apparent if the lines Gr 1697- 
1706 are compared with a corresponding passage in Die Klagei
'sit ez mir nû sô geziuhet daz mich diu Sælde vliuhet und ich niuwan ir gruoz mit vrümikeit gedienen muoz, deswar ich kan si wol erjagen, si enwelle sich mir me versagen dan si sich noch ieman versagete der si ze rehte jagete. sus sol man si erloufen,mit kumber sælde koufen.' (Gr 1697-1706)
'man sol ez ze notstrebe ginendeclichen erloufenmit kumber sælde koufen.' (DK 752-4)
'Von diu swem ez so geziuhet daz im daz heil vor fliuhet unde er niwan sinen gruoz mit tugenden verdienen muoz, als ez dir, lip, ist gewant, dem muoz werden erkant wes er die liute dunket wert. erwirbet er iht des er gert, der mac im selben danc sagen und den muot wol hohe tragen.
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Ja enwæne ie dehein manane kumber liep gewan.' (DK 781-92)
The similarity between the terminology and the rhyme scheme 
(Gr 1697-1700/DK 781-4; Gr 1705f./DK 753f.) in these two 
passages supports the claim that there is a correspondence 
of theme here. Consequently, one can surmise that Gregorius 
is displaying his superior powers of thought in this debate 
in conjunction with his recognition of the need to utilize 
those powers actively to achieve sælde. In addition, the 
moral ambiguity of the abbot's fears for Gregorius becomes 
further evident by drawing such comparisons with Hartmann's 
concerns in his earlier narratives. The abbot's argument in 
persuading Gregorius to remain at the monastery is in part 
based on the comfortable life he can expect to lead there, 
as Gregorius' reaction indicates (Gr 1675ff.). This advocacy 
of comfort corresponds to the body's laziness in Die Klage 
and Erec's sloth. It is hardly an option to be recommended, 
therefore, and instead serves to highlight the percep­
tiveness of Gregorius' reasoning by equating him by 
association with the heart and with the mature Erec in these 
previous narratives. It is also significant in the light of 
this evidence that, unlike the adviser to Gregorius' 
parents, the abbot is not described as wis. His role as a 
source of wisdom is therefore less unequivocal and this 
particularly serves to highlight Gregorius' own sound 
reasoning behind his desire for knighthood.
However, it is also noteworthy in terms of a study into 
perception in this work, that Gregorius' description of his 
instinctive desire to be a knight is expressed particularly 
and repeatedly in terms of the effect on his thoughts;
'ouch hân ich ez gelernet wol von kinde in minem muote hie: ez enkam uz minem sinne nie. ich sage iu, sit der stunde daz ich bedenken kunde beidiu übel unde guot,so stuont ze ritterschaft min muot.' (Gr 1566-72)
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In fact, this reflection on knighthood occurred to the 
extent that Gregorius claims to be a more experienced knight 
in his imagination than the best knights in reality (Gr 
1575-8). Furthermore, his dreams have been so powerful that 
his studies at the monastery proved little competition, 
despite his success as a scholar;
'iedoch so man mich sereie unz her ze den buochen twanc,so turnierte min gedanc.so man mich buoche wente,wie sich min herze senteund min gedanc spiltegegen einem schilte!' (Gr 1582-8)
He likewise confesses that it has always been his intention 
to become a knight if he discovers that he has the 
birthright and the means (Gr 1501-3). Thus, the power and 
long-standing nature of Gregorius' thoughts on this subject 
are emphatically revealed.
However, in spite of the evidence that Gregorius' perceptive 
faculties are functioning well in terms of this justifiable 
goal, the very power of these thoughts and drives gives rise 
to the suspicion that Gregorius' passion is too great for 
complete rationality on this issue. Here we have again the 
suggestion of an imbalance between the passionate and 
rational capacities as was described in Die Klage and Erec. 
In addition, the very suddenness of Gregorius' revelation 
has an undermining effect on the image created of him 
earlier as a perfect scholar. Similarly, further and more 
specific suggestions of an undercurrent of impetuosity 
occur.®’® Thus, Gregorius describes the drive which 
persuades him by employing terms which suggest an element of 
irrationality ('gir' Gr 1622, 1800; 'wân' Gr 1514) or a
youthful yearning which is so intense that he even describes 
it as a form of rage ('erbolgen' Gr 1484-6).®” The appear­
ance of this reference soon after the abbot's accusation of 
'tumber zorn' (Gr 1454) emphasizes the dubious nature of
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these yearnings. On the one hand, therefore, the powerful 
instinct for nobility and knighthood which Gregorius is 
experiencing may be understood as positive, irresistible, 
and well-defended by Gregorius' perceptive reasoning. 
However, the descriptions of additional compulsions behind 
this instinct imply that not all of Gregorius' intention to 
become a knight is based on reasoned thought. Of course, 
this is the very nature of instinct, but the disadvantages 
of acting on instinct alone, without the added dimension of 
reason, are also made evident in the text. The earlier 
emphasis on Gregorius' restraint and thoughtfulness 
contrasts sharply with the signs of impetuosity which he now 
reveals in this debate.
It is also significant that, from this point onwards, 
Gregorius temporarily ceases to be referred to as wîs. 
Instead, references to his tumpheit appear at this juncture, 
as do further descriptions of his youthfulness. Thus, in the 
debate with the abbot, Gregorius is twice referred to as 
'junc' (Gr 1457, 1543) and his youthfulness is similarly 
emphasized by the abbot addressing him as 'kint' (Gr 1432, 
1462) and 'sun' (Gr 1515, 1625). The term 'kint' also occurs 
in the abbot's description of Gregorius as a child of God 
(Gr 1526f.) and Gregorius' denial of the fact that he is the 
child of the fisherman (Gr 1494f.). In addition to these 
references to Gregorius' youth we have those which describe 
his 'tumpheit' (Gr 1454, 1484), a term which implies the 
negative aspects of youthfulness, signifying an undeveloped 
capacity to reflect adequately* Therefore, despite the 
abbot's familiar way of addressing the young man, coupled 
with Gregorius' boyish enthusiasm for a knightly lifestyle, 
both of which imply the positive side of youth, the use of 
a more unambiguously negative term also points to its 
disadvantages. However, the narrative context suggests that 
the dangers of youthfulness do not only comprise the 
creation of an imbalance between the heart and the body as 
in Die Klage, or inadequate perception as in the case of
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Erec. Instead, as was evident in the case of Gregorius' 
parents in committing the first incest, these references 
likewise imply the fundamental inherited ignorance of 
humankind.
By concentrating on Gregorius' thoughts and reasoning, it 
also becomes possible to interpret his decision to leave the 
monastery as symbolic of his employment of free will. This 
is supported by the emphasis which is placed on the 
relevance of this choice by Hartmann's abbot (Gr 1432- 
61).®’® The gift of free will can be the means to achieve 
virtue if it is exercised with the guidance of the mature 
and unaffected intellect. However, there is the suggestion 
in this debate that Gregorius' reasoning is not entirely 
sound in all aspects. The emotional undercurrents lurking in 
the background thus point to the possibility that Gregorius 
will not succeed in achieving virtuous action, and thereby 
recall the legacy from the Fall of the uncontrollable will.
A closer study of the terms used by the characters also 
reveals the illusory nature of Gregorius' success in the 
debate. Although both parties discuss the nature of honour 
and success, they in fact talk at cross-purposes. A gradual 
association of Gregorius' name with the term 'sælic' occurs 
during the description of his childhood, thus implying that 
he is a child blessed by God (Gr 1142, 1172, 1235f., 1277, 
1457). Gregorius' definitions of ère, sælde, and heil in the 
debate, however, specifically pertain to the notion of 
worldly success and renown. In itself, this is a legitimate 
interpretation. However, the abbot's broader definition 
incorporates the spiritual dimensions of these terms 
also.®’® Gregorius' restricted comprehension of these terms 
in the debate thus points to the possibility of future 
spiritual shortcomings. Admittedly, Gregorius reveals 
himself to be aware of the means to earn honour and 
salvation. Just as is recommended by the heart in Die Klage, 
Gregorius understands the need for striving and the
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avoidance of ease. However, he shows no sign of comprehen­
ding the further dimension to honour and blessedness which 
was also revealed in Die Klage by means of the symbol of the 
magic herbs, namely that true spiritual honour and 
blessedness can only be dispensed by God and not earned 
entirely by one's own efforts. Striving to become a knight, 
like striving to become a lover, may demand the acquisition 
of virtue, but it is no guarantee that spiritual honour will 
later be bestowed.®®* In this way, knighthood is revealed 
to be a worthy lifestyle if conducted in the appropriate 
manner, but it nevertheless has certain limitations.®®^ 
Although its successful and virtuous pursuit is achieved by 
following the same moral path which will earn heavenly 
reward, it does not comprise the whole path in itself. 
Gregorius' use of the terms ère and sælde suggests that he 
is only focusing on winning worldly honour for himself. If 
this indeed proves to be the case, and Gregorius fails to 
comprehend the further dimensions of these terms, his 
otherwise creditable desire for worldly honour could lead to 
disaster, as Schottmann comments:
ohne das Hartmann haufig angekreidete Moralisieren und Kommentieren wird nur in der Handlung von Anfang an deutlich, daô sein Weg der falsche, da& seine innere Voraussetzung nicht die richtige ist - und daB die ritterlich-hofischen Werte, die er in so vorbildlicher Weise verkorpert, keine absolute Geltung besitzen, daB gerade sie das Unheil befordern konnen, wenn der Mensch blind ist.®®^
In this sense, it is possible to identify ambiguity in the 
motives of both characters in the debate. On the one hand, 
they both reveal an intellectual and an intuitive side to 
their arguments. Thus, the abbot is able to discern the 
wider connotations of honour, but Gregorius is able to 
outargue the abbot's request that he remain in comfort in 
the monastery. On the other hand, however, both characters 
are also driven by emotion. This is apparent in the abbot's 
desire for Gregorius to remain at his side and in Gregorius'
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youthful dreams of glory. Neither character therefore has a 
monopoly on reasonable argument in the debate which is free 
from the interference of powerful emotions. This ambiguity 
allows both perspectives to be equally expressed, and 
creates a complexity regarding this issue which can be said 
to invite curiosity and awareness on the part of the 
audience.
Further exploration of the attitudes of these two characters 
occurs after Gregorius is presented with the tablet. His 
immediate reaction is to recognize the sin of his birth and 
to falter at the thought of ever being able to receive God's 
grace:
Des antwurte im Gregorius vil sêre weinende sus:'ouwe, lieber herre, ich bin vervallen verre âne aile mine schulde. wie sol ich gotes hulde gewinnen nâch der missetâtdiu hie vor mir geschriben stât?' (Gr 1777-84)
There is no question here that Gregorius is uncertain about 
whether he has inherited an aspect of his parents' sin. It 
is clear from his reaction that he believes that he has been 
left with some kind of legacy. It is likewise apparent that 
his concerns do not relate to his worldly honour. Neither 
does he express an awareness of having inherited a personal 
sin, stating instead that he is free of such subjective 
guilt (Gr 1781). The legacy of which he speaks can therefore 
be interpreted as being symbolic of the stain of original 
sin. The abbot proceeds to repeat his warning of the dangers 
of knightly life at this juncture (Gr 1785-98). He has 
played his trump card here, and his reaction implies that he 
senses the opportunity to turn Gregorius' mind from his 
desire for knighthood. However, Gregorius rejects the 
abbot's final advice and in doing so confirms the notion 
that the secular world is a fit arena for the pursuit of 
salvation. Nevertheless, Gregorius' reaction to the tablet
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is of a dual nature in response to the duality of the news 
about his origins. The information on the tablet reflects 
both his worldly and spiritual identities. It therefore 
presents Gregorius with a means to free himself completely 
from his ignorance of both by acting upon the information he 
is given.®®® However, although the tablet offers Gregorius 
this chance, one can also assume that, in keeping with the 
description of the culpable nature of humankind's inherited 
ignorance in contemporary theological works concerned with 
original sin, Gregorius' failure to acknowledge his legacy 
will constitute a personal sin. Gregorius thus discovers 
that he is indeed entitled to take his place in the world of 
knighthood, but he is also obliged to accept that he has 
been spiritually tainted by the sin of his birth, and to 
display his acknowledgement of this inheritance by doing 
penance for his parents as his mother requests. In symbolic 
terms, therefore, Gregorius, along with the rest of 
humankind, has to acknowledge this stain of infamy freely, 
particularly now that the tablet, acting in the role of the 
scriptures, has given him the opportunity to overcome his 
ignorance of his origins.®®* Gregorius' sorrow over the 
circumstances of his birth is countered, however, by his joy 
at being able to fulfil his instinctive desire to pursue 
knighthood. On the surface, both reactions are 
understandable.®®® However, Gregorius only makes a very 
general statement of his intentions in his final 
contribution to the debate, a statement which does not 
include evidence of his unequivocal determination to fulfil 
both aspects of his identity:
'ich engeruowe niemer meund wil iemer varnde sin,mir entuo noch gotes gnâde schinvon wanne ich si oder wer.' (Gr 1802-5)
Likewise, at this juncture, Gregorius' earlier descriptions 
of his powerful drive to become a knight cast some measure 
of doubt on this pledge to discover his true identity. This
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ambiguity is emphasized by the repetition of the term 'gir' 
at this stage:
'Ouwe, 1ieber herre,jâ ist min gir noch merrezuo der verte dan è.' (Gr 1799-1801)
The suspicion that Gregorius' powers of perception, which 
are required to guide the will in his pursuit of his goal, 
are being affected by his emotions is also supported by 
Hartmann's rearrangement of this whole scene. Thus, 
Hartmann's abbot reveals the truth of Gregorius' origins on 
the tablet only after realizing that his powers of 
persuasion have been overwhelmed by Gregorius' arguments. As 
a result, Hartmann is able to portray the sincerity and 
extent of Gregorius' dreams of knighthood, even when he 
believes he is barred from those ranks by birth. In the 
French version, there is no such long discussion of the 
merits of knighthood, and the tablet is presented to 
Grégoire in direct response to his desire to know his 
origins (La vie llllff.).®®® The expansion of the German 
debate and the abbot's delay in producing the tablet thus 
increase the dramatic irony of the episode and emphasize the 
abbot's desperation, and therefore his rather selfish 
motives, to keep Gregorius at his side. However, this delay 
also creates the suspicion that Gregorius' mind has become 
so intent on fulfilling his dreams of knighthood before he 
sees the tablet, that he will not be able to appreciate his 
spiritual inheritance fully, even if his initial reaction 
does not rule this out entirely. Such ambiguity is not 
apparent in the French version. Similarly, there is no 
expansive attempt at dissuasion on the part of the French 
abbot, nor any lengthy revelation of the depth of Grégoire's 
knightly instincts. The entry of Grégoire into the secular 
world and his reasoning behind this desire is therefore far 
less of an ambiguous issue in Hartmann's source. Likewise, 
Grégoire's only reaction to the tablet is one of sadness in 
view of the personal sin he has inherited (La vie 1203f.).
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There is no implication in the French text, therefore, that 
Grégoire's inheritance represents the legacy of the Fall. 
Hartmann's alteration of his source at this juncture is 
therefore far-reaching, and focuses the debate on the role 
of perception and the danger of excessive emotion in 
acknowledging one's spiritual and secular inheritance.
On the surface, therefore, Gregorius' decision to leave the 
monastery to discover his identity is acceptable. However, 
the question remains as to whether he will truly accept the 
dual nature of his identity. Acceptance incorporates not 
only the mental recognition of both the worldly and 
spiritual dimensions to his identity, but also their active 
acknowledgement in some form, just as a sinner is required 
to feel regret and also perform penance for a sin. On 
reading the tablet, Gregorius' words do not unequivocally 
indicate that he accepts both dimensions of his inheritance 
and is willing to act on both.®®’ Instead, his stated 
desire to discover his origins is expressed very generally 
(Gr 1805). However, on leaving the monastery, Gregorius is 
described as being guided by God and acting in his name (Gr 
1825-41, 2241), which suggests that he has not forfeited 
God's favour.®®® Nevertheless, despite these initially 
positive signs, the debate with the abbot has illuminated 
Gregorius' forceful instinctive drive and youthful longings. 
Such ambiguity is also evident in the irony inherent in 
Gregorius' comment concerning his inheritance (Gr 
1695f.),®®® and there is a further warning implicit in the 
discussion between the abbot and Gregorius concerning 
recognition (Gr 1670, 1692). Both of their comments, namely 
that Gregorius will not be recognized (the abbot), and that 
his knightly deeds will cause him to be recognized 
( Gregorius ), anticipate the future restriction of the powers 
of recognition of Gregorius' mother to the knightly deeds of 
her son. Gregorius enters the secular world, therefore, with 
generally positive intentions, but it still remains to be
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seen whether his emotions and instincts will affect the 
actual fulfilment of his obligations.
It is instructive to draw comparisons here with the main 
protagonist of Erec. Erec similarly proves his powers of 
reasoning in his youth, but on marrying and becoming lord, 
he acquires a new identity which demands his acknow­
ledgement. His failure to acknowledge all aspects of his new 
identity, owing to his inadequate inner awareness of his 
obligations, leads to social disaster. Gregorius has 
likewise proven himself an aware and intelligent individual 
in his youth. It remains to be seen, however, whether his 
reaction to the revelation of all aspects of his origins 
will be adequate, either in terms of perception or the 
active fulfilment of his obligations.
The debate between Gregorius and the abbot therefore 
provides ample evidence of the possibility of disaster ahead 
in the ambiguity of the intentions expressed by the main 
protagonist. By not taking the element of wilfulness in 
Gregorius' motivation into account, one is left to conclude 
that his sinful liaison with his mother occurs in spite of 
his best intentions. Rodney Fisher claims, for example, that 
Gregorius' career is:
a continued paradoxical frustration of his essential goodness.®®®
Marianne Kalinke draws similar conclusions:
Before leaving the monastery, Gregorius places himself in the hands of God; thus, although his decision is perhaps unwise and imprudent, his intention is unmistakably good. ®®^
Both of these scholars subsequently maintain that Hartmann 
is portraying the frailty of the human condition in the face 
of objective sin. They argue that objective sin is depicted 
as arbitrary in its choice of victim, and that the
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difficulties in correctly interpreting God's will are being 
described in this work. In these terms, Gregorius' 
extraordinary sin, which is committed unconsciously and 
despite good intent, coupled with his extraordinary degree 
of penance, is used primarily to display the greatness of 
God's mercy. Gregorius' avoidance of despair in such
circumstances is thus emphasized, causing Fisher to draw 
comparisons with Job.®®^ However, the conclusions of these 
scholars can only be reached by disregarding the
prerequisite needed for the development of good intentions 
or the virtuous use of free will, namely sound reasoning. By 
taking this factor into account, the faultlines in 
Gregorius' attitude on leaving the monastery become
apparent, and the issue at stake in this work is revealed to 
be the inherent culpable ignorance which taints humankind.
The Second Incest
On leaving the monastery, Gregorius places himself in God's 
hands with the prayer that he be guided to the place in 
which he might pursue his aim;
NÛ bôt der ellende herze unde hende ze himele und bat vil verre daz in unser herre sande in etelichez lant da sin vart wære bewant. (Gr 1825-30)
His plea from the heart implies that his intentions are i
admirable and, indeed, God responds by granting him his j
wish, which Gregorius acknowledges (Gr 1867-76). Such divine ]
intervention stands in stark contrast to the French version I
in which Grégoire's ship is guided by the Devil to his j
mother's land, a development which reflects the French ^
version's condemnation of the secular world of knighthood as I
inherently sinful (La vie 1235-40). God's guidance, coupled i
with Gregorius' aplomb and shrewdness in battle, confirms
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that the world of secular knighthood is not being 
fundamentally criticized in the German version. Gregorius is 
undoubtedly an overwhelming success in this world, despite 
his lack of training. Significantly, his sound powers of 
thought in this sphere are given particular emphasis in a 
monologue, unique to Hartmann's version, which occurs 
immediately before his success against the besieging 
duke.®®® In this monologue, Gregorius considers his 
position as an untried knight and carefully employs great 
insight to estimate the advantages and disadvantages of 
combat with the duke:
'ich wil benamen diz arme guot wagen uf disem spil. man klaget mich niht ze vil, ob ich von im tôt gelige; ist aber daz ich im an gesige,
SÔ bin ich êren richeiemer ewicliche.daz wizze man unde wip,mir ist lieber daz min lipbescheidenliche ein ende gebedan daz ich lasterlichen lebe.' (Gr 2056-66)
Gregorius demonstrates here his clear awareness of his 
position in the knightly sphere. He has yet to gain honour 
by an act of bravery or skill, and has nothing to lose by 
failing at present. He likewise displays belief in himself 
(Gr 2054f.), but this potentially blinding confidence is 
balanced by a recognition of his situation and an ability to 
assess his chances. There is no sense here on Gregorius' 
part, therefore, of an unreflective lust for action and 
honour amongst his peers. Instead, this monologue displays 
Gregorius' capacity for humility and self-evaluation, and 
confirms the positive portrayal of secular honour in the 
debate with the abbot. Gregorius also attends mass before 
taking the field, and is described as 'der guote' (Gr 2091), 
'der getühtige'(Gr 2142), and 'der sælige' (Gr 2165). 
Furthermore, his self-awareness is coupled with the capacity 
to carry out his plans. This is demonstrated in his general 
success on the field, but also, more specifically, in his
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cunning trickery of the besieging duke in separating him 
from his own troops (Gr 2103-11).
This combat scene is reminiscent in many respects of Erec's 
first tournament. Erec similarly displays the enthusiasm 
coupled with intellectual and physical skill required for 
gaining secular honour. He likewise attends mass before the 
tournament, acts with humility and great awareness of his 
position, and establishes himself amongst his peers by his 
exploits. However, a further point of similarity between the 
two scenes occurs in the references to the protagonists' 
youthfulness (Gr 1872, 2116). Although this aspect is
positive in the sense that these young men should achieve 
such remarkable success, a comparison with Erec suggests 
that the negative side of youthfulness, which manifests 
itself as a deficiency in the power of thought, will 
subsequently come to the fore in Gregorius' experience once 
a more demanding situation presents itself. A further 
indication of possible future failure is evident in the use 
of the ambiguous terms ère and sælde in Gregorius' 
monologue, which appeared earlier in the debate with the 
abbot. Although Gregorius claims on both occasions that his 
mind is set on winning eternal honour and carrying out God's 
will, his youthful enthusiasm leaves a question mark over 
his capability of progressing beyond his achievement of 
secular honour.
It could be argued that this is particularly the case in the 
light of the initial encounter between Gregorius and his 
mother. Thus, although Hartmann appears later to emphasize 
Gregorius' thoughtfulness and acumen with regard to the 
combat, particularly by means of his inner monologue, the 
juxtaposition of this monologue with the recent meeting with 
his mother underlines the fact that Gregorius' obligations 
to his spiritual and secular identities are distinct. This 
is evident in Gregorius' failure to enquire about his 
mother's identity on encountering her. However, it is also
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possible to argue that his neglecting to question his
mother, like the striking of his foster brother, is 
essential to the plot, and has therefore only limited
significance as evidence by which to judge Gregorius' 
actions and attitudes. Certainly, such a crucial issue as 
the reaction of Gregorius to his identity in this work 
requires more concrete evidence for its confirmation,
evidence which indeed is more reliably apparent in
Gregorius' actions after his marriage.
In superficial terms, Gregorius and his mother have a 
legitimate right to marry. He has saved her land and she 
requires a protector, as the narrator confirms (Gr 2211-24). 
Similarly, the mother's vassals ask her to marry and approve 
of her choice of husband (Gr 2185-2250). However, this 
legitimacy is overshadowed by the limited insight of the 
couple which is expressed by references to sight and hearing 
at this point. Both Gregorius and his mother are described 
as hearing about or catching sight of one another at several 
points in this part of the text. Although in Hartmann's 
previous narratives the functioning of the sensory organs 
often indicated perception, here these visual and aural 
actions are the spurs to love and the obscuring of the 
reflective faculty (Gr 1882f., 1895-1910, 1922-31). Such
indirect communication thus causes the result of the future 
meeting between Gregorius and his mother to be predetermined 
by desire, significantly, upon meeting, his heart is 
described as blind, in contrast to his awakened desire;
vür einen gast enphie si ir kint: ouch was sin herze dar an blint und im unkunt genuocdaz in diu selbe vrouwe truoc. (Gr 1935-8)
The references to sight continue in the description of the 
mother's close appraisal of Gregorius which is prompted by 
the familiar material of his clothes (Gr 1939-54). Despite 
her recognition of the cloth, she is only reminded of her
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past suffering and is not prompted by curiosity to enquire 
about Gregorius' identity. The love and desire his mother 
feels, which are described in her glimpses of him before 
they actually meet, thus limit her powers of thought on this 
occasion, so that she is prompted to grieve over her past 
guilt, but not to formulate the question which could save 
them from sin. Her desire thus restricts her perceptive 
powers to the extent that they are prevented from 
precipitating action in the form of a question.®®* This 
neglect does not call into question the validity of her 
earlier contrition and acts of penance, however. Indeed, 
positive references to the mother continue at this stage (Gr 
2235).®®® One may conclude, therefore, that she previously 
achieved satisfaction, and therefore has the right to and 
indeed the need for a new husband. However, by falling in 
love, her reasoning powers are obscured by desire, and, as 
a result, the danger of personal sin arises. A contrast to 
the corresponding scene in the French version is evident 
here. In the French text, blame is deflected from the mother 
by the narrator's comment regarding the ease by which it is 
possible to confuse different materials (La vie 1315-22).
The German version, however, appears to emphasize the
restriction of the mother's thoughts on this occasion. In 
addition, there is no indication of any earlier failure on 
the mother's part or any illegitimacy in her plans to marry 
for which she might otherwise be blamed. As w. Ohly 
comments;
Nicht die Heirat als solche widerspricht ihrerBuBe und ist ihre Schuld, wohl aber, daB sie derSinnlichkeit den Vorzug vor der Stimme desGewissens gibt.®®®
In this manner, the momentary chance of recognition is 
quickly obliterated by the emotion of love.
In addition to the characters' restricted perception, the 
reappearance of the Devil at this juncture, and on their
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marriage, is indicative of the symbolism inherent in the two 
occurrences of incest (Gr 1960-2, 2246). The second incest 
thus echoes the first in representing the decision of the 
parents of humankind to listen to the voice of Evil at the 
Fall. In the first case of incest, the Devil was able to 
influence the impressionable mind of the brother in order to 
lead him into sin. However, as discussed earlier, the 
brother also condemns himself by acquiescing to the Devil's 
suggestions and his own desires. The Devil's reappearance on 
the eve of the second incest is therefore not an indication 
that Gregorius and his mother are helplessly subjected to an 
onslaught of objective sin, as has been claimed,^®’' but 
rather implies a combination of the incitement to Evil aided 
by a lack of insight and an inclination towards desire which 
reflect original sin and thus represent the continuation of 
the legacy of the Fall. Unlike the youthful innocence of the 
brother in the first incest, therefore, Gregorius and his 
mother have no excuse of subjective innocence on which they 
might rely. Instead, their failure is a depiction of the 
culpable sin of neglecting to acknowledge the consequences 
of the Fall.
The controversy regarding the culpability of the characters 
involved in the second incest is particularly the result of 
the absence of narratorial comments, unambiguous statements 
by the characters, or direct insights into their minds to 
provide guidance at this juncture. This was also the case 
with Gregorius' decision to leave the monastery. This 
narrative strategy corresponds with the high level of 
thematic response which Hartmann appears to demand from his 
audience in this text in particular. However, the theme of 
insight in all its aspects is discernible throughout the 
narrative. The ambiguity of presentation is not, therefore, 
matched by an ambiguity of theme. Nevertheless, at crucial 
stages in the narrative, namely Gregorius' initial reaction 
to the tablet, and the meeting between Gregorius and his 
mother, the audience is required to follow events with a
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minimum of guidance. This absence of clear signposts,
however, occurs at stages in Gregorius at which the 
characters themselves display a restricted ability to 
perceive, either as a result of youthful enthusiasm or love. 
Therefore, just as the narrator in Erec became conspicuously 
absent during Erec's period of least perception in the wake 
of his verligen, so there is a lack of guidance within the 
narrative structure in Gregorius at these junctures in 
particular. The lack of clarity in the characters'
perception is thus matched by an obscured narrative
structure. It might also be postulated that the narrator's 
apparent retreat at the second incest is caused by a
reluctance on the part of the author to investigate in 
greater detail an occurrence for which there is no redeeming 
psychological explanation such as is provided by the 
youthfulness of Gregorius' parents in the first incest. For 
whatever reason, the narrator's retreat at this juncture is 
particularly apparent when compared with the narrator's 
guidance and the insight into the characters' minds in 
Gregorius' later encounter with the fisherman.
In the wake of the second incest, the effect of such a 
restriction in awareness soon becomes further apparent in 
Gregorius. This manifests itself through his abandonment of 
his search for his parents. However, his inheritance is not 
totally disregarded, and he dutifully reads the tablet every 
day and prays for his parents as his mother requested;
Die tavel hâte er alle wege in siner heimlichen phlege verborgen uf siner veste, dâ die niemen weste, diu da bi im vunden was. an der er tâgelichen las sin sündecliche sache den ougen ze ungemache, wie er geborn würde und die süntliche bürde siner muoter und sines vater. unsern herren got bater in beiden umbe hulde und erkande niht der schulde
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diu ûf sin selbes rücke lac, die er naht unde tac mit siner muoter uopte,dâ mite er got betruopte. (Gr 2277-94)
Gregorius' grief and tears reveal that his prayers are 
indeed heartfelt. In this sense, Gregorius appears to 
demonstrate exemplary powers of insight. Such constant 
reflection on his birth, and his apparent compliance with 
his mother's request on the tablet that he pray for her and 
his father, has prompted some scholars to claim that 
Gregorius does in fact achieve sufficient penance for his 
parents. As a consequence, they assume that, on marrying his 
mother, he is affected by sin as an objective force 
However, in terms of the prerequisites for true repentance 
or virtue which are to be found in the penitential system 
and in the works of the theologians discussed in Chapter 2, 
and indeed in the prologue to this work, Gregorius reveals 
a significant failing here by neglecting to take action. 
Significantly, despite his tears and prayers which suggest 
a degree of suffering on Gregorius' part, his feelings of 
regret are only termed 'riuwe' (Gr 2307). Thus, in 
accordance with the discussion of true repentance in the 
prologue, no attribute is employed to accompany this term 
which might suggest true contrition rather than the 
implication of grief but not the intent to perform 
satisfaction. This would suggest in turn a restriction of 
Gregorius' perceptive faculty. Thus, he does not fully 
acknowledge the taint he inherited from his parents and his 
obligation to do penance for them, because of his failure to 
act on his reflections. As Walter Ohly states;
die [Unterlassungs-] Sünde des Gregorius besteht in der Beschrânkung auf die Herzensreue ohne Bekenntnis und ohne Tat. ***
Although Gregorius diligently reads the tablet every day, 
thereby reminding himself of his inheritance, he limits this 
time of prayer, hides the tablet in the wall, and makes no
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further attempts to locate his family His ignorance of 
his birth may have been lifted from its shroud of silence in 
the debate with the abbot, but another suppressive silence 
has been imposed upon it by Gregorius' incomplete 
acknowledgement. Walter Ohly denotes this behaviour as a 
kind of spiritual verligen. O n e  must assume therefore 
that Gregorius' tears, although heartfelt and repeatedly 
emphasized at this juncture, are more the result of 
attritio than contritio because they are not accompanied by 
an intention to carry out meaningful and appropriate 
satisfaction. The achievement of action in undertaking 
penance which depends on unobscured powers of perception 
thus forms the basis of Hartmann's emphasis here. The result 
of this inadequate penance is that Gregorius inevitably and 
unwittingly commits a sin himself. The verb erkennen here 
indicates the perpetuation of blindness caused by Gregorius' 
failure to utilize his powers of self-knowledge fully (Gr 
2290f.). Any interference in the process of acknowledging 
one's inherited spiritual taint, in this case as a result of 
love, is therefore revealed in this work to lead directly to 
the committing of a personal sin. Both mother and son 
therefore retain sufficient insight to recall their past sin 
or their sinful inheritance and to experience the pain of 
grief. Despite the genuine nature of their suffering, 
however, neither is able to acknowledge that inheritance 
completely by asking questions and taking action.
Gregorius and his mother thus reveal the manner in which the 
inheritance of humankind from original sin ultimately 
results in personal sin unless it is appropriately 
acknowledged by sufficient perception and action.*®^ The 
literary depiction of this issue is not confined to 
Hartmann's works. Alois Haas uses this theory to explain 
Trevrizent's reference to Parzival's killing of his mother 
and Ither, which occurs as a result of his ignorance, as his 
two great sins (P 499, 20-25). Although, Parzival appears 
subjectively innocent of these crimes in terms of personal
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responsibility, these sins stem from his inherited and 
symbolic subjective guilt which requires acknowledgement. 
Gregorius himself has received information about his 
inheritance, but fails to fulfil his obligations by 
neglecting his search for his parents. In terms of Abelard's 
theory that culpability stems only from a conscious 
intention, Gregorius cannot be considered guilty as there is 
no indication of a conscious decision to abandon his search. 
As will be shortly demonstrated, this has prompted many 
critics to claim that Gregorius is innocent of any culpable 
offence. However, this theory is not the yardstick by which 
to measure this issue. Gregorius' sin is representative of 
the inheritance of humankind from the Fall. As is described 
in the prologue to this work, it is the shared inheritance 
of humankind to live in a state of culpable ignorance which 
must be overcome by recognition and active countermeasures. 
Even though Gregorius' tablet reveals to him the means to 
escape that culpable ignorance, he does not fully respond to 
his obligation to acknowledge its message. As a result of 
this failure, Gregorius commits a culpable sin and 
perpetuates a sequence of related sins. In this way, 
Gregorius acts as a symbolic figure who eventually performs 
a miraculous penance, but also as an ordinary mortal, who 
commits a personal sin as a result of disregarding his own 
sinful inheritance.Like Oedipus, therefore, Gregorius 
commits a serious mistake and provokes a personal tragedy by 
failing to take his identity fully into account on a 
fundamental level.
At this juncture, it would be useful to conduct a brief 
survey of the interpretations of other scholars regarding I
Gregorius' guilt before discussing the issue of culpable t
ignorance any further. The approaches of Wolfgang Dittmann \
and Christoph Cormeau resemble those of scholars mentioned 1
earlier with regard to Erec. Both scholars argue that 
Gregorius is an innocent man afflicted by objective sin. 
Gregorius' act of penance thus represents the exposure of
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humankind to sin as a result of the Fall, but these scholars 
do not accept that this state is one of culpable ignorance 
which involves a dimension of personal responsibility.^'* 
Instead, they consider sin to attack in an arbitrary manner 
which has no reflection on the personal guilt of its 
victims. In addition, neither Dittmann nor Cormeau takes 
Gregorius' inner motivations sufficiently into account. 
Thus, they maintain that as Gregorius commits the second 
incest unwittingly, but nevertheless considers himself 
guilty, Hartmann is rejecting any connection with the 
teaching of twelfth-century scholastic and monastic masters 
on the issue of the culpability of conscious or unconscious 
sin.'”^’ Instead, Hartmann registers his lack of interest in 
creating a psychological dimension in his work by the fact 
that no insight into the characters' thoughts is provided at 
this crucial juncture of the text. In addition, they deny 
that Gregorius' unwitting sin could have been the direct and 
culpable result of an earlier negligence, as they can find 
no evidence of a previous flaw in Gregorius' inner 
motivation. In conclusion, they claim that the significant 
issue in this narrative lies in the reaction of Gregorius 
and his mother to the revelation of the incest. Thus, it is 
the couple's own belief that they are guilty despite a lack 
of conscious sin, a reaction which points to the objective 
nature of their crime.
In contrast, other scholars take account of the twelfth- 
century discussion of the subjective nature of sin in their 
interpretations of this work. As Hartmann, in keeping with 
twelfth-century scholastic and monastic notions, appears to 
be depicting in the second incest that unconscious sin is 
inculpable, these scholars claim that Gregorius' act of 
penance must denote the committing of a conscious sin before 
the second incest. Hildegard Nobel, for example, argues that 
this sin is apparent in Gregorius' arrogant desire to free 
himself from the shame of his foundling status.'*®® Peter 
Wapnewski extends this interpretation by suggesting that
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Gregorius disobeys his mother's request on the tablet that 
he remain in the monastery in order to do representative 
penance for his parents.Although no restrictions are in 
fact placed on the location of Gregorius' penance, 
Wapnewski's further interpretation of this point never­
theless resembles that of the present study. Thus, he 
considers that Gregorius' failure comprises the sinful state 
of mind described by Augustine as reatus, that is an 
unwillingness to do penance and a blindness of heart which 
is the bequest of the Fall and which inevitably leads to 
greater sin.*^®
An alternative explanation is offered by Volker Mertens and 
K. Dieter Goebel, who claim that the question of conscious 
or unconscious sin is not at issue here, because of 
Gregorius' special status as a figure of l e g e n d . T h e i r  
approaches are somewhat diverse, however. On the one hand, 
Mertens argues that Gregorius exiles himself despite his
subjective innocence in the same manner in which saints and
hermits in the legends go willingly into exile without 
having committed a culpable sin. On the other hand, Goebel 
is of the opinion that Gregorius' unwitting second incest is 
culpable because Hartmann is not reflecting early scholastic 
theology in this narrative and therefore does not
differentiate between the culpability of conscious and 
unconscious sin. Instead, Goebel argues, Hartmann is 
reflecting the legends of the Bible and vernacular sermons 
in which both types of sin are considered culpable.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, however, there is 
evidence in the narrative to suggest that Hartmann is indeed 
reflecting notions of the subjective nature of sin which 
were discussed in the twelfth century, and that Gregorius' 
sin represents the subjective sin of culpable ignorance. 
This is revealed if both dimensions of Gregorius'
obligations are taken into account, namely to find his 
parents and establish himself as a knight. Gregorius is made
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directly and sufficiently aware by the tablet of his secular 
and spiritual identities. He is therefore given the 
opportunity to overcome the ignorance of his inheritance. 
However, as he responds fully only to part of his identity 
owing to the effect of love on his thoughts, he is guilty of 
consciously neglecting the remaining spiritual dimension, a 
sin which subsequently manifests itself in the second 
incest. Such culpable ignorance, which can be described as 
a negligence in knowing or accepting knowledge, was of great 
import in theology in the second half of the twelfth century 
as stated earlier with regard to the prologue of Gregorius. 
In a further example of this phenomenon, Kolb cites Alan of 
Lille on the differences between ignorantia vincibilis and 
ignorantia invincibilis:
Si autem ignorantia sit vincibilis, crassa et supina et affectata, non excusât/"^
Similarly, the works of the canon lawyers display an 
interest in this concept;
Ignorantia ex impossibilitate; nulla culpa, ex difficultate; levis culpa, ex negligentia; gravis culpa, ex voluntate; mortalis culpa.
Gregorius could therefore be accused on the above evidence 
of a grave culpable sin. He suppresses the knowledge of his 
origins by contemplating and grieving for them in secret and 
by failing to acknowledge them actively. This sin could also 
be considered a form of præsumptio as described in the 
prologue."^ Such a sin requires the knowledge that one is 
acting wrongfully, coupled with the arrogant assumption that 
one will nonetheless be forgiven. Gregorius has gained 
knowledge of his spiritual inheritance but fails to act upon 
it. This could be interpreted as a postponement of penance, 
although this is difficult to ascertain fully owing to the 
limited depiction of Gregorius' thoughts at this juncture.
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Further revelation of Gregorius' negligence occurs in his 
reaction to the truth as it emerges. This reaction exposes 
the extent to which he has failed to accept his identity in 
full. The catalyst in bringing the truth to light is the 
inquisitive maid, whose determination and talent for spying 
(Gr 2309-28, 2380-403) allow her to discover the reason for 
Gregorius' strange behaviour. She exhibits all the sharp 
awareness and initiative which Enite demonstrated in 
extracting herself from Count Galoain's clutches in Erec. In 
this way, she contrasts with the blindness and inactivity of 
Gregorius and his mother, just as Enite's sharp wits exposed 
Erec's temporarily dulled mind. This contrast is 
particularly stressed by the abundance of terms relating to 
sight, hearing, speaking, and remaining silent in the 
exchange between the mother and the maid (Gr 2329ff. ) 
Again, a comparison can be drawn with Erec, in which these 
terms were seen to denote either an action based on sound 
perception, or else the lack of the same in the case of 
silence. Thus, the maid sees, hears, speaks of, and realizes 
the gravity of the situation. The mother, however, attempts 
to silence her, believing her to be untruthful, and 
misinterpreting her intentions (Gr 2349-55). She thus 
displays her limited insight into her own situation, and 
reveals how silence is a means of suppressing the truth.
The shrewd insight of both the maid and Enite is thus 
required to free the powers of perception in their fellow 
protagonists from obstruction. The mother's reaction is 
initially passive in contrast to the maid's active part. 
This is particularly apparent in the manner in which she 
rejects the maid's information as a mistake (Gr 2344), and 
reveals her own lack of awareness of her husband's 
unhappiness (Gr 2406f.). Her initial rejection thus 
corresponds to her earlier inaction in terms of establishing 
the truth about the material. Furthermore, once she has 
accepted the maid's story, the mother nevertheless attempts 
to explain it away and thereby avoid the truth (Gr 2408ff.).
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This again reveals her blindness with regard to her sinful 
situation. She sees no reason for Gregorius to be unhappy as 
he is powerful, rich, young, healthy, and has a loving and 
obedient wife. Her reasoning thus only extends to Gregorius' 
superficial and secular advantages. The shallowness of her 
reflection is similarly indicated by the note of irony in 
her speech through which reference is made to all the 
failings which have brought about this situation, for 
example her belief that Gregorius' unhappiness stems from an 
event in his childhood (Gr 2422-4), and that he is the best 
husband she could have wished for (Gr 2414-6). Furthermore, 
the mother's desire to know the cause of Gregorius' misery 
is based on her hope that she can be of aid to him when, in 
fact, she is a partner in his sin (Gr 2435-42). Her 
puzzlement over his silence, and her belief that he would 
not keep a secret from her unless he could not bear to 
reveal it, again point back to the restricted insight which 
the couple displayed upon meeting (Gr 2431-4, 2443-7).
Similarly, the mother's comment that she would not like to 
force Gregorius to tell her anything against his will 
ironically underlines both her own inability to perceive the 
evidence for herself and also Gregorius' blind obedience to 
his love-affected will in not continuing his search for his 
spiritual identity.
The maid finally offers a practical solution based on her I
cunning observation of the tablet's whereabouts and her 
knowledge of Gregorius' absence (Gr 2448ff.). Thus, the 
maid's actions and leadership cause the mother to recognize 
the real nature of her situation;
'die selben stat die marhte ich. muget ir des erbiten (er wil doch birsen rxten), vrouwe, so vüere ich iuch dar und zeige ez iu; so nemet ir war waz dar an geschriben si,da erkennet ir ez bi.' (Gr 2460-6)
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Unlike the French version, in which the mother instantly 
appears to accept her guilt on reading the tablet (La vie 
1709-17), however, the mother in the German text falls into 
despair. She concludes that God has rejected her earlier 
heartfelt penance and has therefore permitted the Devil to 
lead her again into sin (Gr 2488-98). In addition, the 
mother clings to the forlorn hope that this tablet does not 
belong to Gregorius (Gr 2501-15). Even with hard evidence 
before her, therefore, she seeks to prolong the silence 
which surrounds the truth of her marriage. Her despair and 
her desperate hope both indicate that the mother is blind to 
the possibility of God's forgiveness for this sin, and is 
even led to question the forgiveness she received for her 
earlier penance.
Gregorius' reaction to his mother's revelation demonstrates 
the state of mind which has come to dominate him. On 
returning from the hunt, his mother demands to be told the 
truth of his origins;
'herre, ir suit mir des verjehen von wannen ir geborn sit. ez ware é gewesen zit der vrâge die ich nu begân;ich wane ich si verspatet hân.' (Gr 2570-4)
An indication is apparent here of the mother's culpability 
in failing to ask this question at their original meeting. 
Likewise, Gregorius' response to this demand for information 
about his identity is telling;
'Vrouwe, ich weiz wol waz ir klaget;iu hat etewer gesagetdaz ich si ein ungeborn man.weste ich wer iuch dar analsus geleidet hate,ezn gelagen mine rateniemer unz uf sinen tôt;nu hel sich wol, des ist im not.swer er ist, er hat gelogen;ich bin von einem herzogenvil endelichen geborn.
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ir suit mir volgen âne zorn daz wir der rede hie gedagen;ich enmac iu vürbaz niht gesagen.' (Gr 2575-88)
Gregorius' suppression of his spiritual identity and his 
overwhelming concern for his worldly honour is thus 
revealed. Unlike the French version in which Grégoire only 
refuses to reveal his origins (La vie 1787-1802), Hartmann 
emphasizes the focusing of Gregorius' mind on his secular 
interests in his aggressive pledge to defend his worldly 
reputation. Furthermore, Gregorius confirms his suppression 
of his vow to seek out his parents by his unwillingness to 
free the truth about his spiritual inheritance from the 
silence which he has imposed upon it.
Once the tablet and the truth are revealed, Gregorius' 
immediate reaction is to defend himself further by blaming 
God for abusing his well-intentioned desire to be reunited 
with his parents on leaving the monastery:
er sprach: 'diz ist des ich ie bat,daz mich got bræhte ûf die statdaz mir so wol geschæhedaz ich mit vreuden sæhemine liebe muoter.richer got vil guoter,des hâstû anders mich gewertdanne ichs an dich hân gegert.ich gertes in minem muotenâch liebe und nâch guote:nu hân ich si gesehen sodaz ich des niemer wirde vrô,wande ich si baz verbæredanne ich ir sus heimlich wære.' (Gr 2609-22)
Gregorius' anger at his supposedly unfair treatment 
indicates his blindness towards his own failure to fulfil 
his vow. His intent may indeed have been sound on departing 
from the monastery, but the cessation of his search for his 
parents demonstrated his neglect of the spiritual aspect of 
his inheritance. His sorrowful claim that he would rather 
have never seen his mother points to his own failure to see.
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that is to know his true identity. Gregorius and his mother 
therefore display similar responses to the revelation of the 
truth. Their reactions are based on horror and regret, but 
also on the angry conviction that they have been mistreated.
In fact, God has dealt fairly with both of them, but their 
lingering blindness renders them unable to recognize this.
As a result of this blindness, they both approach the brink 
of despair, even to the extent that they are compared to 
Judas (Gr 2623-6)/"^ Furthermore, the mother actually 
proceeds to trace the steps to this sin in her conviction 
that she has been forsaken by God with regard to her earlier 
penance. Thus, she believes that she will remain unforgiven 
and be condemned to Hell (Gr 2684-94).
The apparent inevitability of their slide into despair is 
subtly countered, however, by the figure of David, who, 
despite experiencing great sorrow, never actually lost his 
faith in God (Gr 2627). This comparison suggests that an 
alternative to despair exists even in the most difficult of 
circumstances, and this is subsequently confirmed by the 
second stage of Gregorius' reaction. His initial self-pity 
and anger are overtaken by an awareness of his sin.^^^ By 
relying on his clerical training, Gregorius is able to 
instruct his mother that God forgives any sin for which true 
penitence, accompanied by the flow of tears, is shown:
'jâ hân ich einen trôst gelesen daz got die wâren riuwe hât ze buoze über alle missetât. |iuwer sêle ist nie sô ungesunt,wirt iu daz ouge ze einer stunt |von herzelicher riuwe naz, Îir sit genesen, geloubet daz.' (Gr 2700-6)
As described earlier with regard to the prologue, the |
attributes employed here in conjunction with riuwe indicate 1
the full measure of poenitentia, namely regret and the I
intent to perform satisfaction. Gregorius' reaction and I
advice to his mother reveal his insight into and final
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acceptance of all aspects of his identity, even though the 
actual process of realization is not described in itself. In 
this sense, Gregorius' final insight resembles that of Erec, 
in that no direct description of the inner process is given, 
its occurrence instead being indicated by the subsequent 
behaviour of the protagonist. Thus, Gregorius' reaction 
demonstrates that he has gained recognition of the 
fundamental nature of his identity. He has acquired true 
self-knowledge, that is an acceptance of his weakness before 
God.*^® He proposes now to remedy the situation by devoting 
himself entirely to the humble embracing of his spiritual 
identity as a child of original sin, and by achieving 
penance for his personal guilt in committing the second 
incest."^ For this purpose, as the narrator indicates, it 
is necessary to reject all bodily pleasures and comforts (Gr 
2655-62). Gregorius' instructions to his mother regarding 
her penance are clear and concise, showing that at last he 
is eager to take the prompt action with regard to his 
spiritual inheritance which he previously neglected with 
such serious consequences. He joyfully turns his back on the 
world, therefore, and seeks the ignominy from which he 
earlier fled (Gr 2745-7, 2963-5).'*^° Thus, Gregorius' 
embracing of his true identity manifests itself in his 
desire to act, his acceptance of shame, and his avoidance of 
despair.
The Fisherman
The final section of the narrative concerns Gregorius' 
repentance and also provides, in the figure of the 
fisherman, an example of a repentant sinner with whom it is 
perhaps easier for the audience to associate than with the 
semi-symbolic figure of the main protagonist. Hartmann's 
extensive alteration of the fisherman in the French version 
likewise reveals that this character plays an important role 
in the scheme of the German narrative. As well as represent­
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ing a figure to whom the audience might relate, the 
fisherman also provides Hartmann with the opportunity to 
demonstrate clearly the moral message of his narrative, in 
view of the moral ambiguity and existential complexity of 
Gregorius' own sin. Through this figure, therefore, the 
audience is provided with a clear model of sinfulness and 
regret, and of the procedure for gaining forgiveness.
Gregorius himself is distinguished from this point onwards 
by his recognition of his need to demonstrate repentance as 
an inheritor of original sin. The fruits of this achievement 
are made apparent in the wake of Gregorius' penance by such 
attributes as 'gotes trut' (Gr 3418, 3466, 3722), but also 
in the repeated use of the terms 'saelde' and 'heil' (Gr 
3241, 3565, 3739, 3871), which were of such consequence in 
the debate with the abbot. Whereas Gregorius previously 
comprehended only the secular dimension of these terms, here 
they signify his acceptance of his spiritual obligations.
The figure of the fisherman represents the disbelief and 
limited awareness of the unrepentant sinner in contrast to 
the progress which Gregorius has made. He also provides an 
opportunity for the role of perception in the processes of 
sin and repentance to be demonstrated. In addition, the 
fisherman clearly portrays the Church's prescribed acts of 
penance by showing contrition and a willingness to do 
penance, and by c o n f e s s i n g . T h e  lack of confession on 
Gregorius' part, and the lack of priests in the work in 
general, has caused critics, most notably Dittmann, to 
reject any direct connection between this work and 
penitential teaching. However, both the mother and the 
fisherman act as intermediaries on this issue, by 
demonstrating the need for confession whilst the more 
symbolic figure of Gregorius emphasizes the basic 
prerequisite of true contrition.
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The fisherman also serves a further purpose, however. 
Gregorius' own humility and purity of intention receive 
confirmation when challenged by the fisherman's mockery. 
Furthermore, his appreciation of Gregorius, and the 
reasoning behind his rejection of him, is based entirely 
upon Gregorius' outer appearance:
als im der vischæresinen schoenen lip gesach,er wegete daz houbet unde sprach:'jâ dû starker trügenære!' (Gr 2784-7)
His vision is thus limited to superficial qualities as he 
lacks the insight to recognize Gregorius' true nature (Gr 
2901-3). As a result, the fisherman draws false conclusions 
as to Gregorius' reasons for asking for lodging, believing 
him to be intent on murder and robbery (Gr 2788-95). He 
likewise serves to reintroduce the ambiguous issue of honour 
by commenting that, in his (limited) opinion, Gregorius has 
never gained spiritual honour. In fact, Gregorius has 
achieved an awareness of the difference between spiritual 
honour and the knightly renown which he previously pursued 
so vehemently. The fisherman's wife, in contrast, has the 
insight to appreciate Gregorius' true intent, causing her to 
disagree with her husband's rejection of him, and to weep 
with compassion for him:
Des übelen vischæres wîp erbarmte sich über sinen lip. si bedûhte des daz er wære niht ein trügenære. des scheltens des in der man tete umbe sîn dürfticliche bete, des ervolleten ir diu ougen. si sprach; 'des ist unlougen er ensî ein guot man:zewâre ich sihe ez im wol an.' (Gr 2835-44)
Her tears in particular, in combination with the description 
of her compassion, signify the sincerity of her feelings of 
pity, and recall both Erec's breakthrough in the Cadoc
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episode when he is moved to tears at the sight of the 
knight's lady (Er 5335-8), and his later sorrow for the 
widows at Brandigan (Er 9785-91).
The fisherwife proceeds to remind her husband to be aware of 
his Christian duties and, in addition, of his reliance on 
God's bounty for his living from the sea:
'dû hast getân ein scheltendaz dlnem heile nâhen gât.dû weist wol daz din hûs statden liuten alsô verre.swenne dich unser herrediner sælden ermandeund dir sinen boten sande,den soldestû emphâhen bazund vil wol bedenken daz: (Gr 2846-54)
swelh man sich alle tagebegan muoz von bejage,als dû mit zwivel hast getân,der solde got vor ougen hân.' (Gr 2859-62)
Her reminder of the issues which her husband needs to bear 
in mind has sufficient effect upon him to allow Gregorius to 
stay the night. However, the fisherman demonstrates a 
limited appreciation of sælde which corresponds to the 
ambiguity of Gregorius' earlier restricted definition of 
this term. His mockery therefore soon resurfaces in his 
hypocritical offer of assistance to Gregorius in his pursuit 
of penance. The fisherman's ridicule again implies that he 
does not trust Gregorius' intentions, nor the sincerity of 
his regret:
'wart des ie dehein bildedaz din muot ze riuwe stât,so tuon ich dir einen ganzen rat.ich hân ein îsenhaltennû lange her behalten:die wil ich dir ze stiure geben,daz dû bestætest din lebenûf dem selben steine.
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die sliuz ze dlnem beine. geriuwet dich danne der wane, so muostu under dinen dancdoch dar ufe bestan.' (Gr 2986-97)
Thus, he claims that the regret Gregorius purports to feel 
will soon turn into the regret for having undertaken this 
penance. It is also ironical that the fisherman who mocks 
Gregorius' intent should himself provide the instruments and 
location of Gregorius' penance. Gregorius' humility in the 
face of this mockery is particularly revealed in the manner 
in which he receives the fisherman's words with thankfulness 
and joyful laughter (Gr 2815, 2821, 2946). Thus, Gregorius' 
confidence that he has chosen the correct path and his 
absolute trust in his actions is revealed. As a result, he 
is referred to as 'der wise' (Gr 2890), a term which 
signifies his overcoming of his inherited ignorance. This 
reaction is also reminiscent of Erec's confident laughter on 
defeating Keii (Er 4744f.), and on his arrival in Brandigan 
(Er 8028f., 8154-8, 8442). Thus, both Erec and Gregorius
laugh once they have achieved a deep insight into 
themselves.
Further revelation of the fisherman's inner life occurs on 
the arrival of the Romans. Their obvious wealth causes him 
to welcome them, just as Gregorius' outer appearance fuelled 
his rejection. The greedy intentions behind the fisherman's 
hospitality are confirmed by the narrator (Gr 3269f.). This 
portrayal of his selfishness subsequently serves to contrast 
starkly with the revelation he experiences on finding the 
key in the fish;
dô er in in dem vische vant, do erkande er sich zehant wie er getobet hate und vie sich also drâtemit beiden handen in daz hâr. (Gr 3305-9)
A significant contrast is apparent here between the 
fisherman's immediate insight and recognition of his sin in
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Hartmann's version, and the muted response of the fisherman 
in the French version (La vie 2425-44). Furthermore, even on 
revealing the key to the Romans, the fisherman does not 
demonstrate any remorse in the French text (La vie 2456-80). 
The contrast between these two reactions thus reveals the 
emphasis which Hartmann is placing on inner insight and 
regret in his adaptation, and the importance of the 
fisherman in this portrayal.
The significance of this character is likewise evident in 
his series of confessions which repeatedly demonstrate his 
contrition and willingness to satisfy any penance imposed 
upon him (Gr 3318-45, 3624-52, 3665-73). In the first
confession, it is merely stated that the fisherman reveals 
the circumstances of his sin and asks the Romans for 
guidance. Nevertheless, the purity of his regret and 
willingness to do penance is stressed by the terms 'groze 
riuwen' and 'geistliche triuwen' (Gr 3337f.), which the 
Romans are able to appreciate, and which allow them to feel 
compassion for him. The fisherman thus demonstrates his 
complete acknowledgement of his sin, which is likewise 
signified by the tears of sorrow prompted by his belief that 
they will not be able to save Gregorius (Gr 3347-9).
The indirect speech of the fisherman's first confession also 
serves to highlight and to hasten the narrative towards the 
depiction of Gregorius on the rock. There, the powers of 
insight of the legates are revealed in the adjective 'wis' 
(Gr 3167) and in their tears of pity at the sight of 
Gregorius (Gr 3476-82). However, he himself displays an 
excessive humility at their news which appears to border on 
despair (Gr 3499ff.). Initially, therefore, Gregorius' 
penance does not seem to have produced the desired results. 
He misunderstands the legates' intentions in their message, 
believing instead that he has earned God's hatred and that 
he is unworthy of such honour. It appears by this reaction 
that Gregorius' humility has led him to conclude that he is
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unworthy of forgiveness.^^ Furthermore, Gregorius 
demonstrates feelings of shame in his desire to flee from 
the legates, a reaction which recalls the distress of Adam 
and Eve at their nakedness in the Garden of Eden. This 
parallel is rendered particularly explicit by Gregorius' 
attempts to cover himself with leaves (Gr 3408-17). This 
shame might be thought to imply a possible regression on 
Gregorius' part to his earlier concern for his worldly 
honour. However, this reaction is actually an indication of 
the extent of his progression. The connection between 
Gregorius' initial response to the legates and the Fall 
recalls the issues discussed in the prologue, particularly 
regarding the inclination towards Evil and the distraction 
of the reflective capacity which is Gregorius' inheritance 
from original sin. This parallel therefore serves to 
stimulate the audience's assessment of Gregorius' progress.
Such an appraisal is likewise made possible by the 
narrator's trickery in falsely describing Gregorius as 
unscathed. The initial amazement of the audience at the 
supposed miracle prompts a subsequent awareness of the 
perfection of Gregorius' inner rather than his outer 
qualities once the truth is revealed. His progress is 
likewise confirmed in a description of the contrast between 
his heavenly honour and his secular poverty:
sus vunden si den gotes trut, ;einen dürftigen ûf der erde, jze gote in hohem werde, Iden liuten widerzæme, !ze himele vil genæme. (Gr 3418-22) .
Similarly, a contrast can be drawn between Gregorius' i
apparently excessive humility and his actual reaction once j
he has heard all the facts. Gregorius thus proceeds to f
restate his earlier assertion that no sin is beyond I
forgiveness. On this occasion, however, he addresses this i
remark to himself, thereby confirming his complete j
acceptance of his sinfulness (Gr 3596-611). His subsequent
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need for a sign from God finally serves to demonstrate the 
manner in which grace is bestowed independently, and thus 
confirms the forgiveness which Gregorius has earned.
On returning to the mainland, Gregorius thinks of his 
tablet, as he did constantly whilst on the rock, and seeks 
it out (Gr 3684-6). The fact that the tablet is still 
intact, indeed in miraculously good condition, implies that, 
despite Gregorius' penance, the facts of his sinful 
inheritance remain the same. On the rock, the absence of the 
tablet indicated that Gregorius was able to acknowledge his 
inheritance without any external stimulus. Thus, when he was 
parted from it, he proved himself better able to acknowledge 
his inheritance than when he kept the tablet close, but 
hidden away.
On rediscovering Gregorius on the rock, the fisherman is 
prompted to make a second confession. In contrast to the 
first, this is delivered in direct speech and therefore 
clearly reveals his attitude towards his sin (Gr 3624ff.).
In this way, the fisherman expresses his regret for his 
earlier mockery of Gregorius and for his own guilt in 
postponing his penance for this sinful behaviour:
NÛ viel der vischære an diu knie mit manigen trahen vür in, er sprach: 'vil lieber herre, ich bin der selbe sündige man der sich verworhte dar an. ich arme verlorne ich emphie iuch mit zorne. diz was diu wirtschaft die ich iu bot: ich gap iu schelten vür daz brot, ich schancte iu ze vlize mit manigem itewize. 'sus behielt ich iuch ennaht mit unwirde und mit grozem braht. alsus bin ich worden altdaz ich der sünde nie engalt.' (Gr 3624-38)
In contrast to Gregorius' constant contemplation of his sin, 
the fisherman confesses to have put Gregorius out of his
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thoughts (Gr 3648-50). However, his insight into his long- 
overdue penance and his feelings of remorse are now 
confirmed by his tears.
The third confession takes place back on the mainland (Gr 
3662-73). As with the first, it is in indirect speech, and 
the fisherman's own expression of true repentance is 
confirmed by the narrator's insistence that he is 
experiencing 'ganze riuwe' coupled with 'groze triuwe' (Gr 
3669f.). The fisherman subsequently seeks advice on 
achieving penance and restates his recognition of his sin of 
mockery. Once again, therefore, the fisherman's true 
repentance is revealed in his own and the narrator's words, 
as well as in his tears of contrition;
nû wuosch diu groze triuweund diu ganze riuweund der ougen undeden vlecken siner sünde,daz im diu sêle genas. (Gr 3669-73)
The fisherman's insight into his sin, and his consequent 
need to confess as a result of his true repentance thus 
provide a guide to the issues at stake in this work, namely 
perception as a means to recognizing sinfulness, and the 
ability to apply that perception to achieve true contrition. 
These issues are presented through the figure of the 
fisherman as a means of expressing the insight required of 
an ordinary mortal. By extending the French version's single 
statement by the fisherman into a detailed triple 
confession, Hartmann removes the possibility that Gregorius' 
legendary and symbolic status should be a barrier to the 
reader's application of the issues in the narrative to his 
or her own life.
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.Thê...]Papaç.y
On his elevation to the papacy, Gregorius comes to represent 
both the worldly and spiritual spheres which he inhabits, 
and which he has had to learn to embrace equally. He 
therefore becomes that praiseworthy individual who is 
beloved of both God and Man, such as was prescribed in the 
heart's teaching in Die Klage. He is portrayed as ruling 
with humility, and as being guided in his moderation by the 
Holy Spirit (Gr 3793ff.). As such, Gregorius is able to 
impose fair judgement on sinners, using harsh means only 
when necessary, in order to encourage their repentance. This 
description of Gregorius' justice thus extends Hartmann's 
discussion of the penitential system from the penitent 
(fisherman, mother) to the confessor, who similarly needs 
acute insight in order to assess the sincerity of penitence 
in those seeking forgiveness.
The final scene with the mother contains many notes of re­
emphasis of the need to achieve self-knowledge. In a 
humorous repetition of their earlier inability to recognize 
one another, Gregorius and his mother are able on this 
occasion to demonstrate how they have progressed. This is 
particularly apparent in the terms relating to sight and 
recognition in this exchange. Initially, Gregorius does not 
recognize his mother (Gr 3847-61). Similarly, just as the 
mother looked carefully at the material on their first 
meeting, but did not fully acknowledge her acquaintance with 
it, here Gregorius teases her inability to recognize her son 
even though she sees him physically;
er sprach; 'ob daz von gotes gebeiemer môhte geschehendaz man in iuch lieze sehen,nu saget wie; getriuwet ir dochob ir in erkandet noch?'si sprach; 'mich entriege min sin,ich erkande in wol, und sæhe ich in.' (Gr 3890-6)“^*
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Furthermore, Gregorius is himself able to assess the 
sincerity of his mother's penance (Gr 3866f.), as is
subsequently confirmed by the narrator (Gr 3942-8). His 
mother has both concentrated her mind and striven physically 
to achieve penance (Gr 3847-9, 3902-5). This is particularly 
expressed by the use of the term 'rehte buoze' (Gr 3867), 
which reflects the sincere contritio in the mother's first 
penance which was indicated by the term 'wâre riuwe' (Gr
897). 'Rehte buoze' appears only twice in this work, with
both occurrences at the end of the narrative (Gr 3867, 
3988). Thus, Gregorius' observation receives further 
approval in the narrator's reminder in the epilogue of how 
true penance can earn forgiveness for any sinner. The
achievement of rehte buoze which has been investigated 
throughout the course of the narrative is therefore finally 
confirmed;
dâ sol der sündige man ein sælic bilde nemen an, swie vil er gesündet hât, daz sin doch wirt guot rât, ob er die riuwe begâtund rehte buoze bestât. (Gr 3983-8)
Hartmann reveals a continuing interest in inner thought 
processes in this work which may be interpreted against the 
background of the penitential teaching of the Church. This 
connection is not to be taken for granted. However, the 
evidence adduced in this chapter suggests that Hartmann's 
concern with true contrition as a display of regret which is 
precipitated by insight and coupled with the determination 
to act indeed reveals the influence of the thinking of 
twelfth-century masters on penance. A similar background may 
also be claimed for the presentation of Gregorius' sin in 
this work as an example of culpable negligence in failing to 
act on the taint of original sin which he inherits. In 
particular, Gregorius' inclination towards desire interferes |
with his true acknowledgment of this inheritance. In this |
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sense, the social stain of incest symbolizes the subjective 
and unavoidable nature of his sin. Although a child of 
incest is innocent of the personal sin of his or her 
parents, the stain is nevertheless present. Similarly, all 
generations of humankind are branded with the stigma of 
subjective sin from the Fall, and are required to overcome 
their inherited ignorance and restricted insight in order to 
acknowledge this guilt and achieve reparation.
As in Hartmann's previous two narratives, the role of 
reflection in sin and redemption is stressed in Gregorius. 
In this work, however, Hartmann goes beyond the dimensions 
of the love relationship and the lifestyle of a knight and 
lord to a more fundamentally religious level. The 
prerequisites for sin, virtue, and penance are nevertheless 
the same as on a more secular level, namely a failure to 
reflect or act owing to an obstruction of the mental faculty 
in the first case, or the combination of reflection and 
action necessary for true repentance or virtue. Although 
Gregorius demonstrates the mental ability to recognize and 
regret his sinful state, he initially fails to act to 
acknowledge that taint. In this way, he achieves fulfilment 
of the secular part of his identity, but his culpable 
neglect of his inherited spiritual sinfulness leads 
ultimately to his committing a personal sin.
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CONCLUDING POINTS
This study was conceived as an attempt to establish whether 
Hartmann's earliest narratives contain evidence of an inner 
life in the main protagonists and additional characters, to 
consider the development of the portrayal of this element, 
and to appraise its significance within a broad moral 
tradition which reflects Hartmann's situation as an educated 
knight. The ample evidence relating to the protagonists' 
inner thought processes and the manner in which Hartmann has 
adapted his sources on numerous occasions in relation to 
this aspect of his narratives, both of which have become 
apparent during the course of this investigation, suggest 
that not only does Hartmann display an awareness of the 
importance of the inner life in terms of ethical issues, but 
that this awareness constitutes a vital aspect of his 
narratives.
The essential part played by this element in Hartmann's 
works and the author's portrayal of a progression in the 
inner lives of Erec and Gregorius only becomes evident, 
however, by the adoption of a holistic approach which takes 
into account events in the narrative which occur both before 
and after the periods of failure encountered by the protag­
onists. By assessing the frequency and content of the 
thought processes of the protagonists and secondary 
characters throughout the entire narrative in this way, it 
is possible to reveal the extent to which the relative 
ability of each character to perceive is associated by 
Hartmann with the problems they encounter or the mistakes 
they make. Similarly, the narrative structure and the figure 
of the narrator are employed to highlight the issue of self- 
knowledge. Although the detailed focus of this present study 
on the inner thought processes of the characters themselves 
prevented a similarly detailed consideration of this 
sizeable area of investigation, its significance must never­
theless be acknowledged.
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The objections of the three scholars who challenged the 
generally accepted notion of a psychological depth and 
progression in Hartmann's protagonists are the result of not 
taking this notion of perception in Hartmann's works 
sufficiently into account. Nevertheless, these scholars have 
usefully focused attention away from the view that the 
psychological element in Hartmann's works is based on an 
exclusively theological code of morality. The present study 
has thus attempted to embrace this justifiable criticism and 
to investigate evidence to suggest a more general awareness 
of the importance of perception amongst a secular audience 
and to an educated secular poet. Such an awareness draws on 
a variety of influences which combine to create a lay 
concept of morality. The theological notion of the search 
for the self as a means to achieving salvation and communion 
with God is relevant here in terms of its influence on the 
secular community in general through homilies, private 
devotional guides, and in particular the penitential system. 
In addition, however, inner awareness was an element 
demanded by secular codes of honour, knighthood, and 
nobility, and by the feudal structure of society. In 
combination, these universal influences appear to have 
caused essential importance to become attached to the notion 
of perception within a secular concept of morality. This is 
the broad ethical background which Hartmann reflects in his 
portrayal of perception in his early narratives.
Hartmann's interest in inner awareness is evident throughout 
the three narratives considered in this study, although the 
differences in genre cause the focus and the circumstances 
of this portrayal to vary. In general, however, all three 
portray inner awareness as a prerequisite for the fulfilment 
of obligations and virtuous behaviour, reflecting a variety 
of secular moral traditions and thought. Thus, Die Klage, as 
a disputation in which the heart as the intellectual power 
discusses its relationship with the physical body in the 
light of a failed love suit, explores the association
313
between perception and the acquisition of both secular and 
spiritual virtues and consequently between success in a love 
relationship and heavenly salvation. Moreover, this work 
reveals that Hartmann's interest in perception was already 
becoming established in his earliest surviving narrative.
In Erec, the association between perception, action, and the 
achievement of virtue and success is likewise evident. 
Similarly, the perceptive disruption caused by desire is 
again presented in this work. However, despite this 
correspondence with Die Klage in the portrayal of the 
prerequisites of virtue, the accent in Erec falls partic­
ularly on the connection between perception and the 
acknowledgement of social obligations. Thus, Erec is 
required not only to restore his love-afflicted perceptive 
faculty, but also to adapt it in order to fulfil his 
extended and mature social duties. In addition, the role of 
inner awareness in the establishment of a socially- 
beneficial marriage relationship is highlighted in this 
work. Both Erec and Enite must learn to combine their 
respective capabilities in order to rectify and avoid a 
repetition of the damaging objective consequences which 
their love-blindness precipitates.
The relationship between the combined forces of perception 
and action is similarly depicted in Gregorius, although the 
role of action is accorded greater emphasis in this work. 
Nevertheless, the power of love or the inclination towards 
desire is still highlighted as a force of disruption in this 
relationship. However, the overtly religious dimension in 
this work again alters its focus. Thus, although this work 
resembles Erec in its emphasis on the need to acknowledge 
obligations, the duties it portrays are spiritual rather 
than social. In addition, the balanced faculties of 
perception and action are presented as the prerequisites for 
achieving true spiritual insight and contrition. In this 
way, Gregorius demonstrates a close affinity with the notion
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of the inherited culpable sinfulness of humankind and with 
the achievement of true repentance as prescribed in the 
penitential system.
Although the detailed approach of this study rendered it 
necessary to limit the number of texts considered, a brief 
and speculative interpretation of Hartmann's two later 
narratives should be attempted in the light of the con­
clusions reached. Both later works reveal similar evidence 
of a limited insight in the characters which affects a 
multiplicity of obligations. In Der arme Heinrich, the 
emphasis on Heinrich's dual spiritual and secular duties 
resembles the situation faced by Gregorius. However, whereas 
Gregorius fails to act on his spiritual duties, Heinrich 
initially refuses even to consider this aspect of his 
identity. Although after several years of his affliction, he 
achieves a deeper understanding of the cause of his leprosy, 
he nevertheless takes no action to rectify his shortcomings. 
For her part, the maiden shows a limited awareness of her 
role in her destiny, seeking, as a result of youthful, 
religious fervour and selfish desires, to engineer her own 
salvation. Finally, Heinrich achieves an insight into his 
spiritual obligations on witnessing the near fulfilment of 
the maiden's ill-motivated desire to act on his behalf. 
Ultimately, these two protagonists together establish an 
equilibrium between the insight and action required to 
fulfil their spiritual obligations.
Like Erec, Iwein displays a tendency towards impetuosity in 
his initial adventures. In terms of the secular honour 
ethic, this constitutes the only negative aspect of Iwein's 
behaviour here. Otherwise, he is aware and active as a 
knight in pursuit of a justifiable cause. However, like 
Erec, Iwein acquires additional facets to his identity upon 
getting married, but fails to respond to all of them. Thus, 
although he is justified in leaving for the tournament 
circuit, his laxity with regard to his new roles as lord and
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husband has serious social consequences. Subsequently, 
Iwein's rehabilitation involves the demonstration of his 
ability to be aware of his obligations by defending justi­
fiable causes of other women as he should have defended his 
wife, and by being mindful of promises and deadlines. Thus, 
Iwein, like Erec, finally proves himself able to acknowledge 
the new dimensions of his identity which he previously 
neglected.
Hartmann's disputation and his alterations to his sources in 
his later narratives provide abundant evidence that this 
author was concerned with the issue of perception. As this 
present study has attempted to demonstrate, however, this 
interest does not necessarily stem from one source, but 
reflects the social, cultural, and theological concern with 
the inner life and its relationship with virtue or salvation 
in whatever form, which would have been familiar to Hartmann 
and his audience. In conclusion, therefore, attention should 
again be drawn to the fact that Hartmann, as an educated 
knight, straddled and would have been influenced by all of 
these sources. He cannot therefore usefully be pigeonholed 
as an author who is specifically concerned with secular 
honour or with the minutiae of theological developments. 
Instead, he represents a secular awareness of perception as 
it relates in general to these various sources. It was by 
using these broadly familiar concepts that Hartmann sought 
to discuss in his works the rapidly changing moral climate 
of his age.
316
1NOTES
1. G. Ehrismann, Geschlchte der deutschen Literatur bis zum 
Ausgang des Mittelalters» 2. Teil: Die Mittelhochdeutsche 
Literatur» II: Blütezeit, Other major scholars include:Julius Schwietering, Die deutsche Dichtung des Mittelalters; W. Ohly, 'Die heilsgeschichtliche Struktur der Epen Hartmanns von Aue'; H.B. Willson, 'Sin and Redemption in Hartmann's Erec'; Helmut de Boor, Geschichte der deutschen 
Literatur von den Anfàngen bis zur Gegenwart, II: Die
hofische Literatur. Vorbereitung, Bliite, Ausklang 1170-1250; Kurt Ruh, Hofische Epik des deutschen Mittelalters. I: Von 
den Anfàngen bis zu Hartmann von Aue; Ludwig Wolff, 'Hartmann von Aue. Vom Büchlein und Erec bis zum Iwein'; Peter Wapnewski, Hartmann von Aue; Hugo Kuhn, 'Erec' ; Antonin Hrubÿ, 'Moralphilosophie und Moraltheologie in Hartmanns Erec ' ; Christoph Cormeau/Wilhelm Stormer, Hartmann 
von Aue. Epoche-Werk'-Wirkung: Rodney Fisher, 'Erecs Schuld und Enitens Unschuld bei Hartmann'; id., 'Rauber, Riesen und die Stimme der Vernunft in Hartmanns und Chrétiens Erec'; David Duckworth, Gregorius. A Medieval Man's Discovery of 
his True Self. Other works will be discussed in the course of this present study.
2. VoB, pp. 84-7, criticizes the work of Sparnaay, Wapnewski, Putz, Witte, Kuhn, Ruh, Wiehl, and Hrubÿ. VoB provides detailed reference to further scholars whose works reflect ethical considerations in endnote 102.
3. For a full discussion of this point, see below. Chapter5.
4. For a full discussion of this point, see below. Chapter3.
5. Cormeau/Stormer, Hartmann von Aue: Epoche-Vferk-Wirkung, p. 248.
6. Ranawake, review of VoB, p. 144.
7. Peter of Blois, Liber de confessions sacramentali, PL 207, 1088f. Quoted by Fischer, pp. 17f.
8. Schweikle, 'Zum Iwein Hartmanns von Aue. Strukturale Korrespondenzen und Oppositionen'. See Fischer, pp. 52ff.
9. Timothy McFarland, 'Narrative Structure and the Renewal of the Hero's Identity in Iwein', p. 144, compares Iwein's concept of honour as the renown to be gained in knightly pursuits which he displays in his monologue after awakening from his madness, with his later perception of honour as being bound up with his duties to Laudine and her land.
317
:
10. See Alan Robertshaw, 'Ambiguity and Morality in Iwein', pp. 124-6.
11. Hansjürgen Linke, Epische Strukturen in der Dichtung 
Hartmanns von Aue. Untersuchungen zur Formkritik, 
Werkstruktur und Vortragsgliederung. See Fischer, pp. 61ff.
12. Wenzel (ed.), Typus und Individualitat im Mittelalter, p. 7. See O. Ehrismann, 'Hôfisches Leben', p. 101.
13. For further discussion of this point, see below. Chapter5.
14. See G.F. Benecke and K. Lachmann (eds), Iwein, rev. L. Wolff, vol. 2, note to 1. 8121.
15. See entry for suone in A. Erler and E. Kaufmann, Hand- 
worterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte.
16. Dinzelbacher, 'Gefühl und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter. Vorschlage zu einer emotionsgeschichtlichen Darstellung des hochmittelalterlichen Umbruchs', p. 236.
17. Radding, 'Evolution of Medieval Mentalities: A Cognitive-Structural Approach', p. 585.
18. A similar approach is adopted by Corinna Dahlgrün, Hoc 
fac et vives (Lk. 10^26) - 'vor alien dingen minne got'. 
Theologische Reflexionen eines Laien im 'Gregorius' und in 
'Der arme Heinrich' Hartmanns von Aue. She likewise proposes that Hartmann's secular status and audience would make it more likely that his works reflect general and broadly familiar religious notions, such as were to be found in sermons and the liturgy, rather than specific aspects of theological thought. As she does not concentrate on self- awareness, penance is only one of the elements of religious life which she investigates. She then considers the occurrence of biblical imagery and language and also aspects of religious thought in Hartmann's religious narratives, and concludes that Hartmann is indeed employing for the most part those devices and images which would have been familiar to his audience, and in such a way which reveals him to have been generally representative of new developments in theology. See particularly pp. III-IV, 99-101, p. 138, pp. 151-7, 213-22.
19. For a discussion of the phenomenon of the twelfth- century cultural renaissance, see Morris, The Discovery of 
the Individual 1050-1200, pp. 6f. and often; Walter Ullmann, 
The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages, pp. 104-112; G.E. Ladner, 'Terms and Ideas of Renewal'; Christopher Brooke, The Twelfth Century Renaissance; Michael Seidlmayer, 
Currents of Medieval Thought With Special Reference to 
Germany.
318
36. Bumke, pp. 47f.
319
20. R.W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages, pp. 234-6; Seidlmayer, pp. 65-72; Morris, pp. 10-13; Dahlgrün, pp. 10- 12.
21. Morris, p. 23; Brooke, pp. 42-9, including plates 25,30, and 31; Southern, pp. 237-40, including plates I-IV;Karl Bertau, 'Regina lactans. Versuch über den dichterischen Ursprung der Pietà bei Wolfram von Eschenbach', pp. 266-85, notes the influence of this new mode of depiction in Wolfram's work.
22. Morris, pp. 86-95, including plates 1-4. I
23. Morris, pp. 7-9. it24. Morris, pp. 79-86. j
25. Brooke, pp. 117-23, on the sculptor Gilbert at Autun.
26. Walker Bynum, 'Did the Twelfth Century Discover theIndividual?', pp. 2-4. Walker Bynum proceeds to underlinethe role played by greater corporate and communal feeling in the shaping of individual awareness in this age.
27. Ullmann, pp. 3-50.
28. Ullmann, pp. 53-98. Also Morris, p. 26.
29. Ullmann, pp. 54-62.
30. Ullmann, p. 65.
31. Ullmann, p. 98, quoting Sidney Painter.
32. Dominique Barthélémy, 'Kinship', in Georges Duby (ed.),
A History of Private Life: II. Revelations of the Medieval 
World, pp. 85-155, especially pp. 112-7.
33. Morris, pp. 37-48, pp. 121f.; Radding, pp. 590f.;Joachim Bumke, Hofische Kultur: Literatur und Gesellschaft 
im hohen Mittelalter, I, pp. 55-9; Horst Fuhrraann, Germany 
in the High Middle Ages c.1050-1200, pp. 25-7, pp. 77-81; Dinzelbacher, pp. 220f.
34. Cormeau/Stormer, pp. 46-57.
35. John B. Freed, The Counts of Falkenstein: Noble Self- Consciousness in Twelfth-Century Germany, pp. 65-7. Freed (pp. If.) also refers to the work of K. Schmid on the development of this tendency, which can be traced back to the tenth and eleventh centuries in the German empire when office-holding became increasingly hereditary along paternal lines. See also Jeffrey Ashcroft, 'Als ein wilder valk 
erzogen: Minnesang und hofische Socialisation', pp. 60f.
 ,-ii
37. Cormeau/Stôrmer, pp. 57f.
38. Benjamin Arnold, German Knighthood 1050-1300, pp. 9-13; Geoffrey Barraclough, The Origins of Modem Germany, pp. 135-47.
39. Duby, History of Private Life, pp. 75-7; Duby, 'Dans la France du Nord-Ouest au Xlle siècle; les "Jeunes” dans la société aristocratique', pp. 836-41; Ashcroft, pp. 60-3.
40. W.H. Jackson, Chivalry in Twelfth-Century Germany: The 
Works of Hartmann von Aue, pp. 85-92.
41. Arnold, pp. 15f.
42. Jackson, pp. 68f., describes how it became unlawful after 1186 for the sons of priests, deacons, and peasants to become knights. This marked the start of knighthood's development into a socially distinct and noble social class. See also Karl Heinz Borck, 'Adel, Tugend und Geblüt. Thesen und Beobachtungen zur Vorstellung des Tugendadels in der deutschen Literatur des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts', p. 453.
43. Maurice Keen, Chivalry, pp. 143-161; Borck, pp. 427f.
44. Cormeau/Stormer, p. 60.
45. WG 4496-8, 4559-62.
46. Bumke, pp. 421f.
47. Keen, pp. 159-61.
48. Borck, pp. 440-6, lists Der Winsbecke, Der Strieker's 
Beide Knechte, and Wernher der Gartenaere's Meier 
Helmbrecht, Siegfried GroBe, 'wis den wisen gerne bil: Die hofischen Lehren in Hartmanns Gregorius und Wolframs Parzival', p. 62, points to Gurnemanz' accentuation of the discrepancies between Parzival's noble birth and his boorish behaviour (P 164,12; 166,16; 168,25; 170,22f.).
49. Horst Wenzel, Frauendienst und Gottesdienst• Studien zur 
Minneideologie, pp. 25-32.
50. This is not to say that knighthood was not associated with Christian ethics before this, as Keen (pp. 51-55) points out in his references to the chansons de geste and Old High German literature.
51. Bumke, pp. 385-9.
52. Jackson, pp. 86-8; Bumke, pp. 399ff.
53. G. Ehrismann, 'Die Grundlagen des ritterlichen Tugend- systems', in G. Eifler (ed.), Ritterliches Tugendsystem. See also E.R. Curtius, 'Das "ritterliche Tugendsystem"', and
320
Daniel Rocher, 'Lateinische Tradition und ritterliche Ethik;Zum "Ritterlichen Tugendsystem"', in the same Eifler edition.
54. Bumke, p. 416.
55. See C. Stephen Jaeger, The Origins of Courtliness.
Civilizing Trends and the Formation of Courtly Ideals 939- 
1210. One hesitates to embrace Jaeger's conclusions completely that educated courtiers were uniquelyinstrumental in the development of courtly behaviour amongst knights, but he has identified a major area of influence.Jackson, pp. 92-6, points out that Jaeger's reliance onThomasin does not take into account Thomasin's recommendation that knights as well as clerics should be regarded as examples of proper behaviour.
56. Keen, pp. 4-6. See also Klaus Schreiner, '"Hof" (curia) und "hofische Lebensführung" (vita curialis) als Heraus- forderung an die christliche Theologie und Frommigkeit', pp.123ff., who notes that clerical authors did not only express criticism of the courtly way of life, but also attempted by means of this kind of literature to improve and influence the Christian morality of the courts.
57. Wenzel, Frauendienst und Gottesdienst, pp. 93-5.
58. Wenzel, Frauendienst und Gottesdienst, pp. 96-8; Volker Honemann, 'Herger'.
59. Ottokar Fischer, 'Die sogenannten Ratschlage fur 
Liebende', p. 423. See also Wenzel, Frauendienst und 
Gottesdienst, pp. 126-33.
60. Keen, pp. 6-23.
61. Duby, 'Les "Jeunes"', esp. p. 844, argues that didactic courtly literature specifically reflects the real-life tensions between different generations of the military aristocracy, and is aimed at controlling the anarchic approach to life of the younger sons, as well as mirroring their dreams and aspirations. Ursula Peters, 'Artusroman und Fürstenhof. Darstellung und Kritik neuerer sozial- geschichtlicher Untersuchungen zu Hartmanns Erec', esp. pp.435f., and 'Hôfische Liebe. Ein Forschungsproblem der Mentalitatsgeschichte', pp. 7-10, recentres Duby's claims in pointing out that they are based on the evidence of works of ideology, rather than reflecting historical reality. Courtly |literature does not necessarily reflect real tensions |between the iuvenes and seniores, but instead includes the jrole of younger knights within the general discussion of the Iproblems of lordship and knighthood. Peters' adjustment is |valid, but she perhaps goes too far in diminishing the |possibility that these works reflect a very real social Iphenomenon.
321
62. Morris, pp. 43f.
63. Bumke, pp. 522-9; Wenzel, Frauendienst und Gottesdienst, pp. 134-40.
64. Bumke, p. 13; Jackson, p. 108.
65. Southern, p. 243.
66. Southern, p. 246.
67. Hildegard Nobel, 'Schuld und Sühne in Hartmanns 
Gregorius und in der frühscholastischen Theologie', pp. 42- 4; Wenzel, 'Der Gregorius Hartmanns von Aue. Überlegungen zur zeitgenôssischen Rezeption des Werkes', p. 326; W. Ohly, 
Die heilsgeschichtliche Struktur der Epen Hartmanns von Aue, pp. lOf.; Cormeau, Hartmanns von Aue 'Armer Heinrich' und 
'Gregorius'. Studien zur Interpretation mit dem Blick auf 
die Theologie zur Zeit Hartmanns, pp. 77-83.
68. Frank Tobin, 'Fallen Man and Hartmann's Gregorius', p. 86; Wolfgang Dittmann, Hartmanns Gregorius. Untersuchungen 
zur Über lief erung, zumAufbau und Gehalt, p. 188, pp. 195-7; Tobin, 'Gregorius' and 'Der arme Heinrich'. Hartmann's 
Dualistic and Gradualistic Views of Reality, pp. 24f.; K. Dieter Goebel, Untersuchungen zu Aufbau und Schuldproblem in 
Hartmanns 'Gregorius', pp. 107f.
69. M.-D. Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth 
Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin 
West, pp. 246-9.
70. Morris, p. 67. Shari Holmer, 'Popular Religion and the Romances of Hartmann von Aue', also investigates the influence of popular theology on Hartmann, in particular the link between Hartmann's imagery and popular images used in vernacular homilies. See also Dahlgrün, pp. 92-4.
71. Aron Gurevich, Medieval Popular Culture: Problems of 
Belief and Perception, pp. 1-24. Southern, pp. 246-257, also points to Miracles of the Virgin stories as popular forms of religion. See also Dahlgrün, pp. 95-7.
72. Gurevich, pp. 31-3, pp. 153-75.
73. Gurevich, p. 2.
74. Gurevich, p. 6.
75. Southern, pp. 160-9, pp. 223-6; G. Constable, 'Renewal and Reform in Religious Life; Concepts and Realities'; Duby, 
History of Private Life, pp. 514-17.
76. Southern, pp. 156-160; Duby, History of Private Life, pp. 528-30.
322
77. David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, pp. 7- 11.
78. Wolf Gewehr, 'Zu den Begriffen anima und cor im frühmittelalterlichen Denken', pp. 40-2.
79. Knowles, pp. 18ff.
80. Knowles, pp. 29-45? Michael Haren, Medieval Thought. The 
Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the
Thirteenth Century, pp. 44-50.
81. St Augustine, Soliloquies, I, 2, 7. Translation inKnowles, p. 33.
82. St Augustine, Soliloquies, II, 1, 1. Translation inKnowles, p. 33,
83. Wolf Gewehr, Hartmanns 'Klage-Büchlein' im Lichte der 
Frühscholastik, pp. 54f.
84. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, pp. 43f.
85. St Augustine, Confessions, X, 6. See Gewehr, Früh­
scholastik, pp. 50f., p. 55.
86. Xenja von Ertzdorff, 'Das Herz in der lateinisch- theologischen und frühen volkssprachigen religiosen Literatur', p. 253.
87. St Augustine, De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, I, 62. (PL 40, 54). See von Ertzdorff, 'Das Herz', p. 255, p. 261. Also Gewehr, Frühscholastik, pp. 55-7.
88. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, pp. 50f.
89. St Augustine, Confessions, X, 3.
90. Chenu, pp. 72-9.
91. Morris, pp. 60-3.
92. Knowles, pp. 86f.
93. Southern, p. 226. The first quotation is to be found in the Meditatio, XI, (PL 158, 763). The second is in the 
Proslogion. Chap. 1.
94. Benedicta Ward in Anselm's Prayers and Meditations, pp. 53f.
95. Ward in Anselm's Prayers and Meditations, p. 36, pp. 275-7.
96. Southern, p. 227. The text is to be found in 
Similitudines, Chap. C-CIX, (PL 159, 665-9).
323
97. Southern, pp. 229-31; Etienne Gilson, History of 
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 164-6.
98. Morris, p. 76.
99. Southern, p. 231.
100. Justin McCann's introduction to the Epistola, pp. xviff.
101. PL 180, 695. Translated in Morris, p. 64.
102. William of St Thierry, Epistola, XVI, 69. Translation by Shewring.
103. William of St Thierry, Epistola, XVI, 60. Translation by Shewring.
104. William of St Thierry, Epistola, XV, 49. Translation by Shewring.
105. William of St Thierry, Epistola, XV, 54. Translation by Shewring.
106. Duckworth, Gregorius. A Medieval Man's Discovery of his 
True Self, pp. 75-82.
107. Knowles, p. 130; Friedrich Heer, The Medieval World.
Europe 1100-1350, p. 107; Deferrari's introduction to De 
sacramentis, p. ix.
108. McGinn, The Presence of God: A History of Western 
Christian Mysticism. I: The Foundations of Mysticism, pp. xvi-xx.
109. Haren, p. 114.
110. Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate, Prologue, 890D. iQuoted in Haren, p. 113. ■
111. Peter Abelard, Didascalion, I, 1 and 3. See D.E. jLuscombe, The School of Peter Abelard. The Influence of |
Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period, pp. 188f. ;
112. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, II, 13, 2. Translation by Deferrari.
113. Abelard is a scholastic thinker as opposed to a monastic thinker in the sense that he operated as a peripatetic teacher at cathedral schools. Jean Leclerq, 'Renewal of Theology', describes the different audiences, subject matter, and approaches of the scholastic or speculative and monastic or contemplative theologians. However, he also emphasizes the many points of 'cross­fertilization' between the two approaches, for example their use of dialectic and their emphasis on greater personal
324
piety. In addition, Leclerq describes the broad influence of both approaches, particularly on questions of penance and intention. Chenu, pp. 273f., pp. 300-9, likewise draws the same distinctions and conclusions. I have thus attempted to distinguish between the two approaches in a similar way, in an effort to avoid above all the tendency to employ the term 
scholastic as a catch-all for twelfth-century thought.
114. Luscombe, School of Peter Abelard, pp. 1-5 and often.
115. Peter Abelard, Ethica, XIV, (PL 178, 654A). Translated in Luscombe, Peter Abelard's 'Ethics', p. 57.
116. Peter Abelard, Ethica, III, (PL 178, 639B-C). Translated in Luscombe, Peter Abelard's 'Ethics', p. 15.
117. Peter Abelard, Ethica, XII-XIII, (PL 178, 652f.). Translated in Luscombe, Peter Abelard's 'Ethics', p. 55, p.57.
118. Haren, p. 108.
119. See Chapter 1 of this present study.
120. Chenu, p. 277.
121. G.D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima 
collectio, XXII, 1007-10. Translated in John T. MacNeill andHelena M. Gamer, Medieval Handbooks of Penance, p. 413.
122. Morris, p. 73.
123. Mark 1. 15; Luke 15. 20ff.; John 20. 21-3; 1 John 1. 9;2 Corinthians 7. lOf. See B. Poschmann, Penance and the 
Anointing of the Sick, pp. 6-19.
124. From the second epistle of St Clement, 9, 7f. See Poschmann, p. 22.
125. Hermas, Similitude, VIII, 6, 2. See Poschmann, pp. 29f., note 38.
126. Origen, Commentary in John 19. 13. See Poschmann, pp. 67f.
127. Origen, Commentary in John 36. 4, 2. See Poschmann, p. 68.
128. 'Non tam consideranda est mensura temporis quam doloris.' St Augustine, Enchiridion, XVII, 65. English translation from Poschmann, p. 94.
129. This was the case after the Council of Nicaea in A.D. 325. Prior to this, carnal sins were held to be beyond the powers of priestly absolution. See Andrea Hopkins, The 
Sinful Knights. A Study of Middle English Penitential
325
Romance, p. 38.
130. Hopkins, pp. 39f.; MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 20-2.
131. Poschmann, pp. 106f.
132. Hermas, Similitude, VIII, 10, 2; Mandatum, IV, 3, 6. See Poschmann, pp. 30f., including note 39.
133. O.D. Watkins, A History of Penance, I, pp. 330-61, pp. 475f.; Hopkins, p. 39.
134. PL 49, 263 and 284-93; Watkins, I, pp. 304-7, pp. 336-40.
135. Pierre J. Payer, 'Penance and Penitentials', p. 488; MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 24f.
136. Penitential of Cummean, XI. MacNeill and Gamer, p. 116.
137. Penitential of Columbanus, 30. MacNeill and Gamer, p. 257.
138. Payer, pp. 490f.; MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 47-9.
139. Payer, p. 489; Hopkins, p. 43.
140. MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 46f. See also Hopkins, p. 43.
141. MacNeill and Gamer, pp. 26f. Also Gurevich, pp. 24-31, pp. 78-103, who investigates the manner in which the penitentials encouraged self-analysis and other elements of the theology of penance which were incorporated into the popular religious consciousness.
142. Watkins, li, p. 759.
143. MacNeill and Gamer, p. 402.
144. Watkins, II, p. 768.
145. Watkins, II, pp. 735f.
146. Payer, pp. 488f.
147. Poschmann, pp. 139f.
148. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum, XXII, 678. See Watkins, II, p. 748.
149. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum, XXII, 715. See Watkins, II, p. 748.
150. Poschmann, p. 138.
326
151. Paul Anciaux, La Théologie du Sacrement de Pénitence au 
Xlle siècle, p. 10. Anciaux, pp. 8-20, also lists Ivo of Chartres' Decretum (circa 1094), Bonizo of Sutri's Liber de 
vita Christiana (1089-95), and Lanfranc's Libellus de 
celanda confessions (pre 1089) as displaying movement towards and desire for systematization in the treatment of penance.
152. Anciaux, pp. 15f., p. 608.
153. Anciaux, pp. 54f.
154. Anciaux, p. 392, p. 605.
155. Poschmann, p. 157.
156. Luscombe, Peter Abelard's 'Ethics', pp. xxxiif.;Luscombe, 'The Ethics of Abelard; Some Further Considerations', pp. 82-4.
157. Anciaux, pp. 64-7, p. 178.
158. Peter Abelard, Ethica, XIX, (PL 178, 664C-D).Translated in Luscombe, Peter Abelard's 'Ethics', p. 89. See also Anciaux, pp. 155-7.
159. Peter Abelard, Ethica, XXIV, (PL 178, 668C-D).Translated in Luscombe, Peter Abelard's 'Ethics', p. 99.
160. Peter Abelard, Ethica, XXIV and XXV, (PL 178, 668-73). See Luscombe, Peter Abelard's 'Ethics', pp. 98-111. Also Anciaux, pp. 178-81, p. 208, p. 352.
161. Peter Abelard, Ethica, XXV, (PL 178, 671f.). Translated in Luscombe, Peter Abelard's 'Ethics', p. 107, p. 109.
162. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, II, 14, 8.Translated by Deferrari, p. 420. See also Anciaux, pp. 186- 94, p. 208.
163. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, II, 14, 8.Translated by Deferrari, p. 421.
164. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, II, 14, 8.Translated by Deferrari, pp. 418f.
165. Anciaux, pp. 196-201, comments on Gratian's discussion of this problem.
166. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, II, 14, 1.Translated by Deferrari, p. 403.
167. Anciaux, pp. 79f., p. 100, p. 223.
168. Peter Lombard, Liber quattuor sententiarum, IV, 17, 1, (PL 192, 880). English translation in Watkins, II, p. 745.
327
169. Peter Lombard, Liber quattuor sententiarum, IV, 17, 2, (PL 192, 881). English translation in Watkins, II, p. 745.
170. Anciaux, pp. 352f.
171. Anciaux, pp. 330f., p. 353.
172. Anciaux, pp. 86-9, p. 464.
173. Anciaux, pp. 400-2, pp. 473-80.
174. Alan of Lille, Liber poenitentialis, (PL 210, 299). Translation from Watkins, II, p. 747.
175. Anciaux, pp. 502-8.
176. Anciaux, pp. 121-31, p. 490.
177. Anciaux, p. 134. See also Holmer, pp. 7-12.
178. Anciaux, p. 461.
179. Ursula Schulze, 'Bamberger Glaube und Beichte', p. 1402.
180. Schulze, 'Bamberger Beichte', pp. 1402f.; David McLintock, 'Bamberger und Erster Wessobrunner Glaube und 
Beichte', p. 595.
181. K. Müllenhoff and W. Scherer, Denkmaler deutscher 
Poesie und Prosa aus dem VIII-XII Jahrhundert, vol. I, pp. 305f.
182. Wenzel, Frauendienst und Gottesdienst, pp. 132f.
183. Thomasin also describes the control of the intellect over the physical senses (WG 10193-6).
184. GroB, Hartmanns Büchlein dargestellt in seiner 
psychologischen, ethischen und theologischen Bezogenheit auf 
das Gesamtwerk des Dichters, p. 75.
185. Leslie Seiffert, 'On the Language of Sovereignty, Deference and Solidarity: The Surrender of the Accusing Lover in Hartmann's Klage', refers to the heart as neutral and to the body as both masculine and neutral. I have elected to refer to both the body and heart as neutral entities in order to distinguish the body from the lover as a whole.
186. See also Wenzel, Frauendienst und Gottesdienst, pp. 163f.
187. Seiffert, 'On the Language of Sovereignty', p. 28.
328
188. Roy Boggs, Hartmann von Aue. Lemmatisierte Konkordanz
zum Gesamtwerk, I, pp. 314f., lists the followingoccurrences of 'rat, râten'-DK 147, 180, 535, 561, 565, 570,573, 580, 582, 588, 598, 647, 661, 672, 902, 928, 999, 1003,1010, 1056, 1122, 1136, 1139, 1141, 1157, 1266, 1294, 1334,1349, 1487, 1490.
189. See also DK 646-9, 926-8, 941f.
190. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, pp. 83-7.
191. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, p. 241, p. 243.
192. See also DK 112-4, 144-6, 178f.
193. See also DK 75-86, 391-410, 432f.
194. See also DK 1069-98.
195. G. Ehrismann, 'Die Grundlagen des ritterlichen Tugend- systems', p. 42, note 68.
196. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, pp. 30f. Also GroB, p. 1. Notethat Gewehr uses the term early scholastic as a catch-allfor twelfth-century scholastic and monastic thinkers. I197. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, pp. 80-7. ;
198. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, pp. 43f., pp. 93-5. |I199. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, pp. 95-8, cites examples from jscholastic writers, and criticizes Schonbach for |misunderstanding these distinct terms. Ï
1200. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, p. 100.
201. Michel-André Bossy, 'Medieval Debates of Body and Soul', notes the substitution of the heart for the soul in the early thirteenth-century Altercatio cordis et oculi of Philip the Chancellor and the third body/soul debate of jBonvesin. However, these works depict the heart as a jreprobate, afflicted by the forces of love and ignoring its responsibilities by leading the body astray. In this way, these works reflect the fragmentary Trost in Verzweiflung which has been dated as a near contemporary to Die Klage, |but which represents the heart as unreliable and requiring Îchastisement from the body. See F. Maurer, Die religiosen j
Dichtungen des 11. und 12. Jahrhunderts, vol. 2, pp. 342-5.Also E. Papp, 'Trost in Verzweiflung'. The depiction of the heart as the organ of reason in such a debate, however, is |evident in the thirteenth-century Débat du cuer et du corps îby Villon (Bossy, pp. 155f.) and Philip the Chancellor's î
Disputatio membrorum (Bossy, p. 160).
202. Wisniewski, 'Hartmanns Klage-Büchlein', p. 243.
329
203. Wisniewski, p. 241.
204. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das Herz', p. 288, notes 4, 5, and 6.
205. LJ 2385ff. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das Herz', p. 288.
206. DJG 203ff., 372ff. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das Herz', p. 289. Also Wenzel, Frauendienst und Gottesdienst, pp. 159f.
207. RVG 3154ff. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das Herz', pp. 290f. Also Wenzel, Frauendienst und Gottesdienst, pp. 160f.
208. VTG 202ff., 216ff., 444ff., 911ff. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das 
Herz', p. 290.
209. Cormeau/Stormer, p. 107; Gewehr, 'Hartmanns Klage- 
Büchlein als Gattungsproblem', p. 11; Wenzel, Frauendienst 
und Gottesdienst, p. 162.
210. Von Ertzdorff, 'Das Herz', p. 252, pp. 258f.
211. For example, these influences appear to have contributed to the development of the motif of ' dumbe herte ' in Veldeke's work (MF 56,7; 56,23-7). See also Dietmar von Eist (MF 33,12).
212. Von Ertzdorff, 'Die Dame im Herzen und das Herz bei der Dame. Zur Verwendung des Begriffs Herz in der hofischen Liebeslyrik des 11. und 12. Jahrhunderts', pp. 6-8, pp. 45f.
213. Gewehr, 'Gattungsproblem', pp. 9-11, condemns Gustav Ehrismann, Piquet, and Wapnewski for considering Die Klage to be merely a secular variation of the theological concerns in the body/soul disputations.
214. R.C.J. Endres, 'Minne in the Prologue of Hartmann's 
Klage', pp. 71-8.
215. See also Thomas L. Keller (ed.), Hartmann von Aue. 
Klagebüchlein, p. xvii. GroB, p. 3, makes the same point, proposing the connection between love and virtue as evidence of Hartmann's gradualistic views.
216. Mertens, 'Factus est per clericum miles cythereus: Überlegungen zu Entstehungs- und Wirkungsbedingungen von Hartmanns Klage-Büchlein', p. 10.
217. Hrubÿ, 'Moralphilosophie und Moraltheologie in Hartmanns Erec', p. 196.
218. Hrubÿ, 'Moralphilosophie', pp. 209f.
219. Hrubÿ, 'Moralphilosophie', pp. 200-3.
330
220. Hrubÿ, 'Moralphilosophie', pp. 212f. Cormeau, 'Joie de la curt. Bedeutungssetzung und ethische Erkenntnis', pp. 200-4, esp. note 26, rejects Hrubÿ's proposai, and concludes instead that Hartmann was creating a balance of objective and subjective aspects of lay ethical behaviour, based on social norms and the teaching on subjective guilt of twelfth-century scholars. In a later work, Hrubÿ, 'Hartmann als artifex, philosophus und praeceptor der Gesellschaft', pp. 262-4, himself tones down his earlier conclusions by recognizing that Hartmann was attempting to reflect Christian morality in a secular setting. Hrubÿ is content to conclude that secular virtues earn a degree of moral value because they demand the same criteria as Christian virtues.
221. Mertens, 'Factus est per clericum', p. 14.
222. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, pp. 247f.
223. Seiffert, 'On the Language of Sovereignty', pp. 49f.
224. Seiffert, 'On the Language of Sovereignty', p. 51.
225. Gewehr, Frühscholastik, p. 243.
226. Clarence E. Butler, 'Hartmann von Aue als Übersetzer und Padagoge. Eine Untersuchung zur Erhellung padagogischer Absichten in den hofischen Epen', pp. 73-83, describes Hartmann's version as a translation, but highlights the extra dimensions which Hartmann adds to clarify Chrétien's inner textual meaning. Butler does not investigate the volatile adaptation courtoise debate. The scope of this present study also prohibits such an investigation in detail. Suffice to say that Hartmann freely expands on issues apparent in the French text. In this sense, he creates his own dimension of meaning through the emphasis of existing elements. On the adaptation courtoise debate, see: Michel Huby, L'adaptation des romans courtois en Allemagne 
au Xlle et au XlIIe siècles; René Pérennec, 'Adaptation et société: l'adaptation par Hartmann d'Aue du roman de Chrétien de Troyes Erec et Enide'; Alois Wolf, 'Die "Adaptation courtoise". Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem neuen Dogma'; Jill Pamela McDonald, 'Hartmann von Aue's Erec and Chrétien de Troyes' Erec et Enidez The Extent and Logic of Hartmann's Transformations of Chretien's Romance'.
227. See above. Chapter 1.
228. English translation in Chrétien de Troyes, Arthurian 
Romances, translated by D.D.R. Owen.
229. Lexer, Mittelhochdeutsches Handworterbuch, lists tump as denoting 'schwach von sinnen od. verstande, dumm, toricht, unbesonnen, einfâltig, unklug; klares verstandes geraubt; unerfahren, jung; ungelehrt; stumm.' Thus, this term covers all manner of not-knowing, including conscious and unconscious ignorance. Alois Haas, Parzivals 'tumpheit'
331
bei Wolfram von Eschenbach, pp. 234-47, considers tumpheit to denote the new inwardness of twelfth-century thought, but also humankind's inheritance of original sin and its state of childlike belief before the Fall. However, these more specifically religious interpretations have a greater resonance for works such as Gregorius which shares 
Parzival's spiritual scope. In Erec, this term has greater secular connotations, although it reflects the concern with perception in twelfth-century scholastic and monastic thought.
230. According to Lexer, Mittelhochdeutsches Handworterbuch, 
buoze denotes 'geistl. und rechtl. busse: besserung,heilmittel, vergütung, strafe.' Buoz, however, is more generally 'besserung, abhülfe' or used in conjunction with the verbs tuon, machen, and werden. This use is listed in Benecke/Müller/Zarncke as denoting the making good of a mistake or evil by the perpetrator. The examples of its use in Erec (Er 1474, 4355, 4788, 5673) support this, eventhough buoz may often actually denote buoze, which is often used in the phrase ze buoze stàn, and denotes a more reciprocal arrangement between the perpetrator of the evil and the victim. Buoz will therefore not be included in the investigations of the present study as the connotation of contrition is not visible in this term.
231. Lexer, Mittelhochdeutsches Handworterbuch lists riuwe as indicating 'betrübnis über getanes, reue; betrübnis über etwas geschehenes (verlust), schmerz, kummer, trauer, leid, mitleid'. A distinction is made, therefore, between pain experienced as a result of acknowledging one's guilt (regret), or of suffering an objective loss or injury.
232. See above. Chapter 2. This connection contrasts with Werner Schrôder's reading of Erec in which he sees the term 
riuwe used in a courtly rather than in a spiritual sense like in Gregorius. See Schroder, 'Zum Wortgebrauch von riuwe bei Hartmann und Wolfram', pp. 229f.
233. Yeandle, 'Schame in the works of Hartmann von Aue', pp. 198f. and often.
234. Yeandle, p. 221.
235. Er 18, 145, 150, 708, 757, 930, 1138, 1264, 2255, 2285, 2324, 2331. In addition, Erec's combat with Iders isdescribed as his first (Er 1266), and he is praised at the wedding tournament as the best knight ever of his age (Er 2480-2).
236. Boggs, 'Hartmann's Erec', pp. 51f.
237. For example, Er 309, 316, 331, 1318, 1325, 1457, 1462, 9467, 9470.
332
238. Ranawake, 'Erec's verligen and the Sin of Sloth', p. 103, note 32.
239. Geoffrey See, 'An Examination of the Hero in Hartmann's Erec', pp. 39-45; Heimo Reinitzer, 'Über Beispielfiguren im Erec', pp. 605-11; Robert E. Lewis, 'Erec's Knightly Imperfections', pp. 152-7; Roy Boggs, 'Hartmann's Erec', pp. 51-5; Dennis Green, 'Hartmann's Ironic Praise of Erec', pp. 797-804.
240. Clark, Landscapes of Mind, p. 83.
241. Clark, Landscapes of Mind, p. 55.
242. See Green, 'Ironic Praise', pp. 799-802; Jackson, p. 107; Reinitzer, pp. 599-604. Reinitzer also remarks that these comparisons imply Enite's culpability (pp. 610-12). This point is dismissed by Ursula Schulze, 'Amis unde man: Die zentrale Problematik in Hartmanns Erec', p. 22, note 25, who maintains that erotic love is to blame rather than Enite's objective guilt as a woman.
243. On the importance of this transition in aristocratic society, see Duby, 'Les "Jeunes"', p. 836.
244. Schnell, 'Gesinnungsethik', pp. 33-5, concludes that the issue of reflection in Iwein is evident in Iwein's moving from a state of non-reflection to reflection. However, the issue appears to be more complex. Both Iwein and Erec are shown to be capable of reflecting before their crises. The question remains as to what degree Hartmann's protagonists are still able to reflect once their identities have expanded, and to the social effects of that inadequate perception. In contrast to Iwein, however, the issue of immaturity receives greater emphasis in Erec.
245. See above. Chapter 2.
246. Jackson, p. 220.
247. Schulze, 'Âmîs unde man', pp. 17-23.
248. Ranawake, 'Sin of Sloth', pp. 98-100.
249. Martin Jones, 'Chrétien, Hartmann, and the Knight asFighting Man: On Hartmann's Chivalric Adaptation of Erec et
Enide', p. 87.
250. See also Hrubÿ, 'Die Problemstellung in Chrétiens und Hartmanns Erec', pp. 361-3, who describes Enide as representing the lady of the courtly love lyric who haughtily disdains her lover. Enide has to discover that such an approach does not comply with a marriage relationship. Hartmann, in contrast, includes fewer terms relating to the courtly love convention, and portrays Enite instead as a loyal wife.
333
251. Ranawake, 'Sin of Sloth', p. 103.
252. Kuhn, 'Erec', pp. 46f. Kuhn, pp. 44-8, also claims that a process of development exists in these works which is linked with penitential practice. However, Kuhn argues that Erec consciously chooses to follow a path of penitence. VoB, 
Artusepik, pp. 85f., rejects this interpretation, claiming that by allowing any sense of development to exist, Kuhn is contradicting his own earlier rejection of subjective causality.
253. Ranawake, 'Sin of Sloth', p. 115; Ranawake, 'verligen und versitzenz Das Versaumnis des Helden und die Sünde der Trâgheit in den Artusromanen Hartmanns von Aue', p. 34.
254. See below. Chapter 5.
255. Uwe Ruberg, Beredtes Schweigen in lehrhafter und 
erzahlender deutscher Literatur des Mittelalters, pp. 19- 138, considers the concept of silence in classical, biblical, and patristic sources. He concludes that silence indicates patience, restraint, and the ability to listen properly, especially to God. He also argues that silence and speech should be controlled by thought and points to a common image which is also found in secular literature depicting the tongue as an instrument of evil which is imprisoned in the mouth and restrained by the heart. In 
Erec, as Ruberg states, speech and other sensory functions are indeed associated with the powers of the intellect. However, silence is employed primarily in this text to denote uncourtliness or the absence of thought processes.
256. Clark, 'Hartmann's Erec: Language, Perception, and Transformation', pp. 84f., suggests that Enite intends Erec to hear her words. However, there is little textual evidence to support any hidden motives on Enite's part. Peter Kern, 'Reflexe des literarischen Gesprachs über Hartmanns Erec in der deutschen Dichtung des Mittelalters', pp. 132f., maintains that Enite's fear of losing Erec is ambiguous and can be interpreted as either altruistic or egoistic. Admittedly, her selflessness soon becomes apparent against the robbers, as Kern states, but at Karnant her fears are more singularly egotistical than Kern claims. The change in this motivation is subsequently emphasized by the robbers episodes.
257. Evelyn Jacobson, 'The Unity of wort and sinnz Language as Theme and Structural Element in Hartmann's Erec', pp. 124f., also considers Erec to recognize the words but not the meaning. However, she discusses this phenomenon in terms of Erec's linguistic disorder reflecting the objective fall from grace of humankind and the chaos caused by human weakness. Once Erec has regained the ability to communicate unambiguously, his ordered linguistic abilities bring a social harmony which reflects the Divine Order. Jacobson employs discourse analysis techniques to demonstrate that
334
Hartmann is depicting his protagonists schematically, i.e. using the audience's conventional knowledge structure of the Divine Order which prompts certain expectations (p. 122), Jacobson's use of discourse analysis is illuminating. However, one might also suggest that the conventional knowledge structure of Hartmann's audience would have included notions of penance and self-awareness.
258. Clark, 'Language, Perception, Transformation', p. 85.
259. Kuhn, pp. 44f.
260. Cormeau/Stormer, p. 183.
261. Boggs, 'Hartmann's Erec', p. 56.
262. Fisher, 'Erecs Schuld und Enitens Unschuld bei Hartmann', p. 162. However, Fisher makes no connection with the issue of penance and self-knowledge.
263. Fisher, 'Rauber, Riesen und die Stimme der Vernunft in Hartmanns und Chrétiens Erec', p. 365.
264. Heine, 'Shifting Perspectives; The Narrative Strategy in Hartmann's Erec'.
265. Heine, p. 103.
266. See Holmer, 'Popular Religion', p. 7. She also notes that this process stems from the concept of sin as a sickness. Curing like with like was originally a medical principle, generally attributed to Themison of Laodicea (circa. 50BC). See also Ranawake, 'Sin of Sloth', pp. 105f.
267. Her only thoughts are those of longing for each other and for their wedding night which she shares with Erec (Er 1840-56, 1872-5) and her fears that Erec has been killed by Iders (Er 853f.). Her only example of speech is in answer to her father's command to care for Erec's horse (Er 322).
268. Clark, Landscapes of Mind, p. 63.
269. For example, Reinitzer, pp. 610-12; 0. Ehrismann,'Hôfisches Leben', pp. 113f.
270. For example, Barbara Thoran, 'Diu ir man verraten hât - zum Problem von Enitens Schuld im Erec Hartmanns von Aue', pp. 257-9; Thomas Cramer, 'Soziale Motivation in der Schuld- Sühne-Problematik von Hartmanns Erec', pp. 106f.
271. For example, Hugo Kuhn, 'Erec', p. 48; Fisher, 'Erecs Schuld', pp. 163-5 and often; Kurt Ruh, Hofische Epik des 
deutschen Mittelalters, I, p. 118.
335
272. Schnell, 'Literarische Beziehungen zwischen Hartmanns 
Erec und Wolframs Parzival', pp. 315-21; Kathryn Smits, 'Enite als christliche Ehefrau', pp. 13f. and often; id., 'Die Schônheit der Frau in Hartmanns Erec', pp. If. and often; Schulze, 'Âmis unde man', pp. 27-9.
273. Wendy Sterba, 'The Question of Enite's Transgression: Female Voice and Male Gaze as Determining Factors in Hartmann's Erec', pp. 58-60, pp. 67f.
274. Tobin, 'Hartmann's Erec: The Perils of Young Love', pp. 5f.
275. Sterba, p. 62.
276. Karen Pratt, 'Adapting Enide; Chrétien, Hartmann, and the Female Reader', pp. 80-4, argues that women's speech is of less consequence in Hartmann's text than in his source. This is particularly evident in Hartmann's reduction of Enide's speaking out at Karnant, which removes the challenge of the female voice and serves to focus the narrative on Erec. Such a conclusion, however, does not take account of the contrast between the heroines' monologues in the robbers episodes in which Enite's thoughts and speech receive greater emphasis than her French counterpart.
277. McConeghy, 'Women's Speech and Silence in Hartmann von Aue's Erec', p. 775.
278. McConeghy, p. 781.
279. Prudence Allen, The Concept of Woman. The Aristotelian 
Revolution 750BC - AD 1250, pp. 262-315; Joan Ferrante, 
Woman as Image in Medieval Literature. From the Twelfth 
Century to Dante, pp. If., pp. 23-35, pp. 63f.
280. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis. I, 6, 35. See Ferrante, p. 32.
281. Hanning, The Individual in Twelfth-Century Romance, p. 61, p. 79.
282. Dinzelbacher, pp. 221f.
283. Stielstra, 'The Portrayal of Consciousness in Medieval Romance', pp. 1-15, pp. 29-37.
284. Stielstra, pp. 56-9.
285. Peter Wiehl, Die Redeszene als episches Strukturelement 
in den Erec- und Iwein-Dichtungen Hartmanns von Aue und 
Chrestiens de Troyes, pp. 19-37, compares the effects of direct and indirect speech and their use in classical and medieval literature.
336
286. Schulze, *Âmîs unde man', p. 31, argues that Hartmann's nameless count represents the depersonalizing effect of love. One may add that the count's anonymity associates him with the robbers as opposed to Guivreiz, and emphasizes the difference between the threat posed by him and later by Cringles. However, it should not be overlooked that, in the French source, Galoain's name is mentioned on only one occasion (EeE 3129). In addition, this reference occurs in the manuscript used by Foerster (B.N. fr, 1450), but not in the one used by Roques (B.N. 794).
287. See Jackson, pp. 116-8, who compares Hartmann's depiction of the failure of Galoain and Cringles to protect their guests and to keep the peace with judicial and social concerns in the German empire in which counts in particular enjoyed great autonomy and played an important role in the local administration of justice.
288. Jones, 'Knight as Fighting Man', p. 104.
289. It is significant that Hartmann only discusses the issue of cowardice on an occasion on which Erec faces an opponent of equal status. Chrétien investigates this issue in Enide's expectations of her husband. However, in Hartmann's version, only Guivreiz doubts Erec's courage. The issue is thereby presented as a legitimate concern in terms of knighthood, rather than of a wife's pride in and loyalty to her husband.
290. Jackson, p. 124.
291. See above. Chapter 2.
292. Jones, 'Knight as Fighting Man', p. 108.
293. See also Er 4778-806, 4836-45.
294. Clark, Landscapes of Mind, p. 72.
295. The didactic nature of humour distinguishes it from comedy. Comedy can be universally appreciated and is created by an unexpected deviation from the norm. Humour utilizes this element of comedy, but incorporates not only a recognition of the disproportion, but also a desire to overcome it and an awareness of the contradictions of life and imperfections of all earthly beings. Humour therefore places comedy into the perspective of human existence. As such, it requires a degree of insight on the audience's part, as well as experience of the world. See Hans Fromm, 'Komik und Humor in der Dichtung des deutschen Mittel- alters'; Green, Irony in the Medieval Romance} Theo Vater, 'Das Komische und der Humor'.
296. Salmon, 'Ignorance and Awareness of Identity in Hartmann and Wolfram: An Element of Dramatic Irony', p. 95.
337 J
i
vi
297. Fisher, 'Rauber, Riesen', pp. 367f.
298. This point is overlooked by Clark, Landscapes of Mind, pp. 74f., who argues that Erec undergoes an apparent regression at this stage.
299. Jackson, pp. 127f.
300. Fisher, 'Rauber, Riesen', p. 363.
301. Elena Offstein, 'Hartmann's Value System as Reflected in his Treatment of the Decision-Making Process', pp. 47-80, argues that Hartmann distinguishes throughout this text between decisions which are informed by calculation or by instinct. She further maintains that instinctive decisions are always crucial and beneficial for the positive characters and disastrous for the negative characters. An appraisal of inner awareness reveals, however, that an apparently instinctive decision is actually based on perceptive thought processes, such as Erec demonstrates in this episode.
302. Geoffrey See, p, 48, argues that Erec's questioning of the giants reveals a continuation of his inappropriate and uncourtly behaviour, as only direct action is effective against such uncourtly enemies. However, one could also argue that Erec's communicative breakthrough at this juncture is heightened by such uncommunicative opponents. Furthermore, Erec's questions emphasize his careful assessment of the need for combat before taking action.
303. This term is used by both the protagonists in Die Klage (Body:48, 151, 221, 307, 1743; Heart;712, 749, 1418, 1615). In Erec, it appears in these three particular groupings, but also occurs on single occasions when it most frequently denotes good craftsmanship, such as in the trappings on Enite's horse (Er 7599), Feimurgan's plaster (Er 5159, 5240), and the magic fence at Brandigan (Er 8749).
304. Cormeau/Stormer, pp. 186f.
305. Tobin, 'Perils of Young Love', p. 9,
306. Geoffrey See, pp. 39-45, traces the sudden reactions of the hero throughout the text. In the pve-verligen episode, he interprets Erec's swift reactions as demonstrating excessive enthusiasm and obsessiveness. This constitutes a heavy reading of a point which might simply indicate positive youthful eagerness. However, See does recognize that Erec develops the ability to react swiftly to the needs of others, such as Enite on this occasion (p. 49).
307. Schulze, 'Âmîs unde man', p. 36.
338
308. Jones, 'Changing Tack or Showing Tact?; Erec's Self- Criticism in the Second Encounter with Guivreiz in Hartmann von Aue's Free', pp. 231f. Jones cites Harms, p. 127; G. Ehrismann, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur, II, p. 169; Petrus Tax, 'Studien zum Symbolischen in Hartmanns Erec', p. 291; Peter Wapnewski, Hartmann von Aue, p. 57; H.-C. Graf von Nayhauss-Cormons-Holub, 'Die Bedeutung und Funktion der Kampfszenen fur den Abenteuerweg der Helden im Erec und 
Iwein Hartmanns von Aue', p. 109; Helmut de Boor, p. 72; Ruh, p. 136; and J. Schwietering, 'Zur Autorschaft von Seuses Vita', p. 119.
309. Jones, 'Changing Tack', pp. 239-41.
310. Schulze, 'Âmîs unde man', p. 39.
311. Jackson, pp. 129f.
312. Hohler, 'Der Kampf im Garten. Studien zur Brandigan- Episode in Hartmanns Erec', p. 380.
313. Clark, Landscapes of Mind, pp. 84f., however, considers that Guivreiz demonstrates a lack of perception in this reluctance to communicate.
314. Schulze, 'Âmîs unde man', p. 42.
315. Similar motifs are to be found in Hartmann's Iwein in the promise of Laudine to Iwein (Iw 2913-23), and of Arthur to Meljaganz (Iw 4536-46).
316. Mabonagrin's lady and the count 'Galoain' are significant as noble figures who remain nameless. Both characters have dubious motives and are defeated in their selfish aims. Unlike Cringles, however, they live to make possible amends. Their namelessness therefore implies that defeat will force them to recreate their identities as more noble characters.
317. The prologue is missing in MSS. A, B, and E, and appears in G, J, and K. See H. Paul (ed.), Gregorius, pp. VII-XIV.
318. For example, Christoph Cormeau in Cormeau/Stormer, pp. 129f.; Wolfgang Dittmann, Hartmanns Gregorius. Unter- 
suchungen zur Oberlieferung, zum Aufbau und Gehalt, pp. 197- 9.
319. Volker Mertens, Gregorius Eremita. Eine Lebensform des 
Adels bei Hartmann von Aue in ihrer Problematik und ihrer 
Wandlung in der Rezeption, p. 80.
320. Cormeau/Stôrmer, p. 128.
339
321. For a discussion of the prologue in Gregorius functioning as a rhetorical or autobiographical device, see Julius Schwietering, 'The Origins of the Medieval Humility Formula', p. 1288; Mertens, pp. 76-83; Walter Haug, 
Literaturtheorie im deutschen Mittelalter. Von den Anfangen 
bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts. Eine Einfiihrung, chap. 8.
322. David Duckworth, Gregorius. A Medieval Man's Discovery 
of his True Self, p. 384, comments on the wide theological implications which this term carries, which he argues are not appropriate to this work. However, he notes that the term is nevertheless indispensable to Gregorius scholarship.
323. Cormeau/Stormer, p. 128; Hildegard Nobel, 'Schuld und Sühne in Hartmanns Gregorius und in der frtihscholastischen Theologie', pp. 57-61, points to Hrabanus Maurus, Peter Lombard, and Bernard of Clairvaux.
324. Gabriele Schieb, 'Schuld und Sühne in Hartmanns Gregorius', p. 53. See also above. Chapter 2.
325. Hans-Jorg Spitz, 'Zwischen Furcht und Hoffnung. Zum Samar itergleichnis in Hartmanns von Aue Gregorius--Prolog', p. 174.
326. Mertens, p. 90. W. Ohly, 'Die heilsgeschichtliche Struktur der Epen Hartmanns von Aue', pp. 19f., also points to Hugh of St Victor's Allegoriae, IV, 12, and Peter Lombard's Liber quattuor sententiarum, II, 22, 707, for the utilization of the same parable in their works.
327. Anton Schonbach, Über Hartmann von Aue. Drei Bûcher 
Untersuchungen, pp. 121-5, lists the references as follows: Origen PL 26, 316ff.; Augustine PL 35, 1340f.; Ambrose PL 65, 931f.; Bede PL 92, 468ff.
328. Frank Tobin, 'Gregorius' and 'Der arme Heinrich'. 
Hartmann's Dualistic and Gradualistic Views of Reality, pp. 19-23.
329. St Augustine, The City of God, XIV, 13.
330. St Augustine, The City of God, XIII, 13.
331. St Augustine, The City of God, XIV, 16.
332. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, I, 7, 27.
333. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis. I, 6, 26.
334. Luscombe, School of Peter Abelard, p. 151, p. 227 and often.
335. Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux Xlle et Xllle 
siècles, vol. Ill, part 2/1, pp. 23-5.
340
336. Lottin, vol. Ill, part 2/1, p. 12.
337. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, I, 8, 3.
338. In Friedrich Neumann (ed.), Hartmann von Aue, 
'Gregorius der gute Sunder', this element is emphasized by the repetition of the term 'sinne' in line 108 ('sus liezen si in sinne bloz').
339. Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen, 'Die allegorischen kleit im Gregorius-Prolog', p. 206, note 33. In contrast. Spitz, pp. 178-81, by drawing on the works of Bruno of Segni, Caesarius of Arles, and the Rhitmus pape Leonis IX, sees a parallel interpretation of this parable in exegesis which denotes the loss of the garments as the loss of virtue. Once again. Die 
Klage provides evidence to suggest that Spitz's concern with virtue and Bennholdt-Thomsen's concern with rationality are in effect the same, as the achievement of virtue is connected with the process of reasoning. Spitz himself points to this close link by stating that kleit is synonymous with sinne on a literal level, but also with 
tugende on a spiritual level (pp. 181f.).
340. Mertens, p. 170. Mertens, pp. 168-171, concludes with justification that the sinner loses his habitual grace and is therefore reliant on God to supply him with actual grace. However, Mertens associates with this loss the similar disappearance of all the higher potencies of the soul including reason.
341. F. Neumann, note to line 103.
342. Herbert Kolb, 'Der wuocher der riuwe. Studien zu Hartmanns Gregorius', p. 53.
343. Anke Bennholdt-Thomsen, pp. 203-8. An overview of interpretations of this issue is provided by Duckworth, pp. 397-403.
344. 'Semivivum reliquerunt, quia beatudinem vitae immortalitatis exuere, sed non sensum rationis abolere valuerunt. Ex qua enim parte sapere et cognoscere Deum potest, vivus est homo'. Bede, In Lucae Evangelium 
expositio, PL 92, 468f., quoted in Duckworth, p. 400, who proceeds to cite such twelfth-century masters as Peter Lombard and Hugh of St Victor whose works reveal the influence of Bede regarding this point (pp. 400-2).
345. Spitz, pp. 184f., sees no tradition of these elements in the exegesis concerned with this parable. He concludes that Hartmann himself connects the clothes of hope and fear with the dangers of presumption and despair. Nobel, p. 48, notes that Schonbach ungenerously concludes that this addition was the result of a misunderstanding on Hartmann's part.
341
346. Friedrich Ohly, 'Desperatio und Praesumptio. Zur theologischen Verzweiflung und Vermessenheit', pp. 526f., notes that Hartmann is here drawing on a common link made in medieval theology between presumption and despair, on the one hand, and fear and hope, on the other. He cites Gaufredus Babion of Angers as saying 'Spes sine timore praesumptio est; timor sine spe desperatio est' (Sermones de 
tempore, I, PL 171, 346 B). See also Duckworth, pp. 387f., and Spitz, p. 184.
347. Bennholdt-Thomsen, pp. 200-4, attributes these pieces of clothing to the influence of the parable of the Prodigal Son in which the father bestows the prima stola signifying forgiveness upon his remorseful son (Luke 15, 20-2). Through the image of the stolen and presented clothes, Hartmann is thus combining the parables of the Good Samaritan with the Prodigal Son, which prompts Bennholdt-Thomsen (p. 203) to deduce that Hartmann is reflecting Bede's teaching. However, she also notes that whereas Bede does not differentiate between the two sets of clothes, calling both immortalitas and innocentia, Hartmann adapts his interpretation to highlight the role of reflection in the remission of sins by referring to the first set of clothes as 'siner sinne kleit' and the second as 'gedinge unde vorhte' (p. 204).
348. Although geistllche triuwe is a difficult term to translate accurately, its association here with riuwe suggests that Hartmann is subscribing to contemporary penitential thought which would denote this component of penance as the intent to undertake confession and satisfaction and the determination to improve. See Nobel, pp. 50-2.
349. Adjectives used with triuwe i 'ware'- Gr 76; 'geistllche'- Gr 125, 3338; 'guote'- Gr 321; 'grôze'- Gr2255, 3669. Adjectives used with riuwe: 'ware'- Gr 897,2701; 'herzeliche'- Gr 2705, 2491; 'groze'- Gr 226, 3337; 'ganze'- Gr 3670; also adverb 'von herzen'- Gr 49. Triuwe and riuwe combinations: Gr 75f., 125f., 2255f., 3337f,,3669f.
350. Kolb, pp. 12-16. Schroder, 'Zum Wortgebrauch von 
riuwe', pp. 229-234, also discusses this term but without referring to the attributes employed. He concludes that 
Gregorius is the only one of Hartmann's narratives to use this term to indicate the concept of contrition as Christian repentance. Otherwise, he claims, this term, even in Wolfram's Parzival, only suggests a deep suffering in the soul. There seems little reason to make such a sweeping distinction between the narratives in this way. The use of this term with reference to Iders in Erec, for example, appears also to imply the notion of Christian repentance in a secular context.
342
351. One might emphasize the impact of Hartmann's extension of the French prologue far more than Brigitte Herlem-Prey,'Schuld Oder nicht Schuld, das ist oft die Frage. Kritisches zur Diskussion der Schuld in Hartmanns Gregorius und in der 
Vie du Pape Saint Grégoire', pp. 11-13.
352. Contrast Cormeau, Hartmanns von Aue 'Armer Heinrich' 
und 'Gregorius'. Studien zur Interpretation mit dem Blick 
auf die Theologie zur Zeit Hartmanns, p. 50, who claims that the themes of the prologue are not intended to be applied to jthis scene, which merely fills in the background of jGregorius' life history. Brian Murdoch, 'Hartmann's Î
Gregorius and the Quest of Life', however, draws this jparallel between Gregorius' parents and Adam and Eve. Both 1parties are 'of one flesh', inexperienced and placed in isituations of great responsibility in which they are Iextremely vulnerable to the Devil's jealousy (pp. 84f.). iMurdoch proceeds to describe how Gregorius displays aspects jof Adam and Christ, and how his experience represents 1humankind's inheritance of original sin and its attempt to jregain paradise. Murdoch thus perceives a link between this Iwork and Adam's penance in the Vita Adae. No mention is jmade, however, of the effect of sin on the intellect, nor of the manner in which Gregorius' experience highlights the necessary response of humankind to their inherited sinfulness.
353. Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis. I, 7, 31.
354. Werner Schwarz, 'Free Will in Hartmann's Gregorius', pp. 134f. In contrast, Oliver Hallich, Poetologisches, 
Theologisches. Studien zum 'Gregorius' Hartmanns von Aue, pp. 62-4, points to terms denoting passivity on the brother's part and concludes that he does not make a free choice here.
355. Fisher, Studies in the Demonic in Selected Middle High 
German Epics, p. 218.
■I
356. Contrast with Cormeau, 'Armer Heinrich' und 
'Gregorius', pp. 50f., who states that the sister's ihesitation should not be seen as an indication that she is Jimplicated in the sin. ]i357. W. Ohly, pp. 23f,; Stephen L. Wailes, 'Hartmann vonAue's Stories of Incest', p. 71; Siegfried Christoph,'Guilt, Shame, Atonement, and Hartmann's Gregorius', p. 210.The narrator's and the brother's references to their honour Ireveal a concern for the full extent of this honour, thereby isuggesting its secular but also its spiritual aspects (Gr j461, 531). These aspects are subsequently re-examined in the debate between Gregorius and the abbot.
358. Cormeau, 'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius', pp. 53f., states that Gregorius' inheritance is the objective consequence of his parents' sin, rather than an aspect of
343
subjective guilt. Cormeau subsequently concludes that this is the reason why Gregorius' parents are so concerned with preserving his worldly honour, because this is the area in which he is most affected by their sin.
359. Elizabeth Archibald, 'Incest in Medieval Literature and Society', pp. 3-11.
360. Christoph, p. 210, states that the adviser has to remind the siblings of the need to repair the damage to their spiritual honour also. Without his advice, they would not have been capable of appreciating this need. The statements of the parents before they seek his advice do, however, indicate their concern on both levels.
361. See Duckworth, pp. 348-50, who claims that the positive comments made by the narrator with regard to the mother's penance should be considered ironical as she is guilty of desiring to maintain her honourable status in secular society, a move which, according to Duckworth, undermines her feelings of repentance.
362. Wailes, p. 71, nevertheless claims that doubt must be cast on the brother's experience of genuine regret. However, the brother's death appears to exemplify Hartmann's concern to portray the relationship of Gregorius' parents as based on real affection, in order, one presumes, to avoid alienating the audience because of the nature of their sin. No comment is made concerning the brother's feelings of regret, because they are not at issue here. Instead, this aspect is focused upon in the sister's reaction.
363. This interpretation contrasts with Duckworth's claim that the mother's penance is based on weak foundations which crumble as soon as she is attracted to Gregorius (pp. 350- 61). In supporting his interpretation, Duckworth disregards 
ware riuwe as a statement of true regret (p. 50).
364. W.J. McCann, 'Gregorius's Interview with the Abbot: A Comparative Study', p. 88.
365. Hans Schottmann, 'Gregorius und Grégoire', pp. 382-4; McCann, p. 89.
366. Kolb, pp. 33-42; Nobel, pp. 74-6; Wapnewski, Hartmann 
von Aue, pp. 98-100; Duckworth, pp. 147-56; Grosse, 'wis den wisen', pp. 58f.; H.B. Willson, 'Weiteres zur Schuldfrage im 
Gregorius Hartmanns von Aue', pp. 38-42.
367. See, for example, W. Ohly, pp. 28-30; Christoph, pp. 211-13; Jackson, pp. 152f.; Gunther Zuntz, 'Odipus und Gregorius: Tragédie und Legende', p. 95; Cormeau/Stôrmer, pp. 119f.; Fisher, Demonic, p. 201; Dittmann, pp. 226f.; Wenzel, 'Der Gregorius Hartmanns von Aue. Überlegungen zur zeitgenossischen Rezeption des Werkes', pp. 351f.; also Schieb, pp. 56f., who does not consider Gregorius to be at
344
fault in wanting to be a knight, but does consider him guilty of arrogance in his disregard of his mother's request for him to do penance for his parents.
368. Hans Seigfried, 'Der Schuldbegriff im Gregorius und im 
Armen Heinrich Hartmanns von Aue', p. 167.
369. Jackson, pp. 153-8. Jackson also refers to the fact that in the French version of this work, the abbot condemns knighthood and is not contradicted by Grégoire. Such condemnation is also present in other works of German literature of this period (Heinrich von Melk's Erinnerung an 
den Tod, Heinrich von Veldeke's Servatius). Hartmann's failure to add his own voice to this condemnation is therefore all the more remarkable (pp. 151f.).
370. Kolb, pp. 34f., maintains that this concept creates an air of ambiguity in terms of Gregorius' responsibility for his sin of pride (as Kolb sees it) in leaving the monastery. An instinctive choice suggests that no conscious decision to leave has been made.
371. K. Dieter Goebel, Untersuchungen zu Aufbau und 
Schuldproblem in Hartmanns 'Gregorius', pp. 52-65, argues that it was only at the end of the twelfth century that the rule concerning oblation began to be less rigorously enforced. At the time Gregorius was being composed, the issue would therefore have been unclear. However, Goebel further maintains that the abbot's argument is not based on legal obligation, but rather on Gregorius' spiritual obligation to remain in the monastery.
372. W. Ohly, p. 30. In contrast, Kolb, p. 41, and Willson, p. 37, maintain that God's direction of the casket implies just such an obligation.
373. In contrast, see Nobel, pp. 74-6? Duckworth, p. 146, pp. 170f. As a result, the debate between the abbot and Gregorius does not fall exactly into the pattern of wise adviser and inexperienced youth which Grosse, pp. 52-9, observes in Gregorius and Parzival,
374. W. Ohly, p. 30.
375. Jackson, p. 159.
376. McCann, pp. 92-4? Jackson, p. 162.
377. W. Ohly and Cormeau do not mention this aspect; Dahlgrün, p. 170; Seigfried, pp. 181f.; Kolb, p. 35, note 58; Dittmann, p. 225, note 50, do not consider these terms to be negative; VoB, pp. 66f., claims that these terms lose their negative content when compared with earlier descriptions of Gregorius' goodness and self-control.
345
378. McCann, p. 85, In contrast, Hallich, pp. 113-7, looks at terms suggesting that Gregorius feels not only a desire but also a compulsion to leave the monastery. Hallich then concludes that this combination of elements implies the portrayal of predestination in which free will plays its part. Gregorius' departure from the monastery is therefore part of God's plan.
379. Schottmann, pp. 383f.; Tobin, Dualistic and 
Gradualistic, p. 45; Duckworth, p. 146, p. 159; H. Gro&, pp. 60f.
380. Ingrid Hahn, 'Hartmanns Büchlein-Zitat im Gregorius', pp. 104f., does not give this element from Die Klage enough credit when she claims that Gregorius surpasses Hartmann's previous narratives by depicting the manner in which grace is only bestowed by God.
381. Jackson, p. 166; Mertens, pp. 94f.
382. Schottmann, p. 397.
383. Clark, Landscapes of Mind, pp. 94f., maintains that the information on the tablet is incomplete, thereby reflecting the difficulty of passing on knowledge from one generation to the next. However, the tablet contains all the information a person can ever hope to receive about his or her origins, both spiritual and secular. It is the response to that information and its acknowledgement which Hartmann is emphasizing in this work.
384. Wenzel, 'Der Gregorius', pp. 335f. Wenzel, however, proceeds to conclude that Gregorius is mistaken in leaving the monastery where he has been brought by God to do penance for his parents (pp. 344-7).
385. Schieb, p. 57 and Nobel, pp. 76f., do not agree, and instead claim that Gregorius is displaying pride in following his free will after the tablet has ostensibly removed any alternative to his remaining in the monastery to do penance.
386. Schottmann, p. 384.
387. Compare Duckworth, pp. 149f., pp. 163f., who maintains that Gregorius completely rejects the information about his spiritual inheritance and seeks only to establish himself as a knight.
388. W. Ohly, p. 30.
389. Tobin, 'Fallen Man and Hartmann's Gregorius', p. 93.
390. Fisher, 'Paradox', p. 2.
346
391. Kalinke, 'Hartmann's Gregorius: A Lesson in the Inscrutability of God's Will', p. 491.
392. Fisher, 'Paradox', p. 13.
393. Wiehl, pp. 79f., suggests that the relatively few monologues in this narrative indicate that Hartmann is not interested in depicting a subjective level in a work influenced by the legend genre. However, it could be argued that monologues, though important in themselves, are not the only means Hartmann uses to investigate the inner lives of the characters. The addition of this particular monologue is of particular import, however, in terms of revealing Hartmann's support for the pursuit of secular honour,
394. Hallich does not take note of these elements of desire and concludes that the mother is unable to recognize the cloth because of her own inherited ignorance (pp. 92-4).
395. In contrast, Goebel, pp. 66-85, argues that the mother, like Dido, commits a sin by abandoning her penance in order to marry Gregorius. Seigfried, p. 181, comments that Gregorius' arrival may have been considered by the mother as a sign that her penance is complete, just as the fish provides a sign for Gregorius on the rock. This suggestion is valid in so far as it supports the notion that the mother's penance itself is valid. However, there is no specific evidence to support this interpretation in the text.
396. W. Ohly, p. 32.
397. See, for example, VoB, p. 71; Fisher, Demonic, p. 202.
398. Cormeau, 'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius', pp. 64f.
399. W. Ohly, p. 31.
400. Duckworth, pp. 187f.
401. W. Ohly, p. 31.
402. This is particularly so in the report and observations of the maid (Gr 2308, 2322, 2343, 2396, 2401, 2403, 2423, 2455).
403. Haas, pp. 268f., and Lottin, vol. 3, part 2/1, pp. 14f., cite the works of Stephen Langton with regard to this theory.
404. Tobin, Dualistic and Gradualistic, p. 51.
405. Tobin, Dualistic and Gradualistic, p. 73.
347
406. Dittmann, pp. 240-3; Cormeau, 'Armer Heinrich' und 
'Gregorius', p. 70. See also Mertens, pp. 69f.; Zuntz, p.93.
407. Cormeau, 'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius', pp. 77ff. Herlem-Prey, pp. 19-22, similarly claims that Hartmann does not consider the ignorance surrounding the second incest to be exculpatory, because he states unequivocally that the incest is a sin. Herlem-Prey then concludes that Hartmann's approach is the result of his close reflection of the early eleventh-century ideas inherent in the French version, which do not distinguish between objective and subjective guilt.See also VoB, pp. 81f., who claims that the main theological opinion at the end of the twelfth century was to regard all sins committed in ignorance as culpable because they are all imbued with a modicum of subjective guilt as a result of original sin. i
408. Nobel, pp. 73f. j
Î409. Wapnewski, 'Der Gregorius', pp. 236f. |
410. Wapnewski, 'Der Gregorius', pp. 240-4. A further !interpretation is offered by Hallich, pp. llOf., who claims jthat Gregorius is indeed subjectively innocent of the second |incest, but that he still incurs objective guilt from the |perpetration of the crime. In this, Hallich sees Hartmann as 4combining two opposing theological viewpoints. 1
I411. Mertens, pp. 67-9 and often; Goebel, pp. 118-20. See jalso Dahlgrün, pp. 171f. I
412. Alan of Lille, Liber poenitentialis, I, 37. See Kolb, p. 28. Hallich, pp. 109f., rightly criticizes Kolb for pointing to Gregorius' failure to press his mother's vassals for more information on arriving in her land as evidence of vincible ignorance. However, Hallich does not look at other pieces of more substantial evidence for this phenomenon in the text.
413. Summa Gallicana-Bambergensis. See Kolb, p. 31.
414. Such a claim is rejected by Nobel, p. 62. However, W.Ohly, p. 31, note 52, claims that præsumptio is not only a form of obstinacy, but also a sin of carelessness and lassitude.
415. Ruberg, pp. 163f.
416. However, the fact that they do not actually fall into despair does not indicate, as Dittmann maintains, that this concept is not a major theme of this work. Dittmann, pp.235f.
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417. Christoph, pp. 214-21, interprets Gregorius' entire reaction and decision to go into the wilderness as based on secular shame and a belief in the implacability of God, rather than an insight into his guilt. Thus, Gregorius does penance, but without a clear notion of his guilt. His excessive penance is therefore to be understood as a reaction to secular shame from which he cannot escape. His reluctance to re-enter the world as pope is likewise evidence of this shame. Christoph further maintains that an appreciation of guilt alone, rather than shame, would have caused Gregorius to realize that forgiveness was attainable and that such excessive penance was unnecessary. However, as God cannot alleviate secular infamy, Gregorius is forced to suffer in this way.
418. Zuntz, pp. 97f.
419. Cormeau, 'Armer Heinrich' und 'Gregorius', p. 75, denies that Gregorius is guilty of any personal sin in the case of the second incest, and proceeds to claim that such a lack of a personal sin makes Gregorius' avoidance of despair even more remarkable. However, one could postulate that, in view of such a heinous personal sin, Gregorius' avoidance of despair is similarly remarkable.
420. Schwarz, p. 147.
421. See also Nobel, p. 47.
422. Dittmann, pp. 172-6, claims that the absence of confession to priests in this work connects Hartmann more closely with the older form of public penance than the developments in the subjective aspects of penitential practice which arose in the work of late eleventh and twelfth-century scholastic and monastic theologians.
423. Schieb, pp. 61-4. In her study of fourteenth-century Middle English penitential romances, Andrea Hopkins, pp. 196-9, concludes that the penance undertaken by the main protagonists resembles the rite of solemn penance as a unrepeatable, public event, rather than penitential procedure in general. This is due to the fact that the protagonists do not confess to priests or undergo minute self-examination as demanded by confessional manuals but are nevertheless prompted by contrition to make amends for their failings. In Hartmann's works, written some two centuries previously, however, self-examination does indeed take place despite the absence of confession to a priest. The existence of self-examination, contrition and acts of satisfaction imply a closer connection between Hartmann's works and the prescribed approach to general penitential practice than the later works considered by Hopkins.
424. Duckworth, pp. 297-311.
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425. Hrubÿ, 'Hartmann als artifex', p. 260, discusses the fact that both Gregorius and Armer Heinrich demonstrate that God's grace is bestowed but cannot directly be earned, as is stated in Die Klage. Both protagonists only accept that God has blessed them when they see a physical manifestation of his intervention.
426. See also Gr 3897-926.
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